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ABSTRACT 
IMAGE AND VIRTUE IN AMBROSE OF MILAN 
 
Andrew M. Harmon, B.A, M.Div., Th.M. 
 
Marquette University, 2017 
 
 
 
This dissertation analyzes Ambrose of Milan’s trinitarian theology and doctrine of 
human action and argues that a visual logic—that works disclose nature—animates both. 
Ambrose’s trinitarian theology, on the one hand, trades in scriptural proofs that 
emphasize the tangible works (opera) of the Son as relevatory of his divinity and 
indicative of his shared, invisible power with the Father. While Ambrose differs from his 
Latin and Greek predecessors, he takes up controverted texts in his Christological 
reflection, many of which are borrowed from anti-monarchian and anti-homoian debates 
in the several generations prior. To show Ambrose’s consonance with the pre- and pro-
Nicenes, I first investigate the common exegetical strands that occupy four Latins: 
Tertullian, Novatian of Rome, Hilary of Poitiers, and Marius Victorinus. In his own 
Christology, Ambrose uses many of the same debated scriptural passages as they did to 
foreground the importance of the Son’s works for revealing his shared divine power with 
the Father. 
However, Ambrose builds upon these exegetical strands, adding unique and 
unprecedented reflection that colors his theological anthropology and subsequent moral 
counsel. In particular, Ambrose adapts the trope of God as Painter, supported by Isaiah 
49:16, when considering the moral significance of the image of God. While such a move 
might appear miniscule, I argue to the contrary. If the God who is known by and operates 
under the auspices of a visual logic paints the human soul, then the correlative action of 
the individual will follow a similar script. This similar script is plain in Ambrose’s 
doctrine of human action. Ambrose’s consistent emphasis on public Christian virtue is 
adapted largely from Roman exhortations to public virtue and married neatly to 
Ambrose’s pro-Nicene Christology. 
While the distinct character of human action is public, the signal content of 
Christian virtue has to do with its simplicity. Simplicity in word and deed not only serves 
as moral ideal, but does the double service of dismissing Ambrose’s most proximate 
doctrinal opponents, the homoians. I conclude that by connecting orthodoxy and virtue, 
Ambrose affords us a noteworthy contribution to fourth-century Christian theology. 
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could not have completed this. When I came home angry or frustrated, she was there. 
When I came home excited about something tiny and esoteric, she listened. Anna 
dutifully, if fitfully, read portions of these chapters, often commenting that her eyes were 
crossing by staring at the Latin footnotes or that I needed to rewrite or, heaven forbid, 
delete something. And all this she did with our daughters, crawling, sprinting, and 
screaming through our too-cozy home. She is a saint, so much more patient and sweet 
and wise than I. This dissertation is for her. 
  
  
 
iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................................ v 
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1 
Plan of the Dissertation ................................................................................................... 8 
CHAPTER ONE: WHAT WE SEE WHEN WE SEE THE SON: PRECEDENTS IN 
LATIN TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY ............................................................................. 11 
Tertullian of Carthage ................................................................................................... 13 
Novatian of Rome ......................................................................................................... 33 
Hilary of Poitiers ........................................................................................................... 44 
Marius Victorinus ......................................................................................................... 52 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 61 
CHAPTER TWO: THE FIGURES OF BODIES AND THE GRACE OF THEIR 
OFFICES: SIGHT AND SEEING IN AMBROSE’S TRINITARIAN POLEMIC ......... 65 
Ambrose on Seeing in spiritu ....................................................................................... 73 
“Whoever Has Seen Me Has Seen the Father”: Seeing the Father in the Son .............. 83 
Divine Visibility, Multiple Powers, and Bodily Unity ................................................. 90 
Unity of Operation and Power .................................................................................... 105 
Conclusions ................................................................................................................. 115 
CHAPTER THREE: “BEHOLD, JERUSALEM, I HAVE PAINTED THY WALLS”: 
GOD AS PAINTER AND SOURCE OF VIRTUE ........................................................ 117 
Bearing Incorporeal Images: Views from Alexandria ................................................ 119 
God as Painter: Ambrose’s Hexaemeron 6.7.42–6.8.49 ............................................. 129 
  
 
iv 
“Drinking from Thy Own Oisterns”: Ambrose and the Dispossession of Virtue ....... 142 
Images, Divine or Otherwise ...................................................................................... 150 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 163 
CHAPTER FOUR: GOD’S VIRTUE AND OURS: IMAGING THE CHARACTER OF 
DIVINE OPERATION ................................................................................................... 166 
What Might “Shines Forth” and “Semblance” Mean for Ambrose? .......................... 169 
Seeing Ourselves Being Seen: Displays of Virtue in the Roman Tradition ............... 182 
Gauging the Spirit Through the Body: Ambrose’s Roman Virtue ............................. 194 
Imaging Divine Operation, or, Smith on the “Unity of the Faculties” in Ambrose ... 206 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 216 
Reading Heresy as Vice: Pro-Nicene Virtue and Its Homoian Deviants .................... 221 
Simplicity in Elegy: Satyrus as an Exemplum of Faith ............................................... 235 
Simplicity as Childlikeness: Imitating the “Beginning” of Virtue ............................. 239 
Semblances of Virtue and Mirrors of Innocence ........................................................ 254 
Conclusions ................................................................................................................. 269 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................... 277 
 
 
  
  
 
v 
ABBREVIATIONS 
 
BA  Bibliothèque augustinienne 
CCSL  Corpus Christianorum, Series latina 
CSEL  Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum 
FOTC  The Fathers of the Church 
GCS  Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller 
HTR Harvard Theological Review 
JECS  Journal of Early Christian Studies 
JTS  Journal of Theological Studies 
LCL  Loeb Classical Library 
PG  Patrologia graeca 
PL  Patrologia latina 
PO Patrologia orientalis 
SC  Sources chrétiennes 
SP  Studia Patristica 
VC  Vigiliae Christianae 
 
Ambrose of Milan (Ambr.) 
 
Abr. De Abraham 
Apol. Dau. De apologia prophetae Dauid 
Aux. Sermo contra Auxentium de basilicis tradendis (Ep. 75a) 
Bon. mort. De bono mortis 
Cain De Cain et Abel 
Ep. Epistulae 
Ep. ext. coll. Epistulae extra collectionem 
Es. Expositio Esaiae prophetae (frag.) 
Exc. De excessu fratris 
Ex. uirg. Exhortatio uirginitatis 
Fid. De fide (ad Gratianum Augustum) 
Fug. De fuga saeculi 
Gest. conc. Aquil. De gestis concilii Aquileiensis 
Hel.  De Helia et ieiunio 
Hex. Hexaemeron 
Hymn. Hymni 
Iac. De Iacob et uita beata 
Incarn. De incarnationis dominicae sacramento 
Inst. De institutione uirginis 
Iob De interpellatione Iob et Dauid 
Ios. De Ioseph 
Is. De Isaac uel anima 
Luc. Expositio euangelii secundum Lucam 
Myst. De mysteriis 
  
 
vi 
Nab. De Nabuthae 
Noe De Noe 
Off. De officiis 
Paen. De paenitentia 
Parad.  De paradiso 
Patr. De patriarchis 
Psal. Explanatio psalmorum XII 
Psal. 118 Expositio psalmi CXVIII 
Sacr. De sacramentis 
Spir. De Spiritu sancto 
Symb. Explanatio symboli 
Tob. De Tobia 
Valent. De obitu Valentiniani 
Vid.  De uiduis 
Virg. De uirginibus 
Virgin. De uiginitate 
 
 
Other Ancient Authors 
 
[Anonymous]  
 
Phgn. Physiognomica 
Rhetor. Her. Rhetorica ad Herennium 
 
Aristotle (Arist.) 
 
An. pr. Analytica priora 
De motu an. De motu animalium 
Hist. an. Historia animalium 
 
Athanasius of Alexandria (Athan.) 
  
Ar. Orationes contra 
Arianos 
Incarn. Oratio de incarnatione 
Verbi 
Syn. De synodis 
 
Augustine of Hippo (Aug.)  
 
Ciu. De ciuitate Dei 
Conf. Confessionum libri XIII 
Ep. Epistulae 
Ep. ad cath.  Epistula ad catholicos 
  
 
vii 
Gen. imp. De Genesi ad litteram 
imperfectus liber 
Grat. Chr. De gratia Christi 
Iul. Contra Iulianum 
Nup. De nuptiis et 
concupiscentia 
Pelag. Contra duas epistulas 
Pelagianorum 
Serm. Sermones 
 
Aulus Gellius (Gell.) 
 
NA Noctes Atticae 
 
Chromatius of Aquileia (Chromat.) 
 
Mat. Tractatus in euangelium 
Matthaei 
 
Cicero (Cic.) 
 
Amic.  De amicitia 
Brut. Brutus 
Nat. D. De natura deorum 
De or. De oratore 
Fin. De finibus 
Off. De officiis 
Orat. Orator ad M. Brutum 
Rep. De republica 
Tusc. Tusculanae disputationes 
 
Cyprian of Carthage (Cypr.) 
 
Hab. uirg. De habitu uirginum 
 
Didymus the Blind (Didy.)  
 
Spir. De Spiritu sancto 
Com. Psal. Commentarii in Psalmos 
 
Dio Chrysotomus (Dio. Chrys.) 
 
Or. Orationes 
  
 Diogenes Laertius (Dio. Laert.) 
  
  
 
viii 
Eucherius of Lyon (Eucher.) 
 
Form. Formulae 
intelligentiae 
Inst. Instructiones ad  
Salonium 
 
Gregory of Elvira (Greg. Illib.) 
  
Fid. Orth. De fide orthodoxa 
Tr. in Cant. Tractatus in Cantica 
canticorum 
Tract. Orig. Tractatus Origenis  
 
Hilary of Poitiers (Hilar.) 
 
Ar. Liber contra Arianos  
Psal. Tractatus super Psalmos 
Syn. De synodis 
Trin. De trinitate 
 
Irenaeus Lyon (Iren.) 
 
Haer. Aduersus haereses 
 
Jerome (Hier.)  
 
Adu. Pelag. Aduersus Pelagianos 
dialogi III 
Ep. Epistulae 
Is. Commentariorum in 
Isaiam 
Vir. ill. De uiris illustribus  
 
Lactantius (Lact.) 
 
Inst. Diuinarum institutionum  
libri VII 
Ir. De ira Dei 
 
Livy (Livy.)  
 
Ab urb. con.   Ab urbe condita 
  
 
ix 
 
 
Lucan (Luc.) 
 
Demon. Demonax 
Icar. Icaromenippus 
 
Lucretius (Lucr.) 
 
Marius Victorius (Mar. Vict.) 
 
Ar. Aduersus Arium 
Cand. Ad Candidum Arrianum 
Homoous. De ὁμοουσίῳ recipiendo 
 
Novatian (Novatian.) 
  
Trin. De trinitate 
  
Origen (Orig.)  
 
C. Cels. Contra Celsum 
Com. Ion. Commentaria in 
Euangelium Ioannis 
Com. Rom. Commentaria in 
Epistolam ad Romanos 
Hom. Gen. Homiliae in Genesim 
Hom. Num. Homiliae in Numeros 
Hom. Luc. Homiliae in Lucam 
Hom. Psal. Homiliae in Psalmos  
Prin. De principiis 
 
Ovid (Ov.) 
 
Amor. Ars amoris 
Met. Metamorphoses 
Tr. Tristia 
 
Paulinus of Nola (P.-Nol.) 
 
Carm. Carmina 
Ep.  Epistulae 
 
Petronius (Petron.) 
 
Sat. Satyricon 
  
 
x 
 
Philo of Alexandria (Philo) 
 
Det. Quod deterius potiori 
insidari soleat 
Opif. De opificio mundi 
Her. Quis rerum divinarum 
heres sit 
Leg. Legum allegoriae 
Migr. De migratione Abrahami 
Plant. De plantione 
Prob. Quod omnis probus liber 
sit 
 
Phoebadius of Agen (Phoeb.)  
 
Ar. Liber contra arrianos 
 
Plato (Pl.) 
 
Cra. Cratylus 
Phlb. Philebus 
Prm. Parmenides 
Resp. Respublica 
Soph. Sophista 
 
Pliny the Elder (Plin.) 
 
HN Naturalis historia 
 
Pliny the Younger (Plin.) 
 
Pan. Panegyricus 
 
Prudentius (Prud.) 
 
Ham. Hamartigeneia 
 
Pseudo-Tertullian (Ps.-Tert.) 
 
Marc. Carmen aduersus 
Marcionitas 
 
Quintilian (Quint.) 
 
Inst. Institutio oratoria 
  
 
xi 
 
Sallust (Sall.) 
 
Iug. Bellum Iugurthinum 
 
Seneca the Younger (Sen.) 
 
Cons. hel. De consolation ad 
Helviam 
Ep. Epistulae 
 
Silius Italicus (Sil.) 
 
Pun. Punica 
 
Sulpicius Severus (Supl. Sev.) 
 
Chron. Chronicorum libri duo 
 
Tacitus (Tac.) 
 
Ann. Annales 
 
Tertullian (Tert.) 
 
An. De anima 
Cult. fem. De cultu feminarum 
Herm. 
Iud. 
Aduersus Hermogenem 
Aduersus Iudaeos 
Marc. Aduersus Marcionem 
Prax. Aduersus Praxean 
Res. De resurrectione carnis 
Scorp. Scorpiace 
 
Valerius Maximus (Val. Max.) 
 
Fact. ac dict. Factorum ac dictorum 
libri IX 
 
Virgil (Verg.) 
 
Aen. Aeneid 
 
Xenophon (Xen.) 
 
Oec. Oeconomicus 
  
 
 
 
Well, if you want to say at least some true things about a man’s intentions, you 
will have a strong chance of success if you mention what he actually did or is 
doing.  
–G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention §4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Two of far nobler shape erect and tall, 
Godlike erect, with native honour clad 
In naked majesty seemed lords of all 
And worthy seemed, for in their looks divine 
The image of their glorious Maker shone, 
Truth, Wisdom, Sanctitude severe and pure, 
Severe, but in true filial freedom placed. 
 –John Milton, Paradise Lost 4:288–94  
 
 
 
 
  
 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
“For Jesus is seen not with the eyes of the body, but with the eyes of the spirit.”1 
 
The Basilica di Sant’Ambrogio, one of the three Ambrose commissioned during 
his episcopacy, is located just outside Milan’s ancient walls. Its towering glory consists 
of two-story windows, ornate frescoes, and thick arches and is matched by an impressive 
collection of relics within and its location—atop a martyrs’ cemetery. However, 
Sant’Ambrogio’s remarkable features hide a hurried foundation. Uneven riverbed stones, 
piled on and cemented alongside broken bricks and tiles—lain with seemingly little 
rhyme or reason—hold up the structure. Contrast this foundation with that of Milan’s 
“New Cathedral” (later dedicated to Saint Thecla), comprised of well-ordered pebbles—
carefully placed and replaced—and the difference is glaring. The Basilica di 
Sant’Ambrogio, erected some three decades after the New Cathedral, reveals a rushed 
project timeline and a new generation’s building techniques, forced to adapt to financial 
demand, custom, and function.2   
The subject of this dissertation is the relationship of the visible to the invisible for 
Ambrose. I sketch the general contours of the Sant’Ambrogio because they give us 
insight into the man whose name the Basilica bears. Ambrose was a notable politician 
turned bishop, a governor turned scriptural exegete and champion of Nicene orthodoxy. 
He was educated in the typical Roman fashion with other budding Latin elites, yet his 
                                                
1 Ambr. Luc. 1.5 (CSEL 32/4: 13). Translations are my own unless indicated otherwise. Footnotes 
too are working and not intended to be exhaustive, so as not to tire the reader.  
2 Richard Krautheimer, Three Christian Capitals: Topography and Politics (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1983), 68–92, at 72–78. 
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facility with Greek texts outshined even his most famous baptizand, Augustine of Hippo.3 
Add to this that he was, as he puts it, “snatched” from his public administrations, quickly 
baptized, ordained, and “universally” acclaimed to the episcopacy, and Sant’Ambrogio’s 
mottled foundation becomes an even more apt parallel.4 
This dissertation will reconsider the ways in which Ambrose’s theology, 
buttressed by classical sources,5 holds together by means of a visual logic.6 Ambrose’s 
                                                
3 That Ambrose was fluent in Greek has become a scholarly commonplace. For an exception to 
this claim, see S. Giet, “De saint Basile à saint Ambroise,” Recherches des sciences religieuses 33 (1944): 
95–128. 
4 Ambr. Off. 1.1.4 (CCSL 15: 2). Ego enim raptus de tribunalibus atque administrationis infulis ad 
sacerdotium, docere uos coepi quod ipse non didici. Itaque factus est ut prius docere inciperem quam 
discere. Discendum igitur mihi simul et docendum est quoniam non uacauit ante discere. See Neil 
McLynn, Ambrose of Milan: Church and Court in a Christian Capital (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1994), 14–15. McLynn reads Rufinus’ account of Ambrose’s rapid ascendency to bishop as a 
“charade,” put together either by Ambrose or his political authorities. 
5 Ambrose’s facility with various philosophical texts, whether direct or mediated, will raise the 
inevitable question of just how much philosophical weight his statements bear. This question has been an 
open one in secondary scholarship since (at least) the mid-twentieth century, evidenced by a glut of works 
on Ambrose and Augustine. A few representative examples include: Pierre Hadot, “Platon et Plotin dans 
trois sermons de saint Ambroise,” Revue des études latines 34 (1956): 220–39; Pierre Courcelle, “Plotin et 
saint Ambroise,” Revue de philologie, de littérature, et d’histoire anciennes 76 (1950): 29–56; idem, 
“Nouveaux aspects du platonisme chez saint Ambroise,” Revue des études latines 34 (1956): 220–39; idem, 
Recherches sur les Confessions de Saint Augustin (Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1973); Goulven Madec, 
Saint Ambroise et la philosophie (Paris: Etudes augustiniennes, 1974); idem, “L’Homme intérieur selon 
saint Ambroise,” in Ambroise de Milan: XVIe centenaire de son élection épiscopale, ed. Yves-Marie Duval 
(Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1974), 283–308; Andrew Lenox-Conyngham, “Ambrose and Philosophy,” in 
Lionel R. Wickham and Caroline P. Bammel, eds., Christian Faith and Greek Philosophy in Late Antiquity. 
Essays in Tribute to George Christopher Stead (Leiden: Brill, 1993), 112–28; John C. Cavadini, “Ambrose 
and Augustine De bono mortis,” in The Limits of Ancient Christanity: Essays on Late Antique Thought and 
Culture in Honor of R. A. Markus, ed. William E. Klingshirn and Mark Vessey (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1999), 232–49. Though these (and other) studies come to a variety of conclusions, their 
insights point to the fact that Ambrose’s approach to philosophical sources is complicated, both similar and 
dissimilar from the founts of pagan wisdom in general and Platonic sources in particular. 
6 With precious few exceptions and unsurprisingly, the explorations of early Christians’ distinctly 
theological motivations in foregrounding the importance of sight and visibility have been largely relegated 
to Augustine. See, e.g., Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian 
Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), at 309–12; idem, Augustine and the Trinity 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 230–50; Michel R. Barnes, “The Visible Christ and the 
Invisible Trinity: Mt. 5:8 in Augustine’s Trinitarian Theology of 400,” Modern Theology 19.3 (2003): 329–
55; Matthew Drever, Image, Identity, and the Forming of the Augustinian Soul (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), 85–109; Margaret Miles, “Vision: The Eye of the Body and the Eye of the Mind in Saint 
Augustine’s ‘De Trinitate’ and ‘Confessions,’” The Journal of Religion 63.2 (1983): 125–42; Mary 
Sirridge, “‘Quam videndo intus dicimus’: Seeing and Saying in De Trinitate XV,” in Medieval Analyses in 
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Exposition of the Gospel of Luke 1.5–1.9 will function as our organizing passage 
throughout. There we find Ambrose linking the enacted character of divine action and its 
human counterpart. Such reflection is sheltered under an explication of Luke 1:2 
(“Accordingly, as they have delivered them unto us, who from the beginning were 
eyewitnesses and ministers of the Word.”).7 Though the gospel writer appears concerned 
with the seeming reliability of the narrative to follow, Ambrose shows little interest in 
discussing issues of reliability. He instead focuses on the two predicated sources of the 
                                                                                                                                            
Language and Cognition: Acts of the Symposium of The Copenhagen School of Medieval Philosophy, 
January 10–13, 1996, ed. Sten Ebbesen and Russell L. Friedman (Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzels Forlag, 
1999), 317–30; Roland Teske, S.J., “St. Augustine and the Vision of God,” in Augustine: Mystic and 
Mystagogue, ed. Frederick Van Fleteren et al (New York: Peter Lang, 1994), 287–308. A couple recent 
treatments help broaden the importance of sight and visibility outside of simply Augustine. See Michel 
René Barnes, “Latin Trinitarian Theology,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Trinity, ed. Peter C. Phan 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 70–84; idem, “A Night at the OPERA: That the Father is 
Seen in the Son,” unpublished monograph chapter; and Brian P. Dunkle, Enchantment and Creed in the 
Hymns of Ambrose of Milan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 60–84, at 67–69. Other secondary 
treatments deal with early Christian seeing, and while beneficial, are not distinctly theological. E.g., Susan 
Ashbrook Harvey, “Olfactory Knowing: Signs of Smell in the Lives of Simeon Stylites,” in After 
Bardaisan: Studies on Continuity and Change in Syriac Christianity in Honour of Professor Hans J. W. 
Drijvers, ed. G. J. Reineck and A. C. Klugkist (Leuven: Peeters Press, 1999), 23–34; Georgia Frank, The 
Memory of the Eyes: Pilgrimage to Living Saints in Christian Late Antiquity (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2000); eadem, “The Pilgrim’s Gaze in the Age before Icons,” in Visuality Before and 
Beyond the Renaissance: Seeing as Others Saw, ed. Roberts S. Nelson (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), 98–115; eadem, “‘Taste and See’: The Eucharist and the Eyes of Faith in the Fourth Century,” 
Church History 70 (2001): 619–43; Cynthia Hahn, “Loca Sancta Souvenirs: Sealing the Pilgrim’s 
Experience,” in The Blessings of Pilgrimage, ed. Robert Ousterhout (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
1990), 85–95; and Patricia Cox Miller, “‘The Little Blue Flower Is Red’: Relics and the Poetizing of the 
Body,” JECS 8 (2000): 213–36. 
7 Scholarly engagement with this fruitful passage has been non-existent, with the exception of 
Brian Dunkle’s very recent monograph on Ambrose’s hymns. See Dunkle, Enchantment and Creed in the 
Hymns of Ambrose of Milan, 64. Dunkle references a portion of the passage, highlights the importance of 
the “spiritual senses,” and concludes, “Ambrose affirms that the created order has a certain integrity that 
can function as a means for sensing the divine” (64). Still, Dunkle mentions nothing of the second half of 
Ambrose’s reflection, which emphasizes the visibility of virtue and intention. Ambrose’s quip that “Jesus is 
seen not with the eyes of the body, but with the eyes of the Spirit” [Ambr. Luc. 1.5 (CSEL 32/4: 13)] has a 
distinct afterlife and is in fact critical to developments in Western theology. Augustine picks up on it in his 
Epistles 147 and 148 to Paulina and Fortunatus, respectively, when discussing whether or not God can be 
seen. From the seed of Ambrose’s reflection, Augustine derives a complex, threefold hierarchy of seeing: 
corporeally, spiritually, and intellectually. See esp. Aug. Ep. 147.19.46 (CSEL 44: 320–21) and Aug. Ep. 
148.2.9–10 (CSEL 44: 339–41). The thirteenth-century supplement to Thomas Aquinas’ Summa theologiae 
also references Ambrose’s phrase when responding to whether or not the blessed will one day see God with 
the eyes of the body. Ambrose’s statement is further used as authoritative support for the Supplement’s 
distinction between seeing directly and indirectly. See ST III suppl. 92, a. 2. 
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narrative’s assumed reliability—(1) eyewitnesses and (2) ministers of the Word—taking 
each predication in turn. Talk of eyewitnesses pertains to those who saw Jesus, but it also 
triggers within Ambrose’s scriptural imagination a collection of biblical texts debated in 
monarchian and homoian controversies. These texts represent the literary battleground 
for determining the discrete identity of the Son and the nature of the Son’s relationship to 
the Father, respectively. Evidence of Ambrose’s debt to these interpretative traditions, I 
will argue, is clear.  
Dispute and controversy over the Son’s visibility arose with the monarchian 
controversies of the early third century. Tertullian’s Against Praxeas will serve as our 
initial entrance into early monarchian theology and the biblical texts that inform it. The 
follower of Praxeas, Tertullian contends, was guilty of eliding the identity of the Father 
and Son; the Father could be said to simply become the Son. In response, Tertullian 
upholds the distinctive identity of the Son and his connection to the Father. While 
Tertullian applies language of the Son’s “projection” from the Father and tends toward a 
“minoration” of the Son with respect to the Father, he indicates the Son’s substantial 
continuity with the Father.8 Just as a sunbeam allows us to see in the light of the sun, so 
does the Son allow us to glimpse something divine. Still, this sunbeam is a portio that 
moderates the sun’s substance.9 
While several generations separated Tertullian’s anti-monarchian polemic and the 
post-Nicene homoian controversies, similar scriptural texts were disputed in both battles. 
                                                
8 The language of “minoration” is Ernest Evans’. See Ernest Evans, Tertullian’s Treatise against 
Praxeas: The Text Edited, with an Introduction, Translation, and Commentary (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock 
Pub, 2011), 44. For a primary text that admits of this minoration interpretation, see Tert. Prax. 9.2 (CCSL 
2: 1168). 
9 Tert. Prax. 14.3 (CCSL 2: 1176). 
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Phillip’s demand to see the Father (Jn. 14:8–10), for instance, is consistently cited, as is 
Jesus’s statement that he can do nothing apart from the Father (Jn. 5:19). Homoians, 
unlike monarchians, did not question the distinct identity of the Son. That was assumed. 
Homoians questioned the Son’s sharing of substance or power with Father. The true God 
was thought to be invisible, and given that the Son was visible, it made little sense to 
identify the Son as God. This seeming, and substantial, disparity between Father and Son 
was only compounded by the fact that the word “substance” was nowhere to be found in 
the scriptures. 
Anti-homoian polemics, like those we find in Hilary of Poitiers, Marius 
Victorinus, and Ambrose, assumed the mantle of reexegeting the homoians’ supporting 
texts. Though specific to their respective contexts, Hilary, Victorinus, and Ambrose all 
reference the critical importance of the Son’s visible opera for determining the Son’s 
invisible shared divinity and power with the Father. Victorinus uses the Greek term 
ὁμοούσιος for making his case; Hilary and Ambrose do not. It is clear however that each 
of the three is trying to defend the Nicene cause against those who want to drive an 
ontological wedge between the Father and Son based on the latter’s visibility.  
Upon his appointment to the see of Milan by acclamation, Ambrose became a 
dominant personality in a religious-political landscape fraught with debate. Though 
complicated by imperial power and regional politics, this debate was over whether the 
Son was of the same or similar substance as the Father. Ambrose, as we will see, was an 
ardent defender of the former. His predecessor, Auxentius, argued the latter—that the 
Son was of similar, but not of the same, substance as the Father.10 Because of his similar 
                                                
10 For an extensive overview of homoian theology, see Michel Meslin, Les Ariens d’Occident: 
335–430 (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1967), 253–403. On Ambrose’s engagement with homoian theology in 
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proof texts and exegetical strategies, Ambrose’s inclusion in this Latin pro-Nicene 
tradition is straightforward. I will further claim that these traditional Latin debts are 
driven by a visual logic that emphasizes Jesus’s concrete works as sources of insight into 
the invisible nature of the Godhead. While there might be some who quibble with this 
claim, it is admittedly benign. Ambrose’s unprecedented move comes when he connects 
this Christological visual logic with a similar logic pertaining to human action and the 
acquisition of virtue. Such a connection is made, again, with reference to the second 
predicate in Luke 1:2 (“ministers of the Word”). The ministers are those who follow after 
the precepts of Jesus, virtuous in both intentio and actio. The apostles, Mary and Martha, 
and other followers of Jesus depict for us the challenge of having intent and action 
expressed in our deeds. Often, Ambrose insists, human action favors one or the other: 
well intended but not enacted, or too hasty and not thought through.  
Human action follows the same visual script as its divine analogue, revealing 
individuals’ true intentions and theological allegiances. I maintain throughout that this 
parallel construction was no coincidence but an intentional product of Ambrose’s 
combining his theological sources and his typically Roman education. As one formed for 
public service and political readiness, Ambrose filters his patchwork theological sourcing 
through the life of the orator. In so doing, he translates his Latin theological heritage, 
which foregrounds the concrete works of Jesus, into a moral register. What results are 
exhortations to distinctly public virtue: the importance of bodily comportment, voice 
inflection, and gait. These, as we will explore, are critical topics in the works of Cicero, 
                                                                                                                                            
particular, see Christoph Markschies, Ambrosius von Mailand und die Trinitätstheologie: Kirchen- und 
theologiegeschichtliche Studien zu Antiarianismus und Neunizänismus bei Ambrosius und im lateinischen 
Westen (364-381 n.Chr. (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1995), 84–142. 
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Quintilian, and Seneca, among others. Discerning the intricacies of human action, for 
Ambrose, thus offers insight into the moral standing of an individual. 
This bridge Ambrose draws between divine and human action, I argue, is 
operative in his description of the image of God, which is supported by his gloss on 
Isaiah 49:16 (“Behold, Jerusalem, I have painted thy walls,” LXX). Two things follow. 
First, I will show that for Ambrose, Isaiah 49:16 proves that God is the source of virtue. 
Secondly, in Ambrose’s gloss on Isaiah 49:16, he holds that a well-painted soul is one in 
which “the semblance of divine operation shines.”11 With this phrase, I argue that 
Ambrose does not simply intend a claim to the human being’s dignity. Careful study of 
Ambrose’s other uses of “semblance” and “shines” establishes that the semblance of 
divine operation shines in the soul means that the character of human action mirrors its 
divine author. In other words, human action follows the same visual logic as the action of 
its divine artist.  
Discerning the character of human action presses us to say something about the 
content of that action. The last chapter proposes that, for Ambrose, the distinctiveness of 
the saint’s moral action is her simplicity of intention, word, and deed. Ambrose further 
maintains that Jesus is the “beginning” (principium) of virtue, meaning he is both the 
moral standard and starting point of virtue. That Christ can be labeled the principium 
again sends Ambrose looking for other instances of the word in the scriptures. I will note 
that Ambrose’s use of principium comes from a variant of Isaiah 9:6 (“…and the 
principium shall be upon his shoulders”), which Ambrose attaches to the first part of the 
verse (“a child born and son given”). The reference to a child—Ambrose takes it to imply 
                                                
11 Ambr. Hex. 6.7.42 (CSEL 32/1: 233–34). 
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Christ as the Child—indicates the virtue embodied in childlikeness, again reiterating the 
importance of simplicity.  
I argue that Ambrose’s use of a family of words for simplicity—simplicitas, 
integritas, etc.—does the double service of reiterating the concrete and lived character of 
human action, while attaching simplicity to orthodoxy. It is no coincidence then that 
Ambrose resortes to the common trope of calling the homoian position as decidedly un-
simple. Proceedings from the Council of Aquileia will serve as an extended test case. 
Repeatedly, Ambrose lambasts Palladius and Secundianus, labeling them deceptive and 
cagey. Such duplicitous behavior, he thinks, poorly hides their vice and, perhaps more 
importantly, their theological missteps and homoian allegiance. In light of these 
connections, Ambrose’s exhortation to mean what we say is not simply a veiled attempt 
at theatrical rhetoric. How one presents herself in word and deed speaks volumes about 
her interior motivations and theological proclivities. By treating human action as a script, 
Ambrose aligns public virtue and orthodoxy, both components motivated by a visual 
logic that attends to the significance of works for indicators of invisible realities. 
 
Plan of the Dissertation 
The dissertation is organized in five chapters. Chapter One identifies four Latin 
antecedents to Ambrose: Tertullian, Novatian, Hilary of Poitiers, and Marius Victorinus, 
who helped lay the foundation of Western Christology. In each of these authors, I show 
how and for what ends their theology is driven by a visual logic that tries either to argue 
for the Son’s discrete identity or to square the Son’s visibility with the invisibility of the 
true God. Chapter Two reveals Ambrose as a card-carrying member of this Latin 
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theological tradition, highlighting the critical importance of Jesus’ visibility for 
disclosing his own invisible divinity, which he is said to share with the Father. For 
Ambrose, Jesus’ works (opera) prove his divinity; because of them we can see that the 
Son shares a single power with the Father. Hence, the logic works the other way, as well. 
Because the Son and Father share a common, invisible power, when we witness the Son’s 
works, we are actually witnessing the Father working, too. Ambrose describes this divine 
working in several ways, but his most lasting statement argues simply for the unity of 
operations.  
Chapter Three bridges Ambrose’s Christology and his moral theology by way of 
his doctrine of the image of God. If God can be said to operate in accord with such a 
visual logic, then two things can be said about human beings. The first is that Ambrose’s 
description of God as image-painter of human beings, supported by his unprecedented 
use and interpretation of Isaiah 49:16 (“Behold, Jerusalem, I have painted thy walls.”), 
means that God is the source of moral action. Chapter four explicates the second 
implication of Ambrose’s claim that the well-painted soul is one “in which a semblance 
of divine operation shines.”12 This phrase, I argue, implies not only the beauty or inherent 
dignity of the human person, but that human action resembles its divine counterpart. Or, 
to put it more precisely, the same visual logic that governs Ambrose’s considerations of 
divine operations governs his considerations of virtuous human action.  
If chapter four shows how human action resembles its divine counterpart, then 
Chapter Five argues for the distinctive Christian (or pro-Nicene) content of that action. In 
that chapter, I seek to answer the question of what makes Christian virtue different from 
                                                
12 Ambr. Hex. 6.7.42 (CSEL 32/1: 233–34). 
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those who do not accept God’s simplicity, either because they worship many gods or 
because they posit a difference of substance within the Trinity. The chapter begins by 
drawing out Ambrose’s claim of the homoians’ deception and disengenuity in the council 
proceedings from Aquileia, 381 CE. Lest we think such a claim is mere rhetorical 
artifice, I show simplicity as moral ideal and the hallmark of the Christian in Ambrose’s 
two-part funeral oration for his brother, Satyrus. Thus, simplicity marks off distinct 
Christian virtue. The chapter concludes by analyzing Ambrose’s interactions with and 
descriptions of non-Nicenes. These interactions and descriptions serve to upbraid his 
opponents’ deception and duplicity and promote the simple practices and presentation of 
faith and truth. Ambrose depicts non-Nicenes as disingenuous and vicious, while pro-
Nicenes, consistent and simple in their faithful words and deeds, allow their yea to be 
yea. 
 While the chapters that follow aim at theological reconstruction, I take into 
account Ambrose’s public station and pedagogical and rhetorical training, typical of a 
budding, fourth-century Roman elite. Brief glimpses into these avenues of formation 
serve only to emphasize the visual logic operative over the course of Ambrose’s 
bishopric and his writings. The successful Roman proconsul, much like the true orator or 
philosopher, was to practice what he preached, to comport the body, voice, and gait such 
that interior stability was publicized for both his own sake and for the sake of his 
audience. These ideals are not lost on Ambrose, who, though “snatched” from his civic 
duties, transposed those same ideals to his episcopal office and allowed them to inform 
his theology.  
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CHAPTER ONE: WHAT WE SEE WHEN WE SEE THE SON: PRECEDENTS IN 
LATIN TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY 
 
 
 
From its advent, Latin trinitarian theology’s concern for the relationship between 
the Father and Son has been centered on the theme of sight or visibility. Multiple 
scriptural passages, highlighting the critical importance of seeing the Son (or God, in 
general),1 fuel this reflection and rise to prominence within the Latin tradition because of 
their contested status in third-century monarchian controversies2 and fourth-century 
debates between pro-Nicenes and Western homoians.3 Though a century-wide chasm and 
                                                
1 E.g., Isaiah 44:6, 45:5, 45:14; Baruch 3:36–38; John 5:19, 10:30, 14:9–11; Romans 1:20, 9:5; 
Philippians 2:5–7; Colossians 1:15; and Hebrews 1:3, 1 Timothy 1:17, 6:16. See Michel René Barnes, 
“Latin Trinitarian Theology,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Trinity, ed. Peter C. Phan (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 70–84, at 72–73. Barnes notes that “from its beginning Latin theology 
has an emphasis on ‘sight’ in trinitarian theology: our sight of the Son, of the Father in the Son, and the 
Son’s sight of the Father,” and that Tertullian “begins the Latin anti-monarchian emphasis on the 
theophanies as ‘proofs’ for the separate existence of the Father and the Son.” See also Alan F. Segal, “‘Two 
Powers in Heaven’ and Early Christian Trinitarian Thinking,” in The Trinity: An Interdisciplinary 
Symposium on the Trinity, ed. Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall, S.J., and Gerald O’Collins, S.J. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), 73–95. Building on his earlier book, Segal maintains that disputes over 
“two powers” find their origins in Hellenistic Jewish (esp. Philo) and Rabbinic thinkers. There is also an 
emphasis on sight in Greek theology, particularly Origen, but the overlap of the cited scriptural passages 
between Origen and Ambrose is not as great as that between Latin traditions and Ambrose. Hilary, for 
instance, points out that the “Arians” use John 5:19, 10:30, and 14:8–11 for their argumentation. See Hilar. 
Trin. 8.37 (CCSL 62a: 350), 8.48 (CCSL 62a: 360–61), 9.2 (CCSL 62a: 372–73), 10.21 (CCSL 62a: 474–
75), 10.25 (CCSL 62a: 479–81). See also Hanson, The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God, 824–48, 
where he lists debated scriptures in trinitarian controversies, and he notes that John’s gospel was “the major 
battlefield in the New Testament during the Arian controversy” (834); Richard Paul Vaggione, OHC, 
Eunomius of Cyzicus and the Nicene Revolution (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), 383–95; Manlio 
Simonetti, La crisi ariana nel IV secolo (Rome: Institutum patristicum Augustinianum, 1975), 505–10; 
Meslin, Les Ariens d’Occident 335–430, 231–34. 
2 See Simonetti, La crisi ariana nel IV secolo, 3–10, at 8; Adolf von Harnack, History of Dogma 
(New York: Russell & Russell, 1958, 3: 63; Stephen E. Waers, “Monarchianism and Origen’s Early 
Trinitarian Theology” (PhD Dissertation, Marquette University, 2016), passim.  
3 By “pro-Nicene” in this chapter, I am referring generally to those in support of the Nicene 
formula and its key theological pressure points. In the next chapter I write of pro-Nicene theology as a 
technical category, distinguishing it from neo-Nicene theology. That a similar polemic, with similar proof 
texts, could be deployed is no doubt due to certain similarities between monarchianism and Western 
homoianism. See Hanson, The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God, 566–67. Hanson writes: “It was 
certainly an item in the Homoian faith that a doctrine of the Incarnation meant a reduction of divinity. . . . 
Ever since the Second Sirmium Creed of 357 . . . a drastic subordination of the Son to the Father had been 
the keynote of this school of thought. . . . The Sermo Arianorum maintains that the Son is eternally, 
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the epoch-making Council of Nicaea separated these debates, a common canon of 
contested texts lay at the core of each.4 Extended reflection on Phillip’s demand of Jesus 
to see the Father (Jn 14:8–10), for instance, can be found both in Tertullian’s polemic 
against the monarchian Praxeas and in Marius Victorinus’s defense of the 
consubstantiality of the Son and Father against “the Arians”.5  
Commonality, however, should not detract from the debates’ differing goals. 
Anti-monarchians attempted to establish the discrete, divine identity of the Son, while 
anti-homoians, generally unworried with establishing the Son’s identity as such, sought 
to understand how witnessing the visible words and works of the Son grants insight into 
the invisible nature of the Father. This insight into the divine nature is possible, by anti-
homoian lights, because the Father and Son are united in power (or in substance).6 By and 
large, passages from the Gospel of John served as the exegetical battleground upon which 
this fight ensued.7 Four authors are particularly beneficial for our analysis: Tertullian of 
                                                                                                                                            
constitutionally, subordinated to the Father, even after the necessity of doing anything to promote our 
salvation is past.” 
4 See D. H. Williams, “Monarchianism and Photinus of Sirmium as the Persistent Heretical Face 
of the Fourth Century,” HTR 99.2 (2006): 187–206. Williams shows how monarchian and Arian theologies 
were often grouped together as two expressions of a similar heresy. I explore Williams’s analysis later in 
bridging anti-monarchian and anti-homoian polemics. See also R. P. C. Hanson, “The Bible in the Early 
Church,” in The Cambridge History of the Bible, ed. P. R. Ackroyd and P. R. Evans (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1970), 412–53, at 416, 440–48. 
5 John 14:8–10 as well as multiple other scriptural texts will be studied in detail thoughout.  
6 With Barnes, Ayres, and others, I prefer to speak of pro-Nicene theology as a transformation 
(rather than an abrupt change) of its pre-Nicene antecedents. See Michel René Barnes, “De Régnon 
Reconsidered,” Augustinian Studies 26.2 (1995): 51–79; Ayres, Nicaea, 302–4; Matthew Crawford, Cyril 
of Alexandria’s Trinitarian Theology of Scripture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 10–66. See 
also M. R. Barnes, “A Night at the OPERA: That the Father is Seen in the Son,” unpublished monograph 
chapter. Barnes calls anti-monarchianism the “platform logic of Latin trinitarian theology,” and he states 
that “key points of engagement with the monarchians remain basic themes or exegetical nodes in Latin 
trinitarian theology, among which are a concern for the connection between sight and being, and the 
exegesis of John 14:9–10.” 
7 See Maurice F. Wiles, The Spiritual Gospel: The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel in the Early 
Church (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), 112–28. Wiles draws out the exegetical context 
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Carthage, Novatian of Rome, Hilary of Poitiers, and Marius Victorinus.8 These four serve 
as touchstones, and identifying the general contours of their trinitarian theologies will aid 
both in locating Ambrose’s deep Latin debts and in naming his critical advances. 
 
Tertullian of Carthage 
Emphasis on seeing God is prevalent throughout Tertullian’s (ca. 160–240) 
works, unsurprising if we consider Daniélou’s assertion that Tertullian’s theology takes 
the form of “a kind of phenomenology” for seeking to understand the identity of the Son.9 
Writing in North Africa, Tertullian debated the teachings of various opponents. His 
treatise Against Praxeas was penned against a figure likely connected to the Roman 
                                                                                                                                            
of third- and fourth-century christological debates. He writes: “This same characteristic of the Gospel [of 
John] gave rise also to the teaching of Praxeas and Noetus, who identified the divine element in Christ with 
the Father. This challenge could be met in two ways. In the first place, it was necessary to show that the 
Gospel [of John] makes a clear distinction between the persons of the Father and the Son. And secondly, it 
was necessary to give an alternative exegesis of those texts on which Praxeas and Noetus had sought to 
base their case. Both tasks involved a more precise definition of the pattern of Christological interpretation 
demanded by the Fourth Gospel” (117). Hanson notes the importance of Johannine texts in Christological 
debates, as well. See Hanson, “The Bible in the Early Church,” 444–45. 
8 I focus here on precedents in Latin trinitarian theology, rather than Greek, because the scriptural 
consonances between Ambrose and his Latin forbears are more striking than his consonances with Greek 
ones. See Michel René Barnes, Power of God: Dynamis in Gregory Nyssa (Washington, D.C: Catholic 
University of America Press, 2001), 219. I realize the challenge inherent in cloistering off “Latin” from 
“Greek,” especially given recent scholarly advances that tend to frustrate such neat dichotomies. My 
working distinction between Greek and Latin here has nothing to do with freighted theological or 
philosophical assumptions and everything to do with that which is written in either the Greek or Latin 
language. The theme of sight is also prevalent in Greek theology. The scholarly assumption that has been 
shown to be deeply problematic was that the West moved from unity to trinity, while the East moved from 
trinity to unity. See again Michel René Barnes, “De Régnon Reconsidered,” 51–79; and Lewis Ayres, “' 
Remember That You Are Catholic' (serm. 52.2): Augustine on the Unity of the Triune God,” JECS 8.1 
(2000): 39–82, and sources cited therein. 
9 Jean Daniélou, The Origins of Latin Christianity: A History of Early Christian Doctrine before 
the Council of Nicea, vol. 3, trans. David Smith and John Austin Baker (London; Philadelphia: The 
Westminster Press, 1977), 343. For dating and background information, see Johannes Quasten, ed., 
Patrology, Vol. 2: The Ante-Nicene Literature After Irenaeus (Westminster, MD: Christian Classics, 1983), 
246–339, at 284–85 for Against Praxeas.  
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bishop Callistus, and his followers.10 Tertullian only gives us two bits of information 
about this Praxeas: that he traveled from Asia to Rome11 and that, while in Rome, he 
persuaded the bishop against Montanist teachings.12 Praxean theology was known for 
stressing the absolute unity of God, and hence, for making the Father, Son, and Holy 
Spirit “one and the same.”13 Based on Tertullian’s engagement in Against Praxeas, we 
can conclude that the monarchians buttressed such strong claims to unity by highlighting 
                                                
10 Waers, “Monarchianism and Origen’s Early Trinitarian Theology,” 133. Waers notes Hermann 
that Hagemann (Die römische Kirche und ihr Einfluss auf Disciplin und Dogma in den drei ersten 
Jahrhunderten [Freiburg im Breisgau, 1864], 234–57) advances the view that Praxeas was a pseudonym for 
Callistus. See Brent, Hippolytus and the Roman Church, 525–35 and Ronald E. Heine, “The Christology of 
Callistus,” JTS 49 (1998): 56–91, at 58 and 60. See Andrew Brian McGowan, “Tertullian and the 
‘Heretical’ Origins of the ‘Orthodox’ Trinity,” JECS 14.4 (2006): 437–57, at 449–51; Brent, Hippolytus 
and the Roman Church, 525–29. See also Harnack, History of Dogma, 3: 59–61. Harnack argues against 
the scholarly assumption that “Praxeas” was a “nickname . . . that by it [readers] really ought to understand 
Noëtus, Epigonus, or Callistus” (3: 59). Cf. Geoffrey D. Dunn, Tertullian (London; New York: Routledge, 
2004), 24–25. Dunn asserts that “Praxeas . . . may well be a pseudonym for a Roman figure who advocated 
monarchianism (modalism or patripassianism), the doctrine that so insisted on the oneness of God that it 
blurred any distinction between Father, Son, and Spirit because each was just God in a particular guise.” J. 
N. D. Kelly makes a similar point in his Early Christian Doctrines (London: Adam & Charles Black, 
1968), 121. Evans does not argue either way, simply that it has been suggested that Praxeas is a placeholder 
or nickname. See Evans, Tertullian’s Treatise against Praxeas, 10, 184–85. See also Harnack, History of 
Dogma, 3: 52–80. Harnack asserts that “Monarchians of all shades” “represented the conception of the 
Person of Christ founded on the history of salvation, as against one based on the history of his nature” (3: 
62). Harnack labels the opponents of Tertullian, Hippolytus, Origen, and Novatian “modalistic 
monarchians.” He asserts that monarchianism was “for almost a generation the official theory in Rome” (3: 
53) and that “sympathies of the vast majority of the Roman Christians . . . were on the side of the 
Monarchians, even among the clergy only a minority supported Hippolytus” (3: 57). See Quasten, 
Patrology, Vol. 2, 285 where Praxeas is named “a Modalist or Patripassian.” Quasten, Ernest Evans, and 
Timothy Barnes all date Aduersus Praxean to Tertullian’s “Montanist period” (213 CE) because of its 
strident language against those who oppose its tenets. See Evans, Tertullian’s Treatise against Praxeas, 
75–82; Timothy David Barnes, Tertullian: A Historical and Literary Study, reissued with corrections and a 
postscript, 1985 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 326–28. While Tertullian’s career is typically 
divided between pre- and post-Montanist phases, several recent treatments shy away from drawing stark 
lines of distinction and are less inclined to see dramatic changes in Tertullian’s literary output. See, e.g., 
Dunn, Tertullian, 6; and Christine Trevett, Montanism: Gender, Authority and the New Prophecy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 68–69. 
11 Tert. Prax. 1.4 (CCSL 2: 1159). 
12 Tert. Prax. 1.5 (CCSL 2: 1159–60). See Waers, “Monarchianism and Origen’s Early Trinitarian 
Theology,” 132–33. 
13 Tert. Prax. 2.3 (CCSL 2: 1162; trans. Evans, 132): maxime haec quae se existimat meram 
ueritatem possidere, dum unicum deum non alias putat credendum quam si ipsum eundemque et Patrem et 
Filium et Spiritum dicat. 
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scriptures like Isaiah 45:5 (“I am God and there is none beside me.”)14—a position one 
commentator has helpfully called “an exclusive understanding of the unity of God.”15 To 
combat such teaching, Tertullian takes exception to both the form and content of 
monarchian exegesis and reinterprets those same signal texts to conform to what he 
claims is received teaching and to a creedal “rule of faith.” 
Certain monarchians were also known for identifying the body of the Son as the 
true manifestation of the Father,16 a tendency that laid bare debts to Stoic mixture 
theory.17 Quick to label the Godhead (or Father) “spirit” (pneuma), monarchians 
maintained the Son was properly human. Only when the spirit was mixed with the human 
could the human be termed properly divine. This “mixing” of divine and human elements 
was precisely how the Roman monarchian Callistus, for instance, could conclude that the 
Son was united with the Father.18 Regarding this monarchian logic of bodily unity, 
Anthony Briggman writes: “This union of the Father/Spirit with the Son as ‘one God’ 
                                                
14 Tert. Prax. 20.1 (CCSL 2: 1186): Ego Deus et alius praeter me non est. 
15 Waers, “Monarchianism and Origen’s Early Trinitarian Theology,” 139.  
16 See Heine, “Christology of Callistus,” 61–63, 68–71, 75–78. Heine references Hippolytus, 
Refutatio 9.12.16–19, which presents Callistus’ exegesis of John 14:10: “For the Father who was in him 
assumed the flesh and made it God by uniting it with himself, and made it one, so that Father and Son are 
designated one God, and this unity, being a person, cannot be two, and so the Father suffered with the 
Son.” 
17 See Anthony Briggman, “Irenaeus’ Christology of Mixture,” JTS 64.2 (2013): 516–55, at 517–
18. Briggman writes that the “Stoic concern [was] to arrive at a physical theory that explains how the active 
principle (God/pneuma/Logos) and passive principle (matter) relate to each other.” Cf. Katharina Bracht, 
“Product or Foundation? The Relationship between the Doctrine of the Holy Trinity and Christology in 
Hippolytus’ and Tertullian’s Debate with Monarchianism,” Acta Patristica et Byzantina 18 (2007): 14–31, 
at 24. Bracht mentions Tertullian takes up “the stoic theory of the physical unification of bodies . . . not as 
in the case of an alloy, in which both substances are transformed into a new one and take on new 
characteristics, but in the sense of an extensive mixture, when both substances retain their original 
characteristics.” See Paul Mattei, “Angelus ad imaginem? L’anthropologie de Tertullien,” Augustinianum 
41.2 (2001): 291–327, at 299, where Mattei draws out the connection between Tertullian’s image theology 
and how in Christ the image of man “coincides” with the effigy of the Word. 
18 Briggman, “Irenaeus’ Christology of Mixture,” 526. 
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becomes problematic when it comes to the passion of Jesus, for in order to avoid 
patripassianism Callistus must be able to say that the Son suffers while the Father/Spirit 
does not.”19 Briggman’s assessment makes it plain why Tertullian would write that 
Praxeas “drove out the Paraclete and crucified the Father.”20 The mixing of the spirit and 
human might well have yielded a possible answer to the Son’s distinct identity, but it also 
could be understood to compromise the spirit by subjecting it to the suffering of the 
human body. Recognizing this lurking and untenable problem, monarchians concluded 
that the Father could participate in the suffering of the Son without feeling the same 
effects as the Son.  
Tertullian then summarizes the monarchian position as follows: “The Father 
himself came down into the virgin, was himself born of her, himself suffered, and 
therefore, is himself Jesus Christ” (Ipsum dicit Patrem descendisse in uirginem, ipsum ex 
ea natum, ipsum passum, denique ipsum esse Iesum Christum).21 As Tertullian sees it, 
Praxeas must describe the life, ministry, and death of the Son as modes of paternal 
manifestation: the Father is (or becomes) the Son, even as he condescended from 
invisible to visible. The danger, in Tertullian’s eyes, was that each of the divine persons 
would lose a distinct identity. And this very danger was the pitfall that came packaged 
with naming God as one without qualification or specification. If the Praxean line was 
                                                
19 Briggman, “Irenaeus’ Christology of Mixture,” 526. 
20 Tert. Prax. 1.5 (CCSL 2: 1160).  
21 Tert. Prax. 1.1 (CCSL 2: 1159). Translations are mine unless noted otherwise. See Mark 
DelCogliano, “The Interpretation of John 10:30 in the Third Century: Antimonarchian Polemics and the 
Rise of Grammatical Reading Techniques,” Journal of Theological Interpretation 6.1 (2012): 117–38, at 
128. 
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taken, then the ways in which the scriptures speak of divine agency—of each divine 
person acting—would be lost.  
With this critique in mind, Tertullian’s concern throughout Against Praxeas is to 
maintain that the visible presence of the Son as a divine person does not detract from the 
Father’s single, unmatched power. To make his case for both the transcendence of the 
Father and real existence of the Son, Tertullian describes how the monarchians have 
failed to recognize the critical distinction between divine monarchy and “economy” 
(oikonomia). This distinction implies that there is both one God and that  
the one only God has a Son, his Word who proceeded from him, through whom 
all things have been made; and without whom nothing has been made (Jn. 1:1–4): 
that this one was sent by the Father into the virgin and was born of her, being both 
man and God, Son of man and Son of God, and was named Jesus Christ; that he 
suffered, died, and was buried, according to the scriptures (1 Cor. 15:3–4) and, 
having been raised up by the Father and taken back into heaven, sits at the right 
hand of the Father (Mk. 16:19) and will come to judge the quick and the dead 
(Acts 10:42); and that thereafter he, according to his promise, (Jn. 16:7), sent from 
the Father the Holy Spirit, the Paraclete, the sanctifier of the faith of those who 
believe in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit.22 
 
Tertullian labels this a rule of faith (regula fidei), that is, a tried standard that antedates all 
the “very novelty of yesterday’s Praxeas” (ipsa nouellitas Praxeae hesterni).23 The 
catechetical nature of the rule further reveals that Tertullian understood the debate with 
the monarchians to be one over received teaching.24 “Remember at every point that I have 
professed this rule” (regulam), Tertullian reminds his audience, “by which I testify that 
                                                
22 Tert. Prax. 2.1 (CCSL 2: 1160). For more on Tertullian’s monarchian context and consonances 
with Hippolytus, see Bracht, “Product or Foundation?,” 21–25.  
23 Tert. Prax. 2.2 (CCSL 2: 1160). For more on Tertullian’s use of regula, including a cross-
textual analysis, see Evans, Tertullian’s Treatise against Praxeas, 188–92. Evans contends: “The Rule of 
Faith is not a form of words but a series of ideas, a guide for teachers rather than a test of the neophyte’s 
faith” (189).  
24 See J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Creeds (London: Adam & Charles Black, 2006), 100–130, at 
115–16. Kelly references Prax. 2 and shows its consonances with the ancient Roman baptismal creed. 
  
 
18 
the Father and Son and Spirit are unseparated from one another, and in that case you will 
recognize what I say and in what sense I say it” (et ita quid quomodo dicatur agnosces).25 
Several passages from Against Praxeas bear out Tertullian’s anti-monarchian 
intent and uncover the importance of seeing the Father by means of the Son and what that 
seeing says about the identity of the Son and his relationship to the Father. Tertullian 
notes, as do the monarchians, that he finds throughout the scriptures descriptions of God, 
both unseen26 and seen.27 The challenge rests squarely on the exegete to insure that the 
seeming contradiction of these statements on the visibility and invisibility of God remains 
more apparent than real. Tertullian contends that in all the Old Testament theophanies—
e.g., Abraham at the oak of Mamre (Gen. 18) or Jacob wrestling with a heavenly figure 
(Gen. 32)—there must have been an “other” (alius) besides the invisible God, and this 
other is manifesting the divine presence. Tertullian names the Son this “other.”28 As the 
                                                
25 Tert. Prax. 9.1 (CCSL 2: 1168). 
26 E.g., Exodus 33:20; John 1:18; 1 Timothy 6:16. See René Braun, Deus Christianorum: 
Recherches sur le vocabulaire doctrinal de Tertullien (Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1977), 53. For 
Tertullian’s references to Exodus 33:20, see Tert. Prax. 14.1 (CCSL 2: 1176), 14.5 (CCSL 2: 1177), 14.8 
(CCSL 2: 1177–78), 15.2 (CCSL 2: 1178–79); Marc. 2.27 (CSEL 47: 373–74), 4.22 (CSEL 47: 495–96), 
5.19 (CSEL 47: 643). For Tertullian’s references to John 1:18, see Prax. 8.3 (CCSL 2: 1174), 15.2 (CCSL 
2: 1178–79), 15.4 (CCSL 2: 1179), 15.6 (CCSL 2: 1179), 21.3 (CCSL 2: 1186). For references to 1 
Timothy 6:16, see Prax. 15.2 (CCSL 2: 1178–79), 15.4 (CCSL 2: 1179), 15.8 (CCSL 2: 1180), 16.6 (CCSL 
2: 1181–82). 
27 E.g., 1 John 1:1 (“We have seen and heard and handled the Word of life”); 1 Corinthians 9:1 
(“Have I not, he says, seen Jesus”). For Tertullian’s other references to 1 John 1:1, see Prax. 15.2– 5 
(CCSL 2: 1178–79). For Tertullian’s other references to 1 Corinthians 9:1, see Prax. 15.2, 15.7 (CCSL 2: 
1179–80). 
28 Tert. Prax. 14.6 (CCSL 2: 1177). For other instances of alius see Prax. 5.5, 12.6–7, 21.2–3, 
25.1. For a discussion of alius in Prax., see D. Rankin, “Tertullian’s Vocabulary of the Divine Individuals 
in Adversus Praxean,” Sacris Erudiri 40 (2001): 5–46, at 10–13. Cf. Segal, “‘Two Powers in Heaven,’” 
86–87. Segal points to both Philo and Justin Martyr as those who wrote of the λόγος as ἕτερος θεός. Segal 
points to the work of E. R. Goodenough (The Theology of Justin Martyr: An Investigation into the 
Conceptions of the Earliest Christian Literature and Its Hellenistic and Judaistic Influences [Jena: Verlag 
Frommannsche Buchlandlung, 1923]) for secondary support of “another God” in Hellenistic Jewish 
literature. 
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Father’s alius the Son is like the Father in every way possible, and yet distinct “by 
distribution” (distributione).29 
Therefore it was the Son always who was seen and the Son always who conversed 
and the Son always who worked by the authority and will of the Father; because 
“the Son can do nothing of himself, unless he should see the Father doing it” (Jn. 
5:19)—doing it, of course, in his mind. For the Father acts by mind, whereas the 
Son sees and accomplishes that which is in the Father’s mind. Thus all things 
were made by the Son, and without him nothing was made (cf. Jn. 1:3).30 
 
Here, we witness Tertullian explicating the relationship between descriptions of God as 
visible and invisible and glossing John 5:19 for his defense. The Son, following the 
authority and will of the Father, reveals the invisible Father, who acts “in mind” (in 
sensu). 
Substantia is what Father and Son share.31 The Father is invisible with reference 
to his “plentitude of divinity” (plenitudinem diuinitatis)32 and “plentitude of majesty” 
(plenitudine maiestatis),33 and the Son is seen “according to human capacity” (secundum 
hominum capacitates).34 The Son, as word and spirit, is invisible “out of the condition of 
                                                
29 Tert. Prax. 9.1 (CCSL 2: 1168).  
30 Prax. 15.9 (CCSL 2: 1180): Filius ergo uisus est semper et Filius conuersatus est semper et 
Filius operates est semper ex auctoritate Patris et uoluntate quia Filius nihil a semetipso potest facere, nisi 
uiderit Patrem facientem, in sensu scilicet facientem. Pater enim sensu agit, Filius uero quod in Patris 
sensu est uidens perficit. Sic omnia per Filium facta sunt et sine illo factum est nihil. See Braun, Deus 
Christianorum, 187–94. 
31 Prax. 2.4 (CCSL 2: 1161). Quasi non sic quoque unus sit omnia dum ex uno omnia per 
substantiae scilicet unitatem et nihilominus custodiatur oikonomiae sacramentum, quae unitatem in 
trinitatem disponit, tres dirigens … Patrem et Filium et Spiritum, tres autem non statu sed gradu, nec 
substantia sed forma, nec potestate sed specie, unius autem substantiae et unius status et unius potestatis 
quia unus Deus ex quo et gradus isti et formae et species in nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti 
depuntantur. For a discussion of this vocabulary in Tertullian, see Evans, Tertullian’s Treatise against 
Praxeas, 38–58. Evans maintains that substantia in Prax. should be understood as a similar concept to 
Aristotelian οὐσία (Evans, Tertullian’s Treatise against Praxeas, 53). 
32 Prax. 14.2 (CCSL 2: 1176). 
33 Prax. 14.3 (CCSL 2: 1176). 
34 Prax. 14.2 (CCSL 2: 1176). 
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his substance” (ex substantiae condicione iam nunc),35 and yet visible according to the 
“measure of his derivation” (pro modulo deriuationis).36 By substantia I take Tertullian to 
mean, as Daniélou has maintained, “the concrete ground which permanently underlies 
individual realities and persists throughout the varieties of qualities, actions and changing 
elements.”37 Substantia is that given which serves to “define the different orders of 
reality.”38  
To make his point, Tertullian offers an analogy: “just as we may not look upon 
the sun in respect of the total of its substance (substantiae) which is in the sky, though 
with our eyes we can tolerate its beam because of the moderation of the portion which 
from thence reaches out to the earth.”39 The Son is likened to a beam of sunlight, a portio 
of the substance that allows us to see something of the light without gazing directly at the 
searing fullness of the sun. It is not simply that the beam is seen and the sun unseen; the 
beam proceeds out of the sun’s substance and moderates that substance so that all is 
illumined. Similarly, it is not simply that the Son is seen while the Father is not—
Tertullian’s distinctions between divine unity and economy cannot be mapped neatly 
                                                
35 Prax. 14.6 (CCSL 2: 1177). 
36 Prax. 14.3 (CCSL 2: 1176). 
37 Daniélou, The Origins of Latin Christianity, 345–46. 
38 Daniélou, The Origins of Latin Christianity, 346. 
39 Prax. 14.3 (CCSL 2: 1176; trans. adapted from Evans, 149). Sicut nec solemni obis contemplari 
licet, quantum ad ipsam substantiae summam quae est in caelis, radium autem eius toleramus oculis pro 
temperatura portionis quae in terram inde porrigitur. See Evans, 39–45, who explores the range of 
meanings associated with substantia in Tertullian’s broader corpus: sense of property; akin to ὑπόστασις; 
and synonymous with “being” or “essence”. See also Braun, Deus Christianorum, 167–99. Daniélou 
discusses the important role substantia plays in Tertullian’s works, noting the dispute over Tertullian’s 
possible sources of the term. Daniélou implicitly sides with Braun, who argues against Harnack (theory of 
legal origin) and Evans (Latinized Greek concept) that substantia is a term used from “everyday speech . . . 
further proof of the fact that Tertullian’s vocabulary is more indebted to ordinary language than to technical 
vocabulary” (345).  
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onto the distinctions between visibility and invisibility.40 While the Father is absolutely 
unseen in himself, the Son is seen according to human capacity and unseen according to 
his substantial unity with the Father; the Son’s visibility depends on his “condition” 
(condicio) in the economy of salvation. As we noted above, in Against Praxeas 2.4, 
Tertullian uses the technical term gradus, which denotes the “order of succession of the 
divine persons” and indicates divine threeness, conjuring up images of logical 
progression or steps. Ultimately, however, consideration of these “grades and forms and 
species” points to the one God (unus Deus).41 “They are three, not by status, but by 
grade” (tres autem non statu sed gradu), as Tertullian puts it.42 
The constant give and take between unity and trinity recurs throughout 
Tertullian’s work, emerging prominently at Against Praxeas 24. 
Therefore he also made manifest the conjunction of the two persons, so that the 
Father separately might not, as though visible, be asked for in open view, and that 
the Son might be accepted as the representor of the Father. And no less did [Jesus] 
explain this also, in what manner the Father was in the Son and the Son in the 
Father: “The words,” he says, “that I speak  unto you, are not mine” (Jn. 14:10)—
evidently because they are the Father's—“but the Father remaining in me does the 
works” (Jn. 14:10). Therefore the Father, remaining in the Son through works of 
power and words of doctrine, is seen through those things through which he 
remains, and through him in whom he remains: and from this very fact it is 
apparent that each person is himself and none other, while he says, “I am in the 
Father and the Father in me” (Jn. 14:11). And so he says, “Believe.” But “believe” 
                                                
40 Daniélou, The Origins of Latin Christianity, 365. “This contrast [between invisible Father and 
visible Son] does not affect the specific nature of the persons of the Trinity in eternity, but only their 
existence as individual figures in the economy.” 
41 Prax. 2.4 (CCSL 2: 1161). Tres autem non statu sed gradu, nec substnatia sed forma, nec 
potestate sed specie, unius autem substantiae et unius status et unius potestatis quia unus Deus ex quo et 
gradus isti et formae et species in nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti deputantur. Daniélou, The 
Origins of Latin Christianity, 359. See Joseph Moingt, Théologie trinitaire de Tertullien, II: Subtantialité et 
individualité; étude du vocablaire philosophique, Théologie 69 (Paris: Aubier, 1966), 297–430. See too 
Evans, Tertullian’s Treatise against Praxeas, 52–53. 
42 Prax. 2.4 (CCSL 2: 1161). See also Prax. 9.3 (CCSL 2: 1168–69): Sic alium a se Paracletum, 
quomodo et nos a Patre alium Filium ut tertium gradum ostenderet in Paracleto, sicut nos secundum in 
Filio propter oikonomiae obseruationem. 
  
 
22 
what? That I am the Father? I think it is not so written, but, “That I am in the 
Father and the Father in me, or if not,  believe because of the works” (Jn. 14:11)—
those works in fact through which the Father was seen in the Son, not with the 
eyes but with the mind.43  
 
Note that Tertullian emphasizes the distinctiveness of Father and Son with reference to 
John 14:10–11: “each person is himself and none other”.44 Such an emphasis is held over 
and against the monarchian claim that the Son actually is the Father or that the Father 
becomes the Son. We also see Tertullian arguing for the indivisibility of the Father and 
Son, an argument that highlights, again, the inseparable substance of the persons.45  
The Father and Son are united, not in a single bodily person, but in “works of 
power and words of doctrine” (per opera ergo uirtutum et uerba doctrinae), and that this 
is “in respect of unity of substance, not of singularity of number” (ad substantiae 
unitatem, non ad numeri singularitatem).46 For Tertullian, Christ functions as the uicarius 
                                                
43 Tert. Prax. 24.7–8 (CCSL 2: 1195; trans. amended from Evans 168–69). Bolding added for 
emphasis. Igitur et manifestam fecit duarum personarum coniunctionem ne pater seorsum quasi uisibilis in 
conspectu desideraretur et ut filius repraesentator patris haberetur. Et nihilominus hoc quoque 
interpretatus est quomodo pater esset in filio et filius in patre: verba, inquit, quae ego loquor uobis, non 
sunt mea—utique quia patris—pater autem manens in me facit opera. Per opera ergo uirtutum et uerba 
doctrinae manens in filio pater per ea uidetur per quae manet et per eum in quo manet, ex hoc ipso 
apparente proprietate utriusque personae, dum dicit: ego sum in patre et pater in me. Atque adeo: credite, 
ait. Quid? me patrem esse? non puto scriptum esse, sed: quia ego in patre et pater in me, si quo minus, uel 
propter opera credite, ea utique opera per quae pater in filio non uisu, sed sensu uidebatur. See Kevin B. 
McCruden, “Monarchy and Economy in Tertullian’s Adversus Praxeam,” Scottish Journal of Theology 
55.3 (2002): 325–37, at 334–35. McCruden argues that the dangers of patripassianism undergird many of 
Tertullian’s polemical statements and motivate him to uphold the Father as invisible. McCruden writes: 
“Since the Father is invisible and totally transcendent, there needs to be a visible manifestation of the 
invisible, one who is both second to the Father, yet united to the Father through the principle of origin in 
order that the transcendent Father might be revealed. In other words, Tertullian's principle of the invisible 
and visible God underlies and drives his economic reflections on the Son's authentic distinctness” (335).   
44 See Evans, Tertullian, 41. Ayres, Nicaea and its Legacy, 20–30. In identifying Origen of 
Alexandria as a starting point for analyzing Nicene theology, Ayres notes a dynamic similar to that of 
Tertullian here, namely, that of each divine person’s unique identity.  
45 See Tert. Prax. 19.8 (CCSL 2: 1185): non ex separatione substantiae sed ex dispositione, cum 
indiuiduum et inseparatum Filium a Patre pronuntiamus, nec statu sed gradu alium, qui etsi Deus dicatur, 
quando nominatur singularis, non ideo duos Deos faciat sed unum, hoc ipso quod et Deus ex unitate Patris 
uocari habeat. 
46 Tert. Prax. 25.1 (CCSL 2: 1195). 
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patris or repraesentator patris, by which he means not simply that the Son is 
“representative of the Father,” but that the Son makes present—quite literally, he is the 
“re-presenter”—that which (or the One whom) he recalls or sees.47 These works and 
words are done through the Son and by the Father, and subsequently reveal the character 
of the Father, since the Father “remains” (manet) in the Son. While Tertullian’s grammar 
of this indivisibility and inseparability is not as precise or technical as that of writers in 
the throes of fourth-century Nicene controversies, the beginnings of such a doctrine of 
common substance are nonetheless discernable here.48  
The Son is said to witness the Father’s working in sensu (“in mind”) and act 
accordingly, accomplishing that which the Father has in sensu.49 A technical 
understanding of sensus will further aid us in analyzing how and for what ends Tertullian 
spells out the distinction between divine visibility and invisibility.50 Two possible sources 
help Tertullian sketch the content of sensus. First, sensus was a slippery concept in the 
Roman rhetorical tradition; its rendering varied from “feeling” to “meaning” to 
                                                
47 See Evans, Tertullian’s Treatise against Praxeas, 308–9. 
48 See also Tert. Herm. 44.3 (CSEL 47: 174): Et cui credibile est deum non apparuisse materiae 
uel qua consubstantiali suae per aeternitatem? 
49 Tert. Prax. 15.9 (CCSL 2: 1180). 
50  See Gerald Boersma, Augustine’s Early Theology of Image (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
2016), 22–27. Boersma indicates that the Son is seen “according to his mission or proper to the economy of 
salvation” (23). This is a critical point for Boersma, citing other secondary literature that tends to view the 
Son as visible and Father as invisible all the way down. Boersma’s brief section on Tertullian concludes 
thus: “As image, Christ is the same substance as his source and not the mediating visible image of the 
invisible God. Nevertheless, in the economy of salvation, Tertullian distinguishes between the Logos, who 
as invisible image shares the invisible substance of the Father, and the sarx—the visible image that Christ 
manifested in the theophanies of the Old Testament and the Incarnation” (27). See also Rankin, 
“Tertullian’s Vocabulary,” 13, 19: “[Tertullian] is primarily committed to the notion of the oneness of God 
but also to an economic threeness, implied and expressed, within it. . . . substantia, potestas and status [are] 
characteristics of the divine one-ness, while concepts such as gradus, species and forma are of its three-
ness.” 
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“understanding.”51 Well-versed in classical rhetoric, Tertullian likely recognized the 
slippage inherent in the term and attempts to use it in a more or less consistent manner 
when referring to a given person, place or thing (word, deed, God, etc.): sensus has 
something to do with something rational.52  
The use of sensus also recurs in the Latin Asclepius, a partial translation of an 
Egyptian-Greek Gnostic text written sometime before 413 CE and circulated throughout 
North Africa.53 Sensus here functions as a technical psychological term referring to 
something immaterial, pure, and specifically divine. At one point, the anonymous author 
calls sensus “the soul of the gods.”54 Still, sensus appears to pertain only to the highest, 
most powerful gods.55 These subtleties notwithstanding, sensus carries with it multiple 
valances, similar to the Greek νοῦς (“intellect”), of which sensus is considered a rough 
                                                
51 See Cic. Nat. D. 3.13.32 (LCL 268: 314–17), where Cicero indicates that every living thing has 
sensus; Cic. De or. 2.45.189 (LCL 348: 332–35), where sensus is synonymous with “feeling” or 
“affection.” Cf. Quint. Inst. 8.2 (LCL 126: 336–39), where Quintilian juxtaposes words with a clear sense 
and those with a “concealed meaning” (occultos sensus); and Phaedrus, Fables 4.5 (LCL 436: 306–7), 
where sensus is referred to as the “meaning” of a document. Cf. Phaedrus, Fables 1.7 (LCL 436: 200–1), 
refers to a sensum communem (“common sense”). 
52 For use of sensus in reference to the human subject, see Tert. Marc. 1.16, where Tertullian 
contrasts corpus and sensus; Marc. 2.16, where Tertullian indicates that the human mind has the same 
“motus et sensus” as its divine counterpart, yet not of the same quality. Cf. Cic. De or. 2.35.148 (LCL 348: 
304–5), where Cicero writes of judging changes in the orator’s countenance for clues to his sensus animi. 
53 See Corpus Hermeticum II: Asclepius, ed. A. D. Nock and trans. A. J. Festugière (Paris: Les 
Belles Lettres, 1945), 296–355. The most recent English translation is Brian P. Copenhaver, Hermetica: 
The Greek Corpus Hermeticum and the Latin Asclepius in a new English Translation with Notes and 
Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 67–92. See also Stephen Gersh, 
“Theological Doctrines of the Latin Asclepius,” in Richard T. Wallis, Jay Bregman, eds., Neoplatonism 
and Gnosticism (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1992), 129–66; Clement Salaman, Asclepius: The Perfect 
Discourse of Hermes Trismegistus (Bristol: Bristol Classical Press, 2007), 11–50. Gersh notes how the 
Latin Asclepius is a result of “syncretism” between Platonism and Stoicism, emphasizing both the “radical 
transcendence” and “thorough immanence” of the divine (132). 
54 Corpus Hermeticum II: Asclepius 17: 315–17; trans. Copenhaver, Hermetica, 77. 
55 Corpus Hermeticum II: Asclepius 18: 317; trans. Copenhaver, Hermetica, 77. 
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Latin rendering.56 Festugière notes that sensus is a distinct Gnostic term that pertains to 
the faculty of divine intuition.57 In the Latin Asclepius, sensus thus designates discrete 
insight of divine origin58 that grants perception or understanding of that origin’s 
character.59 At the work’s closing, the Hermeticist hymns to the “most high god”: 
We thank you, supreme and most high god, by whose grace alone we have 
attained the light of your knowledge; holy name that must be honored, the one 
name by which our ancestral faith blesses god alone, we thank you who deign to 
grant to all a father’s fidelity, reverence and love, along with any power that is 
sweeter, by giving us the gift of mind, reason, and understanding—mind, by 
which we may know you; reason, by which we may seek you in our dim 
suppositions; knowledge, by which we may rejoice in knowing you.60 
 
Sensus, here translated as “mind,” is a divine property bestowed upon human beings that 
allows for knowledge of the divine. Sensus is grouped with, but distinct from, ratio and 
                                                
56 See Copenhaver, Hermetica, at 217–18, 221. See also Walter Scott, Hermetica: The Ancient 
Greek and Latin Writings which contain Religious and Philosophical Teachings Ascribed to Hermes 
Trismegistos, volume III: Notes on the Latin Asclepius and the Hermetic Excerpts of Stobaeus, ed. Walter 
Scott (Oxford: Clarendon, 1926), 100–2. Scott connects sensus to νοῦς and immediately to Philo (because 
of his repeated use of νοῦς). See also Édouard Jeauneau, “Sensus dans l’exégèse biblique du haut moyen 
age (IXe – XIIe siècle), in Tendenda vela: Excursions littéraires et digressions philosophiques à travers le 
moyen âge (Turnhout: Brepols, 2007), 87–98, at 87–88. 
57 See Festugière, Corpus Hermeticum II, 363. 
58 Corpus Hermeticum II: Asclepius 7: 303–4; trans. Copenhaver, 70. 
59 See J. Peter Södergård, The Hermetic Piety of the Mind: A Semiotic and Cognitive Study of the 
Discourse of Hermes Trismegistos (Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell, 2003), 26–67. Though Södergård is 
focused on the function of νοῦς, his explorations bear on ours here. He indicates that νοῦς “functions as a 
central metaphor and concept in the Hermetic discourse which conveys metaphysical presence and means 
for transcendence” (31). Södergård also takes exception with Festugière’s claim that the Corpus 
Hermeticum is simply a collection of Greek philosophical sayings with no true Egyptian influence. On this, 
cf. Peter Kingsley, “Poimandres: The Etymology of the Name and Origins of the Hermetica,” in From 
Poimandres to Jacob Böhme: Gnosis, Hermetism and the Christian Tradition, ed. Roelof van den Broek, 
Cis van Heertum (Amsterdam: In de Pelikann, 2000), 41–76, at 50–53 with John M. Dillon, The Middle 
Platonists, 80 B.C. to A.D. 220 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 389–92, which describes 
Heremetic Gnosticism as indicative of a “Platonic Underworld.” 
60 Corpus Hermeticum II: Asclepius 41: 353–55; trans. altered from Copenhaver, 92, with 
emphasis added. Gratias tibi summe, exsuperantissime; tua enim gratia tantum sumus cognitionis tuae 
lumen consecuti, nomen sanctum et honorandum, nomen unum quo solus deus est beneficendus religione 
paterna, quoniam omnibus paternam pietatem et religionem et amorem et, quaecumque est dulcior 
efficacia, praebere dignaris condonans nos sensu, ratione, intellegentia: sensu, ut te cognouerimus; 
ratione, ut te suspicionibus indagemus; cognitione, ut te cognoscentes gaudeamus.  
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intellegentia, each pertaining to different ways of comprehending the divine (knowing, 
seeking, and rejoicing). 
In Against Praxeas 5.2–3, Tertullian equates God’s reason with the divine sensus, 
writing: 
God is rational and reason is primarily in him and thus from him are all things 
[rational]: and that reason is his mind. This the Greeks call “logos”, by which 
word we also designate discourse: and consequently our people are already wont, 
through the artlessness of the translation, to say that “discourse was in the 
beginning with God” (cf. Jn. 1:1), though it would be more appropriate to 
consider reason more ancient, because God is not discursive from the beginning 
but is rational even before the beginning, and because discourse itself, having its 
ground in reason, shows reason to be prior as being its substance.61  
 
Sensus describes the rational, motivational, and invisible nature of some thing (word, 
deed, God, etc.).62 Here, sensus is equated with reason (ratio) itself, as that which was in 
the beginning within God (in ipsum). Here too, Tertullian mentions the connection of 
sensus to the Greek λόγος, which he Latinizes as “discourse” (sermo): “Mind” (sensus) 
and reason” (ratio) are prior to “discourse” (sermo). When the Father is thus said to act in 
sensu, Tertullian is grasping at how to best explain the rational character of divine 
activity, that there is something behind the physical act itself.63  
                                                
61 Tert. Prax. 5.2–3 (CCSL 2: 1163–64). Rationalis enim deus et ratio in ipsum prius et ita ab ipso 
omnia. Quae ratio sensus ipsius est. Hanc graeci λόγον dicunt, quo uocabulo etiam sermonem appellamus 
ideo que iam in usu est nostrorum per simplicitatem interpretationis sermonem dicere in primordio apud 
deum fuisse, cum magis rationem competat antiquiorem haberi, quia non sermonalis a principio sed 
rationalis deus etiam ante principium, et quia ipse quoque sermo ratione consistens priorem eam ut 
substantiam suam ostendat. Later in the section, Tertullian writes: “Before the establishment of the 
universe God was not alone, since he had reason in himself and in reason discourse, which he made another 
beside himself by activity within himself. This power and the disposition of the divine mind (divini sensus 
dispositio) is in the scriptures also displayed under the name of wisdom (sophiae nomine ostenditur)” 
(Prax. 5.7–6.1 [CCSL 2: 1164]). See Evans, Tertullian’s Treatise against Praxeas, 31–38, 212–13. 
62 See Prax. 3.6 (CCSL 2: 1162; trans. Evans, 133). Tertullian distinguishes between the 
“meaning” (sensus) of a fact and the “sound of a word.”  
63 Prax. 6.1 (CCSL 2: 1165), where God is said to have established and begotten “in his own 
sensu.” 
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Such an attempt to explain the rational character of activity by means of sensus is 
present at Against Praxeas 6.1 and 6.3. It is according to God’s sensus that all things 
were created and have their being. 
For first, when God willed to put forth in their substances and species those things 
among which he had distributed his wisdom and reason and discourse, he first 
brought forth discourse, having its own individual reason and wisdom, so that the 
things of the universe might come into existence through the one through whom 
they had been thought and arranges, indeed, even insofar as they were made 
within the mind of God. And this one thing had been lacking to them that they 
should be plainly recognized and understood in their own species and 
substances.64 
 
Tertullian’s distinction between God’s creation and God’s sensus here functions similarly 
to his distinction between divine economy and unity, respectively. God’s agential, 
rational activity appears to designate the economic workings of the Godhead—“so that 
the things of the universe . . . might come into existence . . ..” Tertullian’s use of sensus 
describes that this creation has already happened “within the mind of God.”  
We have seen how sensus functions as insight into the timeless “mind” of God, 
akin to others of Tertullian’s statements regarding the marked unity of the Father. I 
indicated above that one of the qualities of sensus is its invisibility, a quality that 
descriptions from Roman rhetorical traditions and the Latin Asclepius, differences 
notwithstanding, also endorse. Such a claim interjects the following challenge: How can 
the Son, visible as he is, “see” the Father invisibly, in sensu? Let us recall the earlier 
reference: 
                                                
64 Prax. 6.3 (CCSL 2: 1165); italics added for emphasis. The Latin reads as follows: Nam, ut 
primum Deus uoluit ea quae cum sophia et ratione et sermone disposuerat intra se, in substantias et 
species suas edere, ipsum primum protulit sermonem, habentem in se indiuiduas suas, rationem et 
sophiam, ut per ipsum fierent uniuersa per quem erant cogitata atque disposita, immo et facta iam quantum 
in Dei sensu. Hoc enim eis deerat ut coram quoque in suis speciebus atque substantiis cognoscerentur et 
tenerentur. 
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Therefore it was the Son who was always seen and the Son who always conversed 
and the Son who always worked by the authority and will of the Father; because 
“the Son can do nothing of himself, unless he should see the Father doing it” (Jn. 
5:19)—doing it, of course, in his mind. For the Father acts by mind, whereas the 
Son sees and accomplishes that which is in the Father’s mind. Thus, all things 
were made by the Son, and without him nothing was made (Jn. 1:3).65 
 
John 5:19 helps Tertullian’s case that the Son can do nothing of himself, but only what he 
sees the Father doing; the Son always works by the “authority and will of the Father,” 
seeing and accomplishing that which the Son sees the Father doing. Again, the 
unity/economy distinction appears to be operative here in the distinction between the 
presence of the Son’s words in the Father’s mind and the accomplishment of the same 
works by the Son in the world. This distinction can help answer the question of how the 
Son is able to see the Father’s sensus, if in fact it is invisible. 
Though Tertullian never explicitly labels sensus invisible in Against Praxeas, he 
does note its incorporeality in Against Marcion 1.16 by contrasting sensus and corpus. In 
arguing against the Marcionite claim that there are two gods, one pertaining to things 
visible, the other to things invisible, Tertullian maintains that the same God made both 
heaven and earth, things seen and unseen. He then draws an analogy to the human 
subject: “Man too is himself similarly tempered with diversity, both in body and in mind” 
(Sic et hominem ipsum diversitas temperauit, tam in corpore quam in sensu).66 Given this 
                                                
65 Tert. Prax. 15.9 (CCSL 2: 1180). Bolding added for emphasis. Filius ergo uisus est semper et 
filius conuersatus est semper et filius operatus est semper ex auctoritate patris et uoluntate quia filius nihil 
a semetipso potest facere, nisi uiderit patrem facientem, in sensu scilicet facientem. Pater enim sensu agit, 
filius uero quod in patris sensu est uidens perficit. Sic omnia per filium facta sunt et sine illo factum est 
nihil. See Braun, Deus Christianorum, 187–94. 
66 Tert. Marc. 1.16. (CSEL 47: 311): The remainder of the section reads as follows: Alia membra 
fortia, alia infirma; alia honesta, alia inhonesta; alia gemina, alia unica; alia comparia, alia disparia. 
Proinde et in sensu nunc laetitia, nunc anxietas; nunc amor, nunc odium; nunc ira, nunc lenitas. Sensus is 
used in the context of responding to Marcion’s claim of two gods, competing from the side, respectively, of 
things visible and invisible.  
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statement and the above association of sensus with divine unity (rather than economy), 
we can conclude that the Son “sees” the works of the Father in sensu by virtue of that 
divine unity. Tertullian’s statement that the Father is seen “not with the eyes but with the 
mind” (non uisu, sed sensu uidebatur) further highlights a distinction between the body 
and sensus. Such statements are telling too of a qualified understanding of invisibility: 
though no one has ever seen God (Jn. 1:18), the Father is seen in the works of the Son 
(Jn. 14:9), and the Son is able to “see” the Father.  
To further draw out the technical content of sensus, Tertullian later references 
Isaiah 40:13: “Who has known the mind of the Lord and who has been his counselor” 
(Quis cognouit sensum Domini et quis illi consilio fuit)?67 The multiple manuscripts of 
the Vetus Latina show variants of the phrase, “the mind of God”—what Tertullian 
translates as sensum Domini. Gryson’s critical edition of the Vetus presents sensus,68 
mens,69 and spiritus70 as Latin equivalents of the LXX νοῦς.71 (We recall that in the Latin 
Asclepius sensus functions as a rendering for νοῦς, a technical term that recurs in the 
Greek manuscripts of the Corpus Hermeticum, a collection of North African Gnostic 
texts authored sometime before 413 CE.) Tertullian concludes that only Christ, the 
                                                
67 Tert. Prax. 19.2 (CCSL 2: 1184). Tertullian’s Latin rendering is typical of the Vetus Latina text 
of the Apostolic Fathers and Irenaeus and remains more or less unchanged throughout his works. For other 
references to Isaiah 40:13 in Tertullian’s works, see Herm. 17–18 (CSEL 47: 144–45); Marc. 2.2 (CSEL 
47: 335), 5.6 (CSEL 47: 590–91). 5.18 (CSEL 47: 638–39). 
68 See Cypr. Test. 3.53 (CSEL 3/1: 155); Ambr. Fid. 4.11.144 (CSEL 78: 208); Hex. 1.3.9 (CSEL 
32/1: 8); Luc. 6.4 (CSEL 32/4: 233), 6.27 (CSEL 32/4: 242); Spir. 2.9.90 (CSEL 79: 122), 3.3.16 (CSEL 
79: 158). 
69 See Mar.-Vict. Ar. 1.37 (CSEL 83/1: 121); Aug. Psal. 7.1 (CCSL 38: 36); Serm. 27.7 (CCSL 41: 
366); Iul. 2.90 (CSEL 85/1: 225). 
70 See Hier. Is. 11.40.12/17 (CCSL 73: 459–60). This is also the translation in Jerome’s Vulgate. 
71 See Vetus Latina: Die Reste der altalateinischen Bibel, ed. Gryson, Band 12/2: 926–27. 
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Wisdom and Power of God (1 Cor. 1:24), has known the mind of the Father (solus sciens 
sensum patris) and acts endued with divine power and insight. Because the Son and 
Father are unified in mental substance, the Son “sees and accomplishes that which is in 
the Father’s mind,” making known the Father’s invisible attributes by his works.72 Sight 
is thus critical for Tertullian as he bridges the invisible realities of God (sensus and 
substantia) and the works of the Son: by “seeing” the Father, the Son is able to act in 
accordance with the Father’s will; by “seeing” the Son, we are able to know something of 
that same will. 
Another passage, from Against Praxeas 20, highlights other Johannine verses that 
raise questions of the Father’s relationship to the Son as it pertains to “seeing” the divine. 
But for the further restraints of [monarchian] arguments we must pay attention to 
whatever they will excerpt from the scriptures to support their opinion, unwilling 
as they are to look at other things which preserve the rule, and that while 
preserving the divine union and the place of monarchy. For as in the old [books] 
they retain nothing else except, “I am God and there is none other beside me” (Is. 
45:5), so also in the Gospel the Lord’s answer to Philip is considered, “I and the 
Father are one” (Jn. 10:30), and, “Whoever has seen me sees the Father,” and, “I 
am in the  Father and the Father in me” (Jn. 14:9–11). To these three passages [the 
monarchians] wish the whole implementation of both testaments to yield, though 
the smaller number ought to be understood in accordance with the greater. But 
this is the characteristic of all heretics. Since there are a few places which can be 
found in the woods, they defend the few against the many and become advocates 
of the later against the earlier. But the rule always determined for every thing in 
earlier instances from the beginning prescribes even for the later—and the same in 
the case of the fewer.73  
                                                
72 Tert. Prax. 15.9 (CCSL 2: 1180).  
73 Tert. Prax. 20.1–3 (CCSL 2: 1186; Evans, 159). Sed argumentationibus eorum adhuc 
retundendis opera praebenda est si quid de scripturis ad sententiam suam excerpent, cetera nolentes 
intueri quae et ipsa regulam seruant et quidem salua unione diuinitatis et monarchiae statu. Nam sicut in 
ueteribus nihil aliud tenent quam ego deus et alius praeter me non est, ita in euangelio responsionem 
domini ad philippum tuentur: ego et pater unum sumus, et: qui me uiderit, uidit et patrem, et: ego in patre 
et pater in me. His tribus capitulis totum instrumentum utriusque testamenti uolunt cedere cum oporteat 
secundum plura intellegi pauciora. Hippolytus levels a similar charge against Noetus in Contra noetum 3.1, 
asserting that Noetus’ exegesis is “piecemeal.” See Andrew B. McGowan, “God in Early Latin Theology: 
Tertullian and the Trinity,” in Brian Daley et al., God in Early Christian Thought: Essays in Memory of 
Lloyd G. Patterson, Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 61–82. 
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In a passage critical of the monarchians’ selective exegesis—picking and choosing 
passages to highlight the unity of God—Tertullian quotes the three scriptural touchstones 
in question: Isaiah 45:5, John 10:30, and John 14:9–11.74 These three texts, central to 
monarchian exegesis, represented contested theological ground in anti-monarchian 
polemic.75 Enumerating his opponents’ textual support and lambasting their interpretive 
methods provides a springboard for Tertullian’s counter-exegesis. 
 Just two chapters later, Tertullian argues that monarchian identification of the 
Father and Son as a single person on the basis of John 10:30 is mistaken. Instead, by 
wielding a grammatical critique, Tertullian maintains that the Father and Son are unum, 
“one thing,” and not unus, a single persona; the gospel texts reads “the Father and I are 
one,” not “is one,” implying that the Father and Son are in fact distinct personae.76 While 
Tertullian is not precise regarding the character of this unum, his argument is 
straightforward: the Father and Son are similar and united by love and will; this unity can 
be glimpsed by means of the Son’s words and works. 
                                                
74 See Heine, “Christology of Callistus,” 74; Evans, Tertullian’s Treatise against Praxeas, 21–22. 
For the importance of anti-monarchian exegesis of John 14:9–11 in pro-Nicene debates, see also Matthew 
R. Crawford, “The Triumph of Pro-Nicene Theology over Anti-Monarchian Exegesis: Cyril of Alexandria 
and Theodore of Heraclea on John 14.10–11,” JECS 21.4 (2013): 537–67, at 549–55. 
75 No extant monarchian writings survive; their thought can be reconstructed only through 
polemical works. To think of monarchian theology as a unified whole is to ignore the multiple exegetical 
trends that several monarchians cultivate. See Heine, “The Christology of Callistus”; Harnack, History of 
Dogma, 3: 58; J. F. Bethune-Baker, An Introduction to the History of Christian Doctrine (London: 
Methuen, 1933); Evans, Tertullian’s Treatise against Praxeas, 10–18; T. E. Pollard, “The Exegesis of John 
X. 30 in the Early Trinitarian Controversies,” NTS 3 (1956–57): 334–49, at 335; Pollard, Johannine 
Christology and the Early Church (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 54; Maurice Wiles, 
The Spiritual Gospel, 118–19; J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines (New York: HarperCollins, 1978), 
120; Waers, “Monarchianism and Origen’s Early Trinitarian Theology,” 131–150. 
76 See Tert. Prax. 22.11 (CCSL 2: 1191). “Yet when he says that two, of the masculine gender, are 
one <thing>, in the neuter-which is not concerned with singularity but with unity, with similitude, with 
conjunction, with the love of the Father who loveth the Son, and with the obedience of the Son who obeys 
the Father's will—when he says, One <thing> are I and the Father, he shows that those whom he equates 
and conjoins are two” (Evans, Tertullian’s Treatise against Praxeas, 164).  
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 Still, as Ernest Evans notes, Tertullian admits a certain “minoration” of the Son 
(and Spirit) at Against Praxeas 9.77  
For the Father is the whole substance (tota substantia est), while the Son is a 
derivation (deriuatio) and portion of the whole (portio totius), as he himself 
professes, “Because my Father is greater than I” (Jn. 14:28) and by him, and he 
has also been made less (minoratus), he [the Son] sings in the psalm, “a little on 
this side of the angels” (Ps. 8:6). So also the Father is other (alius) than the Son as 
being greater (maior) than the Son, as he who begets is other than he who is 
begotten, as he who sends is other than he who is sent, as he who makes is other 
than he through whom a thing is made.78 
 
Since the Son, who is begotten and sent and mediates the Father’s making, is other than 
the Father, who begets, sends, and makes, the Son can be said to be less than the Father 
as a derived portion of the Father’s plentitude. Glossing John 14:28, Tertullian writes that 
the Son is a “derivation and portion of the whole.” While Tertullian affirms this 
minoration, he is adamant to assert that the substance is nevertheless one and undivided: 
just as a root is undivided from its shoot or spring from its river or sun from its beam, so 
are the Father and Son undivided.79 Tertullian calls the shoot, river, and beam “species”80 
and “projections” (προβολαί), applying in Greek a Valentinian-Gnostic technical term,81 
of the substances whence they proceed.82 To distance himself from the Valentinians’ 
                                                
77 See Evans, Tertullian’s Treatise against Praxeas, 44. 
78 Tert. Prax. 9.2 (CCSL 2: 1168). 
79 Prax. 8.5 (CCSL 2: 1167–68). All these images become typical of anti-monarchian polemic. See 
Ayres, Nicaea and its Legacy, 70–76. 
80 Prax. 8.5 (CCSL 2: 1167). 
81 Prax. 8.1–2 (CCSL 2: 1167): Hic si qui putauerit me προβολὴν aliquam introducere, id est 
prolationem rei alterius ex altera, quo facit Valentinus, alium atque alium Aeonem de Aeone producens, 
primo quidem dicam tibi: Non ideo non utitur et ueritas uocabulo isto et re ac censu eius quia et haeresis 
utatur. Immo haeresis potius ex ueritate accepit quod ad medacium suum strueret. . . . Valentinus 
προβολὰς suas discernit et separat ab auctore et ita longe ab eo ponit ut Aeon patrem nesciat. 
82 Prax. 8.5–7 (CCSL 2: 1168). Tertullian uses profero (“carry out,” “bring forth”) and prodeo 
(“come forth”) to explain the dynamic introduced by the technical term προβολή. 
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understanding of “projection,” Tertullian argues that though projections are indeed 
distinct from their sources (root, spring, and sun), they are of the substance of their 
sources, dependent upon and intrinsically linked to them. He accuses the Valentinians of 
misusing the word, constructing it into a lie (Immo haeresis potius ex ueritate accepit 
quod ad medacium suum strueret) and severing the “projection” from its causal source 
(Valentinus προβολὰς suas discernit et separat ab auctore).83 
 The importance of Tertullian’s anti-monarchian polemic for the future of Latin 
trinitarian theology cannot be overstated. His polemical writing makes prominent the 
Son’s visibility through his works in relationship to the invisibility of the Father. 
Exegetical debates over who or what was revealed in the Old Testament theophanies and 
New Testament miracles ossified Tertullian’s concern. The Son was said to be invisible 
with respect to his unity with the Father and visible with respect to his economic 
dispensation and perfect submission to the Father.  
  
Novatian of Rome 
Novatian of Rome (ca. 200–58) develops Tertullian’s anti-monarchian claims 
about the identity of the Son given his visibility and the invisibility of God.84 Novatian’s 
                                                
83 Prax. 8.1–2 (CCSL 2: 1167). 
84 For a general introduction into Novatian’s Trinitarian thought, see Russell J. DeSimone, The 
Treatise of Novatian, the Roman Presbyter on the Trinity: A Study of the Text and the Doctrine (Rome: 
Institutum patristicum Augustinianum, 1970), 21–36; and Novatian, The Trinity, The Spectacles, Jewish 
Foods, In Praise of Purity, Letters, translation and introduction by Russell J. DeSimone, FOTC 67 
(Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1974), 1–12. Novatian, it has been said, never 
went a day without reading Tertullian. See Adolf von Harnack, Tertullian in der Litteratur der alten 
Kirchen (Berlin: Sitzungsberichte Preuss. Akad. der Wissenschaft, 1895), 562. 
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treatise On the Trinity85 was written to oppose monarchians—particularly Sabellians86—
and adoptionists; the work grants us insight into doctrinal developments regarding the 
Father-Son relationship.87 The Sabellians, Novatian writes, “think of [Jesus] not as the 
Son, but as God the Father Himself,” a description similar to the one Tertullian offers of 
Praxeas and his followers.88 Adoptionists, on the other hand, according to Novatian, 
maintained that Jesus was mere man. On the Trinity thus represents an author caught 
between a Sabellian rock and an adoptionist hard place,89 or as Novatian himself says, 
“the Lord is crucified between two thieves” (inter duos latrones crucifigitur Dominus).90  
                                                
85 Jerome calls Novatian’s Trin. “a sort of epitome” of Tertullian’s Prax. (Hier. Vir. ill. 70). Cf. 
Quasten, Patrology, Vol. 2, 212–19. De trinitate’s “treatment of [the Trinity] is much more exact and 
systematic, much more complete and extensive than that of any prior attempt” (217). See also Adhémar 
d’Alès, Novatien, Étude sur la théologie romaine au milieu du IIIe siècle, Études de théologie historique 
(Paris: G. Beauchesne, 1924), 84–134, at 90–91, 126. DeSimone, The Treatise of Novatian, 41–52. 
DeSimone, against Jerome, is adamant that Novatian’s De trinitate represents real development and is not 
“a mere compendium of [Tertullian’s Aduersus praxean]” (42). DeSimone dates the De trinitate before 250 
CE (43–44) and also notes, with others, that the work “can only improperly be called a treatise on the 
Trinity” since it deals primarily with the first two persons of the Trinity, only mentioning the Holy Spirit in 
passing. More precisely, it should be thought of as a commentary on the rule of faith (48).  
86 See Novatian. Trin. 12.8–9 (CCSL 4: 32). See also Harnack, History of Dogma, 3: 58–59. 
87 See Daniel Lloyd, “Ontological Subordination in Novatian of Rome’s Theology of the Son” 
(PhD Dissertation, Milwaukee, WI, 2012), 8. Lloyd calls this second group (adoptionists) “humanitarian 
monarchianists.” Cf. James Leonard Papandrea, “Between Two Thieves: Novatian of Rome and Kenosis 
Christology,” in If These Stones Could Speak . . . : Studies on Patristic Texts and Archeology; Essays in 
Honor of Dennis E. Groh (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 2009), 51–71. 
88 Novatian. Trin. 23.2 (CCSL 4: 57) and Tert. Prax. 10.4 (CCSL 2: 1169). Epiphanius of Salamis 
describes Sabellius and his followers as teaching the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are simply different 
names for the same hypostasis. See Epiphanius, Panarion 62.1.1–62.8.5, in The Panarion of Epiphanius of 
Salamis: Sects 47-80, De Fide (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 121–28. Epiphanius argues that the “recent” (62.1.1) 
Sabellian heresy argued that “the Father is the same, the Son is the same, and the Holy Spirit is the same, so 
that there are three names in one entity” (62.1.4). Sabellius used the image of a sun with three operations: 
illumining, warming, and the shape of the orb (62.1.6–8). In the West, theologians typically referred to 
such formulations as “patripassian,” while “Sabellian” was typically used by Eastern Christians. Harnack 
argues that the Monarchian distinction between Father and Son was “nominal,” while at the same time 
“more than nominal . . . [since] the one God, in being born man, appeared as Son” (Harnack, History of 
Dogma, 3: 64). See also Braun, Deus Christianorum, 167 n.1, who maintains that “la théologie de 
Novatien, comme son langage, dépend étroitment” on Tertullian. 
89 See Geoffrey D. Dunn, “The Diversity and Unity of God in Novatian’s De Trinitate,” 
Ephemredies Theologicae Lovanienses 78 (2002): 385–409, at 409. Dunn describes Novatian as “sailing 
between the Scylla and Charybdis of Adoptionism and Modalism.” See Novatian. Trin. 12.9 (CCSL 4:32). 
Eligant ergo ex duobus, quid uelint, hunc qui ab Africo uenit Filium esse an Patrem; Deus enim dicitur ab 
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With opposition on both his right and left, Novatian was forced to present a 
doctrine of the Trinity without collapsing the Father into the Son and without arguing that 
the Son was mere man.91 Novatian nuances Tertullian’s image language, tempering it 
with talk of form.92 There are two pressure points for this aversion to image language. On 
the one hand, image language, trading in the language of “seeming” or “appearing,” 
summons the ghosts of Docetism (that Christ only “appeared” to be human).93 Still, on 
the other, Novatian occasionally discourages consideration of Christ as image because 
image language is to be associated with created human beings. Exegesis of Philippians 
2:6–11 helps his case. “If Christ had been only a man,” Novatian writes, “he would have 
been spoken of as in ‘the image’ of God, not ‘in the form’ of God. For we know that 
humanity was made according to the image, not according to the form, of God.”94  
                                                                                                                                            
Africo uenturus. Si Filium, quid dubitant Christum et Deum dicere? Deum enim scriptura dicit esse 
uenturum. Si Patrem, quid dubitant cum Sabellii temeritate misceri, qui Christum Patrem dicit? Nisi 
quoniam siue illum Patrem, siue Filium dixerint, ab haeresi sua inuiti licet desciscant necesse est, qui 
Christum hominem tantummodo solent dicere, dum illum rebus ipsis coacti Deum incipient promere, siue 
dum illum Patrem, siue dum illum Filium uoluerint nuncupare. 
90 Novatian. Trin. 30.6 (CCSL 4: 73). 
91 See Dunn, “The Diversity and Unity of God in Novatian’s De Trinitate,” at 386, 390. Contrary 
to other notable scholars, Dunn argues that from the outset of Trin., Novatian is concerned with the 
“threeness” of God and with challenges for explaining the “oneness” of God. 
92 Novatian. Trin. 22.2 (CCSL 4: 55). See Russell J. DeSimone, “Again the Kenosis of Phil. 2,6–
11,” Augustinianum 32.1 (1992): 91–104, at 99–100; Boersma, Augustine’s Early Theology of Image, 28. 
This is not to say that Novatian fails to use image language. As we will see later, he trades in such language 
in the latter chapters of Trin.  
93 See Novatian. Trin. 10.6 (CCSL 4: 27). Neque igitur eum haereticorum agnoscimus christum, 
qui in imagine, ut dicitur, fuit et non in ueritate, <ne> nihil uerum eorum quae gessit fecerit, si ipse 
phantasma et non ueritas fuit, neque eum qui nihil in se nostri corporis gessit, dum ex maria nihil accepit, 
ne non nobis uenerit, dum non in nostra substantia uisus apparuit, neque illum qui aetheream siue 
sideream, ut alii uoluerunt haeretici, induit carnem, ne nullam in illo nostram intellegamus salutem, si non 
etiam nostri corporis cognoscamus soliditatem, nec ullum omnino alterum, qui quoduis aliud ex figmento 
haereticorum gesserit corpus fabularum. 
94 Novatian. Trin. 22.2 (CCSL 4: 55). Si homo tantummodo Christus, in imagine Dei, non in forma 
Dei relatus fuisset. Hominem enim scimus ad imaginem, non ad formam Dei factum. See Tert. Prax. 2.4 
(CCSL 2: 1161), noted above at n. 21, where forma is a descriptor of God’s economic manifestation in the 
world. Quasi non sic quoque unus sit omnia dum ex uno omnia per substantiae scilicet unitatem et 
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By adapting Pauline language from Philippians 2, Novatian creates a theoretical 
distinction between image (imago) and form (forma): image is a predicate proper to 
human beings, form, proper only to God. To describe the distinction’s content, Novatian 
argues that the Son is “chief and noble” (praecipuus atque generosus) above all creation, 
including the angels, and that the Son is “the imitator of all His Father’s works (imitator 
omnium paternorum operum) in that he himself works even as his Father.”95  
Novatian supplements his gloss on Philippians 2 with reference to John 14:8–10 
as proof of how this divine power is disclosed.96 Referencing Philip’s exchange with 
Jesus—“Lord, show us the Father,” etc.—Novatian argues that the works of the Son bear 
out the shared power of the Father and Son and so sets his position contrary to Sabellian 
and monarchian exegesis.  
For what the Lord said—“If you have known me, you have known my Father 
also: and henceforth you have known Him, and have seen Him” (Jn. 14:7)—he 
had said not wanting to be understood as the Father, but that the one, who 
thoroughly and fully and with all faith and all reverence approaches the Son of 
God, by every means shall attain and shall see the Father through the Son himself, 
in whom he thus believes. “For no one,” he says, “can come to the Father but 
through me” (Jn. 6:44). And for that reason he shall not only come to God the 
Father, and shall know the Father Himself; but, moreover, he ought thus to hold, 
and so to presume in mind and soul that he has henceforth not only known, but 
seen the Father.97 
                                                                                                                                            
nihilominus custodiatur oikonomiae sacramentum, quae unitatem in trinitatem disponit, tres dirigens . . .  
Patrem et Filium et Spiritum, tres autem non statu sed gradu, nec substantia sed forma, nec potestate sed 
specie, unius autem substantiae et unius status et unius potestatis quia unus Deus ex quo et gradus isti et 
formae et species in nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti depuntantur.  
95 Novatian. Trin. 22.2 (CCSL 4: 55). 
96 The use of John 14 (particularly verses 8–10), as mentioned at the outset of the chapter, has a 
broad following in Latin theology. For Novatian’s recourse to Johannine texts, see Evans, Tertullian’s 
Treatise against Praxeas, 25–28. 
97 Novatian. Trin. 28.4–5 (CCSL 4: 66): quod enim dixit dominus: si me cognouistis, et patrem 
meum cognouistis, et amodo nostis illum et uidistis illum, non sic dixerat ut se patrem uellet intellegi, sed 
quoniam qui penitus et plene et cum tota fide et tota religione accessit ad dei filium, omnibus modis per 
ipsum filium, in quem sic credit, ad patrem peruenturus sit eundem que uisurus. nemo enim, inquit, potest 
uenire ad patrem nisi per me. et ideo ad patrem deum non tantum uenturus est et cogniturus ipsum patrem, 
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According to Novatian, present in the Son’s very words to his followers is evidence for 
the divine unity of works and power between the Father and Son. This evidence exists 
because, according to Novatian, the Son is the image of the Father. The Son as image 
shows us something of the Father, and hence, to know and see the Son is to know and see 
the Father. Later in the chapter Novatian clarifies how this seeing takes place. Novatian 
then resorts to the use of image language which he had earlier discouraged:  
Seeing the image of God the Father through the Son, it was as if [the one seeing] 
saw the Father; since every one believing on the Son should be exercised in the 
contemplation of the image, so that, being accustomed to seeing the divinity in the 
image, he may progress and grow even to the perfect contemplation of God the 
Father Almighty.98  
 
When one sees the Son, it is “as if” (atque si) one sees the Father. Novatian pushes the 
point still further: seeing the Father in the Son has to do with spiritual progress and 
growth to perfect contemplation. Seeing the Son, through whom shines the image of the 
Father, is an act of preparatory contemplation for the viewer. The Son as image is an 
educative tool by which we become accustomed to seeing divinity so as to become fit for 
perfect contemplation of God. 
Novatian’s logic here hinges on two significant clusters of terminology. The first 
pertains to being accustomed or habituated to seeing the Father by seeing the Son—a line 
                                                                                                                                            
sed etiam sic tenere debet atque ita animo ac mente praesumere, quasi iam nouerit patrem pariter et 
uiderit. For the theme that the “Word performs the works of God,” see Lloyd, “Ontological Subordination 
in Novatian of Rome’s Theology of the Son,” 208–14. Cf. Novatian, Trin. 22.2 (CCSL 4: 55). 
98 Novatian. Trin. 28.25 (CCSL 4: 68): […] dum imaginem dei patris per filium uidet, atque si 
uiderit patrem, quandoquidem unusquisque credens in filium exerceatur in imaginis contemplatione, ut 
assuefactus ad diuinitatem uidendam in imagine proficere possit et crescere usque ad dei patris 
omnipotentis perfectam contemplationem […]. 
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of thinking also present in Irenaeus.99 Throughout On the Trinity, Novatian uses terms 
like assuefacio,100 assuesco,101 and soleo102 (and their cognates) to describe both the Son’s 
economical descent and humanity’s preparation for seeing the Father face-to-face. The 
second cluster of terms supplements accustomization language and pertains to verbs of 
sight and seeing. On the Trinity 18.1–5 is perhaps the clearest example of these terms at 
work. The passage is worth quoting at length: 
Behold, the same Moses recounts in another place that God was seen by Abraham 
(Gen. 12:7, 18:1). Yet that same Moses hears from God that “no one sees God and 
lives” (Ex. 33:20). If God cannot be seen, then how was God seen? Or if God is 
seen, then how is God not able to be seen? For John also says, “No man has seen 
God” (Jn. 1:18) and the Apostle Paul, “Whom no man has seen, nor can see” (1 
Tim. 6:16). But certainly scripture does not lie. Therefore God was truly seen. 
From this we can understand that it was not the Father who was seen, for the 
Father is never seen; but the Son, who has been accustomed both to descend and 
to be seen because he has descended. “For he is the image of the invisible God” 
(Col. 1:15), so that the meanness and fragility of the human condition might grow, 
already then, occasionally accustomed to see God the Father in the image of God, 
that is, in the Son of God. For gradually and incrementally human frailty had to be 
nourished by the image toward that glory, so that one day it would be able to see 
God the Father. For great things are dangerous if they are sudden. For even the 
sudden light of the sun after darkness, with its too great splendor, will not make 
manifest the light of day to unaccustomed eyes, but rather causes blindness. And 
lest this should occur to the injury of human eyes, the darkness is disrupted and 
dissipated little by little; and the rising of that luminary, mounting by moderate 
increments that escape notice, gently accustoms their eyes to bear its full orb by 
the increments of its rays. So also, therefore, Christ—that is, the image of God 
and the Son of God— is looked upon by men, inasmuch as he could be seen. And 
thus the fragility and meanness of the human lot is nourished, led forth, and 
educated by him; so that, having been accustomed to gaze upon the Son, it may 
one day be able to see God the Father Himself as he is, that it may not be stricken 
                                                
99 For examples of accustomization or accustomizing language in Irenaeus, see Haer. 3.17.1, 
3.20.2, 4.5.4–5, 4.13.2, 4.21.3, 4.38.1, 5.8.1. See Eric Osborn, Irenaeus of Lyons (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 81–115; idem, “Irenaeus,” in The Blackwell Companion to the Theologians, 2 
Volume Set, ed. Ian S. Markham (Malden, MA: John Wiley & Sons, 2009), 1: 124. 
100 E.g., Novatian. Trin. 18.4 (CCSL 4: 44), 28.25 (CCSL 4: 67–68), 29.16 (CCSL 4: 71). 
101 E.g., Trin. 18.3 (CCSL 4: 44), 18.5 (CCSL 4: 44). 
102 E.g., Trin. 12.9 (CCSL 4: 32), 18.2 (CCSL 4: 44), 18.13 (CCSL 45–46), 18.16 (CCSL 4: 46), 
30.2 (CCSL 4: 72). 
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by His sudden and intolerable brightness of his majesty, and be unable to see God 
the Father, whom it has always desired.103  
 
In the above passage, Novatian’s logic takes up seemingly contradictory scriptural 
statements that God is both seen and unseen. Abraham was said to have seen God and yet 
Exodus indicates that no one has ever seen God and lived. Reference, too, to John’s 
gospel and Paul’s First Epistle to Timothy reiterate the challenge. Each of these citations 
refer, Novatian maintains, to the invisibility of the Father, not of the Son. The Son was 
surely seen—this is why he is called “the Image of God.” “Image,” as earlier indicated 
when we considered other texts, points Novatian clearly to concern for what it means to 
“see” the Son. Adapting Tertullian’s metaphor of the sun and its “projections” from 
Against Praxeas 8.5,104 Novatian explains how human beings are accustomed to see the 
unseen God through the Son. The Son as image thus plays an educative role in 
individuals’ eventual vision of God. 
                                                
103 Novatian. Trin. 18.1–5 (CCSL 4: 44). Ecce idem Moyses refert alio in loco quod Abrahae uisus 
sit Deus. Atquin idem Moyses audit a Deo quod nemo hominum Deum uideat et uiuat. Si uideri non potest 
Deus, quomodo uisus est Deus? Aut si uisus est, quomodo uideri non potest? Nam et Ioannes Deum nemo, 
inquit, uidit umquam, et apostolus Paulus: Quem uidit hominum nemo nec uidere potest. Sed non utique 
scriptura mentitur. Ergo uere uisus est Deus. Ex quo intellegi potest quod non Pater uisus sit, qui 
numquam uisus est, sed Filius, qui et descendere solitus est et uideri, quia descenderit. Imago est enim 
inuisibilis Dei, ut mediocritas et fragilitas condicionis humanae Deum Patrem uidere aliquando iam tunc 
assuesceret in imagine Dei, hoc est in Filio Dei. Gradatim enim et per incrementa fragilitas humana nutriri 
debuit per imaginem ad istam gloriam, ut Deum Patrem uidere posset aliquando. Periculosa sunt enim 
quae magna sunt, si repentina sunt. Nam etiam lux solis subita post tenebras splendore nimio insuetis 
oculis non ostendet diem, sed potius faciet caecitatem. Quod ne in damnum humanorum contingat 
oculorum, paulatim disruptis et dissipatis tenebris ortus luminaris istius mediocribus incrementis fallenter 
assurgens oculos hominum sensim assuefacit ad totum orbem suum ferendum per incrementa radiorum. Sic 
ergo et Christus, id est imago Dei et Filius Dei, ab hominibus inspicitur, qua poterat uideri. Et ideo 
fragilitas et mediocritas sortis humanae per ipsum alitur, producitur, educatur, ut aliquando Deum quoque 
ipsum Patrem, assueta Filium conspicere, possit ut est uidere, ne maiestatis ipsius repentino et intolerabili 
fulgore percussa intercipi possit, ut Deum Patrem, quem semper optauit, uidere non possit. See Adhémar 
d’Alès, Novatien, étude sur la théologie romaine au milieu du IIIe siècle, Études de Théologie Historique 
(Paris: G. Beauchesne, 1924), 111–12. D’Alès mentions this passage in the context of “Alexandrian 
philosophy,” which developed a “theory of divine intermediaries.” 
104 See Tert. Prax. 8.5 (CCSL 2: 1167–68). 
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Verbs of sight and contemplation determine the meaning of this passage: uideo, 
inscpicio, and conspicio each taking on a different shades of meaning. Video is 
Novatian’s typical marker of sight, rendered simply as “see.” Inspicio serves to 
emphasize attention or consideration in ways uideo cannot; hence, I translate ab 
hominibus inspicitur as “looked upon by men.” Conspicio connotes not only sight, but 
lasting attention and thorough regard, and therefore, I have translated it “gaze upon.” To 
say that these verbs and their cognates represent a true progression in modes of seeing 
would be too presumptuous or even contrived. But, at the least, Novatian does seem to be 
communicating multiple aspects of seeing. The one who sees the Son is both visually 
aware of the Son’s works and wholly attends to their beauty and power. And in so seeing, 
analyzing, and attending, the individual becomes habituated to the final vision of God. In 
other words, vocabulary of seeing and of being accustomed function as a description of a 
divine pedagogy performed through the Son.  
At On the Trinity 3.6, Novatian recalls that creation itself was once humanity’s 
means for knowing God, the visible by which we were to glean the invisible. He makes 
his case with a paraphrase of Romans 1:20: “the human mind (animus), learning hidden 
things from those that are manifest (ex manifestis occulata condiscens), from the 
greatness of the works (de operum magnitudine) which it sees, might, with the eyes of the 
mind (occulis mentis), consider the greatness of the Maker.”105 This statement is as much 
a claim about the epistemology of the seer as it is about the creation seen. Human beings 
are wired to understand hidden things by things manifest. Even given this fact, Novatian 
reiterates, we must be “accustomed” to see aright; our bodies are likewise to be 
                                                
105 Novatian. Trin. 3.6 (CCSL 4: 16). 
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“accustomed” (assuefacit), so they too can be associated with God’s divine power.106 The 
Son serves as our tutor, nourishing and educating us to that eventual reality by imaging 
the Father to us.  
While such a statement might bear similarities to Tertullian, Novatian does not 
argue in the same ways that the Father and Son share a single substance. Most often, 
Novatian will use substance with reference to the stuff of which Jesus is made rather than 
a statement of identity of the Father and the Son.107 Still, later Latin Nicenes will shy 
away from Novatian’s language that within Jesus there is a “concord of substance” 
(concordia substantiae)108 or that between the Father and Son there is a “communion of 
substance” (communionem substantiae).109  
                                                
106 Novatian. Trin. 29.16 (CCSL 4: 71). See Lloyd, “Ontological Subordination in Novatian of 
Rome’s Theology of the Son,” 82–87. Understanding how the Son educates and helps human beings 
become “accustomed” to seeing God implicitly confirms Dunn’s assessment that “an exploration of the 
doctrine of the Trinity was less Novatian’s concern (I am not saying though that it was of no concern) than 
was helping his readers to understand their faith in the activity of God throughout salvation history. If this 
be the case then the evidence in the treatise of Novatian’s shortcomings with regard to trinitarian theology 
may not be shortcomings at all but may be evidence that the Trinity per se was not at all the centre of his 
pamphlet” (Dunn, “The Diversity and Unity of God in Novatian’s De Trinitate,” 390). 
107 See, e.g., Novatian. Trin. 10.8–9 (CCSL 4: 28). Quid ergo tibi cum figura corporis, si corpus 
odisti? Immo reuinceris corporis quod odisti circumferre substantiam, cuius suscipere uoluisti etiam 
figuram; odisse enim debueras corporis imitationem, si oderas ueritatem, quoniam si alter es, aliter uenire 
debueras, ne dicereris filius creatoris, si uel imaginem habuisses carnis et corporis. Certe si oderas 
natiuitatem, quia creatoris oderas nuptiarum coniunctionem, recusare debueras etiam imitationem hominis 
qui per nuptias nascitur creatoris. Neque igitur eum haereticorum agnoscimus christum, qui in imagine, ut 
dicitur, fuit et non in ueritate, <ne> nihil uerum eorum quae gessit fecerit, si ipse phantasma et non ueritas 
fuit, neque eum qui nihil in se nostri corporis gessit, dum ex maria nihil accepit, ne non nobis uenerit, dum 
non in nostra substantia uisus apparuit, neque illum qui aetheream siue sideream, ut alii uoluerunt 
haeretici, induit carnem, ne nullam in illo nostram intellegamus salutem, si non etiam nostri corporis 
cognoscamus soliditatem, nec ullum omnino alterum, qui quoduis aliud ex figmento haereticorum gesserit 
corpus fabularum. 
108 Trin. 24.11 (CCSL 4: 60): deum accipiant atque ideo christum iesum dominum ex utroque 
connexum, ut ita dixerim, ex utroque contextum atque concretum et in eadem utriusque substantiae 
concordia mutui ad inuicem foederis confibulatione sociatum hominem et deum scripturae hoc ipsum 
dicentis ueritate cognoscant.  
109 Trin. 31.20 (CCSL 4: 77–78): Vnde unus deus ostenditur uerus et aeternus pater, a quo solo 
haec uis diuinitatis emissa, etiam in filium tradita et directa, rursum per substantiae communionem ad 
patrem reuoluitur. Most Latin Nicenes will not indicate more than one substantia with reference to God. 
See, however, Augustine’s somewhat forced and untechnical description, which makes ὑποσστάσις 
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Following trends in image theology, Novatian argues that the image of God’s 
divinity is manifest through the Son.110 Since the Son is the image of the Father, by seeing 
the Son, we have insight into the nature of the Father. “For [the Son] is also the image of 
God,” Novatian writes elsewhere, “hence added to these things is the fact that ‘as the 
Father works, so does the Son work also’ (Jn. 5:19) and the Son is the imitator of all the 
Father’s works. Accordingly, everyone should consider that he has (in a certain sense) 
already seen the Father, inasmuch as he sees the one who always imitates the invisible 
Father in all his works.”111  
While others, like Hilary and Ambrose, utilize image language to describe the 
Son, they will not say that the Son “imitates” the Father, because of the Nicene worry that 
if the Son imitated the Father, he would be considered less than consubstantial with God 
the Father. The Son’s image is for Nicene theologians not a result of the imitation of the 
Father, but the iconic manifestation of the Father’s nature. For Hilary, as we will see, 
language of seeing (primarily, uideo and cognates) pertains to knowing something of the 
Father’s and the Son’s consubstantiality. 
The Nicene worry is alien to Novatian. Considering the present Son and his deeds 
prepares the seer over time to see the Father face-to-face. The dynamic is similar to what 
                                                                                                                                            
coincide with Latin substantia in his Trin. 5.8.10 (CCSL 50: 216–17). See Lewis Ayres, Augustine and the 
Trinity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 296–301; Richard Cross, “Quid Tres? On what 
precisely Augustine professes not to understand in De Trinitate V and VII,” HTR 100 (2007): 215–32; 
Johannes Arnold,“Begriff und heilsökonomische Bedeutung der göttlichen Sendungen in Augustinus De 
Trinitate,” Recherches augustiniennes 25 (1991): 3–69.  
110 For a brief analysis of Novatian’s image theology, see Boersma, Augustine’s Early Theology of 
Image, 27–31. See also Michel René Barnes, “The Visible Christ and the Invisible Trinity: Mt. 5:8 in 
Augustine’s Trinitarian Theology of 400,” Modern Theology 19.3 (2003): 329–55, at 340–41. 
111 Novatian. Trin. 28.15 (CCSL 4: 67). Nam et imago est Dei Patris, ut his etiam illud accedat, 
quoniam sicut Pater operatur, ita operatur et Filius, et imitator est Filius omnium operum paternorum, ut 
perinde habeat unusquisque quasi iam uiderit Patrem, dum eum uidet qui inuisibilem Patrem in omnibus 
operibus semper imitatur. 
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we witnessed in Tertullian: the works of the Son prove the Son divine and reveal his 
intimate connection with the Father. Still, for Novatian, the Father is “always both the 
same and equal to Himself,”112 which means that the Father is unable to experience 
change, birth, time, place, etc. Statements like these drive an ontological wedge between 
the Father and the Son.113 The Father is unable to be “accustomed” to anything—He 
simply is. The Son, on the other hand, occupies a middle ground: he communes with the 
Father’s substance, and yet, like humanity, he can be affected because he can be prepared 
for, or “accustomed” to, his earthly descent.114  
Fourth-century authors recycle many of the same proof-texts used by Tertullian 
and Novatian in their anti-monarchian writings—a fact that frustrates the once-assumed 
claim of the radical novelty of fourth- and fifth-century theology.115 In part the 
association between those before and after Nicaea is a blurring of the lines that were 
thought to separate their opponents. The sort of damnation by association was 
                                                
112 Novatian. Trin. 4.7 (CCSL 4: 18). See D’Alès, Novatien, étude sur la théologie romaine au 
milieu du IIIe siècle, 100, 122–23. 
113 Cf. D’Alès, Novatien, étude sur la théologie romaine au milieu du IIIe siècle, 126; and Dunn, 
“The Diversity and Unity of God in Novatian’s De Trinitate,” 400–5. Dunn appears to follow D’Alès’ 
suggestion that the invisibility/visibility distinction between Father and Son does not pertain to divinity but 
to “a subordination of dignity or of function between Son and Father” (400). Michel Barnes critiques 
D’Alès as “resolving the antinomy . . . via an anachronistic reading” (Barnes, “The Visible Christ and the 
Invisible Trinity,” 351, n.42). 
114 E.g., Novatian. Trin. 18.1–5 (CCSL 4: 44). See Lloyd, “Ontological Subordination in Novatian 
of Rome’s Theology of the Son,” at 238–86. 
115 See Williams, “Monarchianism and Photinus of Sirmium as the Persistent Heretical Face of the 
Fourth Century”; Winrich A. Löhr, “A Sense of Tradition: The Homoiousian Church Party,” in Arianism 
After Arius, ed. M. R. Barnes and D. H. Williams (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1993), 81–100; William A. 
Jurgens, The Faith of the Early Fathers (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1970), 247; Mark Weedman, 
The Trinitarian Theology of Hilary of Poitiers (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 125–30. Löhr helpfully notes that 
nuanced heresiology became rare for those in the throes of the fourth-century Christological debates (Löhr, 
99). 
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common.116 It would be easy to make a hard-and-fast identification of pro-Nicenes and 
their pre-Nicene proto-orthodox forebears—propped up by similar constellations of 
controverted scriptural texts in either group. Such an association blurs the lines drawn by 
later Latins after Nicaea. Nicenes like Hilary, Marius Victorinus, and Ambrose (even 
Augustine) could not assume a role for the Son like that assigned to him by their 
predecessors. Because of their respective track records in post-Nicene debates, each 
argues in discrete ways for the equal divinity of the Father and Son. So while these 
Nicenes resemble those categorized as “traditional Latin theologians” based largely on 
their scriptural references and logics, their thought signals important theological 
development. 
 
Hilary of Poitiers 
Fourth-century debates over the relationship of the Father and Son took on a 
different shade than the anti-monarchian polemics of the third century, addressing new 
doctrinal challenges and anxieties. Most significantly, the Nicene formula introduced a 
                                                
116 Ambr. Fid. 3.15.123–3.15.126 (CSEL 78: 150–52): Quomodo negant dei esse substantiam? 
Quomodo uerbum substantiae, quod creberrimum in scripturis est, putant esse uitandum, cum ipsi "ex alia 
substantia" - hoc est eterousion - dicendo filium substantiam tamen in deo esse non abnuant? Non igitur 
uerbum, sed uim uerbi fugiunt, quia nolunt uerum esse dei filium. Nam licet humano uerbo non possit 
diuinae generationis series conpraehendi, tamen iudicarunt patres fidem suam tali proprie contra 
eterousion sermone signandam, auctoritatem secuti prophetae qui ait: Quis stetit in substantia domini et 
uidit uerbum eius? Secundum impietatem igitur suam positum substantiae uerbum recipiunt Arriani, 
secundum pietatem autem fidelium conprobatum repudiant et refutant. Nam quid est aliud, cur homousion 
patri nolint filium dici, nisi quia nolunt uerum dei filium confiteri? Sicut auctor ipsorum Eusebius 
Nicomedensis epistula sua prodidit scribens: Si uerum, inquit, dei filium et increatum dicimus, homousion 
cum patre incipimus confiteri. Haec cum lecta esset epistula in concilio Nicaeno, hoc uerbum in tractatu 
fidei posuerunt patres, quod uiderunt aduersariis esse formidini, ut tamquam euaginato ab ipsis gladio 
ipsorum caput nefandae heresis amputarent.Frustra autem uerbum istud propter Sabellianos declinare se 
dicunt et in eo suam imperitiam produnt. Homousion enim aliud alii, non ipsum est sibi. See also Williams, 
“Monarchianism and Photinus of Sirmium as the Persistent Heretical Face of the Fourth Centry,” 203–4. 
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new descriptor for the relationship of the Father and Son: ὁμοούσιος. Particularly acute 
for Hilary, bishop of Poitiers (ca. 310–67 CE), as for his near-contemporary Ambrose, 
was Western homoianism, a theology which proposed that the Son was similar (ὅμοιος), 
but not equal, in substance or essence to the Father.117 This one iota of difference fostered 
great dissention, often complicated by imperial edict and influence. Hilary’s On the 
Councils offers primary evidence for this interaction between homoian and homoousian 
allegiances. Perhaps more importantly, this interaction is driven in large part by scriptural 
references to the Son’s visibility and the homoian inability to reconcile that visibility with 
other passages promoting divine invisibility.  
They [the Homoians] excuse themselves for having desired to be silent as to 
ὁμοούσιον and ὁμοιούσιον on the ground that they taught that the meaning of 
the words was identical. Unskilled bishops (rudes episcopii), I believe, and 
ignorant (ignorantes) of the significance of ὁμοούσιον: as though there had never 
been any council about the matter, or any quarrels (lites) . . . . . But it is not 
known how he [the Son] was born, can it be unknown, that God the Son being 
born not of another substance but of God, has not an essence differing from the 
Father’s? Have they not read that the Son is to be honored (honorificandum) even 
as the Father (cf. Jn. 5:23), that they prefer the Father in honor? Did they consider 
it unknown that the Father is seen in the Son (in Filio uideri) (cf. Jn. 14:9), that 
they make the Son differ in dignity, splendor, and majesty?118  
 
Here, we see that, in the midst of an invective against homoians Ursacius and Valens, 
Hilary is concerned with the homoian tendency to subordinate the Son to the Father and 
how that tendency is hitched to anxieties over divine (in)visibility. “Were they uniformed 
that the Father is seen in the Son?” Hilary asks rhetorically. In failing to recognize both 
                                                
117 See Gustave Bardy, “L’Occident et les documents de la controverse arienne,” Revue des 
science religieuses 20 (1940): 28–63.  
118 Hilar. Syn. 27.79 (PL 10: 532–33). As Borchardt explores, Hilary never refers to the names of 
his living opponents, and only rarely to Arius or Sabellius (C. F. A. Borchardt, Hilary of Poitiers’ Role in 
the Arian Struggle [The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966], 53–138). Hilary instead is content to level 
invective against non-Nicenes. Hilar. Trin. 5.25 (CCSL 62: 176–77), 6.7 (CCSL 62: 202), 7.6 (CCSL 62: 
265–66), 8.28 (CCSL 62a: 339–40), 8.40 (CCSL 62a: 353–54). 
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the unity and distinction of the Father and Son, homoians subordinated the Son and thus 
honored him less than the Father. John 5:23 and John 14:9 are the textual cornerstones for 
Hilary’s contention: since the Father is seen in the Son, the two should be worshipped 
equally. 
Throughout this section of On the Councils, Hilary cites Johannine texts contested 
throughout trinitarian controversies (Jn. 5:19, 5:25; 14:9, etc.) to prove that the Son is of 
the same substance as the Father, countering the typical homoian doctrine of the 
subordinated role of the Son due to his visibility. Only the invisible Father, by homoian 
lights, was to be properly called God. But the fact that the Son acts in accord with the 
Father, Hilary rebuts, implies likeness, and thus, equality of “power” (uirtus) and 
“nature” (natura).119 “No likeness exists,” Hilary writes, “unless there be an equality of 
nature (aequalitate naturae), and equality of nature cannot exist unless there be unity 
(una), not of person (personae) but of kind (generis).”120  
For Hilary, as we saw for Novatian and will see for Ambrose, the Son is the true 
image or manifestation of the Father; this image grants the viewer a connection to the 
shared invisible power of Father and Son.121 On this point, Hilary exegetes John 5:19, 
10:30, and 14:8–10 against his opponents to demonstrate the “true meaning” (ueritas 
demonstrata) of the scriptures and to explain what it might mean that the Father and Son 
are both one and yet discrete.122 Although Hilary’s twelve-book On the Trinity was 
                                                
119 Hilar. Syn. 27.75 (PL 10: 529–30). 
120 Hilar. Syn. 27.76 (PL 10: 530). 
121 Hilar. Trin. 3.5–7 (CCSL 62: 76–78). 
122 Hilar. Trin. 10.5 (CCSL 62a: 462). For Hilary on “inseparable operations,” see Ayres, Nicaea 
and its Legacy, 182–83. George Newlands notes a “high proportion of Johannine texts” in Hilary’s De 
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compiled over the course of several years, the theme of seeing the Father in the Son 
recurs throughout. Particularly important for our analysis are books 3, 8, and 9.123  
Throughout On the Trinity Hilary responds to the homoian challenge doubting 
that a visible Son can be of the same substance or share the same power as an invisible 
God.124  To handle this issue Hilary’s homoian opponents maintained a “concord of 
unanimity, so that there may be in them a unity of will not of nature, that is, that they may 
be one not by what they are, but by wanting the same thing . . .. Thus, it is not nature 
which makes [Father and Son] one, but will.”125 While the claim to a volitional unity 
might satisfy some, Hilary argues that the homoians’ claim is an empty one.126 Unities of 
will and person fail to describe the unique union between Father and Son; the two must 
be unified in nature (or kind), as well. Hilary argues further that homoian explanations of 
the unity are propped up by mistaken understandings of key passages from the gospel of 
John that introduce a stumbling block to their own teaching. 
For heretics labor to deceive others by the dictum, “I and the Father are one” (Jn. 
10:30), that it might not be believed that in them is the unity of nature and non-
                                                                                                                                            
trinitate at George M. Newlands, Hilary of Poitiers: A Study in Theological Method (Eugene, OR: Wipf & 
Stock, 2008), 164. 
123 It is generally considered that the first four books of De trinitate were written prior to Hilary’s 
exile, with the remainder of the treatise coming later. For my understanding of Trin., I am indebted to 
Weedman, The Trinitarian Theology of Hilary of Poitiers; and Carl Beckwith, Hilary of Poitiers on the 
Trinity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 73–148. Weedman notes the polemical contexts of 
Hilary’s writing. Beckwith notes the later additions to books 2 and 3 of Trin., in particular the somewhat 
jarring preface of book 3 that introduces exegesis of John 14:8–10.  
124 See Hilar. Trin. 3.1 (CCSL 62: 73). “It seems impossible that something should be both within 
and without another (ut quod in altero sit aeque idipsum extra alterum sit), or that  . . . these beings can 
reciprocally contain one another.” 
125 Hilar. Trin. 8.5 (CCSL 62a: 318–19). Hilar. Trin. 8.17 (CCSL 62a: 328–29). Mark Weedman 
argues that Philippians 2:6–7 provides the exegetical schema for understanding Trin. 8 and 9. See 
Weedman, The Trinitarian Theology of Hilary of Poitiers, 131–35.  
126 Hilar. Trin. 3.5 (CCSL 62: 77). This emptiness, in part, is because Jesus’s “mode of action 
frustrates sight and sense . . . the power of God (uirtus Dei) is manifest in the deeds discerned.” 
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differing essence of deity, but only a oneness from mutual love and an agreement 
of wills. To this end, they produce an example of that unity, as we demonstrated 
above, even from the words of the Lord, “they all may be one, as you Father are 
in me, and I in you, that they also may be in us” (Jn. 17:21).127 
 
Hilary surely does not deny unanimity of Father and Son, but contends that it is 
impossible for two to be unified in will and not nature, their visibility and invisibility 
notwithstanding. In fact, and he puts it even more strongly: unity of will comes packaged 
with unity of nature—“the same nature cannot will diverse things.”128 
Following John 10:30, Hilary maintains both that the Son’s words and works are 
accurate manifestations of the Father’s nature and that the Father and Son are one in their 
shared nature.  
The Father speaks through [the Son’s] speaking, and works through his working, 
and judges through his judgment, and through his being seen, and reconciles 
through his reconciling, and abides in him who abides in the Father—what more 
appropriate words, I ask, could he have used in his teaching to suit our 
understanding of his exposition, that we might understand their unity, than those 
by which, through the truth of the birth and the unity of the nature, it is declared 
that whatever the Son did and said, the Father said and did in the Son? This says 
nothing of a nature alien to Him, or added by creation to God, or born into God 
from a portion of God, but it betokens the divinity begotten by a perfect birth as 
perfect God, who has such assurance of the consciousness of his nature that he 
says, “I am in the Father and the Father in me” (Jn. 14:11), and again, “All things 
whatsoever the Father has are mine” (Jn. 16:15). For [the Son] lacks nothing of 
                                                
127 Hilar. Trin. 8.10 (CSEL 62a: 321–22): Laborantes enim heretici fallere per id quod dictum est 
Ego et Pater unum sumus, ne naturae in his unitas et indifferens diuinitatis substantia crederetur, sed ex 
dilectione mutua et ex uoluntatum concordia unum essent, exemplum unitatis istius, ut superius 
demonstrauimus, etiam ex dictis Domini protulerunt: Vt omnes unum sint, sicut tu Pater in me et ego in te, 
ut et ipsi sint in nobis. 
128 Hilar. Trin. 8.19 (CCSL 62a: 330): Vnum sunt Pater et Filius natura honore uirtute; nec natura 
eadem potest uelle diuersa. See also Trin. 7.24–25, 9.69–70. For a similar statement in De synodiis, see 
Hilar. Syn. 27.76 (PL 10: 530). “No likeness exists unless there be an equality of nature (aequalitate 
naturae), and equality of nature cannot exist unless there be unity (una), not of person (personae) but of 
kind (generis).” Beckwith points to the similarity of Hilary’s understanding of the unity of will and nature 
to that of George of Laodicea (Hilary of Poitiers on the Trinity, 144). See also Weedman, The Trinitarian 
Theology of Hilary of Poitiers, 142–43. Weedman glosses Hilary’s argument this way: “Only someone who 
is similar to the Father is the Father’s and can carry out the Father’s works. By his birth, the Son possess 
[sic] everything in himself that is God, so we must acknowledge that the works the Son does are 
characteristic of God.” See also Hanson, The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God, 568.  
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God in him in whose working and speaking and manifestation God works and 
speaks and is seen. They are not two either in their work, word, or the 
manifestation of one.129  
 
Hilary’s Nicene gloss of John 10:30 comes by way of John 14:11 and 16:15: the invisible 
unity of the Father and Son is borne out in the Son’s operations; this is what the gospel 
writer intended by writing that the Father is “in the Son” and the Son “in the Father” (Jn. 
14:11). The Father speaks, works, and is seen “through” (per) the Son’s words and works 
and in his revelation.  
 On the Trinity 9 carries through book 8’s emphasis on seeing the Father in and 
through the Son and his works. Throughout the book, Hilary cites homoian proof texts 
pertaining to the Son’s perceived inferiority to the Father (Jn. 17:3, 5:19, 14:28; Mt. 
24:36). By referencing these verses, the homoians indicate that calling the Son “God” is 
only “a mere title.”130 What the homoians fail to understand, Hilary retorts, is that some 
passages in the scriptures pertain to the Son as the “form of God,” others to the Son as the 
“form of a servant;”131 and “the homoians misread these passages because they ascribe 
                                                
129 Hilar. Trin. 8.52 (CCSL 62a: 364–65). Dicens enim se per loquentem loqui et per operantem 
operari et per iudicantem iudicare et per uisum uideri et per reconciliantem reconciliare et manere se in eo 
qui in se maneret, quaero quo alio ad intellegentiae nostrae sensum expositionis suae uti potuerit aptiore 
sermone, ut unum esse intellegerentur, quam isto quo per natiuitatis ueritatem et naturae unitatem 
quidquid Filius ageret ac diceret, id in Filio Pater et loqueretur et gereret? Non est hoc itaque naturae a se 
alienae, neque per creationem in Deum conparatae, neque ex portione Dei in Deum natae; sed perfecta 
natiuitate in Deum perfectum genitae diuinitatis. Cuius haec naturalis conscientiae fiducia est, ut dicat: 
Ego in Patre et Pater in me; et rursum: Omnia quae Patris sunt mea sunt. Nihil enim ei ex Deo deest, quo 
operante et loquente et uiso, Deus et operatur et loquitur et uidetur. Non sunt duo in unius uel operatione 
uel sermone uel uisu. See Newlands, Hilary of Poitiers, 107–9. “The dicta/facta dialectic of the rhetorical 
tradition now being bridge by the one Verbum of the incarnation . . . Hilary is much concerned to stress that 
God can only be known through God . . . More precisely, God is known in Christ.”  
130 Hilar. Trin. 9.2 (CCSL 62a: 372). 
131 Hilar. Trin. 9.14 (CCSL 62a: 386). See For more on Christ and forma, see Weedman, The 
Trinitarian Theology of Hilary of Poitiers, 130–35. That Christ is in the forma dei is a statement of equality 
of nature for Hilary. When the Son assumes the forma serui, however, that unity is frustrated. Weedman 
continues: “Although the Father and Son’s natures remained united, the incarnated Son lost the unity with 
the Father’s forma; he retains the Father’s power, but not his form. The assumption of the humanity, 
however, did create an obstacle to their unity. The forma servi lost the unity of nature with the Father, and 
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what is appropriate to the forma serui to the forma dei.”132 The well-known Christ hymn 
from Philippians 2, where Paul considers the Son’s forms of both God and man, serves as 
an interpretive lens to tackle challenging passages.133 For Hilary, the Son makes the 
Father known because he is the very “form of God and the image of His substance” (est 
Dei forma et imago substantiae eius)134 (Heb. 1:3). With reference to key scriptural texts, 
Hilary reiterates that image language should not designate a nature of lower status, but 
that the Father and Son are united in substance. It is, in other words, through the “power 
of the Son’s nature that they might come to know the nature. Once understood, the power 
of the nature would show them the nature of the understood power” (intellecta naturae 
uirtus naturam intellectatae uirtutis ostenderet).135  
                                                                                                                                            
this disunity will only be overcome when the Son’s humanity assumes the glory of the Son’s divine nature. 
. . . The unity of their glory had departed in the incarnation, but when the forma servi receives the Father’s 
glory, the Son will remain what he always was, united with the Father’s glory and form.” 
132 Weedman, The Trinitarian Theology of Hilary of Poitiers, 132. Weedman notes that throughout 
the remainder of De trinitate, Hilary’s use of Phil. 2:5-8 serves less and less like a “straightforward 
exegetical principle [and more like] a theological ‘dynamic.’” 
133 See Paul Henry, “Kénose,” in Supplément au Dictionnaire de la Bible 5 (Paris: Librairie 
Letouzey et Ané, 1957): 55–138; Pierre Grelot, “La traduction et l’interprétation de Ph 2, 6–7,” Nouvelle 
revue théologique 91 (1971): 897–922. 
134 Hilar. Trin. 3.23 (CCSL 62: 95). See also Boersma, Augustine’s Early Theology of Image, 35–
36, where Boersma notes that forma dei and imago dei function as “synonyms for Hilary.” See also 
Newlands, Hilary of Poitiers, 125, where he makes the case that names—like “image”—are not merely 
names, “but through them the things which they signify are themselves revealed.” 
135 Hilar. Trin. 8.49 (CCSL 62a: 361). See Hilar. Syn. 15 (PL 10: 491–2). cum patri filius et 
coimaginatus ad speciem sit, nec sit dissimilis in genere; quia diversitatem substantiae geniti ex substantia 
patris filii similitudo non recipit, et omnem in se divinitatis paternae, qualis et quanta forma est, invisibilis 
Dei filius et imago complectitur: et hoc vere est esse filium, paternae scilicet formae veritatem 
coimaginatae in se naturae perfecta similitudine retulisse. See Boersma, Augustine’s Early Theology of 
Image, 39–46. While Boersma capably interprets key passages from Trin. and elsewhere, he fails to 
explicate how and what precisely the words and works of the Son disclose. Instead, Boersma investigates, 
somewhat understandably, the nature and function of image-language (esp. Col. 1:15) in Hilary’s polemical 
context, concluding that the Son as image of God must be understood as an “invisible”; the Son “is not the 
visible mediation of the invisible God; the Son is not ‘image’ as a midway point between God and 
humanity who as ontologically inferior reveals the incomprehensible Father. . . . While the Son draws his 
life from the Father he receives the fullness of divinity from the Father, perfect from perfect, whole from 
whole. . . ‘Image’ is demonstrative of quality, for Hilary, for which reason the image cannot be anything 
less than its invisible source” (at 42–43). I do not doubt this is the case for Hilary, but I wonder how 
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 At On the Trinity 9.20, Hilary maintains that in “almost all [of the Son’s] 
discourses, he offers the explanation of this mystery, never separating himself from the 
divine unity . . . he places himself in unity with [the Father] . . .. So Christ, who works the 
works, and the Father who testifies through them, show that they are of an inseparable 
nature through the birth, for the operation of Christ is signified to be itself the testimony 
of God concerning him.”136 It is through the Son’s works that the substantial unity of 
Father and Son is seen; preeminent of those works is the birth of the Son. Where the 
scriptures seem to speak of an essential distinction between Father and Son, Hilary argues 
that the Son and Father have the “same power in operation” (uirtus operandi);137 the two 
are “inseparable;” and “to behold the Son is the same as to behold the Father.”138 The 
inseparability and unity of nature, in short, are not compromised by the Son’s visibility, 
but are in fact evident as a result. “The Son, who is equal with the Father, is displayed in 
his works (in gestis),” Hilary posits, “so that that the Father could be seen in Him: in 
order that through him, the Father himself might be discerned equal to the Son, and that 
we might know that in Father and Son there is no distinction of the power of nature.”139  
Clear similarities exists between Hilary’s exegesis of these debated scriptures and 
Tertullian’s a century or so prior. A touchpoint of these theological reflections is an 
                                                                                                                                            
Boersma would square Hilary’s discussion of the Son’s words and works with reference to his claims to the 
invisibility of the image. 
136 Hilar. Trin. 9.20 (CCSL 62a: 390–92).  
137 Hilar. Trin. 9.46 (CCSL 62a: 423). Quodsi eadem est uirtus operandi et eadem est religio 
honorandi, non intellego in quo tandem naturae infirmis contumelia relinquatur, cum eadem sit in Patre et 
Filio et uirtutis potestas et honoris aequalitas. 
138 Hilar. Trin. 9.52 (CCSL 62a: 430).   
139 Hilar. Trin. 9.52 (CCSL 62a: 430).  See Jean Doignon, “Une exégèse d’Hilaire de Poitiers sur 
le désir de voir la face de Dieu,” Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 41.3 (1994): 542–45. 
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ongoing dispute over the visibility of the divine. Both Tertullian and Hilary highlight the 
importance of seeing divine manifestations as disclosing discrete filial identity and/or the 
Godhead’s invisible substance: seeing divine works in the Old Testament theophanies; 
seeing the Son’s works in the gospels; and most significantly in moving into the fourth 
century, seeing the essential unity God in the works of the Son. By witnessing the Son’s 
works, and since the Father and Son are united in both will and nature, Hilary argues that 
the Father’s very substance is on display. To that end, Hilary glosses several Johannine 
(and Pauline) passages to rebut non-Nicene exegesis. 
 
Marius Victorinus 
While Hilary’s anti-homoian theology is anything but non-technical,140 Marius 
Victorinus (ca. 300141–65 CE142) presents us with a careful explication of homoousian 
                                                
140 See Barnes, The Power of God, 172. Barnes argues that Hilary uses power “in very technical 
senses indeed.” This can be held up against Carl Beckwith’s claim that Hilary’s “language is frustratingly 
economical” and “strained because of his lack of a technical Trinitarian vocabulary” that develops later in 
the fourth century. (“What he is attempting to express is what the next generations of pro-Nicenes will 
articulate as one ousia and two eternally distinct hypostases.”) Cf. Beckwith, Hilary of Poitiers on the 
Trinity, 132.  
141 Cf. A. H. Travis, “Marius Victorinus,” HTR 36 (1943): 83–90. Travis puts Victorinus’ birth at 
281. Pierre Hadot follows suit, arguing that Victorinus’ conversion later in life must mean he was 70 or 80 
at the time of his conversion. See Pierre Hadot, Marius Victorinus ( Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1971 ), 
24–25. For general introduction, see F. F. Bruce, “Marius Victorinus and His Works: In Memory of 
Alexander Souter (1872–1948),” in A Mind for What Matters: Collected Essays (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1990), 213–32. 
142 John Voelker notes that Victorinus is barely mentioned after the mid-360s. See John T. 
Voelker, “The Trinitarian Theology of Marius Victorinus: Polemic and Exegesis” (PhD Dissertation, 
Marquette University, 2006), 201. See also Aug. Conf. 8.2.3–8.3.5, who recounts Victorinus as “extremely 
learned,” “tutor to numerous noble senators,” who “defended [pagan] cults for many years with a voice 
terrifying to opponents.” Augustine makes the point in recalling Victorinus’ “conversion” to Christianity 
that he “preferred to make profession of his salvation before the holy congregation.” This confession, 
Augustine maintains, countered his “public profession” of rhetoric, for which he was renown, even lionized 
(Conf. 8.3.5). Augustine’s picture of Victorinus as a “hard-core” pagan is an assumed anachronism in 
secondary works. See Stephen Andrew Cooper, Marius Victorinus’ Commentary on Galatians (Oxford: 
Oxford Univeristy Press), 16–40, at 22–23, ns. 33–34; Hadot, Marius Victorinus, 52–58, 235–52; Robert A. 
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theology, buttressed by debts to classical rhetoric and neo-Platonic sources.143 Jerome 
names Victorinus an African by birth, who taught rhetoric in Rome under Constantius’ 
imperial rule (337–61 CE).144 Soon after his conversion to Christianity, Victorinus wrote 
works against various Arians “in dialectic style and obscure language—only to be 
understood by the learned,” as Jerome puts it.145 It is debated as to whether Ambrose 
knew or studied with Victorinus while both were in Rome prior to the former’s 
appointment to the episcopacy, or while they were both in Milan. Though scholars 
                                                                                                                                            
Markus, “Paganism, Christianity and the Latin Classics in the Fourth Century,” in J. W. Binns, ed., Latin 
Literature of the Fourth Century (London: Routledge, 1974), 1–21; R. Markus, The End of Ancient 
Christianity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 29. Cf. Ramsey MacMullen, Christianizing 
the Roman Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 69–71. 
143 See Paul Henry, “The Adversus Arium of Marius Victorinus, the First Systematic Exposition of 
the Doctrine of the Trinity,” JTS 1.1 (1950): 42–55. Henry is primarily concerned with tracking down 
Plotinian themes in Victorinus’ work, showing how and where Victorinus adopts and adapts Neo-Platonism 
for his understanding of the trinity. On Victorinus’ debts to Neo-Platonism, see Marcia Colish, “The 
Neoplatonic Tradition: The Contribution of Marius Victorinus,” in The Neoplatonic Tradition: Jewish, 
Christian and Islamic Themes, ed. Arjo Vanderjagt and Detlev Pätzold (Cologne: Dinter, 1991), 57–74. 
144 We know that Ambrose was connected to Simplicianus, wrote letters to him referring to their 
deep abiding friendship. See Ambr. Ep. 37, 38, 65, 67. See F. Holmes Dudden, The Life and Times of 
Ambrose of Milan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1935), 1: 57–8; J. Patout Burns, “A Surprise for 
Simplician,” in Studies on Patristic Texts and Archaeology: If these stones could speak—Essays in Honor 
of Dennis Edward Groh, ed. George Kalantzis and Thomas F. Martin (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 
2009), 7–27. Burns mines Ambrose’s letters and Augustine’s writings to reconstruct their correspondences 
with Simplicianus, primarily dealing with the conceptions of grace and Christian freedom. We also know 
that Simplicianus was connected to Victorinus. Aime Solignac, “Le cercle milanais,” in BA 14, (Paris: 
Desclée de brouwer, 1962), 529–36, at 532). Solignac names Simplicianus as “le centre” of the Milanese 
Christian-Platonist “circle.” See also Pierre Paul Courcelle, Recherches sur les ‘Confessions’ de saint 
Augustin, (Paris: E. de Boccard), 170–71, 383–91, at 383–84. In a recent treatment of Victorinus, Gerald 
Boersma refers to him offhandedly as “the African philosopher.” See Boersma, Augustine's Early Theology 
of Image, 57.; Boersma, “Participation in Christ: Psalm 118 in Ambrose and Augustine,” Augustinianum 
54.1 (2014): 173–97, in which Boersma argues that Psal. 118 is evidence “of the neo-Platonic milieu 
current in Milan at this time” and that “Ambrose’s account of the soul displays many Platonic resonances” 
(174).  
145 Hier. Vir. ill. 101. The generally accepted timeline for Victorinus’ polemical works, dated from 
358 to 363, can be found in Hadot’s introduction to the Sources chrétiennes critical edition, Traités 
théologiques sur la Trinité (SC 68: 7–89), and reproduced in Quasten, Patrology 4: 70–72.  
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generally accept the presence of a “Milanese circle” of Christian-Platonists, the precise 
character and structure of such a “circle” is contested.146 
Victorinus is unique in the Latin Christian tradition for his analogous descriptions 
of God. The relationship of the Father and Son is portrayed in conceptual pairs: potency 
and act, substance and image, and hiddenness and manifestation, among others. Each of 
these pairs identifies how the Father and Son can be both distinct—seen in the case of the 
Son, unseen in the Father—and yet, of the same substance. Throughout his polemical 
works, written from 358 CE onwards, Victorinus constructs a philosophically rigorous 
dialogue on the possibility and promise of using analogy in pro-Nicene trinitarian 
theology.  
Victorinus’ “Arian” opponent, Candidus by name, garners the brunt of his ire in 
several letters.147 In his first letter to Candidus, Victorinus admits the audacity in speaking 
                                                
146 See Solignac, “Le cercle milanais,” BA 14, 529–36, at 530; Pierre Paul Courcelle, Les lettres 
grecques en Occident, de Macrobe à Cassiodore (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1948), 119–29; Courcelle, 
Recherches sur les “Confessions” de saint Augustin, 13–38, 168–74. Pierre Hadot, citing Courcelle 
(Recherches sur les ‘Confessions’) exclusively, assumes Ambrose’s familiarity with Victorinus. See Hadot, 
Traités théologiques sur la Trinité, 84–85. Both Ambrose and Victorinus, Hadot contends, were part of 
Milan’s neo-Platonic Christian elite, evidenced by their affinity with Plotinus. For a similar track, see 
Andrew Lenox-Conyngham, “Ambrose and Philosophy,” in Lionel Ralph Wickham and Caroline Penrose 
Hammond Bammel, Christian Faith and Greek Philosophy in Late Antiquity: Essays in Tribute to George 
Christopher Stead, Ely Professor of Divinity, University of Cambridge (1971–1980), in Celebration of His 
Eightieth Birthday, 9th April 1993 (Leiden: Brill, 1993), 117–28. Lenox-Congnyham assumes Ambrose’s 
familiarity with the “Neoplatonic circles” in Milan. So too does Johannes van Oort. See his Jerusalem and 
Babylon: A Study Into Augustine’s City of God and the Sources of His Doctrine of the Two Cities (Leiden: 
Brill, 1991), at 50–51. Cf. Goulven Madec, Saint Ambroise et la philosophie (Paris: Études augustiniennes, 
1974), 170–71. Madec maintains that the “audaciously metaphysical Neo-Platonism” (le néoplatonisme 
audacieusement métaphysique) of Marius Victorinus had “little in common with the “moralizing Neo-
Platonism” (le néoplatisme moralisant) of Ambrose. 
147 See Hanson, The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God, 532, assumes Candidus is a literary 
construction. Hanson also notes how much more sophisticated Victorinus’ trinitarian theology is than any 
Arian thinker (at The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God, 533–34). “If we ask how much Marius 
knew of the Arianism which he attacked in his works, we must answer that he knew more than all and also 
less than all about Arianism. . . . In short, there is no satisfactory evidence that Marius Victorinus had any 
genuine knowledge of Arianism as it was in his day. He could exercise his intellect more rhetorico in 
producing arguments which he was later to refute, and he could reproduce some old Arian documents 
which had long become the stock texts for controversy, but that was all. He occasionally refers to Marcellus 
and Photinus, but shows no close acquaintance with their doctrines.” Cf. Hadot, Traités théologiques sur la 
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of what or who God is, citing Isaiah 40:13 (“Who has known the mind of the Lord or 
who has been his counselor?”),148 but proceeds nonetheless, noting that the Holy Spirit 
“arouses analogies of ideas (figurationes intellegentiarum) inscribed (inscriptas) in our 
soul from all eternity.”149 These analogies grant insight into the consubstantial 
relationship of the Father and Son (and to a lesser extent, the Holy Spirit).150 The 
analogies pair concepts or terms, each dependent on the other for its very existence. To 
speak “by analogy” (simultudine) helps the speaker understand the nature of divine 
consubstantiality (homoousios). Victorinus’ recurrent analogy is act and potency; act, a 
specific species or existent, reveals potency to act.151 “For every being has an inseparable 
species,” he writes, “or rather, the species itself is the substance itself, not that the species 
is prior to ‘to be,’ but because the species makes ‘to be.’ definite. . . and ‘to be’ is the 
Father, the species is the Son.”152 Lest we gloss over the stark claim above, let us consider 
what it might mean for an external manifestation (species) to “define” a substance. 
                                                                                                                                            
Trinité, 23–27. Hadot is here silent on Candidus as a literary construction. Elsewhere, however, Hadot 
argues that Candidus functions as a literary device to show how a Christian might reason with an Arian 
interlocutor and that philosophers starting from the same philosophical viewpoints can arrive at different 
conclusions. See Pierre Hadot, Porphyre et Victorinus, Collection des études augustiniennes 32 (Paris: 
Études augustiniennes, 1968), 1.40, n.3.  
148 Victorinus translates the verse as follows: Quis enim cognouit domini mentem aut quis fuit eius 
conciliator? 
149 Mar. Vict. Cand. 1 (CSEL 83/1: 15). 
150 See Mar. Vict. Cand. 31 (CSEL 83/1: 47). See also Hadot, Traités théologiques sur la Trinité, 
77–88. 
151 See Marcia I. Colish, The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages (Leiden: 
Brill, 1985), 131-141, at 135; R. A. Markus, “Marius Victorinus,” in Cambridge History of Later Greek 
and Early Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 331–40; Hadot, Traités 
théologiques sur la Trinité, 78. Hadot describes the analogy as “d’origine stoïcienne, qui considère 
l’existence concrète comme le terme d’une progression vers la détermination.”  
152 Mar. Vict. Ar. 1.19 (CSEL 83/1: 84). 
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If God is “at once being and act” (qui et id est quod est esse et id quod operari), 
then both aspects are constitutive of the character of God.153 Victorinus identifies the 
Father as the first action and first existence and substance, “the original τό ὄν . . . 
existing always without beginning, existing from himself” (sine principio semper 
exsistens, a se exsistens).154 The Son, on the other hand, is understood as “action (actio) . . 
. the image of the substance of God (substantiae dei imago) . . . through which God is 
understood (intellegitur), as it was declared: ‘Whoever sees me, sees the Father’” (Jn 
14.9).155 While the contours of Victorinus’ argument are unique to the Latin tradition, his 
use of certain Johannine proof texts has substantial precedent, complicating the 
occasional scholarly claim to his relative independence from the Latin polemical tradition 
or to his supposed facile fabrication of Arian theology.156 
                                                
153 Mar. Vict. Ar. 1.33 (CSEL 83.1: 115). For Victorinus’ use of the substantive infinitive for his 
argument, see Michael D. Metzger, “Marius Victorinus and the Substantive Infinitive,” Eranos 72 (1974): 
65–70, at 68–70. Metzger makes the point that  “there is only one known example of an infinitive modified 
by an attributive adjective before Marius Victorinus [Pliny, Letters 8.9 (LCL 59: 26-7)]. The same is true 
for the combination of a pronoun in the Genitive case with an infinitive [Valerius Maximus, Memorable 
Doings and Sayings 7.3.7 (LCL 492: 135–36)]. There are no earlier instances of substantives in the 
Genitive case used in this manner. It would appear then that the expanded and sophisticated utilization of 
the substantive infinitive is due to the activity of Marius Victorinus, a man writing in the heat of the 
philosophical and theological controversies of the fourth century. . . . I am inclined to . . . see [the 
substantive infinitive] as a native Latin expression whose employment was expanded both by contact with 
Greek and by the need to deal with certain philosophical and theological problems” (Metzger, “Marius 
Victorinus and the Substantive Infinitive,” 68, 70). 
154 Mar. Vict. Ar. 1.33 (CSEL 83/1: 116). 
155 Mar. Vict. Ar. 1.34 CSEL 83/1: 116). See Ambr. Fid. 5.7.97 (CSEL 78: 251). See also Mar. 
Vict. Cand. 1.14 (CSEL 83/1: 31–32), where Victorinus uses the image of a pregnant woman as an 
example of potency and act co-existing within the same being: Quid autem generat? Quod fuit intus. Quid 
igitur fuit intus in deo? Nihil aliud quam τὸ ὄν, uerum τὸ ὄν, magis autem προόν, quod est supra generale 
ὄν genus, quod supra ὄντως ὄντα, ὄν iam operante potentia. Hic est Iesus Christus.” 
156 The long-held, rarely-challenged assumption is that Victorinus, while writing in Latin, is novel 
in his theology. Gerald Boersma, for instance, juxtaposes Victorinus and other pro-Nicenes; Hilary and 
Ambrose use the anti-monarchian tradition, while “Victorinus develops a self-standing theology of image 
to fit the Homoousian cause” (Boersma, Augustine's Early Theology of Image, 53). Mark Weedman (The 
Trinitarian Theology of Hilary of Poitiers, 56–73) contends that Marius Victorinus shows a great deal of 
“independence” and should thus not be depicted as reliant on Latin predecessors. See Hanson, Search, 531–
56; and Simonetti, La crisi ariana nel IV secolo, 287–98. Of Mar. Vict. Ar. 1.11 (CSEL 83/1: 69), Hanson 
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Victorinus sees the dynamic pair of being and act throughout creation. At Against 
Arius 1.32 he describes the incorporeal soul in these terms. Matter, he indicates, always 
has a form (species), and so the incorporeal substance that is the soul, in which there is 
matter, always “has a definition and image (definitionem et imaginem), its vital and 
understanding power” (uitalem potentiam et intellegentialem).157 A soul is thus “doubly 
powerful” (bipotens)—existing as being and “one movement of life and understanding” 
(potentia in uno motu existente uitae et intellegentiae). The soul is “substance and 
movement,” and Victorinus understands this double movement of life and understanding 
to be consubstantial with the incorporeal essence of the soul.158  
Victorinus supplements his Johannine reflection with Pauline material to further 
clarify his logic of the consubstantiality of the Father and Son.159 Pride of place is given 
                                                                                                                                            
notes that Victorinus is resolutely “anti-Tertullianic” in both thought and vocabulary, denying the use of 
persona language for fear that it could easily lapse into patripassianism (Hanson, The Search for the 
Christian Doctrine of God, 544–45). Hanson later argues that Victorinus’ theology is a “synthesis of Neo-
Platonism and Christianity, confident and brilliant. . . . But . . .  [he] had no influence that can be 
ascertained on his contemporaries in the West. Few, if any, could have understood him, certainly not 
Ambrose nor Damasus, and Hilary would have been alarmed at his ready use of philosophical terms” 
(Hanson, Search, 862). Cf. Voelker, “The Trinitarian Theology of Marius Victorinus: Polemic and 
Exegesis,” esp. 111–60, 224–25. Voelker, showing how Victorinus uses typically anti-monarchian 
scriptural texts for his defense, argues against this assumed independence and for Victorinus’ connection to 
prior and contemporary Latin polemical literature. While Voelker stops short of saying Victorinus adopted 
Tertullian’s Against Praxeas, he does indicate that “the theme of divine visibility is the most obvious 
portion of Tertullian that makes its way into Victorinus’ fourth-century Nicene-trinitarian polemic and 
exegesis 150 years later” (53), and that “there are clear instances in Victorinus’ works where he harks back 
to Tertullian’s reading of Scripture, including his use of specific trinitarian Scripture texts and 
commonplaces (the same can be said about his familiarity and use of Novatian)” (224). Voelker admits, 
however, that Victorinus references only John 5:19 in Against Arius. Still, he concludes that when 
Victorinus does use the text, it bears significant polemical weight.  
157 Mar. Vict. Ar. 1.32 (CSEL 83/1: 113). See Hadot, Traités théologiques sur la Trinité, 79. Hadot 
notes “l’originalité” of Victorinus is not that he discusses a substance’s determinative nature, but that he 
associates being with the Father and the Son with form, the determination of that being. 
158 Mar. Vict. Ar. 1.32 (CSEL 83/1: 113). 
159 This is unsurprising given the fact that Victorinus is well known for his commentaries on the 
Pauline epistles, which were penned a couple years after his doctrinal works and are thought to be the first 
extensive Latin commentaries on Paul. Stephen Cooper, “Philosophical Exegesis in Marius Victorinus’ 
Commentaries on Paul,” in Interpreting the Bible and Aristotle in Late Antiquity, ed. Josef Lössl and John 
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to the exegesis of Colossians 1:15–16 (where Christ is labeled “the image of the invisible 
God”) and 1 Corinthians 1:24 (where Christ is called “the power and wisdom of God”). 
Victorinus interprets 1 Corinthians 1:24 by analogizing the double predication (“wisdom 
and power”) of the Son: 
For with God things are not as they are in bodies or in bodily things where the eye 
is one thing, sight another, or as they are in fire, where fire is one thing, its light 
another. For both eye and fire have need of something other: the eye, of a light 
different from itself so that from it and through it vision can take place, and the 
fire has need of air so that light might come from it. But the power and wisdom of 
God are like vision: the power of vision has vision within it. This vision is 
externalized when the power of vision acts; then vision is begotten by the power 
of vision and is itself its only begotten—for nothing else is begotten by it. And 
vision is related to the power of vision, not only within, when it is in potentiality, 
but when is is more outside, when it is in action; so vision is related to the power 
of vision. Vision is therefore consubstantial with the power of vision, and the 
whole is one: indeed, the power of vision rests, but vision is in movement; and by 
vision all things are made visible.160  
 
The most notable and illustrative example here is the power and act of vision. Victorinus 
aims to show that vision includes both a “power” or “potentiality” and the “act” of 
seeing. In so offering the example, Victorinus notes a clean distinction and clear 
                                                                                                                                            
W. Watt (Farnham; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011), 67–90. Cooper maintains that Victorinus’ 
“predilection for understanding church doctrine in light of philosophical teaching is really nothing other 
than his desire to do theology, which for him . . . meant faith pursuing the path of reason seeking 
understanding. But in the commentaries, unlike his trinitarian treatises which expound a pro-Nicene 
doctrine of God in light of highly technical language of late Platonist teachings on first principles, he 
attempts to articulate these deeper theological matters in a way that would be comprehensible to a reader 
who lacked philosophical expertise” (88–89). 
160 Mar. Vict. Ar. 1.40 (CSEL 83/1: 126–27). Non enim ut in corporibus aut in corporalibus, aliud 
est oculus, aliud uisio, aut in igne, aliud ignis, aliud lumen eius. Eget enim et oculus et ignis, alterius 
alicuius, et oculus alterius luminis, ut sit et ex ipso et in ipso uisio, et ignis aeris, ut sit ex ipso lumen. Sed 
sicuti uisionis potentia in se habet uisionem, tunc foris exsistentem, cum operatur potentia uisionis, et 
generatur a potentia uisionis uisio unigenita ea ipsa—nihil enim aliud ab ea gignitur—et ad potentiam 
uisionis uisio est, non intus solum, sed et intus in potentia et in actione magis foris, et ideo ad potentiam 
quippe uisio cum sit, ὁμοούσιον ergo uisionis potentiae uisio et unum totum, et potentia quidem quiescit, 
uisio autem in motu est, et per uisionem omnia uisibilia fiunt. See also Barnes, The Power of God, 149–72, 
at 153–56. Barnes references this passage and Victorinius’ unique gloss of 1 Corinthians 1:24 and 
distinctive use of the Greek ὁμοούσιον. 
  
 
59 
connection between the internal (intus) reality and external (foris) manifestation of that 
reality: the internal needs the external and vice versa for the vision to be fully considered.  
Victorinus’ strong statement of consubstantiality in Against Arius 1.40 concludes 
with a defense of impassability, maintaining that the predications of Son—the “Power 
and Wisdom of God” (1 Cor. 1:24)—are the activities (acta) that remain with (iuxta) God 
and pertain to that which is external (foris). Victorinus then concludes with a succinct 
statement: “And if there is passion (passio), the passion is in the action (in actione).”161 
The economy of words is striking; it is unclear if Victorinus intends the Passion 
(crucifixion) or simply means a passion (emotion or internal disturbance). Either way, the 
move preempts patripassian critiques hurled at pro-Nicenes by non-Nicene theologies of 
the Son; the critiques implied that since the homoousion meant that the Son simply was 
the Father, when the Son suffered, the Father suffered, as well. But by locating the passio 
of God in actione, Victorinus shores up the impassibility of the Father, assuring that it 
was the Son, consubstantial with the Father, who suffered in his species. 
While every analogy breaks down at a certain point, it is clear for Victorinus that 
the precise terms matter less than the dynamic they seek to convey, namely, that the 
Father and Son are distinct from each other yet share the same substance. The act/potency 
relationship within a single genus of substance gets Victorinus the absolute distinction 
and sharing of the same substance:  
[…] Whether we call them God and Word, or God and the power and wisdom of 
God or being and life or being and understanding or intelligence, or being, life, 
and understanding, or Father and Son, or light and brightness, or God and 
character, or God and form and image, or substance and species, or substance and 
movement, or power and action, or silence and speech, it must be confessed as the 
                                                
161 Mar. Vict. Ar. 1.40 (CSEL 83/1: 127). 
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same substance. For if we call God being and the Son life, how do we separate 
life from being, whether in the Father or in the Son?162 
 
Victorinus’ concatenation of analogies reiterates his prime point: simply because Father 
and Son are confessed to be distinct does not mean they cannot be consubstantial. The 
point is a critical one for combatting common homoian claims about the invisibility of the 
true God and the subordinated status of the visible Son. 
Victorinus also describes the invisibility of the Father and the visibility of the Son 
in terms of movement (motus), which he names as the determinative factor for life, 
understood as motion moving itself. 
That which is life and self-movement is the Father. But that which to be moved 
and through itself to be life is the Son. For the cause of movement is life. The 
Father is then, and by predominance, original life, having hidden in him a 
movement which remains in repose, interior self-movement. But the Son is 
manifested movement, and for this reason the Son, because he has proceeded 
from that which is interior movement, is existing as movement by predominance, 
because he is movement manifested.163  
 
Here we see the Father labeled as “hidden” movement, while the Son is “movement 
manifested.” Again, it is the Son who reveals the “interior self-movement” (intus se 
mouentem) of the Father by his life. A thorny issue arises when Victorinus writes of the 
                                                
162 Mar. Vict. Ar. 1.41 (CSEL 83/1: 129–30). Quo modo quod sit ipsa dicemus: siue deum et 
λόγον dicemus, siue deum et dei uirtutem et sapientiam, siue quod est esse et uitam, sive quod est esse et 
intellegere, siue patrem et filium, siue lumen et effulgentiam, siue deum et chacterem, siue deum et formam 
et imaginem, siue substantiam et speciem, sicut ibi, non ut hic, siue substantiam et motionem, siue 
potentiam et actionem, siue silentium et effatum, ipsam substantiam esse confitendum. Deum enim quod est 
esse dicentes, filium uitam, quomodo separamus uitam ab eo quod est esse, siue in patre, siue in filio.  
163 Mar. Vict. Ar. 1.42 (CSEL 83/1: 132): Hoc igitur quod est esse uitam et per semet esse 
motionem pater est. Hoc autem quod est motum esse et per semet esse uitam filius est. Causa enim motionis 
uita. Pater ergo et magis principalis uita, motionem requiescentem habens in abscondito et intus se 
mouentem. Filius autem in manifesto motio, et ideo filius, quoniam ab eo quod est intus processit, magis 
autem motio exsistens, quod in manifesto. Emphasis added. See Hadot, Traités théologiques sur la Trinité, 
79. Hadot lists “predominance” and “implication” as two typically neoplatonic elements of Victorinus’ 
thought. See Mary T. Clark, “A Neoplatonic Commentary on the Christian Tradition: Marius Victorinus,” 
in Dominic J. O’Meara, ed., Neoplatonism and Christian Thought (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1978), 24–
33, at 30–31; eadem, “Marius Victorinus Afer, Porphyry, and the History of Philosophy,” in R. Baine 
Harris, ed., The Significance of Neoplatonism (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1976), 265–74, at 266; A. C. 
Lloyd, The Anatomy of Neoplatonism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 98–120, at 114–15. 
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Father, as life, as the “cause of movement,” presuming some sort of inequality between 
Father and Son. Such causality language might give readers pause, but Victorinus appears 
only to defend the consubstantiality of Father and Son highlighted at Nicaea—manifested 
in texts like John 10:30 and Philippians 2—with passages like John 14:28 (“The Father is 
greater than I”), a commonplace of anti-Nicene theologies. John Voelker points to 
Victorinus’ text On the Importance of Accepting the Homoousios 3.23–27, where there is 
a clear distinction between Christ being “from God” and Christ being “by God”: 
For you say: “God from God, light from light.” Is this from nothing when you 
name the source? Therefore Christ is from God (de deo), he is not, therefore, from 
nothing (de nihilo), he is from light (de lumine), not from nothing (de nihilo). For 
“from God” (de deo) signifies from God’s substance (de ipsius substantia). 
Indeed, “by God” (a deo) is something else (aliud). Indeed, all is by God (a deo), 
however Christ is from God (de deo).164 
 
For the Son to be “from” the Father, in other words, does not necessitate subordination as 
it does for creatures, but only that the Son is “from God’s substance.” Thus, Victorinus 
can write that the Son is both “equal and inferior to the Father” (et aequalis est patri et 
inferior).165 Victorinus nevertheless maintains that the Father and the Son are both life 
and movement, though the Father is “by predominance” (magis) life, the Son is “by 
predominance” movement.  
 
Conclusion 
 The above has surveyed four Latin theologians to throw into stark relief a central, 
but neglected theme in the development of Latin theological doctrine: visibility of the 
                                                
164 Mar. Vict. Homoous. 3.23–27 (CSEL 83/1: 282). Cited at Voelker, “The Trinitarian Theology 
of Marius Victorinus: Polemic and Exegesis,” 176, translation amended. Cf. Hilar. Trin. 3.12 (CCSL 62: 
83–84). 
165 Mar. Vict. Ar. 1.13 (CSEL 83/1: 71). 
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Son. Visibility, as we explored, proved pivotal in trinitarian debates over the identity of 
the Son and his relationship of the Father and Son. These debates begin in earnest with 
third-century monarchian controversies, which privileged the perfect power of the Father 
and the lesser role of the Son. For their defense, monarchians cluster scriptural references 
to the invisibility of the Father and the visible Son. To combat claims that the Father 
simply becomes the visible Son, Tertullian (and other anti-monarchians) re-exegeted 
those same contentious references to different ends. The Father did not become the Son, 
but remained the Father; to see the dynamism of invisibility-visibility as a contradiction 
was to mistake substance for economy. The Son was to be seen as a divine “projection,” 
dependent upon and yet distinct from the Father. There are explicit places in Against 
Praxeas where this motion out from the Father results in subordinating tendencies: the 
Son is less than the Father, “a little on this side of the angels.”166 Still, while Tertullian 
lacks the later terminology of consubstantialis, he is adamant to show the continuity, 
rather than disjunction, of substance between Father and Son.  
A similar dynamic comes through in Novatian’s On the Trinity. Novatian, 
treading a third path between Sabellian modalist and adoptionist christologies, argues 
both against the Son as visible manifestation of the Father and the Son as mere man. To 
that end, he explores what it means that the Son is the form and image of God. Early on 
in his treatise, Novatian hones in on language of the forma dei; the Son is properly the 
form of, not the image of, God; the latter was a predication reserved exclusively for 
human beings.  
                                                
166 E.g., Tert. Prax. 9.2 (CCSL 2: 1168). 
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Novatian later returns to the use of image language with reference to the Son, 
contending that it captures a crucial aspect of filial nature. The Son, both as form and 
image, is understood as the imitator of God’s works: the Son sees the Father and acts 
accordingly. This is image as imitation. That the Son properly images the Father means 
that Novatian has no issue explicating verses like John 14:28 (“the Father is greater than 
I”). The Son as the form of God, according to Novatian’s gloss of Philippians 2:5–8, is 
equal with God, “having divine power over every creature . . . after the example of the 
Father.”167 It is precisely the question of the Son’s equality, and not his similarity or 
likeness, which is under debate. However fascinating Novatian’s consideration of 
“image” is, his repeated use of imitation language with reference to the Son had little 
Nicene afterlife.  
Later pro-Nicenes, like Gregory of Nyssa, are careful to speak of the Son as 
“image” in increasingly technical ways, but here, what is contested is not the Son 
imaging the Father. The challenge in the fourth century is over whether the visible Son is 
equal with the invisible Father, and if so, in what ways the Son is equal in power, 
substance, and divinity. Hilary of Poitiers and Marius Victorinus were our cases in point. 
Their polemical trinitarian works aim to prove the Son’s consubstantial relationship with 
the Father over against non-Nicene theologies. For Hilary, Jesus, the Son and image of 
God, shared the Father’s substance, nature, and power. The Son’s works and words 
manifest not simply his similarity of divine substance, as the homoians would have it, but 
the very equality of divine substance. While the homoians argued for a difference in 
substance of Father and Son based on the former’s invisibility and latter’s visibility, for 
                                                
167 Novatian. Trin. 22.4 (CCSL 4: 55). 
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Hilary, the visibility of the Son did not allow for any subordination. To say the Son acts 
in accord with the Father’s will implied an equality of divine power and nature. True 
unity would not exist if substantial equality did not exist, as well.  
Marius Victorinus offers perhaps the most philosophically rigorous explication of 
the Father-Son relationship against the homoians. By plumbing the depths of analogical 
reasoning, Victorinus presents us with technical illustrations that spell out how God can 
be both invisible Father and visible Son. His example of sight is a powerful one. Sight 
implicates both the potency to see and the exterior acts of seeing itself; one cannot do 
away with the potency to see without destroying the actual sight. In a similar way, God, 
existence itself, is both unseen “being” and seen “act.” This is what Victorinus intends 
when he says the Son’s relationship to the Father is “consubstantial.” Other analogies 
help Victorinus’ case, but in the end we are left with a philosophically inflected defense 
of ὁμοούσιος that adapts traditional anti-monarchian exegesis. 
Ambrose’s familiarity with these texts and the authors that gloss them is unstated 
but plain to the trained eye. His repeated use of Johannine texts, textual arguments for a 
single-power theology, and most importantly for our purposes, the critical importance of 
visibility secures his membership in this Latin polemical tradition. It is to Ambrose that 
we now turn. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE FIGURES OF BODIES AND THE GRACE OF THEIR 
OFFICES: SIGHT AND SEEING IN AMBROSE’S TRINITARIAN POLEMIC 
 
“If he was visible in the flesh, it was that flesh that was visible, not his divinity; 
the flesh was passible, not his divinity.”1 
 
 Text traditionally used in anti-monarchian and anti-homoian ways drive 
Ambrose’s Christological reflection on the dual Latin emphasis on divine unity (of 
power, nature, substance, etc.) and on the manifestation of that unity in the works of the 
Son.2 Like several Latins who preceded him, Ambrose cites key scriptures that play on 
the invisible-visible dynamic, making critical the status of the Son as divine revealer.3 
This chapter shows Ambrose hard at work arguing against two strands of non-Nicene 
exegetical theology.4 Ambrose’s Trinitarian polemic is first aimed at those who profess 
                                                
1 Ambr. Symb. 4 (CSEL 73: 6). Si fuit uisibilis in carne, caro illa fuit uisibilis, non diuinitas, fuit 
passibilis caro, non diuinitas. A scholarly cloud of unknowing once hovered above the Symb.; its 
authorship was disputed, and the text was initially not attributed to Ambrose. This cloud has lifted, and the 
work is typically assumed to be of Ambrosian authorship, even if it has been neglected in secondary 
literature. The Explanatio is undated but bears immediate resemblance to De mysteriis and De sacramentis, 
works typically dated ca. 390 CE. See Richard Hugh Connolly, The Explanatio Symboli Ad Initiandos, 
Texts and Studies, Contributions to Biblical and Patristic Literature 10 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1952), 28–39. Connolly notes similarities in vocabulary between the Explanatio symboli and De 
sacramentis, De fide, and Hexaemeron (among others). Most significant for our purposes is that Connolly 
draws attention to Ambrose’s use of operatio, uoluntas, maiestas. Connolly finally suggests that language 
of the symboli in the texts surrounding the Basilica Controversy (noted later in this chapter) “gives the 
setting” for the work and that “it is tempting to imagine that it was on this very occasion—a stormy one, as 
the letter [Ep. 76] shows—that our Explanatio was delivered” (39). If Connolly is correct, and the Basilica 
Controversy is the context, then the Symb. would be dated 385/6 CE. 
2 See Michel René Barnes, “Latin Trinitarian Theology,” 70–84, at 73–75, 80. Barnes maintains 
that the doctrine of unity of power/operations is arguably more foundational to Latin Trinitarian theology 
than substance/person language. Cf. Bracht, “Product or Foundation?,” 14–31. Bracht makes the point that 
Hippolytus’ Against Noetus and Tertullian’s Against Praexus, both anti-monarchian polemics, provided a 
foundational reflection for Latin Trinitarian theology, however, he overemphasizes the importance of 
persona language as the driving impetus in Latin theology at this time.  
3 E.g., John 10:30, 10:38, 14: 9–11; Romans 1:20; 1 Corinithians 1:24; 2 Corinthians 4:18; 
Colossians 1:13–15; Hebrews 1:3. 
4 See Williams, “Monarchianism and Photinus of Sirmium as the Persistent Heretical Face of the 
Fourth Century,” 203–4. Willams notes three non-Nicene theologies that are the focus of Ambrose’s 
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multiple powers in the Trinity. Their argument runs as follows: Since the true God is 
invisible and is endowed with a divine power, and since the visible Jesus claims to be 
God and is presumably endowed with a divine power, then we must conclude that 
multiple powers exist in the Trinity. Ambrose also fends off those who say that there is 
no consubstantial relationship between the Father and Son. To these two challenges, 
Ambrose offers variations of a single-power theology. By “power” Ambrose means 
something along the lines of, as Michel Barnes has put it, “the intrinsic capacity of a 
nature to affect, insofar as that nature is what it is and exists.”5 Power, in sum, names a 
general capacity to act.  
As mentioned in the last chapter, homoian theologians exegeted certain texts to 
consider the relationship of the Father and Son. To counter homoian exegetes, Nicene 
supporters reinterpreted those same texts to argue for the shared divinity (power, 
substance, etc.) of Father and Son. In the extant fragments of homoian bishops, 
distinction between Father and Son is a live question, reiterated in terms of invisibility 
and visibility. One of Ambrose’s main theological interlocutors, Palladius of Rartiaria,6 
refuted, condemned, and deposed after their interactions at the Council of Aquileia in 381 
CE, promotes a distinction between Father and Son driven by the Son’s visibility. In a 
passage indicative of homoian theology, Palladius writes: 
                                                                                                                                            
polemic: Sabellian, Photinian, and Arian. In Ambrose’s description, Sabellius confused the Father and the 
Word; Photinus held that the Son’s first appearance was in Mary’s womb; and Arius promoted multiple 
powers in God. 
5  Barnes, Power of God, 171. Barnes locates the roots of this conception of dunamis in pre-
Platonic philosophy and he emphasizes that dunamis, in that context, was “causal” (52–54).  
6 For more on Palladius and the Basilica Controversy, see Neil McLynn, Ambrose of Milan: 
Church and Court in a Christian Capital (Berkeley, CA: Univeristy of California Press, 1994), 188–96; D. 
H. Williams, Ambrose of Milan and the End of the Nicene-Arian Conflicts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1995), 84–87; Meslin, Les Ariens d’Occident 335–430, 111–34. 
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There is the question of whether the Son is the invisible God. It has been said to 
you that the Father: “No man has ever seen, nor can see him” (1 Tim. 6:16); and 
similarly, “The invisible, immortal, only God” (1 Tim. 1:17); and “No one has 
seen God and lived” (Ex. 33:20); and again “No one has ever seen God, the only-
begotten has made him known, who is in the bosom of the Father” (Jn. 1:18). But 
about the Son it is said, “We have seen his glory, glory as of the only-begotten 
from the Father” (Jn. 1:14); and “God appeared to Abraham by the oak of 
Mamre” (Gen. 18.1); and then there is the episode with the blind man, who said, 
“Who is the Son of God, that I may believe in him?” and the Son of God himself 
said in reply, “It is he whom you have seen, and to whom you are speaking” (Jn. 
9:36–37).7 
 
Several controverted texts are on display here, fueling the problem Palladius sees with the 
juxtaposition of the Father’s invisibility and the Son’s visibility. Michel Barnes, rightly I 
think, makes this passage out to be something of a synecdoche for homoian theology in 
the second half of the fourth century. From it, Barnes enumerates five theological 
touchstones typical of homoian theology. 1. The true God is invisible. 2. The Son’s signal 
feature is his visibility.8 3. Old Testament theophanies are to be understood as revelations 
                                                
7 Cited in Barnes, “The Visible Christ and the Invisible Trinity,” 336–37. See “Fragments de 
Palladius” 106.340v (SC 267: 290–91). Rursus si Filius inuisibilis D[eu]s. Dictum est tibi scibtum esse de 
Patre: ‘Quem uidit hominum nemo neque uidere potest’ (1 Tim. 6:16) item: ‘Inuisibili inmortali soli D[e]o’ 
(1 Tim. 1:17), item: ‘D[eu]m nemo uideuit et uiuet’ (Ex. 33:20) sed et adhuc: ‘D[eu]m nemo uidit umquam, 
unigenitus qui est in sinu Patris ipse enarrauit’ (Jn. 1:18) de Filio uero: ‘Et uidimus gloriam eius, gloriam 
tamquam unigeniti a Patre’ (Jn. 1:14), item: ‘D[eu]s autem apparauit Abrahae [s]edenti ad ilicem 
Manbrae’ (Gen. 18:1), item ei [q]ui cecus fuerat dicenti: ‘Quis est Filius D[e]i, ut creda[m] [i]n illum’ 
(Jn. 9:36), dictum esse ab ipso FIlio D[e]i: ‘Quem uidisti et qui loquitur tecu[m] [i]pse est’ (Jn. 9:37). 
Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy, 265–67, explores Ambrose’s interaction with Palladius and Secundianus as 
indicative of the sustained presence of homoian theology in the second-half of the fourth century.  
8 See e.g., Ambr. Symb. 4 (CSEL 73: 6–7), where Ambrose characterizes the “Arians” as those 
who, misinterpreting anti-Sabellian formulas in Milan’s creed, “judge the omnipotent Father as invisible 
and impassible . . . so that they might designate the Son as visible and passible.” In his (and the only) 
English translation, Richard Connolly notes that “the text here is very compressed and the sense obscure. . . 
. [T]he text is not certain. . . . The reference to the Symbol of the Roman Church seems to imply that 
whereas ‘we’ (at Milan?) profess to follow the Roman text, by departing from it and adding ‘invisible and 
impassible’ after the mention of the Father we should lay ourselves open to the charge of asserting that the 
Son, in his divine nature, is visible and passible; and they would then say ‘You see, they have the Symbol 
thus’, in order that they might describe the Son as visible and passible.” See Connolly, The Explanatio 
Symboli Ad Initiandos, 22n1. Cf. Ambr. Fid. 2.3.33 (CSEL 78: 68). While Ambrose initially groups 
heretics under the umbrella of promoting potestates plures of God, he distinguishes in this passage the 
Sabellians, who “confound the Father and the Son,” on the one hand, and the Arians, “who sever the Father 
from the Son” (patrem filiumque secernens), on the other. In clear opposition, Ambrose offers an 
affirmation of the distinctiveness of the two persons and avows their unified divinity. Cf. Harnack, History 
of Dogma, 3: 79–80: “The Western Fathers and opponents of heretics from the middle of the fourth century 
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of the Son. 4. The Son’s visibility is also found in the New Testament. 5. This theology is 
expressed as exegesis.9 Each of these five touchstones points, in unique ways, to the 
critical role of the visibility of the Son in determining his relationship to the true (read: 
invisible) God. To explicate the relationship of the Father and Son, Ambrose follows the 
polemical path of his forebears, returning again and again to the key scriptural texts in 
question. And so, similar to what we have observed in the antecedent Latin tradition, 
Ambrose reexegetes those same texts for Nicene ends: the Father and the Son are said to 
share in a single, invisible power (uirtus, potestas), evidenced and discerned by a “unity 
of operation” (unitas operationis). 10 
Distinctive of fourth-century pro-Nicene authors is the assumption that power 
functions, according to Barnes, as “the same kind of title as ‘eternal’ or ‘good’ or 
‘omnipotent’: whatever is this, is God. Since the Son has the same power as the Father, 
the Son is God as the Father is God.”11 This assumption, for Barnes, helps parse out 
differences between neo-Nicene and pro-Nicene. He writes: “Distinguishing features of 
the two forms of ‘Nicene’ theology include: (1) neo-Nicene theology identifies the Son as 
the single, proper ‘Power’ of God, while pro-Nicene theology understands the Father and 
                                                                                                                                            
speak not infrequently of Monarchians—Sabellians; but they, as a rule have simply copied Greek sources, 
from which they have transferred the confusion that prevailed among the Greek representatives of 
Sabellianism, and to a still greater extent, we must admit, among the historians who were hostile to it.” In 
his footnote, Harnack names Ambrose: “Whether Ambrosius or Ambrosiaster refer . . . to Roman or say 
Western Monarchians living in their time is at least questionable” (3: 79, n.1). 
9 See Barnes, “The Visible Christ and the Invisible Trinity,” 337. 
10 As will be noted throughout, substance (substantia) and divinity (diuinitas) are also significant 
points of unity between the Father and the Son. The phrase “unity of operation” recurs in Ambrose’s 
corpus, and it will be discussed in the final section of the present chapter. See, for instance, the 
dissertation’s organizing text, Luc. 1.7 (CSEL 32/4: 14–15), mentioned in the Introduction and later in this 
chapter. 
11 Barnes, Power of God, 169–72, at 170.  
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Son to share the ‘Power’ of God, and thus to share the same nature; and (2) neo-Nicene 
theology is not engaged in the debate over John 5:19, while pro-Nicene is.” Lewis Ayres 
specifies Barnes’ definition of pro-Nicene by enumerating three principles: (1) a 
distinction between person and nature (“whatever is predicated of the divine nature is 
predicated of the three persons equally and understood to be one”) (2) eternal generation 
of the Son occurring within the unified and unknowable divinity and; (3) a doctrine of 
inseparable operations.12  
Scholars have picked up on the pivotal role power plays in fourth-century 
theology. The last century has given us a number of accounts of “neo-Nicene” theology 
and, increasingly and more recently, “pro-Nicene” theology. In particular, there has been 
debate as to what precisely constitutes “neo-Nicene” theology. Largely continental, this 
debate, as Ayres points out, has been conceived on Harnack’s terms (i.e., over 
Athanasius’s unity and the Cappadocians’ diversity as the nexus of primary 
development). “If up till now [381],” Harnack writes, “orthodox faith had meant the 
recognition of a mysterious plurality in the substantial unity of the Godhead, it was now 
made permissible to turn the unity into a mystery, i.e., to reduce it to equality and to 
make the threefoldness the starting-point. . . . The unity of the Godhead, as the 
Cappadocians conceived of it, was not the same as the unity which Athanasius had in 
mind.”13 
                                                
12 Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy, 236–40, at 236. As will become apparent in this chapter’s final 
section, I am loathe to use the phrase “doctrine of inseparable operations,” even while Ambrose will 
describe unified operation between the Father and Son as “inseparable.” 
13 Adolf von Harnack, History of Dogma, 4: 80–101, at 84–85. 
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If we expect a technical power vocabulary to match Ambrose’s specific 
references to power, we will be left disappointed. Ambrose’s power terminology is 
varied: he freely mixes potestas (and cognates) and uirtus (and cognates), and no real 
distinction exists between them in his works.14 With whichever term, Ambrose concludes 
repeatedly that there is to be one power in God and that the Trinitarian persons are 
somehow unified in that power. For his defense, Ambrose trades in logic typical of what 
scholars have called “neo-Nicene” and “pro-Nicene” theologies.15 Neo-Nicene 
theologians like Athanasius, Phoebadius of Agen, and Gregory of Elvira call the Son 
himself the “Power of God.” Since there is only one true Son, it follows that there could 
be only one power in God. Pro-Nicene theologians like Didymus the Blind and the 
Cappadocians assign to divine power roughly the same place as substance in their 
discourse on unity and distinction in the Godhead and assert that the Father and Son share 
one power. Ambrose’s simultaneous use of both neo- and pro-Nicene lines suggests their 
complementary characters. Ambrose defends the eternality of Christ with reference to 
both Romans 1:20 (“For the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by 
                                                
14 Ambrose’s De fide book 1 is a concentrated example of this free mixing of technical terms. For 
references to potestas, see Fid. 1.1.6–7 (CSEL 78: 6–7), 1.1.9 (CSEL 78: 7), 1.1.10 (CSEL 78: 8), 1.3.19 
(CSEL 78: 11), 1.4.33 (CSEL 78: 16), 1.12.76 (CSEL 78: 33), 1.13.85 (CSEL 78: 37), 1.16.106 (CSEL 78: 
45–46), 1.17.112 (CSEL 78: 48), 1.17.117 (CSEL 78: 50). For references to uirtus, see Fid. 1.2.13 (CSEL 
78: 9), 1.2.16 (CSEL 78: 9–10), 1.2.17 (CSEL 78: 10), 1.5.39 (CSEL 78: 17), 1.7.49–50 (CSEL 78: 21–22), 
1.8.57 (CSEL 78: 25), 1.10.62 (CSEL 78: 27), 1.10.67 (CSEL 78: 29), 1.11.68 (CSEL 78: 29–30), 1.17.112 
(CSEL 78: 48). This instances notwithstanding, Ambrose typically uses uirtus to speak about moral 
excellence. See, e.g., Abr. 2.6.33 (CSEL 32/1: 590): denique ut Abraham humilius, qui electionem optulit, 
ita Loth insolentius, qui electionem usurpauit—uirtus se humiliat, extollit autem se iniquitas—qui se debuit 
committere maturiori, ut esset tutior, denique eligere nesciuit. nam primo leuauit oculos et regionem 
conspexit, hoc est illam rem, quae non esset prima ordine, sed tertia, hoc est nouissima. prima sunt enim 
quae sunt animae bona, secunda quae corporis, id est salus uirtus pulchritudo formae gratia, tertia sunt 
quae accidunt, hoc est diuitiae potestates patria amici gloria.   
15 See Barnes, Power of God, 169–72; Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy, 236–40.  
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the things that are made, even his everlasting power and divinity”)16 and 1 Corinthians 
1:24 (“unto them who are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ, the power of God and 
wisdom of God”),17 with both single-power theologies in his corner:  
Hear now another argument from which he makes clear the eternity of the Son. 
The apostle says that “God’s power and divinity are eternal” (Rom. 1:20). 
However, Christ is the power of God, for it is written “Christ is the power of God 
and the wisdom of God” (1 Cor. 1:24). Therefore if Christ is the power of God, 
since the power of God is eternal, then Christ is also eternal.18 
 
Ambrose, in line with neo-Nicene convictions, labels Christ the uirtus dei. Since this 
power is eternal and since Christ is identical to this power, so Christ is eternal.  
The pro-Nicene position is indebted to and builds upon its neo-Nicene antecedent 
with special reference to John 5:19 (“The Son can do nothing of himself, but only that 
which he has seen the Father doing”).19 As we saw above, Ambrose has no problem 
labeling Christ the “wisdom and power of God”20—reminiscent of neo-Nicene exegesis.21 
                                                
16 Apart from Myst. 3.8 (CSEL 73: 91) and Fug. 3.14 (CSEL 32/2: 174), Ambrose rarely cites the 
entire verse. He uses it in two ways. The first highlights the “invisible things of God” in light of divine 
revelation. See, e.g., Luc. 1.7 (CSEL 32/4: 15): inuisibilia enim eius per ea quae facta sunt intellecta 
conspiciuntur. The second straightforwardly references God’s “everlasting power and divinity,” for 
example, at Fid. 1.10.62 (CSEL 78: 27).  
17 See Luc. 6.33 (CSEL 32/4: 245). Ipsis uero uocatis, Iudaeis atque Graecis, Christum dei 
uirtutem et dei sapientiam. 
18 Ambr. Fid. 1.10.62 (CSEL 78: 27). Accipe aliud, quo clareat filium sempiternum. Apostolus 
dicit quod dei sempiterna uirtus sit adque diuinitas. Virtus autem dei Christus; scriptum est enim Christum 
esse dei uirtutem et dei sapientiam. Ergo si Christus dei uirtus, quia uirtus dei sempiterna, sempiternus 
igitur et Christus. See “Fragments de Palladius” 102–4.340r (SC 267: 288–89), where Palladius uses both 
Romans 1:20 and 1 Corinthians 1:24 in addition to Colossians 1:15. 
19 Non potest filius a se facere quicquam nisi quod uiderit facientem patrem. Almost all of 
Ambrose’s references to this verse are in De fide. For the most extensive treatment, see e.g., Fid. 4.4.38–
4.4.47 (CSEL 78: 170–73) and 4.5.63–4.6.71 (CSEL 78: 178–81). Ambrose’s preoccupation with John 
5:19 is undoubtedly more acute in the later books of De fide, written after the first two books. I discuss the 
shift in Ambrose’s terminology and seeming familiarity with homoian theology later in this chapter. 
Dispute over the meaning of John 5:19 can be found in “Fragments de Palladius” 81–82.336r (SC 267: 
264–67). 
20 The two most common occasions for this neo-Nicene line of exegesis are when Ambrose 
references either Romans 1:20 (“the invisible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen, 
being understood by the things which are made, even his eternal power and divinity”) or 1 Corinthians 1:24 
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Still, his neo-Nicene exegesis is buttressed by a largely pro-Nicene theology, arguing that 
the Father and Son share a common invisible power seen whenever the Son acts. While 
the distinction between neo- and pro-Nicene power theologies might seem oblique, even 
tangential, I rehearse it precisely because it will come up in later discussions of what 
precisely the Son reveals through his works. For Ambrose, as we will see, the Son and 
Father are united in a single, invisible power, and the visible works of the Son reveal that 
unity of power and prove the Son’s divinity.  
 The present chapter proceeds in four sections. The first reconstructs how Ambrose 
thinks the invisible is revealed by means of the visible. To that end, I analyze Ambrose’s 
descriptions of the process of sight elucidated in his explanation of the baptismal ritual. 
The second section shows how this visual logic is operative in Ambrose’s claims of 
seeing the Father in the Son. The third section locates the opponents’ positions against 
which Ambrose directs his Trinitarian polemic and explores how he argues against claims 
to both multiple divine powers and bodily Trinitarian unity. Scriptural statements of 
divine invisibility and visibility form the theological scaffolding for this polemic. The 
fourth and final section explores what Ambrose thinks we see when we see divine works. 
Here, I foreground how themes of visibility and sight motivate Ambrose’s discussions of 
the unity of divine operations and power that obtains between the Father and Son.  
                                                                                                                                            
( […] “Christ, the power of God and wisdom of God”). For examples of the former, see Ambr. Fid. 5.8.112 
(CSEL 78: 258) and 5.13.165 (CSEL 78: 275). For an example of the latter, see Ambr. Fid. 1.2.16 (CSEL 
78: 10). For a rare neo-Nicene gloss of John 14:6, see Fid. 3.7.50 (CSEL 78: 126), where “the way (i.e., 
Jesus)” is called the “power of God” (dei uirtus).  
21 E.g., Athan. Ar. 1.11. “[…] turning to the Greeks, [Paul] has said, ‘The visible things of Him 
from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his 
eternal power and Godhead.’ And what the power of God is, he teaches us elsewhere himself, ‘Christ the 
power of God and the wisdom of God’ (1 Cor. 1:24). Surely in these words he does not designate the 
Father, as you often whisper to one another, affirming that the Father is ‘his eternal power’ (Rom. 1:20). 
This is not so; for he says not, ‘God himself is the power,’ but ‘his is the power.’ Very plain is it to all that 
‘his’ is not ‘he;’ yet not something alien but rather proper to him.” 
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Ambrose on Seeing in spiritu  
The bulk of this chapter argues that, for Ambrose, the Son is seen, and that in 
being seen, Son shows us something of the invisible divine nature. It is beneficial to first 
show how Ambrose thinks human beings see things of God “in the Spirit” (in spiritu).22 
Ambrose’s argument is seemingly straightforward: we understand invisible, metaphysical 
realities by means of the visible. He makes his case by attending to two complementary 
registers. The first deals with the invisible principle from which springs a given act. We 
might imagine such a register noting the weight of seeing for discerning the unseen 
impulses of a given action (for example, power, love, fear, knowledge of the good, etc.).23 
The second register is distinctly eschatological and concerns itself with how seeing can 
pick up eternal significance. When writing in these ways, Ambrose will often identify an 
epistemic distance between the things we see now (in a mirror dimly) and the things we 
will see (face-to-face) (see 1 Cor. 13:12). This present section shows how these two 
registers implicate one another, tracing how Ambrose’s distinct scriptural reasoning holds 
them together. 
Since Ambrose believes that human beings harbor unseen powers moving them to 
act and are destined to realities beyond their current state, he deduces that human beings 
have a general proclivity toward unseen realities. For Ambrose, this proclivity is plain 
because of the ways we see in general and the ways we see things of the Church and of 
                                                
22 Ambr. Luc. 1.6 (CSEL 32/4: 13). 
23 I see this register akin to Ambrose’s debts to Latin rhetorical traditions, which themselves 
depend on both physiognomy (judging moral character off appearance and action) and Stoic action theory. 
I will explore these debts in more detail in Chapter Four. 
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faith in particular. The logic of seeing that draws us into unseen realities permeates 
Ambrose’s writings. For instance, Ambrose’s opening chapters in On the Mysteries (ca. 
390) describe baptism as both a visible act and an invisible reality; Ambrose calls the 
latter the “very reason of the sacraments” (ipsam rationem sacramentorum).24 Explaining 
the “reason” behind baptism forces Ambrose to reconstruct the tangible, step-by-step 
logistics of the rite; each step is an intentional expression of an unseen reality.25  
Craig Satterlee helpfully indicates that explaining the rite would have been critical 
to the baptized, recent or otherwise. The aim, in sum, was “to have a persuasive, 
enlightening, deepening effect on the hearers’ understanding of the Church’s rites of 
initiation that leads them to live in the different, new dimension that is the Christian 
life.”26 Keep in mind, the demand for mystagogy—the formation of the newly initiated in 
the Church’s mysteries—was, in large part, meant to address the shifting religious-
political landscape of the fourth century. With the Empire and its leaders tolerating, and 
                                                
24 Ambr. Myst. 1.2 (CSEL 73: 89). Other secondary treatments consider Ambrose’s De mysteriis 
and De sacramentis as critical for understanding his theology. See Christoph Jakob, “Arkandisziplin”, 
Allegorese, Mystagogie: Ein neuer Zugang zur Theologie des Ambrosius von Mailand, Athenäums 
Monografien: Theologie Theophaneia 32 (Frankfurt am Main: Hain, 1990); Craig Alan Satterlee, Ambrose 
of Milan’s Method of Mystagogical Preaching (Collegville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2002), 1–7; and recently, 
Smith, Christian Grace and Pagan Virtue, 74–123. Cf. McLynn, Ambrose of Milan, 238, n.67. McLynn 
argues that “Much work on the relationship between Ambrose’s treatises and their homiletic core is vitiated 
by excessive use of his two baptismal works . . . as a control.”  
25 See Joseph Martos, Deconstructing Sacramental Theology and Reconstructing Catholic Ritual 
(Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2015), 124–29. Martos discusses Ambrose as one who initiated the shift from 
“metaphorical description” of the sacraments to a “metaphysical explanation” (at 124). Martos also labels 
Ambrose “mechanical” in his thinking, by which he means, that “anyone who believes and is baptized will 
be saved” (at 126). Ambrose displays such “mechanical thinking” in Myst. 3.8 (CSEL 73: 91–92; cited 
below) and his thought is supposedly in contrast to that of Cyril of Alexandria and Gregory of Nyssa. 
26 Satterlee, Ambrose of Milan’s Method of Mystagogical Preaching, 2. There is no shortage of 
literature on Ambrose’s mystagogical preaching, and much of this literature references something of a shift 
in perception, seeing, or sight as critical to Ambrose’s motivation. See Edward Yarnold, “The Ceremonies 
of Inititation in the De Sacramentis and De mysteriis of St. Ambrose,” SP 10, ed. F. L. Cross (Berlin: 
Akademie-Verlag, 1970), 453–63; Giampietro Francesconi, Storia e simbolo: “Mysterium in figura : la 
simbolica storico-sacramentale nel linguaggio e nella teologia di Ambrogio di Milano (Brescia: 
Morcelliana, 1981). 
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even embracing, Christianity, churches became flooded with people nominally familiar 
with, but ultimately untrained in, the faith. Mystagogy served as a doctrinal life raft that 
kept neophytes afloat, pointing out holy things previously obscured by public spectacle.27 
Maria Doerfler too has highlighted the importance of “seeing” in the late-antique 
Latin West, given Christianity’s newly assumed political role. With the Church acquiring 
and learning to wield such public clout, Doerfler contends that a “kind of double- and 
triple-vision” was demanded of churchgoers at this time. “Before their eyes, a 
government official could turn bishop, the threatening heights of his judgment seat 
converted into the spiritual elevation of the episcopal chair.”28 Ambrose, a proconsul 
turned bishop of the functional capitol of the Western Empire, was a case in point.29 
Because of the acclamation by which he was chosen for the episcopacy in the age of an 
                                                
27 For an exploration of late-ancient spectacle and theater in preaching, see Blake Leyerle, 
Theatrical Shows and Ascetic Lives: John Chrysostom’s Attack on Spiritual Marriage (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2001), at 13–41 for an overview of the role of theater and 20–31 for the 
theater’s educational force for literate and illiterate alike. For an example of Ambrose’s critique of 
spectacle see, Psal. 118 5.28 (CSEL 62: 97): Auertamus igitur oculos nostros a uanitatibus, ne, quod 
oculus uiderit, animus concupiscat; mystica enim differamus interim.utinam hac interpretatione possimus 
reuocare ad diuersa circensium ludorum atque theatralium spectacula festinantes! Vanitas est illa quam 
cernis. pantomimum aspicis, uanitas est; luctatores aspicis, uanitas est, quia cernis eos de uiridibus 
frondibus luctantes habere coronas; illi enim ueri sunt luctatores, qui aduersum huius saeculi luctantur 
inlecebras et non capit oculos suos palaestra embrorum. Equos currentes aspicis, uanitas est, quia uane 
currunt qui ascendentem saluare non possunt. Denique recursus ipse te doceat, quia uane currunt qui non 
directum conficiunt iter, obliuiscentes superiora et ea quae posteriora sunt adpetentes. 
28 Maria Doerfler, “Law and Order: Monastic Formation, Episcopal Authority, and Conceptions of 
Justice in Late Antiquity” (PhD Dissertation, Duke University, 2013), 322–23. 
29 A proconsul during late antiquity was functionally a provincial governor with authority over a 
particular region. In Ambrose’s case, he was proconsul of Emilia and Liguria, modern-day northern Italy. 
For the role of a Roman proconsul generally, see J. B. Rives, Religion and Authority in Roman Carthage: 
From Augustus to Constantine (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), 76–85. Rives notes that, though broad, the 
wideranging duties of the proconsul were concerned with the “administration of justice and the supervision 
of towns” (77). The proconsul was the liason between Rome and local elites. Rives also comments that the 
religious role of the proconsul was, like the emperor, “to lend prestige and to heighten the identification 
with Rome rather than from any particular religious authority” (at 83). See also Jill Harries, “Triple Vision: 
Ulpian of Tyre on the Duties of the Proconsul,” in Roman Rule in Greek and Latin Writing: Double Vision, 
ed. Jesper Majbom Madsen and Roger Rees (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2014), 193–209, at 194–99. 
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imperially-supported Church, citizens—the new laity—had to be trained to “see” him not 
as governor, but as bishop and pastor. Doerfler continues, 
Teaching others to see was, after all, one of [the Christian clergy’s] great 
preoccupations, in large part because of most Christians’ manifest inability to 
discern what they ought to have been able to recognize “naturally” and 
“instinctively.” . . . [The preachers told them] what they ought to have seen, re-
visioning the events in their full spiritual complexity on their audiences’ behalf, 
and in the process re-inscribing the latter’s experiences through their narration.30 
 
For Doerfler, “seeing” became important during the fourth century CE in ways 
unimagined in times prior. “Natural” or “instinctive” seeing, Doerfler indicates, thus 
became an effective pedagogical site for the sake of educating the faithful and buttressing 
the institution of the Church.  
Satterlee and Doerfler emphasize in discrete ways the importance of seeing for the 
constitution of the late-antique church. For Satterlee, seeing deepened Ambrose’s 
homelitical teaching, enriching the messages of the gospel for those with ears to hear. For 
Doerfler, the importance of multivalent seeing arose out of cultural, rather than explicitly 
theological, necessity.31 Because of the shifting religious-political landscape, clergy were 
forced to adapt, to learn to educate their congregations in new ways of seeing.  
Since sight itself was multivalent,32 seeing with “corporeal eyes” was one thing; 
seeing with the eyes of faith was another—since “those things which are not seen are 
                                                
30 Doerfler, “Law and Order,” 326–27. Emphasis in original. 
31 See Doerfler, “Law and Order,” 187: “[…] biblical interpretation is thus a strand of judicial and 
ethical reasoning that runs alongside that of philosophically-informed reasoning. The conjunction of the 
two lines of argument is, in many regards, as old as the Christian religion, or at least as old as its Scriptures, 
and the development of legal reasoning and means of arbitration for communal disputes was among its 
authors’ first tasks.” 
32 Ambrose is not unique in this. See Mariette Canévet, “Sens spirituel,” in Les sens spirituels: 
sens spirituel, goût spirituel, toucher, touches, gourmandise spirituelle, luxure spirituelle, Dictionnaire de 
spiritualité 15 (Paris: Editions Beauchesne, 1993), 3–41. Origen, on whom Ambrose relied, writes of 
“spiritual senses” often. See Karl Rahner, “Le début d'une doctrine des cinq sens spirituels chez Origene,” 
Revue d'ascétique et de mystique 13 (1932): 113-45; John M. Dillon, “Aisthêsis Noêtê: A Doctrine of 
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much greater than those which are.”33 Ambrose has multiple ways of describing such 
seeing: “through the eyes of the spirit” (per oculis spiritualibus)34, “by the eyes of the 
soul” (oculis animae)35, or by “the eyes of the heart” (oculi cordis).36 All these 
descriptions express the spiritual sense of seeing. This spiritual sense, Georgia Frank 
maintains, “stood for a variety of mental images and visual processes taught to new 
Christians as a way to prepare them to receive the eucharistic bread and wine. Without 
erasing the evidence of the physical sense, these visual strategies generated a host of 
mental images . . . [N]eophytes were taught to look closer at the liturgy unfolding.”37 
Participating in the sacraments allowed one to peer behind the veil hiding a world 
unimagined. “Sight” thus functioned as an activity constitutive of the Church. And 
                                                                                                                                            
Spiritual Senses in Origen and Plotinus,” in Hellenica et Judaica: Hommage à Valentin Nikiprowetzky, eds. 
A. Caquot, M. Hadas-Lebel, and J. Riaud (Leuven: Peeters, 1986), 443–55. See too Clement, Strom. 5.4 
(SC 278: 56–67). 
33 Ambr. Sacr. 1.3.10 (CSEL 73: 20). See Ambr. Spir. 3.12.87 (CSEL 79: 186): Nempe hanc 
claritatem uiderunt apostoli, cum dominus Iesus diuinitatis suae luce in monte fulgeret. Viderunt, inquit, 
apostoli et in faciem prociderunt. Putas ne illos, uel cum prociderent, adorasse, cum fulgorem divini 
luminis corporalibus oculis sustinere non possent, et splendor lucis aeternae aciem visus mortalis 
obduceret? 
34 Luc. 1.5 (CSEL 32/4: 13). 
35 Psal. 118 1.11 (CSEL 62: 12). 
36 Parad. 6.33 (CSEL 32/1: 290). 
37 Georgia Frank, “‘Taste and See’: The Eucharist and the Eyes of Faith in the Fourth Century,” 
Church History 70.4 (2001): 619–43. While Frank begins her analysis with Ambrose (and returns to him 
throughout her article), she notes that “other catechists of Ambrose’s day [Cyril of Jerusalem, John 
Chrysostom, and Theodore of Mopuestia] explored these sensory faultlines more fully” (620). See also 
Kimberly Hope Belcher, Efficacious Engagement: Sacramental Participation in the Trinitarian Mystery 
(Minneapolis: Liturgical Press, 2011), 27–28. Belcher’s brief mention of Ambrose owes to Georgia Frank 
(“Taste and See”), highlighting that this style of preaching aimed at “cultural discipline that allowed their 
auditors, through practice, to see the unseen” (28, emphasis original). See also Mary Carruthers, The Craft 
of Thought: Meditation, Rhetoric, and the Making of Images, 400–1200, Cambridge Studies in Medieval 
Literature 34 (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Carruthers’s excellent and 
wideranging work explores the rhetorical force and function of images in the construction of memory. I 
have also benefited from Liz James and Ruth Webb, “‘To Understand Ultimate Things and Enter Secret 
Places’: Ekphrasis and Art in Byzantium,” Art History 14.1 (1991): 1–17. See also Liz James, “Color and 
Meaning in Byzantium,” JECS 11.2 (2003): 223–33, who calls the use of ekphaseis “rhetorical and 
experiential” (at 223). 
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Ambrose understood his role as bishop, in large part, as requiring him to alter (or correct) 
the content of his congregants’ seeing within a liturgical context.  
When Ambrose recalls the baptismal rite to his listeners, he reminds them 
continuously that the multiple movements within the rite indicate metaphysical realities. 
The rite begins with “the mystery of the opening” (apertionis mysterium), whereby the 
scene of the healing of a man deaf and mute from Mark 7:31–37 was reenacted by the 
priest and the initiate.38 Ambrose touched the mouth of the baptized, quoting Jesus’ 
Aramaic imperative: “ephpheta” (“be opened”). The initiate was then led into a 
“sanctuary of regeneration,” stripped naked, and anointed by the clergy with oil before a 
threefold water baptism by immersion.  
For Ambrose, the rite served as an index of deeper meaning, each component 
symbolizing a metaphysical reality. He reminds his audience that the baptized were 
ushered into the “holy of holies” and that they “saw the Levite, . . . the priest, . . . saw the 
highest priest.”39 Ambrose then sums up the dynamic between what was done and the 
meaning behind it with a word of counsel: “Do not consider the figures of the bodies, but 
the grace of their offices” (noli considerare corporum figuras sed ministeriorum 
gratiam).40 Ambrose redraws and rehearses this distinction between the tangible figura 
                                                
38 Ambr. Myst. 1.3 (CSEL 73: 90). See also Symb. 1 (CSEL 73: 3). See also Smith, Christian 
Grace and Pagan Virtue, 3–8, 70–123, at 79–80; Garry Wills, Font of Life: Ambrose, Augustine, and the 
Mystery of Baptism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 108–10. Wills’s work seeks to reconstruct 
Ambrose’s sacramental practice, especially with respect to the baptism of Augustine.  
39 Ambr. Myst. 2.6 (CSEL 73: 90). 
40 Ambr. Myst. 2.6. See Psal. 39.9 (CSEL 64/6: 218); Luc. 3.49 (CSEL 32/4: 136–37), where 
Ambrose writes of Adam “preceding Christ in figure” (praecederet in figura). See also Baziel Maes, La loi 
naturelle selon Ambroise de Milan (Presses de l’Université Grégorienne: Rome, 1967), 111–12. Maes 
briefly explicates Ambrose’s distinction between imago, figura, typus, and ueritas in explaining the 
relationship of Christ to the law and prophets. See also Victor Saxer, “Figura corporis et sanguinis Domini: 
Une formule eucharistique des premiers siècles chez Tertullien, Hippolyte et Ambroise,” Rivista di 
archeologia cristiana 47 (1971): 65–89. 
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and the unseen gratia throughout On the Mysteries, repeatedly referring to scriptural texts 
to make the case that what is seen is only a sign, a temporal manifestation of a fuller 
reality: 
What have you seen? Water, certainly, but not this alone; the Levites (deacons) 
ministering with it, the highest priest (bishop) questioning and consecrating. First 
of all, the apostle taught you that “we are not to contemplate the things that are 
seen, but the things that are not seen, for the things that are seen are temporal, but 
the things that are not seen, eternal” (2 Cor. 4:18). For elsewhere you have “the 
invisible things of God from the creation of the world are understood through the 
things that have been made; his eternal power also and divinity” (Rom. 1:20) are 
judged by his works. Therefore, too, the Lord himself says: “If you do not believe 
me, at least believe my works” (Jn. 10:38). Believe therefore that the presence of 
divinity is at hand there. You believe the work, do you not believe the presence? 
From where does the work follow, unless the presence preceded it?41  
 
The passage utilizes the baptismal rite as an object lesson to explain the general dynamic 
the Christian faith instills: visible things are temporary figures of eternal graces. 
Ambrose’s reflection here begins with the sacramental rite; the various components—
water, the minister, etc.—are but figures of deeper realities. Ambrose’s scriptural 
supports (2 Cor. 4:18, Rom. 1:20, Jn. 10:38) point to realities both unseen (motive 
principle) and final (eschatological) that lay behind concrete action. For the remainder of 
                                                
41 Ambr. Myst. 3.8 (CSEL 73: 91–92). quid uidisti? aquas utique, sed non solas: leuitas illis 
ministrantes, summum sacerdotem interrogantem et consecrantem. primum omnium docuit te apostolus 
non ea contemplanda nobis, quae uidentur, sed quae non uidentur, quoniam, quae uidentur, temporalia 
sunt, quae autem non uidentur, aeterna. nam et alibi habes, quia inuisibilia dei a creatura mundi per ea, 
quae facta sunt, conpraehenduntur, sempiterna quoque uirtus eius et divinitas operibus aestimatur. unde et 
ipse dominus ait: si mihi non creditis, uel operibus credite. crede ergo diuinitatis illic adesse praesentiam. 
operationem credis, non credis praesentiam? unde sequeretur operatio, nisi praecederet ante praesentia? 
De mysteriis and De sacramentis are roughly contemporary works and cover much of the same theological 
ground, presenting to neophytes reflection on the nature of the sacraments. De sacramentis offers a very 
similar description of the act of baptism. See Ambr. Sacr. 1.3.10 (CSEL 73: 19–20). “You entered; you saw 
water; you saw the priest; you saw the Levite. Lest someone say, ‘Is this all?’ Yes, this is all, truly all, 
where there is all innocence, where there is all piety, all grace, all sanctification. You have seen what you 
were able to see with the eyes of your body, with human perception; you have not seen those things which 
are effected but those which are seen. Those which are not seen are much greater than those which are seen, 
‘For the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal’ (2 Cor. 4:18).” 
See Smith, Christian Grace and Pagan Virtue, 148–57. Smith mentions how Ambrose juxtaposes the 
Christian baptismal rite with the Jewish mysteries, identifying Ambrose’s language of uirtus with gratia 
and how the use of similtudo functions within Ambrose’s baptismal theology.  
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this section, I want to focus on the first two of these texts, 2 Corinthians 4:18 and 
Romans 1:20. The next section will consider Ambrose’s use of John 10:38 and examine 
how visual logic drives his Christology.  
Ambrose’s persistent use of 2 Corinthians 4:18 (“We are not to contemplate the 
things that are seen, but the things that are not seen, for the things that are seen are 
temporal, but the things that are not seen, eternal”) helps him distinguish things temporal 
from things eternal. For example, in his work On Abraham (ca. 387), Ambrose discusses 
whether, when, and how Abraham saw God. He references 2 Corinthians 4:18 to signal 
the goal of Abraham’s devotion: flight from the Chaldean teachings (things temporal) and 
attention to “true religion” that considers things unseen, foremost of which is the invisible 
God (things eternal). Abraham’s ability to see God, Ambrose concludes, results from 
ceasing to look for God within the world (intra mundum), in things seen, and in shifting 
his religious allegiance and becoming humble.42 By renouncing the teachings of the 
Chaldeans, Abraham “began to see God and to recognize God as God, by whose invisible 
power (inuisibili uirtute) he perceived all things to be ruled and governed.”43  
The goal of seeing things unseen, supported by 2 Corinthians 4:18, is applied to 
the struggle for virtue in Ambrose’s treatise On the Good of Death (390 CE), as well. 
When describing the process of divesting ourselves of pleasure and the subsequent need 
for the soul’s eschatological flight, Ambrose writes: “We cannot comprehend such 
                                                
42 See Smith, Christian Grace and Pagan Virtue, 90–91, which argues that fides and deuotio for 
Ambrose help determine the lasting value of things eternal, with special attention to Abraham. 
43 Ambr. Abr. 2.3.9 (CSEL 32/1: 571). See also Abr. 2.8.46 (CSEL 32/1: 599–600): Intellegibilis 
enim usia caelum est, uisibilis uel sensibilis substantia terra est. . . . Ex illa intellegibili substantia 
theoreticae uitae induat altitudinem, spectans non illa quae uidentur, sed quae non uidentur, hoc est non 
terrena, non corporalia, non praesentia, sed incorporalia aeterna calestia, de ista autem uisibili substantia 
operatoriae atque ciuilis disciplinae capessat gratiam. 
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heavenly truth with hands or eyes or ears, because ‘what is seen is temporal, but what is 
not seen is eternal’ (2 Cor. 4:18). Indeed we are often deceived by sight (fallimur uisu) 
and we see things for the most part other than they really are (aliter pleraque quam sunt 
uidemus). . . . Let us contemplate, not what is seen, but what is unseen.”44 East of Eden 
our senses are not trustworthy guides; worldly pleasures and pursuits complicate our 
contemplation of higher things unseen.45 Ambrose always pulls a veil between where we 
are and where we are going (or who we are and who we will be). To assume untroubled 
access to things eternal by means of perfect vision and insight peddles counterfeit 
confidence in our present state, as well as treating that which is seen, the temporal, as if it 
were eternal.46 The verse in question (2 Cor. 4:18) functions in large part as a reminder of 
the deceit the senses interject into our pursuits; for Ambrose, the verse reiterates the 
eternal character of the final goal.47 
While 2 Corinthians 4:18 serves as an eternal check on our corporeal confidence, 
Romans 1:20 (“For the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the 
things that are made, even his everlasting power and divinity”) helps Ambrose argue for 
seeing things unseen in contexts pertaining to both creation and Christology. In 
Ambrose’s Hexaemeron the use of Romans 1:20 is understandably with reference to 
                                                
44 Ambr. Bon. mort. 3.10 (CSEL 32/1: 711). 
45 See Ambr. Bon. mort. 5.16 (CSEL 32/1: 717–18), where Ambrose warns against the “snares” 
(laquei) of the world and body.  
46 See Ambr. Myst. 3.15 (CSEL 73: 95).  
47 For other references to 2 Corinthians 4:18, see: Noe 20.72 (CSEL 32/1: 466); Ep. 21.3 (CSEL 
82/1: 154–55); Ep. 22.14–15 (CSEL 82/1: 166); Ep. 31.1 (CSEL 82/1: 216); Hex. 1.3.9 (CSEL 32/1: 8); 
Off. 2.10.52 (CCSL 15: 116), 3.1.7 (CCSL 15: 155); Luc. 6.34 (CSEL 32/4: 246); Psal. 118 10.7 (CSEL 
62: 206–7), 10.25 (CSEL 62: 219), where Ambrose asserts that “the image of the invisible God is not in 
that which is seen but that which is unseen”; 18.41 (CSEL 62: 419), where Ambrose connects quae non 
uidentur aeterna with Christ, who is described as non temporalis, sed ex patre ante tempora quasi deus 
uerus dei filius et quasi uirtus semptierna supra tempora.  
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creation: the intricacies and beauties of creation proclaim the “invisible majesty” 
(inuisibilis maiestas) of its author.48 Elsewhere, however, Ambrose’s use of Romans 1:20 
is most often Christological.49 When exegeting Luke 1:2—“As they have delivered them 
unto us, who from the beginning were eyewitnesses and ministers of the word”50—
Ambrose writes generally about seeing God in or through Jesus as analogous to seeing 
the Creator’s handiwork in or through creation. “I see Jesus, I see also the Father, when I 
raise my eyes to heaven, I turn them to the seas, I turn them again to the land. ‘For the 
invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made’ 
(Rom. 1:20).”51 This Christological use is more typical of Ambrose’s proof-texting, 
which should become unsurprising given Asterius’ non-Nicene use of Romans 1:20 
discussed later in the chapter. 
Most of the Christological uses of Romans 1:20 are obvious borrowings of the 
Pauline phrase, “the eternal power and divinity,” which Ambrose glosses as predicates of 
Christ himself and therefore proof of Christ’s eternal nature.  
Therefore we declare the Son to be “eternal Power” (Rom. 1:20). If, then, his 
“power and divinity are eternal,” surely his potency is eternal also. Therefore, he 
who diminishes the Son diminishes the Father; he offends piety and violates 
charity. Let us honor the Son, “in whom the Father is well pleased,” for it has 
pleased the Father that praise be given to the Son, “in whom He Himself is well 
pleased” (Mt. 3:17, 17:5).52  
                                                
48 Ambr. Hex. 2.4.15 (CSEL 32/1: 54). See also Hex. 1.4.16 (CSEL 32/1: 14); Psal. 118 2.33 
(CSEL 62: 39–40).  
49 See Ayres, “Remember You Are Catholic,” 63, at n.56. 
50 See Ambr. Luc. 1.5 (CSEL 32/4: 12), where Ambrose first quotes the verse: Sicut tradiderunt 
inquit nobis qui ab initio ipsi uiderunt et ministri fuerunt uerbi. Cf. Orig. Hom. Luc. 1.4–5 (SC 87: 104–7). 
As noted in the introduction, Ambrose’s interpretation of this verse bears resemblance to Origen’s Homilies 
on Luke. Still, Ambrose’s gloss is informed by homoian anxieties alien to Origen. 
51 Ambr. Luc. 1.7 (CSEL 32/4: 14). 
52 Ambr. Fid. 4.8.80 (CSEL 78: 184): Et ideo filium ‘sempiternam’ dicimus esse ‘uirtutem.’ Si 
ergo ‘sempiterna eius uirtus adque diuinitas,’ utique et potentia eius est sempiterna. Filio igitur qui 
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Here, with recourse to a Christological reading of Romans 1:20, Ambrose offers a neo-
Nicene interpretation of the verse: the Son is the eternal Power of God, and thus to 
dishonor the Son is to dishonor the Father. In fact, Ambrose’s Christological use of 
Romans 1:20 is always neo-Nicene: the visible things of God tell of the Son as the single, 
eternal, divine power. 
 
“Whoever Has Seen Me Has Seen the Father”: Seeing the Father in the Son 
We indicated in the previous section that to make his case that visible works are 
signs of invisible realities, Ambrose references two Pauline texts (2 Cor. 4:18 and Rom. 
1:20) in connection to the words of Jesus in John 10:38. In so doing, Ambrose offers his 
audience a parallel construction of the contemplation of things unseen through things 
seen. Just as the ritual elements of baptism point to deeper spiritual realities, so too do 
things made (quae facta sunt) disclose the inuisibilia of God (even God’s “power and 
divinity”). Still, by attaching 2 Corinthians 4:18 and Romans 1:20 to Jesus’ words in John 
10:38, Ambrose is making a further point. Just as baptism is a visible index for invisible 
realities, so are Jesus’ visible works (opera) indicative of, or “precede[d]” (praecederet) 
by, his “presence of divinity” (diuinitatis praesentiam).53 What follows further illumines 
this logic and reveals how Jesus’ opera allow us to see the Father. 
                                                                                                                                            
derogat, patri derogat, pietatem offendit, uiolat caritatem. Nos honorificemus filium, ‘in quo pater 
conplacet; placet enim patri, ut laudetur filius, ‘in quo ipse conplacuit.’ See also Fid. 4.10.118 (CSEL 78: 
199), 5.13.164 (CSEL 78: 275). 
53 Ambr. Myst. 3.8 (CSEL 73: 91–92). 
  
 
84 
 While Ambrose reflects repeatedly on the “works” (opera) of the Son throughout 
his corpus, explicit quotation of John 10:38 is less common. Ambrose’s Flight from the 
World 2.10 is an exception. “The power of God is an operational power,” Ambrose 
writes. “Even if God is not seen, he is judged from his works, and his works reveal the 
worker so that he who is not comprehended may be perceived. On this account also the 
Lord says, ‘If you do not believe me, at least believe the works’ (Jn. 10:38).”54 Ambrose’s 
use of John 10:38 drives his distinction between what is “perceived” (intellegatur) and 
“comprehended” (conprehenditur), the latter more significant than the former. By 
“perceive” (intellegatur), I take Ambrose to mean something straightforward like “see” 
or “glimpse.” One need not “comprehend” something seen or perceived, however. So, by 
“comprehend” (conprehenditur), I take Ambrose to be intimating something “grasped” or 
“received into one’s mind.”55 Jesus’ “works” (opera) function as our mode to perceive 
something of God, while the full comprehension of the divine remains out of reach. 
Ambrose will often adapt this visual logic when labeling Christ the true Image of 
God. We see this logic on display, for instance, during the controversy over the Portian 
Basilica between Nicenes and homoians in 385/6 CE.56 When summoned to the imperial 
                                                
54 Ambr. Fug. 2.10 (CSEL 32/2: 170). ergo operatoria uirtus dei. Etsi non uidetur, tamen ex suis 
operibus aestimatur operatoremque opera sua produnt, ut intellegatur qui non conprehenditur. Unde et 
dominus ait: ‘si mihi non creditis, uel operibus credite.’ See Symb. 6 (CSEL 73: 9), where Ambrose 
references Jn. 10:38 when explaining the Nicene formula’s line about Christian belief in the remission of 
sins. In his Psal. 118 7.7 (CSEL 62: 131), Ambrose uses a similar collection of verbs for seeing and 
comprehending: suscipitur (“accept”), intellegitur (“perceive with our understanding”), and conprehenditur 
(“comprehend”). 
55 Akin to Silius Italicus’ lines in Punica. See Sil. Pun. 3.406–8 (LCL 277: 144–45).  
56 See Ambr. Ep. 76 (CSEL 82/3: 108–25). There is scholarly debate over two issues: first, which 
basilica was demanded, the Portian or the Nova; and second, how many sieges took place. On the first of 
these, see, e.g., Williams, Ambrose of Milan and the End of the Arian-Nicene Conflicts, 214–15. On the 
second, see Andrew Lenox-Conyngham, “The Topography of the Basilica Conflict of A.D. 385/6 in 
Milan,” Historia: Zeitschrift für alte Geschichte 31.3 (1982): 353–63, at 354–6. See also Marcia L. Colish, 
“Why the Portiana?: Reflections on the Milanese Basilica Crisis of 386,” JECS 10.3 (2002): 361–72. 
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court, demanding he offer up the basilica, Ambrose refused and was subsequently held in 
contempt of court. Outside the imperial palace, a mob of Ambrosian supporters coalesced 
and forced the release of the bishop. The court relented, released Ambrose, and, for a 
time, retracted the demand for the basilica. Several months later, the homoians gained 
another foothold—official recognition as the Catholic faith.57 Several formal imperial 
demands ensued to yield first the Portian and then the New Basilica. Ambrose again 
refused, culminating in a sermon against the homoian Auxentius, Ambrose’s predecessor 
as bishop and, though deceased, the ultimate catalyst behind the imperial demands.58  
Near the end of his sermon, dated to Palm Sunday 386 CE, Ambrose addresses 
the Basilica dispute by concatenating and reinterpreting a number of debated scriptural 
texts to form a cohesive argument against homoian discontents.59 He prefaces this part of 
his sermon by comparing the “Arians” and “Jews” and contends that the former are much 
worse than the latter because they are “willing to surrender to the Emperor the rights of 
the Church.”60 To make his case, Ambrose cites Matthew 22:18–21, where Jesus tells the 
                                                                                                                                            
Colish notes that the Portiana sat outside of the city center, while the Basilica Nova was at the city’s center 
and was the primary site of Ambrose’s ministry. At the time, these were the only two churches with 
baptisteries, shedding further light on the homoian demand for control of the basilica around Easter.  
57 See Williams, Ambrose of Milan and the End of the Arian-Nicene Conflicts, 212–13. 
58 Ambr. Ep. 76a.17 (CSEL 82/3: 92). 
59 Paulinus, Vita Ambrosii 12, 13, 20; Aug. Conf. 9.7 (CSEL 33: 208–9); Rufinus, Historia 
ecclesiastica 2.15–16; Theodoret, Historia ecclesiastica 5.13; Socrates, Historia ecclesiastica 5.11; 
Sozomen, Historia ecclesiastica 7.13. The secondary literature is voluminous. I am particularly indebted to 
Williams, Ambrose of Milan and the End of the Arian-Nicene Conflicts, 210–17; Lenox-Conyngham, “The 
Topography of the Basilica Conflict of A.D. 385/6 in Milan.” 
60 Ambr. Ep. 75a.31 (CSEL 82/3: 103). The sermon is often also titled Contra Auxentium. See 
Mary Sheather, “Theory and Practice in Ambrose: De officiis and the Political Interventions of the Bishop 
of Milan,” in Geoffrey Dunn and Wendy Mayer, eds. Christians Shaping Identity from the Roman Empire 
to Byzantium: Studies Inspired by Pauline Allen (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 167–85, at 172–78. Recall too Fid. 
5.9.116 (CSEL 78: 259–60), where Ambrose connects the Arians and Jews. On Ambrose’s literary 
association of the heretics with the Jews, see Maria Doerfler, “Ambrose’s Jews: The Creation of Judaism 
  
 
86 
Pharisees’ disciples and some of the Herodians to consider the impressed “image” on a 
denarius in order to determine whether to pay a tax to Caesar.61 By asking to whom they 
should render money and allegiance, these challengers of Jesus—these are Ambrose’s 
“Jews”—sought to put Jesus to the test. Ambrose leveled the charge of betrayal against 
the Arians, since they presented themselves as “following their author” (sequuntur 
auctorem, that is, Arius) and were “liars” (perfidi) who failed to render to the Church that 
to which it had a right, instead giving it to Caesar, that is, the emperor. The implied 
conclusion is this: the “Arians” have surrendered to the emperor the very things of God—
in this case, the Basilica.  
The Arians ostensibly take the place of the Pharisees and Herodians in Ambrose’s 
sermon; they are the ones who try to put Jesus to the test by offering a denarius with a 
faulty image on it, in hopes of securing the basilicas. Ambrose’s reply links the “image” 
on the coin from Matthew 22:20 with both a Christological gloss of Genesis 1:26 and a 
series of contested texts (e.g., Heb. 1:3; Jn. 14:9; Jn. 10:30).  
But in the church I know of one image, that is the Image of the invisible God, 
concerning whom God said: “Let us make man after our image and likeness” 
(Gen. 1:26), that image about whom it is written, that Christ is the “splendor of 
glory and the image of God’s substance” (Heb. 1:3). In this image, I discern the 
Father, as the Lord Jesus himself said: “Whoever sees me sees the Father” (Jn. 
14:9). For this image is not separated from the Father, for it taught me the unity of 
the Trinity, saying, “I and the Father are one” (Jn. 10:30) and later, “All things 
which the Father has are mine” (Jn. 16:15). And concerning the Holy Spirit, he 
says that it is the spirit of Christ, and has received from Christ, as it is written, 
“He shall receive from me and announce it to you” (Jn. 16:15).62 
 
                                                                                                                                            
and Heterodox Christianity in Ambrose of Milan’s Expositio evangelii secundum Lucam,” Church History 
80.4 (2011): 749–72. 
61 See Ambr. Ep. 76.19 (CSEL 82/3: 119), where Ambrose references Matthew 22:21 when 
recalling the imperial demands to his sister, Marcellina. 
62 Ambr. Ep. 75a.32 (CSEL 82/3: 104). 
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Ambrose’s logic is on full display: Jesus’ reference to the “image” on the coin triggers 
consideration of the Image of God’s substance; seeing that Image constitutes seeing the 
invisible Father, since the Father and his Image are united. The use of texts assembled for 
anti-homoian polemic lends support to Ambrose’s claim that the Son is the true Image, 
divine by his unity with the Father. 
In a letter to a certain layman named Irenaeus concerning Christ as the true chief 
good of humanity (summum bonum), Ambrose writes that Jesus is present as both the 
“interior Image of God, the character of his substance . . . and as man” (adsum interior 
imago dei, character substantiae, et adsum ut homo).63 The terms imago dei and 
character substantiae with reference to Christ are adapted from Colossians 1:1564 and 
Hebrews 1:365, respectively, and recur in Ambrose’s corpus. In accordance with a 
traditional usage among Latin authors, Ambrose then implies the inscrutability of Christ’s 
                                                
63 Ambr. Ep. 11.8 (CSEL 82/1: 82). 
64 For Ambrose’s many uses of Colossians 1:15, see Aux. 32 (CSEL 82/3: 104); Ep. 1.22 (CSEL 
82/1: 14), 5.4 (CSEL 82/1: 36), 22.11 (CSEL 82/1: 164); Hex. 1.4.15 (CSEL 32/1: 13), 1.5.19 (CSEL 32/1: 
15–16), 2.5.19 (CSEL 32/1: 57–58), Exc. 2.109 (CSEL 73: 311–12); Fid. 1.7.48–49 (CSEL 78: 21–22), 
5.2.34 (CSEL 78: 229), 5.7.97 (CSEL 78: 251), 5.11.138 (CSEL 78: 267), 5.17.219 (CSEL 78: 300), 
5.19.228 (CSEL 78: 303–4); Incarn. 10.110 (CSEL 79: 277), 10.112 (CSEL 79: 278–79); Is. 5.48 (CSEL 
32/1: 673); Luc. 2.27 (CSEL 32/4: 55), 2.94 (CSEL 32/4: 96), 3.49 (CSEL 32/4: 124), 7.24 (CSEL 32/4: 
292), 7.232 (CSEL 32/4: 386), 10.49 (CSEL 32/4: 474); Paen. 1.9.41 (CSEL 73: 139), Parad. 5.26 (CSEL 
32/1: 283); Psal. 118 3.20 (CSEL 62: 51–52), 10.16 (CSEL 62: 212), 19.28 (CSEL 62: 436); Psal. 43.90 
(CSEL 64: 325), 47.16 (CSEL 64: 356); Spir. 2.12.138 (CSEL 79: 140); Virg. 1.8.48 (PL 16: 202).  
65 For Ambrose’s many uses of Hebrews 1:3, see Aux. 32 (CSEL 82/3: 104); Hex. 2.6.19 (CSEL 
32/1: 57), 3.7.32 (CSEL 32/1: 80), 6.7.42 (CSEL 32/1: 234), Ex. uirg. 9.57 (PL 16: 353), Fid. 1.7.48 
(CSEL 78: 21), 1.13.79 (CSEL 78: 34), 3.11.78–80 (CSEL 78: 137), 3.14.108 (CSEL 78: 147), 3.16.135–
3.17.137 (CSEL 78: 156–57), 4.2.23 (CSEL 78: 164), 4.9.108 (CSEL 78: 195–96), 4.10.134 (CSEL 78: 
204–5), 5.2.34 (CSEL 78: 229), 5.7.97 (CSEL 78: 251), 5.8.104 (CSEL 78: 254–55), 5.9.118 (CSEL 78: 
260–61), 5.11.138 (CSEL 78: 267), 5.16.198 (CSEL 78: 291–92), 5.18.224 (CSEL 78: 302), 5.19.228 
(CSEL 78: 303–4); Incar. 5.44 (CSEL 79: 246), 8.81 (CSEL 79: 265), 10.108–10.111(CSEL 79: 276–77); 
Luc. 2.12 (CSEL 32/4: 47–48); Psal. 118 19.38 (CSEL 62: 441); Psal. 35.22 (CSEL 64: 65), 38.24 (CSEL 
64: 202), 40.35 (CSEL 64: 252–53), 43.12 (CSEL 64: 270), 47.19 (CSEL 64: 358–59); Sacr. 6.1.1 (CSEL 
73: 72); Spir. 2.12.138 (CSEL 79: 140); Vid. 5.31 (PL 16: 244); Virg. 1.8.46–48 (PL 16: 201–2), 2.2.7 (PL 
16: 209). See “Fragments de Palladius” 102.340r (SC 267: 288–89) and 134.346v (SC 260: 316–17). See 
also also Frances M. Young, “Christological Ideas in the Greek Commentaries on the Epistle to the 
Hebrews," JTS 20.1 (1969): 150–63; Rowan A. Greer, The Captain of Our Salvation: A Study in the 
Patristic Exegesis of Hebrews (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1973). 
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divine nature through a question amended from Jeremiah 17:9b: “But who knows me” 
(sed quis cognoscit me)?66 Ambrose and his readers’ likely familiarity with the text 
allows him both to omit the initial clause (Jer. 17:9a) “for he is man” (et homo est) and to 
appoint the Son as the questioner, posing the inquiry.67 Ambrose’s answer is particularly 
enlightening: “For they see a man, but by his works they believe that he is beyond man 
(sed operibus supra hominem crediderunt). Was he not as man when he wept over 
Lazarus, and yet above man when he resuscitated him? Was he not as man when flogged, 
and yet above man when he took away the sin of the whole world?”68 As the Image of 
God, Jesus’ life and ministry, in other words, inevitably manifests the visible/invisible 
dynamic: “For they see a man, but by his works they believe that he is beyond man”—an 
allusion to John 10:38. Instances of Jesus’ perceived fragility, both emotional in the case 
of Lazarus’ death and physical in the case of his own flogging, place the focus on the 
visibility of the Son’s humanity. But Ambrose then proceeds to point to the invisible 
transcendence manifested within each instance itself and acknowledged by faith, in 
contrast to sight: the Son raised Lazarus to new life despite his deeply human emotion; 
and only someone supra hominem could “take away the sins of the world.”  
                                                
66 See Tert. Marc. 3.7 (CSEL 47: 387); Comm. Apol. 370 (CCSL 128: 87); Cypr. Test. 2.10 (CSEL 
3/1: 74).  
67 For similar shorthand citation of Jeremiah 17:9, see Hier. Ier. 3.74 (CSEL 59: 210). 
68 Ambr. Ep. 11.8 (CSEL 82/1: 83). Sed quis cognoscit me? Hominem enim uiderunt, sed operibus 
supra hominem crediderunt. An non ut homo, cum Lazarum fleret, et rursus supra hominem, com eum 
resuscitart? An non ut homo, cum uapularet, et rursus supra hominem, cum totius mundi peccatum 
tolleret? Ambrose references the latter portion of the verse a few times throughout his career, most often 
citing it as: Et homo est et quis cognoscet eum? For these references, see Ep. 39.7 (CSEL 82/2: 31); Psal. 
118 12.3 (CSEL 62: 253). Ambrose’s use of cognosco is most common in the Latin tradition (e.g., 
Tertullian, Cyprian, Lactantius). Far less common was the use of agnosco. For these instances, see Ambr. 
Inst. 16.99 (PL 16: 329); Paen. 1.3.12 (CSEL 73: 125). Augustine picks up on the usage of agnosco in his 
references to the verse.  
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For Ambrose, the Son’s opera offer their audience entrance into a mystery, not 
unlike the sacrament of baptism. Opera, in other words, point beyond themselves to their 
ultimate invisible realities. Since the works themselves demand further interpretation, 
they constitute something of a divine pedagogy, which serves to train audiences to see 
something beyond the seen works themselves. Such logic is operative in Ambrose’s 
remarkable passage from the Exposition of the Gospel of Luke 1.7, first mentioned in my 
Introduction.  
What, then, is it to see God? I do not want you would not ask me. Ask the gospel, 
ask the Lord himself; nay, hear him saying, “Philip, whoever has seen me has 
seen the Father, who sent me. How do you say, “Show us the Father?” Do you not 
believe that I am in the Father, and the Father is in me? (Jn. 14:9-10)” Certainly, a 
body is not seen in a body, nor a spirit in a spirit, but the Father alone is seen in 
the Son, or the Son is seen in the Father. For unlike are not seen in unlike; but 
where there is unity of operation and of power, the Son is seen in the Father and 
the Father in the Son. “For the works I do,” he says, “he also does” (Jn 5:19). In 
the works Jesus is seen, and the Father is discerned in the Son’s works.69 
 
Ambrose’s reasoning here is threefold. First, Ambrose maintains that seeing God 
amounts to seeing the Father in the Son and the Son in the Father. Secondly, Ambrose 
clarifies what sort of seeing takes place when the Father or Son is seen. Since the Son can 
be said to image the Father, Ambrose must reiterate the precise relationship that obtains 
between the Father and Son. With the statement “Certainly a body is not seen in a body, 
nor a spirit in a spirit. . . . For unlike are not seen in unlike” Ambrose fends off non-
Nicene pitfalls that posit a corporeal indwelling of the divine persons. And as Ambrose 
will argue, corporeal indwelling of the persons presupposes a dissimilarity of Son and 
                                                
69 Luc. 1.7 (CSEL 32/4: 14–15). Quid est ergo deum uidere? Nolo me interroges: euangelium 
interroga, ipsum dominum interroga, immo dicentem audi: Philippe, qui me uidit uidit et patrem, qui me 
misit. Quomodo tu dicis: ostende nobis patrem? Non credis quia ego in patre et pater in me est? Vtique non 
corpus uidetur in corpore nec spiritus uidetur in spiritu, sed solus ille pater uidetur in filio aut iste filius 
uidetur in patre; non enim dissimiles in dissimilibus uidentur, sed ubi unitas operationis est atque 
uirtutis, et filius in patre et pater uidetur in filio. Quae ego inquit opera facio, et ille facit. In operibus 
Iesus uidetur, in operibus filii et pater cernitur. Emphasis added.  
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Father. Thirdly, and finally, Ambrose claims that seeing the Father in the Son is only 
possible if there is a “unity of operation and of power” (unitas operationis est atque 
uirtutis), a statement which links this visual logic to the importance of seeing the works 
of God.  
 This section has shown that the visual logic identified in Ambrose’s reflection on 
the baptismal rite extends to his Christology. To that end, I argued that Ambrose makes 
much of the Son’s works (opera) as indicators of his divinity, affording insights into the 
Father. Commonly disputed texts, like Colossians 1:15 and Hebrews 1:3, further support 
Ambrose’s point that the Son is the one who truly images the Father and reveals 
something of God. In seeing the Son, in other words, we can be confident that we are 
seeing the Father. 
 
Divine Visibility, Multiple Powers, and Bodily Unity: Ambrose’s Pro-Nicene Polemic 
Still, the contention that the Father is seen in the Son must be clarified. What is 
the precise character of seeing that takes place when we see the Father in the Son? This 
section analyzes how Ambrose’s pro-Nicene image theology, driven by visual logic, is 
used to fend off his non-Nicene opponents. We can discern two main ways Ambrose 
responds to non-Nicene teaching, both of which wrestle with the challenge of seeing the 
Father in the Son. The first responds to the claim that there are multiple powers in God, 
while the second rebuts the claim that divine unity is somehow corporeal, or, affirms that 
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seeing the Son in the Father is different than seeing a body in a body.70 Ambrose’s 
polemic re-exegetes his opponents’ favorite scriptural supports and upholds the pro-
Nicene line: in God, a single, invisible power unifies the three divine persons.  
First, Ambrose writes against the non-Nicene position that multiple powers exist 
in God, a common characterization of Arius and his followers.71 Rowan Williams 
explains the logic behind this multiple powers doctrine: “The Logos truly exists as a 
subject distinct from the Father; but defining qualities, the essential life, of one subject 
cannot be shared with another; therefore the divine attributes applied to the Son must be 
true of him in a sense quite different from that in which they are true of the Father.”72 If a 
power was posited proper to God, the same power could not be spoken of with reference 
to Christ, especially since the former is unseen, the latter, seen. This Arian line was 
supported by multiple scriptural texts that described the Son and Father as separate agents 
(e.g., Mt. 24:36; Jn. 5:19; Jn. 14:28). To meet the challenge, Arian exegetes concluded 
God was the Lord of powers, and thereby ruled over multiple powers. The Son was 
considered great, but only one of God’s powers.73  
                                                
70 See Luc. 1.7 (CSEL 32/4: 15): Vtique non corpus uidetur in corpore nec spiritus uidetur in 
spiritu, sed solus ille pater uidetur in filio aut iste filius uidetur in patre. 
71 See Barnes, Power of God, 126–72, at 165–72. Barnes narrates a significant shift in speaking of 
multiple powers in God with the writings of Marcellus of Ancyra. The critique that Arius (and Asterius) 
posited multiple powers in God is frequent in fourth-century literature. Though not using the language of 
dunameis or exousiai, Athanasius’ De synodis notes several scriptures that were used to argue for multiple 
powers in God.  
72 Rowan Williams, Arius: Heresy and Tradition, rev. ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2002), 
232. See also idem, “The Logic of Arianism,” JTS 34 (1983): 56–81. 
73 See Khaled Anatolios, Retrieving Nicaea: The Development and Meaning of Trinitarian 
Doctrine (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2011), 112–14; Stuart G. Hall, “The Thalia of Arius in 
Athanasius’ Accounts,” in Robert C. Gregg, ed., Arianism: Historical and Theological Reassessments: 
Papers from The Ninth International Conference on Patristic Studies (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2006), 
37–58, at 50; Hanson, The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God, 20. 
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Descriptions of first-generation followers of Arius were said to identify the 
multiple acts of and by God and his Son; from these acts, they were said to argue that (at 
least) two powers resided in the Trinity. Athanasius recalls the Arian interpretation of 
Joel 2:25 (LXX), which refers to the “locust and the caterpillar” as “my great power” (ἡ 
δύναμίς μου ἡ μεγάλη) and concludes from this verse that there were multiple powers 
in the Trinity, of which Christ was one.74 Examples of this multiple-powers doctrine are 
frequent in fourth-century literature—many fragments are preserved in anti-Arian 
literature. For instance, Athanasius quotes a fragment from Asterius of Cappadocia (d. 
341 CE), that “many-headed sophist” and supposed follower of Arius, in his On the 
Synods 18: 
For the blessed Paul said not that he preached Christ [to be] his, that is, God’s 
“own power” or “wisdom,” but without the addition, “God’s power and God’s 
wisdom” (1 Cor. 1:24), preaching that God’s own power was distinct, which was 
connatural and co-existent with him unoriginately, generative indeed of Christ, 
creative of the whole world; concerning which he teaches in his epistle to the 
Romans that “the invisible things of God from the creation of the world are 
clearly seen, being understood by the things which are made, even his eternal 
power and divinity” (Rom. 1:20). For as no one would say that the deity there 
mentioned was Christ, but the Father himself, so, as I think, his eternal power is 
also not the only-begotten God (Jn. 1:18), but the Father who begot him. And he 
teaches us of another power and wisdom of God, namely, that which is 
manifested through Christ, and made known through the works themselves of his 
ministry.75 
                                                
74 See Athan. Syn. 18.6 (SC 563: 238–39) Athanasius also lists the psalmist’s language of “the 
Lord of hosts” or “powers.” See Socrates, Historia ecclesiastica 1.36, where the historian indicates 
Asterius’ reference to Joel 2:25 and association with Arius. See also Hanson, The Search for the Christian 
Doctrine of God, 20, where he indicates that Asterius, not Arius, referenced Joel 2:25. Cf. Orig. Com. Rom. 
1.14 (SC 532: 228–31), where Origen glosses Romans 1:16 (“the power of God for salvation to everyone 
who believes”) with references to other verses that mention “power,” one of which is Joel 2:25. See also 
Orig. Cels. 2.9, which refers to Jesus as a “great power and a God like the God and Father of the universe.”   
75 Athan. Syn. 18.4–7 (SC 563: 236–39). “Οὐ γὰρ εἶπεν ὁ μακάριος Παῦλος Χριστὸν 
κηρύσσειν τὴν ἰδίαν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν ἢ τὴν σοφίαν αὐτοῦ, τουτέστι τοῦ θεοῦ, ἀλλὰ δίχα τῆς 
προσθήκης δύναμιν θεοῦ καὶ θεοῦ σοφίαν, ἄλλην μὲν εἶναι τὴν ἰδίαν αὐτοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ δύναμιν, τὴν 
ἔμφυτον αὐτῷ καὶ συνυπάρχουσαν αὐτῷ ἀγεννὴτως κηρύσσων, γεννητικὴν μὲν οὖσαν, δηλονότι 
τοῦ Χριστοῦ, δημιουργικὴν δὲ τοῦ παντὸς κόσμου. Περὶ ἧς ἐν τῇ Πρὸς ῥωμαίους ἐπιστολῇ 
διδάσκων ἔλεγε: Τὰ γὰρ ἀόρατα αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ κτίσεως κόσμου τοῖς ποιήμασι νοούμενα καθορᾶται ἥ 
τε ἀίδιος αὐτοῦ δύναμις καὶ θειότης. Ὥσπερ γὰρ τὴν εἰρημένην ἐνταυθοῖ θεότητα, οὐκ ἄν τις φαίν 
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Asterius emphasizes the singular power of God and a distinct power which comes from 
the manifestation of Christ through his works. As Athanasius writes of Asterius: “the Son 
is considered one among others” (εἷς τῶν πάντων ἐστὶν ὁ υἱός).76 Athanasius concludes 
thusly on the basis of a fragment of Asterius that cites 1 Corinthians 1:24 and Romans 
1:20, two controversial texts in anti-monarchian and anti-homoian polemics, for defense. 
What is particularly striking for our purposes is that in the generation prior to Ambrose 
and roughly contemporaneous with Asterius, Hilary only twice mentions Romans 1:20 in 
his anti-homoian writings, while Ambrose references the verse 30-odd times. This 
difference between him and Hilary indicates that Ambrose clearly has a distinctive, if not 
a borrowed or outdated, “Arianism” in his crosshairs.  
Supporting the possibility of Ambrose’s borrowed early descriptions of Arianism 
are the first two books of On the Faith (ca. 378/9 CE). There, we find Ambrose fumbling 
through textbook summaries of heresies and lacking theological nuance.77 The laundry 
                                                                                                                                            
Χριστὸν εἶναι, ἀλλ᾽αὐτὸν ὑπάρχειν τὸν πατέρα, οὔτως, οἶμαι, καὶ ἡ ἀίδιος αὐτοῦ δύναμις οὐχ ὁ 
μονογενὴς θεός, ἀλλ᾽ὁ γεννήσας ὑπάρχει πατήρ. Ἄλλην δὲ δύναμιν καὶ σοφίαν διδάσκει θεοῦ τὴν 
διὰ τοῦ Χριστοῦ δεικνυμένην δηλονότι καὶ διὰ τῶν ἔργων αὐτῶν τῆς διακονίας αὐτοῦ 
γνωριζομένην.” 
76 Athan. Syn. 17.4 (SC 563: 232–33). See also Hanson, The Search for the Christian Doctrine of 
God, 32–41, which lists multiple fragments from Asterius preserved by Athanasius.  
77 See Hanson, The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God, 667–75, at 668–69. Ambrose 
himself admits that the work is “less of a disputation concerning the faith than a weaving together of many 
testimonies” (De fide 1.prol.4 (CSEL 78: 6)). For statements of the hurried nature of Ambrose’s 
appointment and his unpreparedness, see Ambr. Off. 1.1.4 (CCSL 15: 2). (cf. Cic. Off. 1.4); Ambr. Paen. 
2.8.67–73 (CSEL 73: 190–93). See Tore Janson, Latin Prose Prefaces: Studies in Literary Conventions 
(Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1964), 116–161; Ivor J. Davidson, “A Tale of Two Approaches: 
Ambrose, De Officiis 1.1–22 and Cicero, De Officiis 1.1–6,” JTS 52.1 (2001): 69–76, at 63–64. Davidson’s 
attempts at reconstructing the text also consider whether Ambrose’s De officiis was meant to be read as a 
treatise or preached as a sermon. Davidson mentions that Ambrose’s statement of inadequacy goes beyond 
classical examples, but he does not say how. 
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list of heresies in book one indicts Arius for promoting multiple powers in God.78 
Ambrose argues against such a claim: God is one, and “if God is one, one is the name, 
one is the power of the Trinity.”79 In support of his claim to the unity of God, Ambrose 
cites John 10:30: “‘One [thing,’ Jesus] said, so that there would be no separation of 
power (discretio potestatis), and he adds ‘we are,’ so that you would know the Father and 
Son, so that it would be believed the perfect Father has begotten the perfect Son and the 
Father and Son would be one, not by confusion, but by unity of nature” (pater ac fillius 
unum sint non confusione, sed unitate naturae).80 While Arians hold that there are two or 
three gods, Ambrose argues that God is characterized by “a single power” (unius 
potestatis) that admits diversity.81  
To bolster his case, Ambrose recalls another contested text, the Great 
Commission: “Go, baptize the nations in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit” 
(Mt. 28:19).82 Based on this verse, non-Nicenes discerned the three divine persons as 
                                                
78 Ambr. Fid. 1.1.6 (CSEL 78: 6–7). Adsertio autem nostrae fidei haec est, ut unum deum esse 
dicamus neque ut gentes filium separemus neque ut Iudaei natum ex patre ante tempora et ex uirgine 
postea editum denegmus neque ut Sabellius patrem confundamus et uerbum, ut eundum patrem adseramus 
et filium, neque ut Fotinus initium filii ex uirgine disputemus neque ut Arrius plures credendo et dissimiles 
potestates plures deos gentili errore faciamus, quia scriptum est: ‘Audi Istrahel, dominus deus tuus 
dominus unus est’ (Deut. 6:4). See Michel R. Barnes, “One Nature, One Power: Consensus Doctrine in Pro-
Nicene Polemic,” SP 29 (1997): 205–23, at 211. Barnes suggests that Origen’s doctrine of multiple powers 
“serves as a precedent for one side in the controversies of the fourth century. When the Son is identified as 
God’s ‘second power’, His existence is distinguished from the affective capacity connatural to God’s 
nature.” By affective capacity, Barnes means that the Son as second power is distinct from the essential 
power of God. See also Simonetti, La crisi ariana nel IV secolo, 502–28, at 505–6.  
79 Fid. 1.1.8 (CSEL 78: 7). 
80 Fid. 1.1.9 (CSEL 78: 7). 
81 Fid. 1.1.10 (CSEL 78: 8). 
82 Fid. 1.1.10 (CSEL 78: 8). See Fid. 1.1.8 (CSEL 78: 7), where Ambrose again references 
Matthew 28:19 and emphasizes the singular nature of the name: ‘in nomine’ utique, non ‘in nominibus.’ 
For a discrete fourth-century reading of Matthew 28:19, see Hilar. Trin. 2.1 (CCSL 62: 38); Psal. 2.31 
(CCSL 61: 58). On Hilary’s connection to Matthew 28:19, see Meslin, Les Ariens d’Occident 335–430, 
293–94; Jean Doignon, Hilaire de Poitiers: “Disciple et témoin de la vérité,” (356–367) (Turnhout: 
Brepols, 2005), 22–24. See also Mar. Vict. Ar. 4.18 (CSEL 83/1: 251). There appears to be precedent for 
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representative of three discrete divine powers. But, Ambrose argues, by again proposing 
multiple divine powers, the Arians threaten the singular name of God. Ambrose 
maintains that such a move introduces conflict and division (diuisum) into the Godhead, 
and in recalling another verse from Matthew’s gospel, a kingdom divided against itself 
will easily be overthrown (Mt. 12:25).83  
Even while Ambrose argues against multiple divine powers in this way in his 
roughshod first book of On the Faith, he reasons similarly in On the Faith 5.9.116–
5.9.117, a portion of the work considered by scholars more favorably and much more 
nuanced.84 There too Ambrose references the Great Commission (Mt. 28:19), a text, he 
indicates, the Arians misinterpret repeatedly. Ambrose’s rehearsal of the Arian gloss here 
is similar to On the Faith 1.1.10: these multiple “names” of God—Father, Son, and Holy 
Spirit—are to be associated with multiple divine powers. 
Why is it that the Arians, after the Jewish fashion, are such false and impudent 
interpreters of the divine sayings, going indeed so far as to say that there is one 
power of the Father, another of the Son, and another of the Holy Spirit, since it is 
written: “Go, teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of 
the Son and of the Holy Spirit” (Mt. 28:19)? And from the order of words, they 
make a differentiation of divine power.85 
                                                                                                                                            
Matthew 28:19 as a disputed text among Nicenes and Arians in the East, as well. See Basil, Aduersus 
Eunomium 3.2 (SC 305: 150–53). See Timothy P. McConnell, Illumination in Basil of Caesarea’s Doctrine 
of the Holy Spirit (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2014), 33-47. Lewis Ayres also notes the “Dedication” 
Creed of Antioch (341 CE), which references Matthew 28:19 and indicates “the names are not given lightly 
or idly, but signify exactly the particular hypostasis and order and glory of each of those who are named, so 
that they are three in hypostasis but one in agreement.” See Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy, 118–21, at 118. 
For the primary text, see Hilar. Syn. 29 (PL 10: 502a–503b).  
83 Fid. 1.1.11 (CSEL 78: 8). For other references to Mt. 12:25 in polemical contexts, see Fid. 
3.12.92–93 (CSEL 78: 141), against the homoians; Paen. 2.4.20–28 (CSEL 73: 172–5), against the 
Novatianists.  
84 See Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy, 264, where Ayres mentions that, from the beginning and 
throughout De fide, Ambrose “sees the common operation of the three who are one in divine substance as 
the central mystery [of the Christian faith].”  
85 Fid. 5.9.116 (CSEL 78: 259–60). Quin etiam more iudaico etiam falsi et inpudentes interpraetes 
Arriani uerborum sunt diuinorum dicentes usque adeo aliam patris aliam fili aliam sancti esse spiritus 
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Ambrose’s reply reiterates his previous argument: in the Trinity, there is a “unity of 
majesty and of name” (unitate maiestatis ac nominis).86 True, throughout the scriptures, 
there are places where the Son is named before the Father. But these instances, Ambrose 
maintains, do not indicate a divine hierarchy, let alone that the Son is a power above the 
Father. “Faith knows not this order,” Ambrose concludes, “it knows not a divided honor 
of Father and Son. I have not read, nor heard, nor found various degrees in God. I have 
never read of a second god, or a third. I have read of a first; I have heard of a ‘first and 
only’ (Is. 44:6).”87 It is clear that Ambrose is committed to a unified, singular power in 
the Godhead. To draw from the order of multiple names an ontological ranking that splits 
the persons into separate powers, one subordinate to the other, misses the text’s intent. 
Since “the order of words is often changed” (uerborum ordo saepe mutatur), Ambrose 
argues, whatever “order” there appears to be should not be determinative of division 
between the persons in ranked terms of their divinity, in which they are one.88 
                                                                                                                                            
potestatem, ut scriptum sit: ‘Ite, docete omnes gentes baptizantes eos in nomine patris et fili et spiritus 
sancti,’ et ex uerborum ordine differentiam diuinae faciunt potestatis.  
86 Fid. 5.9.117 (CSEL 78: 260). Ambrose makes a similar argument in Spir. 1.13.132 (CSEL 79: 
72): Quis igitur unitatem negare audeat nominis, cum operationis uideat unitatem? Sed quid ego unitatem 
nominis argumentis adstruo, cum diuinae uocis euidens testimonium sit unum nomen esse patris et fili et 
spiritus sancti? Scriptum est enim: ‘Ite, baptizate gentes in nomine patris et fili et spiritus sancti.’ ‘In 
nomine’ dixit, non ‘in nominbus.’ Non ergo alid nomen patris, aliud nomen fili, aliud nomen spiritus sancti, 
quia unus deus; non plura nomina, quia non duo dei, non tres dei. Cf. Spir. 2.8.71 (CSEL 79: 114–15), 
3.19.148 (CSEL 79: 212–13); Sacr. 2.7.22 (CSEL 73: 35). 
87 Fid. 5.9.117 (CSEL 78: 260). Nescit hunc ordinem fides, nescit discretum patris et fili honorem. 
Non legi, non audiui, nec aliquem in deo inuenio gradum. Nusquam secundum, nusquam tertium deum legi. 
‘Primum’ legi, ‘primum’ ac ‘solum’ audiui. Ambrose’s worries about ranking the divine persons are 
assuaged with references to Revelation 1:17 (“for I am the first and the last”). For Ambrose’s several 
references to Revelation 1:17, see Myst. 8.46 (CSEL 73: 108); Apol. Dau. 1.17.81 (CSEL 32/2: 352); Inst. 
11.73 (PL 16: 323); Psal. 118 20.3 (CSEL 62: 446); Sacr. 5.1.1 (CSEL 73: 59).  
88 Fid. 5.9.118 (CSEL 78: 261). 
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The visibility of the Son and his divinity led Ambrose’s opponents to yet another 
conclusion: the unity of the Father and Son is somehow bodily in nature. The pro-Nicene 
claim to a single divine power, Ambrose argues, also fends off this threat. Four passages 
in particular show Ambrose’s allergy to bodily unity of the Father and the Son. The first 
passage that shows Ambrose’s allergy to the idea of a bodily unity of the Trinity, On the 
Faith 1.7.49–1.7.50, uses image language to continue the argument for prepositional 
unity between the Father and Son. Ambrose contends that the predication “Image” of the 
Son necessitates that the Son is “from God” (de deo). And the Son’s being image de deo 
is not of a bodily nature but a matter of power. The passage reads as follows: 
The prophets say: “In your light we will see light” (Ps. 35:10, LXX), and again 
they say, “For it is the brightness of an eternal light and the spotless mirror of 
God’s majesty, the image of his goodness” (Wis. 7:26). See what great things are 
declared: “Brightness,” because the clarity of the paternal light is in the Son; “a 
spotless mirror,” because the Father is seen in the Son; “the image of goodness,” 
not because a body in a body is discerned, but the whole power in the Son. 
“Image” teaches us that he is not dissimilar, it signifies that he is the expressed 
character, “brightness” marks out his eternity. “Image” therefore is not the face of 
a body, nor a composition of rouges or waxes, but something simple from God, 
“coming out of the Father” (cf. Jn. 8:42) expressed from the source.89 
 
By juxtaposing bodily language with that pertaining to divinity, Ambrose contends that 
the Son is “from God, ‘having come out from the Father,’ pressed out of the source.” 
“The ‘image,’” he writes, “is not a face of a body (non uultus est corporalis), not 
                                                
89 Ambr. Fid. 1.7.49 (CSEL 78: 21–22): Prophetae dicunt: ‘In lumine tuo uidebimus lumen,’ (Ps. 
35:10), prophetae dicunt: ‘Splendor est enim lucis aeternae et speculum sine macula dei maiestatis et 
imago bonitatis illius’ (Wis. 7:26). Vide quanta dicantur: ‘Splendor,’ quod claritas paternae lucis in filio 
sit, ‘speculum sine macula,’ quod pater uideatur in filio, ‘imago bonitatis,’ quod non corpus in corpore, 
sed uirtus in filio tota cernatur. ‘Imago’ docet non esse dissimilem, character expressum esse significat, 
‘splendor’ signat aeternum. ‘Imago’ itaque non uultus est corporalis, non fucis conposita, non ceris, sed 
simplex de deo, ‘egressa de patre’ (cf. Jn. 8:42) expressa de fonte. See also Psal. 38.24 (CSEL 64/6: 202–
3), where Jesus is described as bona imago non ceris picturae figurata radiantis, sed plenitudine diuinitatis 
expressa. In qua imagine et pater simul uidetur et filius, quia utriusque eorum unitas operationis effulget. 
For how Fid. 1.7.49 relates to Ambrose’s broader theological claims, see Markschies, Ambrosius von 
Mailand und die Trinitätstheologie, 89–109; Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy, 70–76; Boersma, Augustine's 
Early Theology of Image, 92–94. Boersma quotes the passage and references Ambrose’s image theology in 
the context of other Latins, notably Hilary and Marius Victorinus. 
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composed of rouges (non fucis conposita), nor of wax (non ceris), but is simple and from 
God (simplex de deo), ‘having come out from the Father’ (egressa de patre), pressed out 
from the source.”90  
While the overarching claim to incorporeal unity is very similar to what we get, 
for example, in Hilary’s On the Trinity 3.23,91 Ambrose’s pairing of Psalm 35:1092 and 
Wisdom 7:2693 is distinctive in Latin Christian literature, although also seen in Gregory 
                                                
90 Ambr. Fid. 1.7.49 (CSEL 78: 22). In Chapter Four, we will see Ambrose adapting the same 
material language—notably fucus and cera—to describe the moral pitfalls inherent in failing to bear the 
image of God. Our prime reference will be Ambrose’s Hex. 6.8.47. “Therefore, man, you have been painted 
by the Lord God, your painter. You are fortunate to have a painter of extravagance. Don’t erase that 
painting, one that shines not with rouge but truth (non fuco sed ueritatem fulgentem), expressed not in wax 
but in grace (non cera expressam sed gratia).” 
91 See Hilar. Trin. 3.23 (CCSL 62: 95–96), which references John 10:30, Hebrews 1:3, and 
Genesis 1:26. Audis: Ego et Pater unum sumus. Quid discindis et distrahis Filium a Patre? Vnum sunt, 
scilicet is qui est et is qui ab eo est, nihil habens quod non sit etiam in eo a quo est. Cum audis Filium 
dicentem: Ego et Pater unum sumus, personis rem adcommoda. Gignenti et genito professionis suae 
permitte sententiam. Sint unum, ut sunt qui genuit et genitus est. Cur naturam excludis, cur ueritatem 
interimis? Audis: Pater in me et ego in Patre. Et hoc de Patre et Filio Fili opera testantur. Non corpus per 
intellegentiam nostram corpori inmittimus, neque ut aquam uino infundimus; sed eandem in utroque et 
uirtutis similitudinem et deitatis plenitudinem confitemur. Omnia enim Filius accepit a Patre, et est Dei 
forma et imago substantiae eius. Eum enim qui est ab eo qui est substantiae imago tantum ad subsistendi 
fidem, non etiam ad aliquam naturae dissimilitudinem intellegendam discernit. Patrem autem in Filio et 
Filium in Patre esse, plenitudo in utroque diuinitatis perfecta est. Non enim deminutio Patris est Filius, nec 
Filius inperfectus a Patre est. Imago sola non est, et similitudo non sibi est. Deo autem simile aliquid esse 
nisi quod ex se erit non potest. Non enim aliunde est quod in omnibus simile est, neque diuersitatem duobus 
admisceri alterius ad alterum similitudo permittit. Ne similia permutes, neque sibi ex ueritate indiscreta 
disiungas: quia qui dixit: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, inuicem esse sui 
similes in eo quod similitudinem nostram dicat ostendit. Ne contigeris, ne contrectaueris, ne corruperis! 
Tene naturae nomina, tene Fili professionem. Nolo aduleris, ut Filium de tuo laudes: bene habet, ut his 
quae sunt scribta contentus sis. See also Scully, Physicalist Soteriology in Hilary of Poitiers, 31; and 
Boersma, Augustine’s Early Theology of Image, 41–43. Both Scully and Boersma mention Hilar. Trin. 
3.23. 
92 For other Christological references to Psalm 35:10, see Psal. 35.22 (CSEL 64/6: 65–66), where 
Ambrose exegetes the verse with reference to other texts central to anti-homoian polemic, namely Hebrews 
1:3, John 14:9–10, John 1:1, John 10:38, John 10:30. Other examples include: Parad. 3.13 (CSEL 32/1: 
272); Spir. 1.14.142 (CSEL 79: 76), 1.15.152 (CSEL 79: 80); Luc. 10.46 (CSEL 32/4: 473); Fug. 9.52 
(CSEL 32/2: 204). See also Hervé Savon, Saint Ambroise devant l’exégèse de Philon le Juif (Paris: Études 
augustiniennes, 1977), 220–23. 
93 Cassiodorus’ Institutions 1.5 references the status of the Book of Wisdom and mentions that 
Ambrose and Augustine gave sermons on the book, although neither collection is extant. For other 
occurrences of Ambrose’s use of Wisdom 7:26, see Abr. 2.10.76 (CSEL 32/1: 628–29); Luc. 8.68 (CSEL 
32/4: 426); Spir. 1.14.142 (CSEL 79: 75–76), 3.12.87 (CSEL 79: 186); Fid. 1.13.79 (CSEL 78: 34–35), 
  
 
99 
of Elvira’s On the Orthodox Faith. 94 This scriptural pairing discloses how precisely the 
manifestation of the Son—the “Image of his goodness”—reveals the power and majesty 
of God. Ambrose’s interpretation of the scriptural constellation is driven by an 
underlying image theology which argues that the Son is from the Father, and that their 
consubstantial relationship inheres not in physical appearance but in their “whole power” 
(tota uirtus).95 The Son, Ambrose argues, displays this divine power; he is, as Ambrose 
puts it elsewhere, the “Image of the Father’s substance.”96 Since the Son is the perfect 
                                                                                                                                            
2.pro.3 (CSEL 78: 58), 2.pro.14 (CSEL 78: 62), 2.2.32 (CSEL 78: 67). See Markschies, Ambrosius von 
Mailand und die Trinitätstheologie, 99–100. 
94 Gregory’s work was issued twice, and both editions connect Psalm 35:10 and Wisdom 7:26, 
with the differences in their treatment being slight. See Greg. Illib. Fid. Orth. 5.59 (CCSL 69: 234). See 
Manlio Simonetti’s introduction to Gregory of Elvira in his Italian translation of the Fid. Orth. in Gregorio 
Di Elvira: La fede, M. Simonetti, ed. (Torino: Societa Editrice Internazionale, 1975), 5–50. See also Jörg 
Ulrich, Die Anfänge der Abendländischen Rezeption des Nizänums (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1994), 195–
212; Hugo Koch, “In Gregors von Elvira Schrifttum und Quellen,” Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte 52 
(1932): 238–72, at 271–72. In the main, Koch’s article treats sources for Gregory’s Tractatus Origenis, and 
only briefly his De fide. The passage in question (5.59) is mentioned at the conclusion of Koch’s article, 
which cites Tertullian’s Apol. 21 (CCSL 1: 122–28), Prax. 8 (noted above), and Justin Martyr’s Dialogue 
61 (a text that draws an analogy: fire : fire :: Wisdom : God. The scriptural text with which Justin concludes 
is Proverbs 8:22ff.). See also Manlio Simonetti, Studi sull’arianesimo (Roma: Editrice Studium, 1965), 9–
87, where Simonetti treats early interpretations of Proverbs 8:22ff. In the homoian Palladius’ fragments, 
there are two references to Proverbs 8:22: at “Fragments de Palladius” 111.341v (SC 267: 296–97) and at 
134.346v (SC 267: 316–17). The latter fragment is linked with Colossians 1:15–17. For Ambrose’s 
similarity to, but not necessarily his reliance upon, Gregory, see Markschies, Ambrosius von Mailand und 
die Trinitätstheologie, 205, 210. Ayres, Augustine and the Trinity, 80–81, 156 n.41, 240 n.36, makes the 
point that Gregory of Elvira (and other pro-Nicene theologians) shares a family resemblance to Ambrose 
and Hilary, but he never makes the explicit connection regarding a shared use of Wisdom 7 and Psalm 35. 
Finally, see, too, François Szabó, Le Christ créateur chez saint Ambroise, Studia Ephemeridis 
Augustinianum 2 (Roma: Studium theologicum Augustinianum, 1968), 30, n.53, who points to an 
argument for a “fonds commun de la foi de Nicée et de la théologie d'Athanase, ” discernable in Damasus' 
Tome, Ambrose, Marius Victorinus, Gregory of Elvira, and Phoebadius of Agen.  
95 See Boersma, Augustine’s Early Theology of Image, 89–95. Boersma makes the case that for 
Ambrose image theology is “in the first place Christology” and therefore is a distinctly “spiritual reality” 
(89). Cf. Phoeb. Ar. 23.1–3 (CCSL 64: 46), where Phoebadius cautions against using deum ex deo, lumen 
ex lumine for fear that “another” (alterus) God or light could be derived from such reasoning. See also 
Michel Barnes, “Other Latin Nicenes,” unpublished article. 
96 Ambr. Fid. 5.7.97 (CSEL 78: 251). For concepts critical to Ambrose’s Trinitarian theology in 
De Fide (unius substantiae, unitas, natura, aequalitas, etc.), see Markschies, Ambrosius von Mailand und 
die Trinitätstheologie, 197–212. For similar statement, see Mar.-Vict. Ar. 1.34 (CSEL 83/1: 116): 
Substantiae autem dei imago est actio filiusque est, per quam intellegitur, et quod sit declaratur: ‘qui me 
uidit, uidit patrem,’ et ipsa substantia exisistens, habens esse et a se. Cf. Hilar. Trin. 11.5 (CCSL 62a: 533–
34). Hilary writes that Christ is “the Image of the invisible God and the Form of God.”   
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Image of the Father, he bears characteristics of the Father’s interior nature without 
complication. In his On the Mystery of the Lord’s Incarnation (ca. 382),97 penned soon 
after books four and five of On the Faith and On the Holy Spirit, Ambrose writes that the 
Son alone is called the image of the invisible God and the mark of God’s substance, 
because “in him there is the unity of the same nature and the expression of his majesty” 
(in eo naturae eiusdem unitas et eius maiestatis expressio est).98 Though Psalm 35:10 and 
Wisdom 7:26 are not quoted explicitly, many of the same key words and phrases noted in 
On the Faith 1.7.49 above are on display in On the Mystery of the Lord’s Incarnation in 
short space—e.g., unitas, maiestas, and expressio.  
Our second passage, On the Faith 1.7.50, furthers the general contours of 
Ambrose’s image theology in broad strokes, denying the non-Nicene assertion of the 
dissimilarity between Father and Son. The Father and Son are similar, even united, in 
some way. Ambrose argues, by referring to John 14:6 and 1 Corinthians 1:24 that the 
Father-Son relationship is non-corporeal. “Whoever looks upon the Son sees the Father in 
image,” Ambrose writes, and this “Father in image” is evident because of the Son’s 
deeds. Ambrose continues:  
Do you see what sort of image is spoken of? The image is truth (Jn. 14:6), justice 
(1 Cor. 1:30), the power of God (1 Cor. 1:24); it is not dumb, for it is the Word; 
not insensible, for it is wisdom (1 Cor. 1:24); not empty, for it is power; not 
vacuous, for it is life; not dead, for it is the resurrection (Jn. 11:25). You see, then, 
                                                
97 Dating the work is difficult. Ambrose refers to Fid. in it, so the earliest is likely late 381 CE. See 
Quasten, 4: 170.  
98 Ambr. Incarn. 10.110 (CSEL 79: 277). See Basil, Adversus Eunomius 2.16 (SC 305: 62–65), 
where Basil cites Psalm 35:10 in a Christological context. See also Ambr. Fid. 3.11.89–91 (CSEL 78: 140–
41), at 3.11.89: Aut si pater in filio sicut filius in patre, et substantiae utique et operationis unitas non 
negatur”; Hex. 6.7.41 (CSEL 32/1: 233): “There is no discrepancy either in divinity or in operation. 
Therefore, in both we do not have one person (persona), but one substance (substantia).” 
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that while he is called an image, they signify that there is a Father, whose image is 
the Son, since no one can be his own image.99  
 
By “image” here, Ambrose indicates that there is no difference or dissimilarity between 
the Father and the Son, who is the perfect Image: he is the manifestation of justice, 
power, and wisdom. 
Ambrose’s On the Faith 5.11.134–35 is our third example that the unity that 
obtains between the Father and the Son is not corporeal but incorporeal. Ambrose’s 
statement here comes at the conclusion of a discussion over whether the obedience of 
Christ should be attributed to his humanity or divinity. After Ambrose states that the Son 
is obedient in the flesh, he contends that the unity of the Father and Son is non-bodily.  
. . . for there is one sentiment and one operation in the Trinity. Just as the Father 
“is seen” in the Son, not indeed in bodily appearance, but in the unity of divinity 
so also the Father “speaks” in the Son, not with a temporal voice nor with a bodily 
sound, but in the unity of the work. So when he had said: “The Father who abides 
in me, speaks”; and “the works that I do, he does” (Jn. 14:10), he added: “Believe 
me, that I am in the Father, and the Father in me; otherwise believe these things 
on account of the works themselves” (Jn. 14:17).100  
 
Ambrose is concerned with how precisely the Father can be said “to be seen” in the Son. 
References to Johannine texts support and help Ambrose address this concern. The Son 
can be said to image the Father, Ambrose maintains, not by his corporeal appearance 
(specie corporali) nor does he speak in the Son by “temporal voice” (temporali uoce) or a 
“bodily sound” (corporali sono), but by his “unity of divinity” and “unity of work.” His 
                                                
99 Ambr. Fid. 1.7.50 (CSEL 78: 22). Vides quam imaginem dicat? Imago ista ueritas est, imago 
ista iustitia est, imago ista ‘dei uirtus’ est, non muta, quia uerbum est, non insensibilis, quia sapientia est, 
non inanis, quia uirtus est, non uacua, quia uita est, non mortua, quia resurrectio est. Vides ergo quia dum 
imago dicitur, patrem significant esse, cuius imago sit filius, quia nemo potest ipse sibi imago sua esse.  
100 Ambr. Fid. 5.11.134–35 (CSEL 78: 265–66). Quia una sententia et operatio trinitatis est. Sicut 
enim pater "uidetur" in filio, non utique specie corporali, sed unitate diuinitatis, ita etiam pater "loquitur" 
in filio, non temporali uoce nec corporali sono, sed operis unitate. Denique cum dixisset: Pater, qui in me 
manet, ipse loquitur, et opera, quae ego facio, ipse facit, addidit: Credite mihi, quia ego in patre et pater in 
me. Alioquin propter opera ipsa credite. 
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tentative explanations of material verbs (e.g., “seen . . . not in bodily appearance” and 
“speaks . . . not with an earthly voice or a bodily sound”) further fend off associating 
bodily unity with the divine. Instead, here, as in the passage from On the Faith 1.7.49–50 
above, Ambrose reasserts that the Son is able to show forth the Father, not because of a 
corporeal unity, but because of their a single, shared, invisible divinity and work. 
Lest we think that Ambrose’s argument for non-corporeal unity between the 
Father and Son is peculiar to On the Faith, On the Holy Spirit 3.11.82 serves as our 
fourth and final example.  
What does it mean, then, that the Father is worshipped in Christ, except that the 
Father is in Christ, and the Father speaks in Christ, and the Father remains in 
Christ (Jn. 14:10–11)? Not, indeed, as a body in a body, for God is not a body; 
nor as a confused mixture, but as the true in the true, God in God, Light in Light; 
as the eternal Father in the co-eternal Son. So it should not be understood as a 
putting of a body [into another], but as a unity of power. Therefore, by unity of 
power, Christ is jointly worshipped in the Father when God the Father is 
worshipped in Christ. In like manner, then, by unity of the same power the Spirit 
is jointly worshipped in God, when God is worshipped in Spirit (Jn. 4:24).101 
 
While there are obvious differences between this passage and Tertullian’s Against 
Praxeas 24.7–8 cited in the previous chapter, a common scriptural proof, John 14:9–10, 
is central to both.102 And both Tertullian and Ambrose refer to John 14:9–10 to assert that 
                                                
101 Spir. 3.11.82 (CSEL 79: 184): Quid est ergo ‘adoratur in Christo pater,’ nisi quia ‘est in 
Christo pater’ et ‘loquitur in Christo pater’ at ‘manet in Christo pater’ (Jn. 14:10–11)? Non utique quasi 
corpus in corpore—non enim deus corpus—nec quasi confusus in confuso, sed quasi uerus in uero, deus in 
deo, lumen in lumine, quasi pater sempiternus in filio coaeterno. Non ergo insertio corporis intellegitur, 
sed unitas potestatis. Ergo per unitatem potestatis coadoratur in patre Christus, cum deus pater adoratur 
in Christo. Similiter itaque per unitatem potestatis eiusdem coadoratur in deo spiritus, dum deus adoratur 
‘in spiritu.’   
102 See Tert. Prax. 24.7–8 (CCSL 2: 1195). “Therefore he also made manifest the conjunction of 
the two persons (duarum personarum coniunctionem), so that the Father separately might not, as though 
visible, be asked for in open view, and that the Son might be accepted as the representor of the Father (ut 
Filius repraesentator Patris haberetur). And no less did [Jesus] explain this also, in what manner the 
Father was in the Son and the Son in the Father: ‘The words,’ he says, ‘that I speak unto you, are not 
mine’—evidently because they are the Father's—“but the Father abiding in me does the works’ (Pater 
autem manens in me facit opera). Therefore the Father, abiding (manens) in the Son through works of 
miracles and words of doctrine (per opera ergo uirtutum et uerba doctrinae), is seen (uidetur) through 
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the Father is in Christ invisibily. Following this line, Ambrose explicitly refuses to 
describe the character of unity between Father and Son corporeally—“not as a body in a 
body” (non utique quasi corpus in corpore), he writes.  
This line of argumentation places Ambrose in conversation with Didymus the 
Blind’s On the Holy Spirit 87–90.103 There, Didymus argues that the Spirit is of the same 
nature and power as the Father and Son, refuting his opponents who argue that scriptural 
passages contradict one another when describing who or what casts out demons: Is it the 
“Finger of God” (Lk. 11.19–20) or the Spirit (Mt. 12:28)? These passages should not be 
taken to show substantial difference among persons of the Trinity, but to “demonstrate 
the unity of a substance, not also its dimensions.”104 Didymus continues: 
For just as the hand, through which everything is accomplished and worked, is not 
divided from the body, and just as the hand belongs to him whose hand it is, so 
also is the finger not separated from the hand of which it is the finger. And so, 
spurn inequalities and dimensions when you think about God, and understand the 
unity that obtains among the finger and the hand and the entire body. Now it is by 
this Finger that the Law was written on tablets of stone (cf. Ex 31:18).105 
 
                                                                                                                                            
those things through which he abides (per quae manet), and through him in whom he abides (per eum in 
quo manet): the proper character of each person being apparent from this very fact, while he says, “I am in 
the Father and the Father in me.” And so he says, “Believe.” But “believe” what? That I am the Father? I 
think it is not so written, but, ‘That I am in the Father and the Father in me, or if not, believe because of the 
works’ (si quo minus uel propter opera credite)—those works in fact through which the Father was seen in 
the Son, not with the eyes but with the mind (ea utique opera per quae Pater in Filio non uisu, sed sensu 
uidebatur).” 
103 Ambrose’s work, dated to 381 CE, owes much to Didymus’s homonymous work, dated to the 
360s. 
104 Didy. Spir. 89 (SC 386: 228–29). Translation from: Athanasius and Didymus the Blind, Works 
on the Spirit: Athanasius’s Letters to Serapion on the Holy Spirit and Didymus’s On the Holy Spirit. 
Translated by Mark DelCogliano, Andrew Radde-Gallwitz, and Lewis Ayres, Popular Patristics Series 43 
(Yonkers: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2011), 171. 
105 Didy. Spir. 90 (SC 386: 228–29). Sicut enim manus non dividitur a corpore, per quam cuncta 
perficit et operator, et in eo est cuius est manus, sic et digitus non separatur a manu cuius est digitus. Reice 
itaque inaequalitates et mensuras cum de Deo cogitas, et intellege digiti et manus et totius corporis 
unitatem, quo digito et lex in tabulis lapideis scripta est. 
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Didymus is adamant to show that bodily language—talk of “lowly things” (minora), he 
writes—should not lead readers to analyze the size or quality of certain body parts. 
Rather, the scripture intends reflection on “incorporeal realities” (incorporalibus).106 The 
body’s unity with its multiple composite parts, in sum, serves as an analogy for 
incorporeal divine unity.  
 In the most recent English translation of Didymus’ On the Holy Spirit, the 
translators note the Aristotelian contours of Didymus’ logic here. By Aristotle’s lights, 
the parts of a natural body—its arms and legs, for example, are not accidentally 
continuous.  They are “naturally continuous,” unified “in themselves” (καθ᾽αὐτό) 
because they always move together, which makes their movement “indivisible in time” 
(ἀδιαίρετος δὲ κατὰ χρόνον).107 According to Didymus, the character of divine unity 
follows suit: though there is diversity introduced in the Godhead by virtue of three 
discrete persons, this diversity of persons does not exclude the natural unity among them, 
even if that unity does not have shared motion through space as its marker. 
In his On the Holy Spirit 3.11.82, Ambrose agrees with Didymus’ general point 
about the Trinity—the inseparability of the divine persons. There is a “unity of power” 
(unitas potestatis) which binds the Father and Son and that is expressed prepositionally 
(“true in the true, God in God, light in light”) and adapted presumably from the Nicene 
formula. Didymus wants to explore the “incorporeal realities” that language pertaining to 
the body can depict, and certainly does not want to insinuate a bodily unity. Rather, for 
                                                
106 Didy. Spir. 89 (SC 386: 228–29; DelCogliano, Radde-Gallwitz, and Ayres, 171). 
107 Arist. Metaph. 5.6.2 (LCL 271: 228–29). I am grateful to conversation with Kellen Plaxco and 
his work on inseparable operations in Didymus for pointing out the connection to Aristotle. See Kellen 
Plaxco, “Didymus the Blind’s Pro-Nicene Doctrine of ‘Inseparable Operations,” unpublished monograph.  
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Didymus, as for Ambrose, the unity of the three persons is natural, like that of a body and 
its parts.  
 This section has explored two nodes of Ambrose’s pro-Nicene theology, both 
hinging on a single-power theology. At some points, he argues against those who 
predicated multiple powers in God because of the Son’s visibility and Father’s 
invisibility. He does this by asserting that the Son and the Father share the same singular 
power and that this can be discerned through Jesus’s statements of divine unity in John’s 
gospel. At other points, Ambrose argues against the notion that the character of this unity 
between Father and Son is somehow corporeal. So while the Son and his works are 
visible, there is, Ambrose contends, invisible power behind such visible works and 
attested by them. In this invisible power, the Father and Son are unified. Johannine texts 
fund Ambrose’s arguments. Sometimes Ambrose seeks to describe how the Father is 
made visible in the Son. Sometimes Ambrose seeks to describe how the Son makes the 
Father visible. While these fuel two discrete sorts of reflection, they point Ambrose to the 
same doctrine, namely that the Father and Son share a single, invisible power. And that 
the Father and the Son share a single, invisible power determines that the works of God 
are discerned and described in a way that surpasses bodily sight of their incarnate 
manifestation in Christ.  
 
Unity of Operation and Power: Seeing the Son in the Father and the Father in the Son   
The first three sections of this chapter have made plain both the general 
inclination to view visible things with an eye toward the invisible realities they 
expressand how that general inclination underlies a single-power theology that helps 
  
 
106 
Ambrose fend off non-Nicene theologies. These I take as the broad contours of 
Ambrose’s Trinitarian theology. But these contours simply sketch Ambrose’s polemic 
and demand further specification. The question before us then is this: What does 
Ambrose think we see (or should see) when we see the works of God? This section 
argues that Ambrose answers the question by subscribing to a doctrine of the unity of 
operation.108  
In saying that divine operation for Ambrose is unified, I mean broadly two things: 
(1) the Son’s work is expressive of his divinity; and (2) the Son’s divinity is shared with 
the Father. Therefore, the deeds performed and words spoken by Jesus show that the 
Father and Son are one. To make his case, Ambrose argues that the Son images God the 
Father. More precisely, the character of the Son’s works (opera) discloses his invisible 
unity with God.  
Examples from Ambrose’s image theology uncover the connection between 
divine operations and the unity between Father and Son. The first is found in a homily on 
Genesis 1:26 from Ambrose’s Hexaemeron.109 When God utters, “Let us make man in 
our image and likeness” (Gen. 1.26), Ambrose asserts, the Father is speaking to the Son. 
This position is contrary to that of the “Jews” and the “Arians,” who both believe that the 
Father has uttered these words to angels (seruolis).110 After noting that the one to whom 
                                                
108 See Ayres, Augustine and the Trinity, 44–50. Differing descriptions of divine operation have 
led Lewis Ayres to claim that there are discrete doctrines of common and inseparable operations. 
Ambrose’s discourse, Ayres contends, primarily conveys a doctrine of common operations but “hints at 
inseparable operation . . . [which argues that] all three divine persons work in each divine act” (46). While I 
do think the distinction Ayres maintains is present, I do not know if it amounts to separate discernable 
doctrines, which is why I stick with the phrase “unity of operation.” 
109 The series of sermons is typically dated between 386–90 CE. 
110 Ambr. Hex. 6.7.40 (CSEL 32.1: 230): Sed ipsius creationis nostrae seriem consideremus. 
Faciamus inquit hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram. Quis hoc dicit? Nonne deus, qui te fecit? 
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he speaks shares a likeness and similitude with God, Ambrose strings together references 
typical of anti-monarchian and anti-homoian polemics: Colossians 1:13–15; John 14:8–
10; John 10:30; and Exodus 3:14, respectively, to affirm that the Son, as the true divine 
Image, bears resemblance to the Father. Ambrose’s argument is unsurprising given his 
Nicene commitments: because of the Son’s unity with the Father, neither is there any 
precedence of rank between Father and Son, nor dissimilarity between the two in divinity 
or work.111 He continues: 
Listen to the Apostle who tells us who is the image of God: “Who has rescued us 
from the power of darkness and transferred us into the kingdom of the Son of His 
majesty in whom we have our redemption and the remission of our sins, who is 
the image of the invisible God and the first-born of every creature” (Col. 1:13–
15). He who always is and was from the beginning is the “Image” of the Father. 
Hence it is the “Image” who says: “Philip, he who sees me sees also the Father.” 
And again, although you see the living “Image” of the living Father, “How can 
you say, show us the Father? Do you not believe that I am in the Father and the 
Father in me” (Jn. 14:8–10)? The “Image” of God is power, not infirmity. The 
“Image” of God is wisdom; the Image of God is Justice, and in fact, wisdom is 
divine justice is eternal. The “Image” of God is the one alone who has said: “I and 
the Father are one” (Jn. 10:30), thus possessing the likeness of the Father so as to 
have a unity of divinity and of plenitude. When he says “let us make,” how can 
there be inequality? When, again, he says “to our likeness,” where is the 
dissimilitude? So, when he says in the Gospel: “I and the Father,” there is 
certainly not one person. But when he says: “We are one [thing],” there is no 
discrepancy either in divinity or in operation. Both, therefore, do not have one 
person, but one substance. Rightly did he add “we are,” because to always “be” is 
divine, so that you would believe to be coeternal the one whom you thought to be 
dissimilar.112 
                                                                                                                                            
Quid est deus? Caro an spiritus? Non caro utique, sed spiritus, cuius similis caro esse non potest, quia ipse 
incorporeus et inuisibilis est, caro autem et conprehenditur et uidetur. Cui dicit? Non sibi utique, quia non 
dicit 'faciam', sed 'faciamus', non angelis, quia ministri sunt, serui autem cum domino et opera cum auctore 
non possunt operationis habere consortium, sed dicit filio, etiamsi Iudaei nolint, etiamsi Ariani repugnent. 
111 Ambr. Hex. 6.7.41 (CSEL 32/1: 232–33). This passage is critical too for analysis of Ambrose’s 
doctrine of the image of God, which I explore in chapters three and four below. 
112 Hex. 6.7.41 (CSEL 32/1: 232–33). Sed qui sit imago dei audi dicentem: ‘qui eripiut nos inquit 
de potestate tenebrarum et transtulit in regnum fili claritatis suae, in quo habemus redemptionem et 
remissionem peccatorum, qui est imago dei inuisibilis et primogenitus uniuiersae creaturae’ (Col. 1:13-
15). Ipse est imago patris qui semper est et erat in principio. Denique imago est qui dicit: ‘Philippe, qui 
uidet me uidet et patrem’ et quomodo tu, cum imaginem uiuam patris uiuentis uideas, dicis: ‘ostende nobis 
patrem? Non credis quia ego in patre et pater in me est’ (Jn. 14:8-10)? Imago dei uirtus est, non infirmitas, 
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Ambrose’s consideration of the Image points him to the similitude between Father and 
Son. This Image is coeternal, and thus one, with the Father. For Ambrose, this divine 
similitude indicates a “unity of divinity and fullness” (diuinitatis et plentitudinis 
unitiatem) between the Son and Father. Here, the language is not of a unity of power but 
of a unity of substantia. Though the terms of the logic are different, the dynamic is 
functionally similar: whatever the Father is, so the Son is, as well. The Son’s visibility—
as the one who images and is united with the Father—discloses the “living Father.” 
Ambrose further contends that this unity of Father and Son allows for “no discrepancy 
either in divinity or in operation” (nulla est discrepantia diuinitatis aut operis). For our 
purposes, we can say that it is due to the unity of substantia or diuinitas between Father 
and Son that the divine works can be said to be one. And it is in seeing the Son as Image 
that we are able to discern more fully this unity. 
Ambrose will describe divine operation as inseparable, by which he means that 
when we witness the opera of the Son, we are seeing each divine person, as well.113 As an 
outworking of a doctrine of divine simplicity—that as first principle, God cannot be a 
composite creature—recourse to inseparable operations further establishes how the work 
                                                                                                                                            
imago dei sapientia est. Imago dei iustitia est, sed sapientia diuina est et sempiterna iustitia est. Imago dei 
est solus ille qui dixit: ‘ego et pater unum sumus, ita habens similitudinem patris, ut diuinitatis et 
plentitudinis habeat unitatem. Ubi dicit ‘faciamus,’ quomodo inaequalitas? Cum iterum dicat ‘ad 
similitudinem nostrum,’ ubi est dissimilitudo? Sic et in euangelio, ubi dicit ‘ego et pater,’ utique non una 
persona est; ubi autem ait ‘unum sumus,’ nulla est descrepantia diuinitatis aut operis. Non igitur in 
utroque una persona, sed una substantia est. Et bene addidit ‘sumus,’ quia semper esse diuinum est, ut 
coaeternum credas quem putabas esse dissimilem. See also Szabó, Le Christ créateur chez saint Ambroise, 
41–57.  
The similarity between Ambrose’s homily and Basil of Casaerea’s on the same topic is 
undeniable. See Basil, Hexaemeron 9.6 (SC 26: 518–20).  
113 See Ayres, Augustine and the Trinity, 46; Ayres, “Remember That You Are Catholic," 39–82; 
Adam Ployd, Augustine, the Trinity, and the Church: A Reading of the Anti-Donatist Sermons, Oxford 
Studies in Historical Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 101–43, at 122–25. 
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of the Son functions as a dense index of invisible unity with the Father (and the Spirit).114 
A passage from book four of On the Faith, for instance, uses the language of 
“inseparable” to spell out how the Father and Son can be said to work together. After 
referencing John 5:19–20—that the Son and Father do the same things because of the 
inseparable and undivided charity between them—Ambrose writes: 
But if, as it truly is, love is naturally inseparable, then indeed operation is 
naturally inseparable, and it is impossible that the work of the Son should not be 
in agreement with the Father's will, when what the Son works, the Father works 
also, and what the Father works, the Son works also, and what the Son speaks, the 
Father speaks also, as it is written: “My Father, who abides in me, He speaks, and 
the works that I do, He does” (Jn. 14:10). For the Father established nothing 
without His power and wisdom, because he made all things in wisdom, as it is 
written: “In wisdom have you made all things;” (Ps. 103:24) and indeed, God the 
Word made nothing without the Father.115 
                                                
114 For the connection between divine simplicity and a pro-Nicene doctrine of inseparable 
operations, see Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy, 273–301. Ayres also shows how claims to divine 
inseparability point to the practice of “appropriation” (attributing to one divine person some characteristic 
common to the Godhead). See also Andrew Radde-Gallwitz, Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, and the 
Transformation of Divine Simplicity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), passim, esp. 208–12. While 
Radde-Gallwitz’s main aim is analysis of Basil and Gregory of Nyssa, his coinciding of simplicity and the 
virtues is particularly important here because it offers a theoretical backdrop against we can discern unity 
of different things said to be simple and non-composite, be they virtues, persons, etc. See also Radde-
Gallwitz, “Gregory of Nyssa on the Reciprocity of the Virtues,” Journal of Theological Studies 58.2 
(2007): 537–52; John M. Cooper, “The Unity of Virtue,” in Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral 
Psychology and Ethical Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 76–117. Throughout his 
career, Ambrose argues for the unity of the virtues. His best known statement can be found in Off.  2.8.43 
(CCSL 15: 112): Denique sapientum definitione, in quo una uirtus est, concurrunt ceterae nec potest sine 
iustitia esse prudentia. See Abr. 1.3.10 (CSEL 32/1: 509), where Ambrose argues that Abraham, in 
possessing, deuotio, is said to possess all the virtues. See also Smith, Christian Grace and Pagan Virtue, 
88–89; Davidson, Ambrose: De Officiis, 550. 
115 Ambr. Fid. 4.6.68 (CSEL 78: 180). Quod si naturaliter est, ut uere est, inseparabilis caritas, 
inseparabilis utique est etiam operatio naturaliter, et inpossibile, ut opus fili cum patria non conueniat 
uoluntate, quando id, quod filius operatur, operatur et pater, et quod pater operatur, operatur et filius, et 
quod loquitur filius, loquitur et pater, sicut scripturm est: ‘Pater meus, qui in me manet, ipse loquitur et 
opera, quae ego facio, ipse facit’ (Jn. 14:10). Nihil enim pater sine uirtute adque sapientia sua condidit, 
quia ‘omnia in sapientia’ fecit, sicut scriptum est: ‘Omnia in sapientia fecisti’ (Ps. 103:24). Nihil etiam 
deus uerbum sine patre fecit. See also Fid. 2.7.52 (CSEL 78: 74), where Ambrose remarks: “there is one 
will where there is one operation” (una ergo uoluntas, ubi una operatio); and Symb. 5 (CSEL 73: 8), where 
Ambrose aligns “one judgment (unum iudicium) of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit” with “one will” (una 
uoluntas), “one majesty” (una maiestas), and one operation of sanctification. Ambrose is not unique in his 
emphasis on unity of will. See also Hilar. Trin. 3.9 (CCSL 62: 80), 4.12 (CCSL 62: 112–13), 8.5–17 
(CCSL 62a: 317–29). In Trin. 8.5, Hilary explicitly uses the phrase “unity of will” (unitate uoluntatis). The 
discussion of divine volition could also have been precipitated by the spate of commentaries on the Pauline 
epistles beginning in the 360s and continuing well into the fifth century.  
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If we speak of God as the epitome of love, then the love binding God with his Son is, by 
nature, inseparable. It would thus follow, Ambrose suggests, that there is likewise a 
single, inseparable will between Father and Son, and their divine opera are inseparable, 
as well.116 John 14:10 lends textual support to Ambrose’s point here: what the Son works 
and speaks, that, too, the Father works and speaks. Reference to Psalm 103:24 supports 
Ambrose’s claim that the Father “established nothing without his power and wisdom.” 
Similarly, it can be said that the Word made nothing without the Father.117  
 Roughly contemporaneous with On the Faith 4 is On the Holy Spirit (ca. 381). 
Throughout the work Ambrose describes divine operation as inseparable: the works of 
the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit of peace, grace, love, etc. indicate a unity of power and 
inseparability of power and substance. “If there is one peace, one grace, one love, and 
one communication of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit,” Ambrose maintains, 
“then there is certainly one operation. And where there is one operation, by all means 
power cannot be divided nor substance separated. For if so how could the grace of the 
same work come together?”118 Ambrose’s logic here is again driven by scriptural proofs: 
                                                
116 At both Fid. 4.5.62 (CSEL 78: 178) and 4.6.67 (CSEL 78: 180). Ambrose places the charity 
between Father and Son as the cause of the identity of their operation. Cf. Aug. Trin. 1.4.7–1.5.8 (CCSL 
50: 34–37), 1.6.12 (CCSL 50: 41–42), 1.12.25 (CCSL 50: 64–65). In each of these instances Augustine 
argues for the inseparability of operation but without reference to John 5:19–20—which is Ambrose’s 
organizing text. I am grateful to Michel Barnes for pointing out this similarity and discrepancy, which 
contravenes Mountain, the CCSL editor of Augustine’s Trin. Cf. Aug. Tract. eu. Io. 20 (CCSL 36: 202–
11), which analyzes the inseparable operation of Son and Father with recourse to John 5:19. 
117 See also Ambr. Fid. 5.16.197 (CSEL 78: 291) for a similar gloss of Psalm 103:24. Quomodo 
enim uultis haec fecisse dei filium? Numquid quasi anulum, qui non sentit, quod exprimit? Sed ‘omnia in 
sapientia’ (Ps. 103:24) pater fecit, id omnia per filium fecit, qui est ‘uirtus dei adque sapientia’ (1 Cor. 
1:24). See also Ambr. Spir. 3.11.83 (CSEL 79: 184).  
118 Ambr. Spir. 1.12.131 (CSEL 79: 71–72). Si igitur una pax, una gratia, una caritas, una 
communicatio est patris et fili et spiritus sancti, una certe operatio est. Et ubi una operatio est, utique non 
potest uirtus esse diuisa, discreta substantia. Nam quomodo operationis eiusdem gratia conueniret? See 
also Spir. 2.10.101 (CSEL 79: 125–26), where the single operation of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is 
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2 Corinthians 13:14; John 14:21; Ephesians 5:2; John 3:16; Romans 8:32; Galatians 2:20, 
5:22; and 1 John 1:3. Each of these texts, in one way or another, implicates multiple 
persons of the Trinity in a single work of peace, grace, love, or communion. 
Later in On the Holy Spirit Ambrose reiterates the argument that the Son’s works 
and words reveal his undivided operation with the Father.  
The Father is never divided from the operation of the Son, and what the Son 
works, he knows the Father wills, and what the Father wills he knows and works. 
Finally, that you might not think that there is some difference of work either in 
time or in order between the Father and the Son, but might believe the oneness of 
the same operation, he said: “and the works which I do He himself does” (Jn. 
14:10). And again, that you might not believe that there is some difference in the 
distinction of the work, but might judge that the Father and the Son will the same, 
do the same, and have the same power, Wisdom says to you about the Father: 
“For whatever things [the Father] does, the same things the Son also does 
similarly” (Jn. 5:19). So there is not some prior or second action, but the same 
effect of one operation.119 
 
The sheer number of uses of opera and its cognates is almost overwhelming. The 
emphasis on the inseparability of divine persons with respect to their opera is plain: the 
Son’s opera are never distinct from the Father’s. The above passage further suggests that 
this “unity of operation” (unius operationis) exists because the Son knows both that and 
also what precisely the Father wills; the two are united in will and motive power, even as 
                                                                                                                                            
indicative of a single will, calling, and commanding for the sake of the Church. Ambrose writes: Nec solum 
una operatio ubique est patris et fili et spiritus sancti, sed etiam una adque eadem uoluntas, una uoluntas, 
una uocatio, una praeceptio. See Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy, 369–72, which notes Augustine’s 
dependence on the Latin tradition (Hilary and Ambrose) for his doctrine of inseparable operations. 
119 Ambr. Spir. 2.12.135–36 (CSEL 79: 139–40). nec umquam pater a fili operatione diuiditur, et 
quod operatur filius, scit patrem uelle, et quod uult pater, filium nouit operari. Denique ne uel in tempore 
uel in ordine aliquam inter patrem et filium putares operis esse distantiam, sed eiusdem operationis 
crederes unitatem: Et opera, inquit, quae ego facio, ipse facit. Et rursus ne discretionem aliquam in operis 
distinctione sentires, sed idem uelle, idem facere, idem posse patrem et filium iudicares, dicit tibi sapientia 
de patre: Quaecumque enim ille fecerit, eadem et filius facit similiter. Non ergo aliqui prior uel secundus 
est actus, sed idem unius operationis effectus est. See also Spir. 2.13.148 (CSEL 79: 145), where Ambrose 
maintains that all three persons work in all of the apostles: Nec solum una operatio in Petro inuenitur patris 
et fili et spiritus sancti, sed etiam in omnibus apostolis diuinae operationis unitas revelatur.  
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they are united in operation. As Ambrose puts it: “So there is not some prior or second 
action, but the same effect of one operation” (sed idem unius operationis effectus est). 
Ambrose’s On the Holy Spirit 3.5.31 bears out this point with recourse not to John 
5:19, 14:10, or the like, but to Psalm 18:2 (“The heavens declare the glory of God, and 
the firmament shows the work of his hands”) and Psalm 8:4 (“For I will behold your 
heavens, the works of your fingers”).120 Ambrose has earlier entertained the possibility 
that certain people understood the scriptural images of God’s hand and God’s finger so as 
to think Son (as Hand) or the Spirit (as Finger) a small portion of God or an entity lesser 
than God, since these images indicate body parts of God. He borrows this description and 
argument from Didymus the Blind’s On the Holy Spirit 87–90, a passage commented 
upon above with reference to Ambrose’s allergy to corporeal unity amongst the divine 
persons.121 In using Didymus’s images and claims as his foundation, Ambrose discloses 
                                                
120 Ambrose is clearly building upon the foundation laid by Didymus the Blind’s Spir. here, which 
refers to the Holy Spirit as the “Finger of God.” There, Didymus quotes Luke 11:19–20, though, and not 
Psalm 8:4, and he declares that if this finger is “joined to a hand and a hand to him whose hand it is, then 
without a doubt the finger is ascribed to the substance of him whose finger it is.” See Didy. Spir. 87–90 (SC 
386: 227–29; DelCogliano et al trans. 171). See also Plaxco, “Didymus the Blind’s Pro-Nicene Doctrine of 
‘Inseparable Operations,’” unpublished monograph. At Ambr. Spir. 3.3.11 (CSEL 79: 154–55), Ambrose, 
too, quotes Luke 11:20.  
121 No Latin theologian, save the anonymous De trinitate, prior to Ambrose references the digitus 
dei (or some variation thereof) as a descriptor of the Holy Spirit. See Anon. De trin. 12, lines 1380ff. The 
De trin. indicates that there are those who do not understand the Holy Spirit to be the digitus dei. 
Depending on when one dates Ambrosiaster’s Pauline commentaries, that author too could be added to this 
exception. See Ambrosiast. Qu. test. 97.20 (CSEL 50: 185–86). Cf. Tert. Marc. 4.26 (CSEL 47: 511–12): 
apud pharaonem enim uenefici illi, adhibiti aduersus moysen, uirtutem creatoris digitum dei 
appellauerunt—digitus dei est hoc—quod significaret etiam ualidissimum tamen. Hoc et christus 
ostendens, commemorator, non obliterator uetustatum, scilicet suarum, uirtutem dei digitum dei dixit, non 
alterius intellegendam quam eius, apud quem hoc erat appellata. In short, Tertullian refers to the finger of 
God as God’s (creative) power and by referring to Exodus 8:19 (“but the magicians said, ‘this is the finger 
of God’”). Hilary adopts this interpretive line too. Hilar. Tract. in Ps. 135.7 (CSEL 22: 718). Prior to 
Ambrose, understanding the Holy Spirit as digitus dei was particular to Greeks. Importing this reflection 
from Didymus, Ambrose interjects the claim for the Holy Spirit as the digitus dei into Trinitarian 
considerations. Latins writing in Ambrose’s wake come to readily associate the digitus dei with the Holy 
Spirit, most notably Augustine. See Aug. Qu. Hept 2.25 (CSEL 28/3: 105–6); Psal. 90.2.8 (CCSL 39: 
1274); Serm. 8.18 (CCSL 41: 99) 155.3 (CCSL 41Ba: 110); Faust. 15.4 (CSEL 25/1: 423); Spir. et litt. 
16.28 (CSEL 60: 182). See also Eucher. Instr. 1.33 (CSEL 31: 77). 
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his commitment to a unity of divine operations. For Didymus, as for Ambrose, the 
contested scriptural images of both the finger and hand of God reveal a unity of divinity 
power and subsequent unity of operation. Here is Ambrose: 
But let them [the homoians?] learn, as I have often said, that not inequality but 
unity of power is signified by this testimony; inasmuch as things which are the 
works of God are also the works of [his] hands, as we read that the same are the 
works of [his] fingers. For it is written: “The heavens declare the glory of God, 
and the firmament announces the work of his hands” (Ps. 18:2); and elsewhere: 
“In the beginning you founded the earth, O Lord; and the heavens are the works 
of your hands” (Ps. 101:26). So then the works of [his] hands are the same as the 
works of God. There is not therefore any distinction of the operation according to 
the kind of bodily members, but a unity of power. But those which are the works 
of the hands are also the works of the fingers, for it is equally written, “For I will 
see your heavens, the works of your fingers, the moon, and the stars, which you 
have established” (Ps. 8:4) What less are the fingers here said to have made than 
the hands, since they made the same thing as the hands, as it is written, “For you, 
Lord, have made me glad through your making, and in the works of your hands 
will I rejoice (Ps. 91:5).”122  
 
At On the Holy Spirit 3.3.11, Ambrose names the Holy Spirit the Finger of God (Lk. 
11:20) and the Son, the Right Hand of God (Ex. 15:6). The Finger and Right Hand of 
God share a common, purposive goal: to cast out evil. And since the Holy Spirit and Son 
can be said to do the same things, to have the same end in mind, they are unified in 
                                                
122 Spir. 3.5.31–3.5.32 (CSEL 79: 162–63). Sed accipiant, ut saepius dixi, non inaequalitatem, sed 
unitatem potestatis hac testificatione signari, quandoquidem, quae opera dei sunt, eadem sint opera 
manuum, eadem etiam legerimus opera esse digitorum. Scriptum est enim: ‘Caeli enarrant glorian dei et 
opera manuum eius adnuntiat firmamentum,’ et alibi: ‘Initio terram tu fundasti, domine, et opera 
manuum tuarum sunt caeli.’ Eadem igitur sunt opera manuum, quae sunt opera dei. Non ergo aliqua 
pro membrorum corporalium qualitate discretio operationis, sed unitas potestatis est. Quae autem opera 
sunt manuum, eadem opera digitorum, quia aeque scriptum est: ‘Quoniam uidebo caelos, opera 
digitorum tuorum, lunam et stellas quas tu fundasti.’ Quid hic igitur digiti minus quam manus fecisse 
produntur, cum idem fecerint digiti, quod manus, sicut scriptum est: ‘Quoniam delectasti me, domine, in 
factura tua, et in operibus manuum tuarum delectabor?’ Emphasis added. For additional references to Ps. 
18:2, see Epistulae extra collectionem 14.5 (CSEL 82/3: 237); Ep. 77.4–5 (CSEL 82/3: 129–30); Hex. 
1.4.16 (CSEL 32/1: 14), 2.4.15 (CSEL 32/1: 54); Fid. 4.2.17 (CSEL 78: 163). A particularly fruitful 
reference mentioning Christ and the virtues with reference to the theme of sight is Luc. 10.40 (CSEL 32/4: 
470). “There are also virtues (uirtutes) ‘of the heavens’ which ‘declare the glory of God’ (Ps. 18:2) and 
which would be moved by a fuller infusion of Christ, spiritual virtues which see Christ (uirtutes spiritales 
quae uident Christum). David taught us how these virtues would be moved, saying, ‘Draw near to him and 
be enlightened’ (Ps. 33:5). Paul also taught how you may see Christ, for ‘when you shall be converted to 
the Lord, the veil is lifted’ (2. Cor. 3:16), and you see Christ.” 
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substantia.123 The block quote immediately above supplements such a logic with recourse 
to several Psalms that Didymus does not cite (Ps. 18:2, 101:26, 8:4, 91:5), showing 
Ambrose hard at work in gathering additional texts to reinforce his argument. 
Whether Milanese homoians were in fact promoting a corporeal divine unity 
based on texts pertaining to God’s hand or finger is less important for our purposes than 
the fact that Ambrose borrows and supplements Didymus’s strong claims to the 
inseparability of operations. The Trinitarian persons can be said to be united in substance 
or power because they are united in work. Just before On the Holy Spirit 3.5.31–3.5.32, 
Ambrose contends that we should not assume a “lessening” (deminutionem) of Spirit or 
Son simply because the persons are depicted as the finger or hand of God. Ambrose also 
contends that since this finger and hand are “of God,” they can be said to do the same 
work as God. As Ambrose reiterates here, “a unity of power” (unitas potestatis) obtains 
among the three just as it does between a finger and hand and the person whose they are. 
 This section has examined what (or who) Ambrose thinks we see when we see the 
works of God. Ambrose argues that the works of the Son of God are expressive of an 
invisible, shared unity (of operation, power, substance, divinity) with the Father. In large 
part, this unity stems from Ambrose’s image theology. Drawing from contested passages 
of scripture, the Son can be said to image the Father, communicated by the character of 
his works. So when we see the Son, we see a shared divine unity manifest. On a couple of 
occasions, Ambrose argues that the works are inseparable, further strengthening a claim 
to divine unity. So when we see the Son, not only do we see his divinity manifest, we see 
the Father and Spirit are present as well doing the very same action by the very same 
                                                
123 Spir. 3.3.12 (CSEL 79: 155). It is noteworthy that this line is not simply borrowed from 
Didymus and dropped, but carried through in later works. See Ambr. Luc. 7.92–93 (CSEL 32/4: 320–21). 
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power. Hence, whatever the work tells us about the Son, it tells us about the Father and 
the Holy Spirit. For Ambrose, visible opera both uncover the relational unity of the 
Trinity and are communicative of the loving character of that unity. 
 
Conclusions 
 This chapter has explored the ways in which the theme of visibility is operative in 
Ambrose’s theology in general and his Christological reflection in particular. I explained 
in the first section how it is that Ambrose thinks we can see something divine and 
invisible by analyzing his description of the concrete sacrament of baptism. By saying 
that we see in spiritu, I argued that, for Ambrose, initiation into the Church is initiation 
into a new mode of seeing, not with the eyes of the body, but with the eyes of soul or 
heart. I then showed how this line of thinking, this visual logic, functions in his 
Christology through key scriptural references. These references help Ambrose make the 
case that the Son is the image of the Father and that seeing the Son allows us to see the 
Father. 
The third section examined the character of this seeing of the Son and showed 
how the description of the character helps Ambrose rebut non-Nicene theologies. On the 
one hand, Ambrose is arguing against those—typically first-generation followers of 
Arius, perhaps according to his textbook definitions of heresy—who promoted a doctrine 
of multiple powers in God. These Arians deduced such a claim from the fact that the Son 
was seen while the Father was hidden; the two persons were two discrete agents and thus 
disclosed (at least) two motive powers for their two separate courses of action. Focusing 
on visibility also helps Ambrose deflect a second non-Nicene position: that there is 
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somehow a bodily unity between the divine persons. For his reply, we analyzed 
Ambrose’s statement that when the Son is said to be in the Father, such a relationship is 
different from saying “a body is in a body.” Ambrose rejects each non-Nicene claim by 
means of a single-power theology: though the Son is visible, he is nevertheless unified 
with Father by an invisible power common to both. The two share the same motive power 
for their action, an unseen unity that is disclosed in the Son’s activities. 
 Hence, the question that we addressed in our final section was this: what do we 
see when we see God? I argued Ambrose’s answer to this question lies in his description 
of the unity of divine operations. The unity of operations can be said to prove the Son’s 
shared power or divinity with the Father. Occasionally, Ambrose will describe this unity 
as inseparable, meaning that all three divine persons are active in each work of God.  
  Ambrose’s textured Trinitarian theology, chocked full of traditional anti-
monarchian and anti-homoian proof texts, helps shed new light on his teaching on the 
image of God and the moral demands that come packaged with it. We might put the 
matter this way: If individuals are made according to the image of God, that is, according 
to the Son, then some resemblance between God and humanity must follow. This idea 
might appear to be a straightforward point that does not bear repeating or further analysis. 
Still, in view of our exploration of the strong themes of visibility and sight in Ambrose’s 
Trinitarian logic, we would do well to consider it afresh.  
  
  
 
117 
CHAPTER THREE: “BEHOLD, JERUSALEM, I HAVE PAINTED THY 
WALLS”: GOD AS PAINTER AND SOURCE OF VIRTUE 
 
The claim of the remaining chapters is that the same dynamic that drives 
Ambrose’s trinitarian theology dictates his moral theology. This chapter shows how the 
infancy of this connection can be found in Ambrose’s doctrine of the image of God. First 
we examine Ambrose’s description of God as the image-painter of human beings, thus, 
the source of moral action. Next, we see that the well-painted soul is one “in which a 
semblance of divine operation shines.”1 This phrase, I argue, implies not only the beauty 
or inherent dignity of the human person, but that human action resembles the character of 
its divine counterpart. This chapter tackles Ambrose’s claim that God is the source of 
human virtue, while the next chapter addresses the character of human virtue.  
To make the case for God as the source of virtue, I first explore precedents to 
Ambrose’s description of God as painter, specifically Origen and the broader 
Alexandrian tradition.2 Origen explains the moral importance of such an image in the 
                                                
1 Ambr. Hex. 6.7.42 (CSEL 32/1: 233–34). 
2 Ambrose further recontextualizes Origen’s talk of competing images with recourse to Roman 
traditions, as well, but these traditions are more helpful for understanding the character of human action 
and are thus included in the next chapter. Ambrose has been critiqued in his time and ours for plagiarizing 
Greek sources. Jerome’s open disdain for Ambrose is well noted. In his introduction to Origen’s Homilies 
on Luke, Jerome, writing to Paula and Eustochium, calls Ambrose’s commentary “childish in expression 
and dull in content” which is why he translated Origen’s homilies. “On my left I hear an ominous crow 
cawing; in remarkable fashion it gleams with the colored feathers of all the birds, although the bird itself is 
black as night.” See also Neil Adkin, “Jerome on Ambrose: The Preface to the Translation of Origen’s 
Homilies on Luke,” Revue bénédictine 107 (1997): 5–14; idem, “Ambrose and Jerome: The Opening Shot,” 
Mnemosyne 46 (1993): 364–76; Pierre Nautin, “Le premier échange épistolaire entre Jérôme et Damase: 
Lettres réelles ou fictives?” Freiburger Zeitschrift fu ̈r Philosophie und Theologie 30 (1983): 331–44; 
Harald Hagendahl, Latin Fathers and the Classics: A Study on the Apologists, Jerome and Other Christian 
Writers (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1958), 372; Ludwig Herrmann, “Ambrosius von Mailand als 
Trinitätstheologe,” Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte 68 (1958): 197–218; Gérard Nauroy, “Jerôme, lecteur 
et censeur de l’exégèse d’Ambroise de Milan,” in Jérôme entre l’Occident et l’Orient, ed. Yves-Marie 
Duval (Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1988), 173–203; Angelo Paredi, Saint Ambrose: His Life and Times 
(University of Notre Dame Press, 1964), 17–19. See also Richard A. Layton, “Plagiarism and Lay 
Patronage of Ascetic Scholarship: Jerome, Ambrose, and Rufinus,” JECS 10.4 (2002): 489–522. 
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pursuit of godlikeness, shunning the lure of rival images in the process.3 The second 
section bears out how Ambrose translates this tradition into his Latin context and 
theology by linking it with interpretations of Isaiah 49:16 (LXX): “Behold, Jerusalem, I 
have painted thy walls.” The use of this verse, I argue, points to God as the source of 
virtue. While asserting that God is the source of virtue appears to be a straightforward 
claim, important nuance lies just beneath the surface. At times, for instance, Ambrose 
charges his listeners to attend to themselves alone (Cf. Dt. 4:9, 15:9)—a charge that 
seemingly smacks of self-sufficiency. But I argue that by exploring his scriptural logic, 
we will see that Ambrose contends that individuals’ dependency on God for their moral 
goodness implies that virtue must be “dispossessed.”4 The final section shows how 
Ambrose connects the claim that human beings have been divinely painted to the 
maintenance of that image instead of its vicious manifestations.  
 
                                                
3 I have benefited from Georgia Frank, “The Image in Tandem: Painting Metaphors and Moral 
Discourse in Late Antique Christianity,” in The Subjective Eye: Essays in Culture, Religion, and Gender in 
Honor of Margaret R. Miles, ed. Richard Valantasis (Eugene: OR: Wipf & Stock, 2006), 33–47. While not 
exploring the works of Origen or Ambrose, Frank’s work spells out how other early Christians (mostly 
Greek and Syrian) understood the moral significance of imaging virtue and/or the divine. 
4 My understanding of the dispossession of virtue owes to James Wetzel’s account of Augustine, 
Ambrose’s most famous baptizand. See his “Splendid Vices and Secular Virtues: Variations on Milbank’s 
Augustine,” Journal of Religious Ethics 32.2 (2004): 271–300, at 298–99. “Augustine tells us that we have 
no self to speak of that is not in God’s keeping. To refer the virtues to God, then, is to find oneself in 
dispossession. This is close to, if not the same as, losing one’s life in order to gain it, or God becoming sin 
in order to enable human beings to become something else.” See also Wetzel, “What the Saints Know: 
Quasi-Epistemological Reflections,” in Parting Knowledge: Essays after Augustine (Eugene, OR: Wipf & 
Stock, 2013), 248–62, at 261–62.  
  
 
119 
Bearing Incorporeal Images: Views from Alexandria  
One key tradition that funds Ambrose’s image theology has Platonic roots and is 
likely mediated through Origen.5 Two aspects of Origen’s theology influence Ambrose’s 
in this domainand are worth exploring: (1) God as the painter of the interior person and 
(2) the moral implications that comes packaged with being so painted, expressed by the 
challenge of imitation and the lure of rival images.  
Origen himself is indebted to generations of reflection on the image of God. 
Philo, for instance, offered a complex, two-pronged analysis of the creation of human 
beings, interpreting Genesis 1:26–27 in light of Platonic Timaean image theology. When 
Genesis 1:26 speaks of being made according to the image, Philo takes the statement as 
descriptive of the νοῦς, the intellect, which is patterned after “the One”;6 in being so 
patterned, the human intellect bears certain a rational resemblance to his Maker.  
When Philo exegetes Genesis 2:7, he indicates that the second creation narrative 
has to do with the formation of the physical individual. Of this creation, he says that the 
rational soul is the equivalent to “a genuine coinage of that divine and invisible spirit 
(του θείου καὶ ἀοράτου πνεύματος ἐκείνου), having been signed and stamped by the 
seal of God (σημειωθὲν καὶ τυπωθὲν σφραγῖδι θεοῦ) whose engraver (ὁ χαρακτήρ) 
is the eternal Logos.”7 Emphasis on the sign and seal of God as image places Philo in 
                                                
5 Didymus the Blind likely figures into Ambrose’s image theology, too, but I focus here on Origen 
since, as will become plain, he and Ambrose share a common doctrine of rival images. For further study on 
Didymus’ image theology, see Richard A. Layton, Didymus the Blind and His Circle in Late-Antique 
Alexandria: Virtue and Narrative in Biblical Scholarship (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 
2004), 85–113.  
6 Philo, Opif. 69 (LCL 226: 54–55). 
7 Philo, Plant. 18–19. See Philo, Her. 57 (LCL 261: 310–13)  
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Stoic company and reveals the mottled nature of Philo’s Middle Platonism. In an attempt 
to harmonize Platonic and Stoic elements, Philo indicates elsewhere that the receiving of 
God’s breath is “an impression stamped by the divine power, to which Moses gives the 
appropriate title of ‘image,’ thus indicating that God is the Archetype of rational 
existence, while man is a copy and likeness.”8 For Philo, Genesis 1 and 2 offer two 
different, albeit related, depictions of what it means to be made according to the image. 
The first, represented by Genesis 1, has to do with the incorporeal human mind imaging 
the divine mind, while the second, Genesis 2, has to do with the individual as “stamped 
according to the image of God”, formed as objects of “sense-perception” (αἰσθητός),9 
and exiled to the “borderland” (μεθόριον) between mortality and immortality.10 Both 
glosses open the door to an emphasis on imitation for the maintenance and display of that 
original created nature.  
Origen adapts and transposes Philo’s interpretation christologically, emphasizing 
that human beings are created “according to the Image,” that is, according to the Son, the 
invisible, “express Image” of the Father.11 By virtue of our creation “according to the 
                                                
8 Philo, Det. 83–4 (LCL 227: 258–59). ἀλλὰ τύπον τινὰ καὶ χαρακτῆρα θείας δυνάμεως, ἣν 
ὀνόματι κυρίῳ Μωυσῆς εἰκόνα καλεῖ, δηλῶν ὅτι ἀρχέτυπον μὲν φύσεως λογικῆς ὁ θεός ἐστι, 
μίμημα δὲ καὶ ἀπεικόνισμα ἄνθρωπος.  
9 Philo, Opif. 136 (LCL 226: 106–9).  
10 Philo, Opif. 134–35 (LCL 226: 106–7). See also, Philo, Leg. 1.31–2 (LCL 226: 166–67); 2.5 
(LCL 226: 226–27). “Ἐκεῖνος δ᾿ ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος ὁ γηγενής, ὁ παντὸς τοῦ γένους ἡμῶν 
ἀρχηγέτης, ἑκάτερον ἄριστος ψυχήν τε καὶ σῶμα γεγενῆσθαί μοι δοκεῖ καὶ μακρῷ τινι τοὺς ἔπειτα 
διενεγκεῖν κατὰ τὰς ἐν ἀμφοτέροις ὑπερβολάς· ὁ γὰρ ἀληθείᾳ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς οὗτος ὄντως ἦν.” 
11 Orig. Prin. 1.2.6–8 (SC 252: 120–29). The plain reference here is to Hebrews 1:3, but behind it 
lies Origen’s obsession with Wisdom 7:25–26, a passage Origen exegetes immediately following the 
reference here. For the importance of Wisdom 7 in Christological reflection in the third and fourth 
centuries, see Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy, 22–24; Williams, Arius: Heresy and Tradition, 131–51. 
Williams identifies Wisdom 7 as a key Christological text in Alexandria, made popular by Origen and often 
paired with Hebrews 1:3. For other secondary treatments of the role of Wisdom in early Christian theology, 
see Robert M. Grant, After the New Testament (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1967), 70–82; William Schoedel, 
“Jewish Wisdom and the Formation of the Christian Ascetic,” in Robert Wilken, ed., Aspects of Wisdom in 
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image,” we bear a rational resemblance to the Son, whom Origen labels “the Word of 
reason.”12 The chain is causal: to be created according to the image of the Son means that 
human beings bear a rational likeness to the Son. Rational likeness subjects individuals to 
either praise or blame based on how that capacity is used: praise for virtue, blame for 
vice.13  
Much ink has been spilled on Origen’s doctrine of the image of God,14 but one 
feature is worth exploring to better understand Ambrose’s own conception: the 
distinction drawn between the image of God and its rivals.15 For this purpose, Origen 
                                                                                                                                            
Judaism and Early Christianity (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), 169–99; Alistair 
H. B. Logan, “Origen and Alexandrian Wisdom Christology,” in Richard Hanson and Henri Crouzel, eds., 
Origeniana Tertia (Roma: Edizioni dell’Ateneo, 1985), 123–29; Roelof Van Den Broek, “The Theology of 
the Teachings of Silvanus,” VC 40.1 (1986): 1–23; Ronald R. Cox, By the Same Word: Creation and 
Salvation in Hellenistic Judaism and Early Christianity (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2007), 64–70, 207–8; Ronald 
E. Heine, Origen: Scholarship in the Service of the Church (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 69–
70.  
12 Orig. Prin. 1.3.8 (SC 252: 162–63). 
13 This is roughly Origen’s doctrine of αὐτεξούσιον (commonly rendered “free will” or “self-
determination”), laid out in its most systematic form in De principiis 3.1–8. See my “Motion, Education, 
and Care: Reading Origen With the Stoics” in Origeniana Undecima: Origen and Origenism in Western 
Thought, ed. Anders-Christian Jacobsen (Leuven: Peeters Press, 2016), 821–30, which owes to insights in 
Michael Frede, A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought (Berkeley: UC Berkeley Press, 
2011), 102–24. See also John Rist, “The Greek and Latin Texts of the Discussion of Free Will in ‘De 
principiis’ Book III,” in Origeniana: premier colloque international des études origéniennes, ed. H. 
Crouzel, et al (Bari: Università Istutio di Letteratura Christiana Antica, 1975), 97–111; B. Darrell Jackson, 
“Sources of Origen’s Doctrine of Freedom,” Church History 35.1 (1966): 13–23.  
14 While relying primarily on texts from Prin., the classic work on Origen’s doctrine of the image 
is Henri Crouzel, Théologie de l’image de Dieu chez Origène (Paris: Aubier, 1956). Though scholars are 
indebted to the attention Crouzel places on certain texts, and at times his careful readings of Origen, he is 
often viewed with suspicion because of his unproblematic depictions of Origen as a pre-Nicene. For a brief 
summary of Crouzel on the image of God, see Walter Burghardt, “The Image of God in Man: Alexandrian 
Orientations,” Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual Convention of Catholic Society of America Ottawa, 
Ontario. June 19–22, 1961 (St. Joseph’s Seminary: CTSA, 1962), 147–60, esp. 150–52. For more recent 
treatments, see Anders Lund Jacobsen, “Genesis 1–3 as Source for the Anthropology of Origen,” VC 62.3 
(2008): 213–32; and Mark Edwards, Image, Word and God in the Early Christian Centuries (Farnham: 
Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2013), 100–15. Neither Jacobsen nor Edwards engages Crouzel's Théologie de 
l’image in detail.  
15 While engagement or familiarity with 1 Corinthians 15:49 is understandably absent, Philo’s Leg. 
1.29.90 (LCL 226: 206–7) expresses a similar doctrine in nuce. “For the mind that was made after the 
image is not earthly but heavenly.” For more detailed consideration of the earthly/worldly/devilish man, see 
Wolfgang Seibel, Fleisch und Geist beim Heiligen Ambrosius, Münchener theologische Studien, 14. Bd 
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supplements reflection on Genesis 1:26–28 with that from 1 Corinthians 15:49. The 
second passage—“just as we have borne the image of the earthly man, so shall we bear 
the image of the heavenly man”—serves to elucidate the first: to be made according to 
the divine image is to bear that image in clear juxtaposition to earthly counterparts to that 
image. The view originates from Origen’s description of God as painter and human 
beings as paintings. He writes: 
Therefore this is the image about which the Father said to the Son: “Let us make 
man to our image and likeness” (Gen. 1:26). The Son of God is the painter of this 
image. And because he is such a great painter, his image can be obscured by 
negligence but cannot be deleted by malice. For the image of God always 
remains, even if you yourself draw “the image of the earthly” (1 Cor. 15:49) over 
it in yourself. You yourself paint that picture in yourself. For when lust has 
darkened you, you have introduced one earthly color. But if you also burn with 
avarice you have mixed in also another color. And also when anger makes you 
bloodred, you add no less also a third color. Another rouge is added also of pride 
and another of impiety. And so by each individual species of malice, like various 
colors which have been brought together, you yourself paint in yourself this 
“image of the earthly” (1 Cor. 15:49) which God did not make in you.16 
 
                                                                                                                                            
(München: K. Zink, 1958), 100–1; Gregory E. Sterling, “‘Wisdom among the Perfect’: Creation Traditions 
in Alexandrian Judaism and Corinthian Christianity,” Novum Testamentum 37 (1995): 355–84, at 366–67; 
Sterling, “The Place of Philo of Alexandria in the Study of Christian Origins,” in Philo und das Neues 
Testament: Wechselseitige Wahrnehmungen; 1. Internationales Symposium zum Corpus Judaeo-
Hellenisticum, 1.–4. Mai 2003, Eisenach, Jena, ed. Roland Deines and Karl-Wilhelm Niebuhr, WUNT 172 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 21–52; Felipe De Jesus Legarreta-Castillo, The Figure of Adam in 
Romans 5 and 1 Corinthians 15: The New Creation and Its Ethical and Social Reconfiguration 
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 2014), 119–66, at 136–42. 
16 Orig. Hom. Gen. 13.4 (SC 7: 328). Haec ergo imago est de qua dicebat Pater ad filium: 
‘Faciamus homines ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram.’ Filius Dei est pictor hius imaginis. Et quia 
talis et tantus est pictor, imago eius obscurari per incuriam potest, deleri per malitiam non potest. Manet 
enim semper in te imago Dei, licet tu tibi ipse superducas ‘imaginem terreni.’ Istam picturam tu tibi ipse 
depingis. Cum enim te libido fuscauerit, induxisti unum colorem terrenum; si uero et auaritia aestuas, 
miscuisti et alium. Sed et cum te ira sanguineum facit, addis nihilominus et tertium colorem. Superbiae 
quoque alius additur fucus et impietatis alius. Et sic per singulas quasque malitiae species, uelut diuersis 
coloribus congregatis, hanc ‘imaginem terreni,’ quam Deus in te non fecit, tu tibi ipse depingis. For more 
on the human response to God as painter, see Lekkas, Liberté et progrès chez Origène, 153–64. Lekkas 
connects the theme of negligence (ἀμέλεια) with both Origen’s controversial doctrine of satiety and, albeit 
in passing, with progress toward the original image of God. For the importance of sight in Origen’s 
doctrine of the image of God, see Robin M. Jensen, Face to Face: Portraits of the Divine in Early 
Christianity (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2004), 94–99.  
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For Origen, the divine image is located in the soul.17 The Son has painted that image 
within: “For he is within you and does not come from without, just as ‘also the kingdom 
of God is within you’ (Lk. 17:21). Origen supports the contention of the internal nature of 
the image with scriptural reference to the parable of the woman and the lost coin (Lk. 
15:8–10). He continues: “And that woman who had lost a drachma did not find it on the 
outside, but in her house, after ‘she lit a lamp and cleaned her house’ from dirt and filth 
which the sloth and dullness of a long time had heaped up, and then she found the 
drachma.”18 The challenge, as Origen sees it, is not to allow passion and vice to creep into 
the mind, since, according to the painting metaphor, additional colors could sully the 
masterpiece. God painted within the individual the divine image; by covetousness or rage 
or some other vice an “earthly color” (colorem terrenum) is introduced “in you” (in te).19 
Add enough colors, in sum, and the original divine image is marred—but not destroyed—
and a new, alien earthly image emerges from a worldly brush.20  
It is noteworthy that Origen attaches his reflection on Genesis 1:26 to 
consideration of 1 Corinthians 15:49. Both verses play a critical role in shaping both 
                                                
17 See also Orig. Hom. Gen. 1.13 (SC 7: 56). Is autem, qui ad imaginem Dei factus est, interior 
homo noster est, inuisibilis et incorporalis et incorruptus atque immortalis. 
18 Orig. Hom. Gen. 13.4 (SC 7: 326–27). See also Jensen, Face to Face, 101–3, which contrasts 
Origen and Athanasius on the topic of seeing the divine as a means of knowing.  
19 See Philo, Opif. 23.69–71 (LCL 226: 54–57). Two themes emerge in Philo that Origen latches 
onto: 1. The incorporeal nature of the image and 2. a distinction between image and archetype or pattern. 
See David Runia, Philo in Early Christian Literature, 175. Runia critiques Crouzel by insisting that that he 
fails to adequately attend to Origen’s Philonic roots. Runia concludes: “A closer examination of texts might 
well reveal that Origen actually sharpens up Philo’s emphases on this point in the direction of a thorough-
going anti-coporealism.” Cf. Crouzel, Théologie de l’image de Dieu chez Origène, 52–57. 
20 See Gerald A McCool, “The Ambrosian Origin of St. Augustine’s Theology of the Image of 
God in Man,” Theological Studies 20.1 (1959): 62–81. McCool argues that Ambrose is so indebted to 
Origen that he must say, with Origen, that the image cannot be lost. While it should be evident at the 
conclusion of this chapter that Ambrose is indebted to Origen, he will say at times that the image can be 
lost or destroyed.  
  
 
124 
Origen’s (and Ambrose’s) doctrine of the image of God. In the block quote above (Hom. 
Gen. 13.4), we see that critical importance on display. The Son paints within the human 
being the image of God. And though this image is beautiful by virtue of the Artist’s 
character, because of “negligence” (per incuriam), this image is on contested moral 
ground, tempted to overlay itself with the “image of the earthly.” Origen offers several 
examples of how vice can “paint” over the Son’s original depiction within the human 
person. It is easy for Origen to associate vice or passion with color here; anger discolors 
the face, lust ruddies the cheeks. These different vicious habits or behaviors, Origen 
notes, “are brought together” (congregatis) and create a worldly palette of obscuring 
colors. 
An earlier homily on Genesis 1:26 also reveals Origen associating the doctrine of 
rival images with the pursuit of godlikeness.21 Distinguishing image and likeness serves 
Origen as a didactic tool for describing pursuit of virtue.22 In following after Jesus the 
Son, the truest image according to whom humanity was created, individuals attain a 
godlikeness, a heavenly image in contrast to an earthly one.23  
                                                
21 Crouzel, Théologie de l’image de Dieu chez Origène, 35. Crouzel notes that, for Origen, 
likeness of God (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ) is the “purpose of life.” See also Anders-Christian Jacobsen, “Conversion 
to Christian Philosophy—the Case of Origen’s School in Caesarea,” Zeitschrift für Antikes Christentum 
16.1 (2015): 145–57. Jacobsen, in ways parallel to Crouzel, upholds the “realisation of the image of God” 
as the primary aim of Origen’s teaching (at 150). 
22 Cf. Orig. Cels. 4.30 (SC 136: 254). See also Orig. Com. Ion. 20.22.23 (GCS 4: 355). Origen 
insists that his opponent, Celsus, misunderstands Genesis 1:26ff by thinking of humanity as altogether 
resembling God at their creation (ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ γεγονότες πάντῃ ἐσμὲν αὐτῷ ὃμοιοι). Contrary to this 
gloss, Origen recalls a clear “distinction” (διαφοράν) being made between “according to the image of 
God” (κατ᾽ εικόνα θεοῦ) and “according to the likeness” (καθ᾽ ὁμοίωσιν), for which Celsus fails to 
account. 
23 See Com. Ion. 2.2. Origen speaks of the Word as the “archetypal image.” See also Mark 
DelCogliano, “Eusebian Theologies of the Son as the Image of God before 341,” JECS 14.4 (2006): 459–
84. DelCogliano analyzes the early fourth-century trope that spoke of Jesus as the “image of God” and how 
that trope is taken in (at least) two directions. Athanasius and Asterius take up a “participative” 
understanding, DelCogliano argues, while Eusebian theologians take up a “constitutive” one. The former 
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For if man made according to the image of God, by gazing on the image of the 
devil has been made like him in sin and contrary to nature, how much more by 
gazing on the Image of God, according to whose likeness he has been made, will 
he receive that form which was given to him by nature, through the Word and his 
power. And let no one, seeing his image to be more with the devil than with God, 
despair that he can again regain the form of the image of God, because the Savior 
came not “to call the just, but sinners to repentance” (Cf. Mt. 9:9–13). Matthew 
was a tax collector and undoubtedly his image was like the devil, but when he 
comes to the Image of God, our Lord and Savior, and follows that image, he is 
transformed to the likeness of the image of God. “James, the son of Zebedee, and 
John his brother” were fishermen and “uneducated men” (Mt. 4:18), who 
undoubtedly then bore a likeness more to the image of the devil, but they also, 
following the Image of God, are made like him, as are the other apostles.24 
 
While there is no clean distinction between image and likeness in this passage from the 
Homilies on Genesis, there appears to be at least a two-step process by which an 
individual pursues godlikeness: “seeing” constitutes the first, “following” after the true 
image, the second. These two steps, I would argue, are what Origen has in mind when he 
uses the phrase “gazing on the image.” When Matthew, for instance, sees and follows 
after the Image, he is transformed (transformatus) from his earthly or devilish image of a 
publican to the likeness of the Image of God.25 Origen presents this transformation as a 
process, moving from seeing oneself as earthly image to seeing and eventually longing 
after the heavenly Image. Origen does not say here what precisely attracts one to imitate a 
                                                                                                                                            
indicates that the Son is God by participation in the true God, while the latter indicates the Son’s divinity 
by virtue of his imitation of the Father. 
24 Orig. Hom. Gen. 1.13 (SC 7: 62–65). Si enim ad imaginem Dei factus homo contra naturam 
intuens imaginem diaboli per peccatum similis eius effectus est, multo magis intuens imaginem Dei, ad 
cuius similitudimen factus est a Deo, per Verbum et uirtutem eius recipient [eius] formam illam quae data 
ei fuerat per naturam. Et nemo desperet uidens similitudinem suam magis esse cum diabolo quam cum Deo 
posse se iterum recuperare formam imaginis Dei, quia non uenit Saluator uocare iustos sed peccatores in 
paenitentiam (Lk. 5:32). Matthaeus publicanus erat et utique imago eius diaboli similis erat, sed ueniens 
ad imaginem Dei, Dominum et Saluatorem nostrum, et sequens eam transformatus est ad similitudinem 
imaginis Dei. Iacobus, Zebedaei fiulius, et Iohannes, frater eius (Mt. 4:21) piscatores erant (Mt. 4:18) et 
homines sine litteris (Acts 4:13), qui utique tunc magis ad imaginem diabolic similitudinem referebant, sed 
sequentes et isti imaginem Dei similes facti sunt ei, sicut et certeri Apostoli.  
25 See Com. Ion. 2.4, where images of the earthly and heavenly are pitted against one another in 
the context of Origen’s interpretation of Revelation 19:11–16.  
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heavenly image and throw off an earthly one. He writes only of the necessity of doing so 
for regaining the likeness to the Image that Adam once lost. 
The connection between image and imitation recurs in Origen’s homilies on 
Psalm 38:7a (LXX) (“indeed though man walks about in an image . . .”).26 According to 
Origen, since the Psalmist wrote of an image, the author must have a particular image of 
something in mind. Origen concludes that this particular Image is Jesus, citing Colossians 
1:15 (“the Image of God and firstborn of all creation”). Origen then pits this Image from 
Colossians 1:15 against multiple, earthly images (diuersis imaginibus), expounding on 
Pauline language from 1 Corinthians 15:49.27 “‘Though man walks about in an image’ 
(Ps. 38:7a), but in whose image?,” Origen asks. “God, an earthly image, a heavenly 
image?”28 Origen searches out an answer by equating living according to the divine law 
(secundum legem dei uiuunt) with bearing a heavenly image, and conversely, “living 
carnally” (carnaliter uiuunt) with bearing an earthly one. 
Now it is yours to discuss and inquire from the faith and works of each, from way 
of life and actions, from thoughts and words, and to consider whether he or she 
walks in the image or in an image of the earthly one. . . . And again, if you are an 
imitator of neither Christ nor Paul, who says: “Be imitators of me, just as I am of 
Christ,” (1 Cor. 11:1) but you are an imitator of the works of the devil who was a 
murderer from the beginning: if you have earthly wisdom and speak earthly things 
your treasure and your heart are on the earth, you bear the image.29 
  
                                                
26 Orig. Hom. Psal. 38.2.1 (SC 411: 370). Cf. Ambr. Iob 3.1.1 (CSEL 32/2: 248). 
27 For Origen, these two verses are deeply connected not only because of their use of image-
language, but also because of the assumed Pauline authorship of both letters. 
28 Orig. Hom. Psal. 38.2.1 (SC 411: 370).  
29 Orig. Hom. Psal. 38.2.1 (SC 411: 370). Tuum est iam discutere et exquirere ex uniuscuiusque 
fide et operibus, ex conversatione et actibus, ex cogitationibus et verbis et considerare utrum in imagine 
caelestis ambulet, an in imagine terreni. . . . Et rursum si non es imitator Christi nec apostoli Pauli, qui 
dicit: Imitatores mei estote, sicut ego Christi, sed imitator es operum diaboli qui homicida fuit ab initio: et 
si terrena sapias et terrena loquaris et thesaurus tuus et cor tuum in terra sit, terreni imaginem portas. 
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The passage is shot through with imitation language. Either one is an imitator of Paul 
and, therefore, Christ, or one is an imitator of the devil and inheritor of earthly wisdom. 
Imitation is equated with bearing an image: the image of the one whom we choose to 
imitate will be manifest in our “faith and works.” Furthermore, as Origen puts it in a 
homily on Genesis, “as one who sees an image of someone sees him whose image it is.”30 
While Origen harps on proper imitation, drawing on Paul’s clean distinction 
between bearing an earthly and heavenly image, the outworking of this pursuit is less 
neat. “Every sinner bears the image,” Origen writes, “but does not do so similarly: a 
murderer and a liar do not carry the image of the earthly one equally, or an adulterer and 
mocker, or a corruptor of children and a thief, although all these carry the image of the 
earthly one, there is a great difference between them according to the diversity of sin.”31 
Corruption takes on many hues manifested by myriad vicious states—a claim Origen 
adapts from the laundry list of fleshly works in Galatians 5; these vices muddy their 
corresponding virtues by exhibiting tyrannical behavior rather than holy humility. Again 
citing 1 Corinthians 15:49, Origen pits these diverse earthly images against their 
heavenly counterparts by leveraging the painting metaphor to prescribe a remedy: “If you 
will scrape off all the dye from your senses of this worst picture, and wipe off every 
figment of poisonous color, the images will make you perish.”32 Like their rivals, 
                                                
30 Orig. Gen. Hom. 1.13 (SC 7: 60). 
31 Orig. Hom. Psal. 38.2.2 (SC 411: 380). Utputa omnis peccator portat imaginem terreni, sed non 
omnis similiter: non aeque imaginem terreni portat homicida et mendax, aut adulter et conviciosus, aut 
puerorum corruptor et fur, quamuis omnes isti terreni imaginem portent, sed multa est inter ipsos 
differentia pro diueristate peccati. 
32 Orig. Hom. Psal. 38.2.2 (SC 411: 382). Si non detraxeris et abraseris a sensibus tuis omnem 
fucum pessimae huius picturae et omne figmentum uenenati coloris absterseris, ipsae te imagines perire 
facient. 
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heavenly or virtuous images are multiple. Origen lauds participating in images provided 
by the ecclesial community—Paul and Timothy, in particular, imitate the Son by their 
obvious virtues.33 By imitating Paul and Timothy, one participates in their very character, 
even in their particular virtues.34 
We should add one more point about Origen’s doctrine of the image of God that 
will help to better illumine Ambrose’s: bearing the image of a virtue is necessarily 
provisional this side of heaven. Later in the same homily on Psalm 38:7a, Origen writes:  
Therefore, we walk in the image of knowledge, and not in knowledge itself (in 
imagine scientiae ambulamus et non in ipsa scientia). . . . Equally, we walk in the 
image of wisdom (in ipsa sapientia imagine) and not in wisdom itself (in ipsa 
sapientia). . . . I daresay the same thing about the justice of God, that we walk in 
an image of justice (in imagine iustitiae) and not yet do we march in that justice 
(in illa iustitia) in which is face to face (Cf. 1 Cor. 13:12).35  
 
Here we see Origen’s blending of a clear Platonic resemblance between the thing itself 
and an image of that thing with Pauline logic (“which is face to face”). Image language 
helps Origen distinguish uncertain possession of virtue in this life from virtue’s perfect 
eschatological fulfillment. For Origen, to image the virtues is a participatory and 
imperfect enterprise; no created thing has unmediated access to God, who is the source of 
knowledge, wisdom, and justice itself, but we can only participate in that knowledge, 
wisdom, and justice, and in this life that participation is imperfect.  
 
                                                
33 Orig. Hom. Psal. 38.2.2–3 (SC 411: 380–83). 
34 Origen’s doctrine of participation likely owes to middle Platonic sources. For similarities, see 
Numenius, fr. 12, in Édouard des Places, Fragments (Paris: Les belles lettres, 1973), 54–55; fr. 16, Des 
Places, 57.  
35 Orig. Hom. Psal. 38.2.2 (SC 411: 374). 
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God as Painter: Ambrose’s Hexaemeron 6.7.42–6.8.49 
To see how Ambrose adapts Origen’s doctrine of God as image-painter and the 
corresponding challenge of rival images, we must go to the well-worn text of his several 
homilies on the creation of the world. A portion of his sermon on the sixth day of creation 
in particular, Hexaemeron 6.7.40–6.8.49, offers us his most detailed gloss on Genesis 
1:26–27.36 Ambrose begins his reflections on the sixth day of creation by lauding the 
greatness of humanity, insisting that God’s “wreath for victory is assigned to the last 
day.” Standing back from a consideration of the first five days’ glory and seeking to 
better present the uniqueness of human beings, Ambrose charges his listeners to “enter . . 
. into this mighty and wonderful theater of the whole visible creation.”37 While it is clear 
throughout the homily (and those that precede it) that Ambrose wants to get on with the 
sermon series to discuss the wonders of human beings (and apparently his listeners do 
too),38 he is forced by “the order which scripture is laid down” to ponder the nature, 
diversity, and respective roles of the animals.39  
                                                
36 See Ragnar Holte, Béatitude et sagesse: saint Augustin et le problème de la fin de l’homme dans 
la philosophie ancienne (Paris: Études augustiniennnes, 1962), 165–76, at 168–69. Typically, scholars date 
the homilies between 386 and 390 CE. Dating the homilies to the late 380s was popularized by Courcelle 
and has largely gone unquestioned. In large part, I think such dating makes for a neat transition to 
Augustine. Augustine’s visit to Milan is dated to 385/6 CE, and this time happens to coincide with the apex 
of Ambrose’s teaching and literary output. See Aug. conf. 6.3.4 (CSEL 33: 117–18), where Augustine 
references the significance of hearing Ambrose’s teaching on the image of God. Holte makes the case that 
Ambrose’s hexameral homiles were “copieusement inspiré de pensées puisées dans les Ennéades de Plotin” 
(at 167). See, e.g., Johannes Quasten, Patrology, 4: 153–54. See also Herman Somers, “Image de Dieu: Les 
sources de l’exégèse augustinienne,” Revue des études augustiniennes 7 (1961): 105–25; R. A. Markus, 
“‘Imago’ and ‘Similitudo’ in Augustine,” Revue d’ études augustiniennes et patristiques 10.2–3 (1964): 
125–44, at 130.  
37 Ambr. Hex. 6.1.2 (CSEL 32/1: 204). 
38 See Hex. 6.2.3 (CSEL 32/1: 205–). 
39 Hex. 6.2.3 (CSEL 32/1: 205). See Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy, 32–34, 314–17. Ayres 
indicates that “patristic exegesis takes as its point of departure the ‘plain’ sense of the text of scripture” 
(32). He adopts Eugene Rogers’s phrase “the way the words run” for how these sacred texts were glossed 
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 By considering animals, their creation and respective characteristics, Ambrose’s 
audience is first to learn of the uniqueness of human beings and is then charged to 
likewise live well. For instance, Ambrose writes: 
In the first place, nature has thrown down on their belly every species of cattle, 
beast, and fish, so that some crawl on their stomachs. You may observe that other 
animals that are supported on their feet are, by reason of the motion of a four-
footed body, are, as it were, more fixed to the earth than free. They have in fact no 
ability to stand erect. They therefore seek their sustenance in the earth, solely 
pursuing the pleasures of the stomach toward which they incline onto your belly. 
Take care not to be bent over like cattle. See that you do not incline—not so 
much, oh human being, in body as in cupidity. Have regard for the form of your 
body and assume in accordance with it the appearance of loftiness and strength. 
Leave to animals the sole privilege of feeding in a prone position. Why, contrary 
to your nature, do you bend over in the act of eating? Why do you find delight in 
what is a violation of nature? Why do you feed on things of the earth like cattle, 
intent on food both day and night? What do you dishonor yourself by 
surrendering to the allurements of the body, a slave to the belly and its appetite? 
Why do you deprive yourself of the intelligence with which the Creator has 
endowed you? Why do you put yourself on the level of the beasts of burden? To 
dissociate yourself from these was the will of God, when He said: “Do not 
become like the horse and the mule who have no understanding” (Ps 31:10).40  
 
Underlying this quote is Ambrose’s concern for the coinciding of self-consistency and 
consistency with nature. How creatures are created in other words determines what sorts 
of things are proper to those creatures. Ambrose chronicles various creatures, noting their 
                                                                                                                                            
in general. See Eugene Rogers, “How the Virtues of an Interpreter Presuppose and Perfect Hermeneutics: 
The Case of Thomas Aquinas,” Journal of Religion 76 (1996): 64–81. Ayres mentions that Basil’s 
hexameral homilies follow the plain sense of the text, tracing how “the words of Scripture run,” and in this, 
Ayres argues, “we see Basil not so much constructing a ‘Christian ontology’ as shaping strategies that will 
give a pro-Nicene cast to his ontological reflection” (Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy, 314). 
40 Hex. 6.3.10 (CSEL 32/1: 209–10). Translation amended from FOTC 42: 233. Primum quia 
omnia genera pecorum, bestiarum ac piscium in aluum natura prostrauit, ut alia uentre repant, alia quae 
pedibus sustinentur demersa magis quadripedi corporis gressu et uelut adfixa terries uideas esse quam 
libera, siquidem, cum erigendi se non habeant facultatem, de terra uictum requirunt et uentris, in quem 
deflectuntur, solas sequuntur uoluptates. caue, o homo, pecorum more curuari, caue in aluum te non tam 
corpore quam cupiditate deflectas. respice corporis tui formam et speciem congruentem celsi uigoris 
adsume, sine sola animalia prona pascantur. cur te in edendo sternis ipse, quem natura non strauit? cur eo 
delectaris in quo naturae iniuria est? cur noctes et dies cibo intentus pecorum more terrena depasceris? 
cur inlecebris corporalibus deditus ipsum te inhonoras, dum uentri atque eius passionibus seruis? cur 
intellectum tibi adimis, quem tibi creator adtribuit? Cur te iumentis comparas, a quibus te uoluit deus 
segregare dicens: nolite fieri sicut equus et mulus, in quibus non est intellectus? 
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several and unique natures and how attending to these naturespoints to their relative 
success as the sort of creatures they are. The reason cows have four feet is that they are to 
eat from the earth, for example; they have no need to be upright. To bring the connection 
between nature and necessity to bear on human beings, Ambrose contends that human 
beings are distinct sorts of creatures and should act according to their created natures, not 
in accordance with the natures of other creatures.  
Ambrose’s use of examples and reasoning from creation corresponds with the 
Stoic commonplace of living according to nature. Zeno maintains that the telos of human 
beings is to live φύσεως (“naturally” or “agreeably with nature”), an ideal he equates 
with the virtuous life.41 Brad Inwood helps us further express this connection:  
For in a rational and therefore consistent Universe, consistency with one’s own 
life will be a necessary condition for consistency with the whole of which one is a 
part. This consistency with oneself will also be a corollary of consistency with 
Nature as a whole. But the Stoics would also have claimed that in their 
deterministic but providential world, if one failed to achieve harmony with nature, 
sooner or later one would fall out of harmony with oneself.42 
 
Self-consistency can thus either be seen as a consequence of attending to nature or as a 
microcosm of it. In either case, the two conditions implicate one another, as Inwood 
notes. This point is critical for understanding Ambrose’s repeated exhortation to “Attend 
to thyself” and his scriptural citation to “Drink from thy own cisterns” (Prov. 5:15). To be 
consistent is the ideal, and it is by looking first outward at creation and then inward that 
                                                
41 Dio. Laert. 7.1.88 (LCL 185: 194–95), 7.5.169–70 (LCL 185: 272–73), Posidonius, Hecato, and 
Chryssipus are also noted as arguing for the ideal of living in accord with nature and equating such a life 
with virtue. See Josiah B. Gould, Philosophy of Chrysippus (Albany, NY: State University of New York 
Press, 2012), 161–80. 
42 Brad Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1985), 105–26, at 106. 
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we can diagnose and remedy inconsistencies in our lives that threaten the acquisition of 
such an ideal. 
Examples from creation, Ambrose writes, prove that Moses (and the scriptures, 
more generally) recorded only that which was to benefit our salvation.43 Ambrose’s 
interpretation also betrays his concern over the presentation of the body and its 
appearance of “loftiness and strength,” and nature gives him the illustrations he needs. 
Animals are industrious and diligent; “we should follow their example and avoid 
slothfulness.”44 Ambrose admits these are “lofty aims,” but creatures small and large 
impress the need to pursue the good willingly. The ant, for instance, “lays up provision 
for a future day without compulsion and with freedom of foresight,”45 while bears lick 
their young into form and shape and so commend us to do the same for our children.46 
And just as dogs are non-rational, but through persistence and training are able to 
cultivate obedience, we are to learn the intricacies of syllogistic reasoning which are, at 
first blush, difficult to comprehend.47 
Much of Ambrose’s interpretation bears resemblance Basil’s Hexameron, but he 
still extols it to his listeners for moral reflection: “We cannot fully know ourselves 
without first knowing the nature of all living creatures” (non possumus plenius nos 
cognoscere nisi prius quae sit omnium natura animantium cognouerimus), he writes.”48 
                                                
43 Ambr. Hex. 6.2.8 (CSEL 32/1: 208–9).  
44 Hex. 6.4.16 (CSEL 32/1: 212–13). 
45 Hex. 6.4.16 (CSEL 32/1: 212–13). 
46 Hex. 6.4.18 (CSEL 32/1: 214). 
47 Hex. 6.4.24 (CSEL 32/1: 220–21). 
48 Hex. 6.2.3 (CSEL 32/1: 205). See Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy, 315. By relying on Basil, 
Ambrose is to be up to the same thing in his homilies, namely, as Ayres puts it, that by “shap[ing] a mode 
  
 
133 
Knowing or attending to ourselves—Ambrose translates Deuteronomy 4.9 and 15:9 as 
“adtende tibi.”49—implies an examination of who we are at bottom: namely, a soul 
created according to the image of God. This, he argues, is the distinguishing mark of 
humanity.50  
Channeling Origen, and possibly the author of the Refutatio omnium haeresium,51 
Ambrose artfully builds on the metaphor of God as a painter, adding to it an alternate 
                                                                                                                                            
of attention to the created order[,] we may come to see the diverse activities of created natures reflecting 
the initial and ongoing harmonious action of the Word in all things and thus grow in appreciation of the 
providential and immediate action of the triune God, while, from the human point of view, we may speak 
of shaping patterns of attention.”  
49 The adaption of this trope is likely from Basil’s “Homily on the Words ‘Be attentive to 
yourself.’” See Basil, L’homélie de Basile de Césarée sur le mot ʻobserve-toi toi-même’: Édition critique 
du texte grec et étude sur la tradition manuscrite (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1962), 23–37. English 
translation: Basil the Great, On The Human Condition, trans. Nonna Verna Harrison (Crestwood, N.Y: St. 
Vladimirs Seminary Press, 2005), 93–105. Gerald Boersma indicates, following Pierre Courcelle, that 
Ambrose is adapting “a standard Stoic interpretation of the Delphic oracle.” See Boersma, Augustine’s 
Early Theology of Image, 95; Pierre Courcelle, “Saint Ambroise devant le précepte delphique,” in Forma 
futuri: Studi in onore del cardinale Michele Pellegrino (Torino: Bottega d’Erasmo, 1975), 179–88. 
Boersma cites Epict. Enchir. 13–14 (LCL 218: 492–95) as primary source evidence of this tradition. See 
also Ambrose, Psal. 118 2.13 (CSEL 62: 27), where he contends that the book of Deuteronomy is the 
origin of the maxim; the “Gentiles,” he writes, ascribe its origin to the Delphic oracle. Cf. Cic. Tusc. 
1.22.51–3 (LCL 141: 60–63); Juv. Sat. 11.27 (LCL 91: 402–3). 
 
50 Ambr. Hex. 6.1.2 (CSEL 32/1: 204–5). 
51 The text is often attributed to Hippolytus, but its authorship is disputed. Regardless of 
authorship, the text references “painting” or “to paint” a couple times in the fifth book. See (Ps?) Hippol. 
Haer. 5.8.17–18 (GCS, Hippolytus Werke 3: 92), where the verse is referenced but in what appears to be a 
variant that Ambrose is adapting from the LXX: ἐπὶ τῶν χειρῶν μου ἐζωγράφηκα ὑμᾶς (“I have painted 
you upon my hands.”). Again, at 5.17.5 (GCS, Hippolytus Werke 3: 114), when explicating the Peratae’s 
heresy, the author indicates that they speak of the Son as akin to a painter. The analogy depicts an artist 
painting from nature, transforming all the forms (ἰδέας) before him to the canvas. Likewise, the Son 
transfers paternal ideas onto unformed matter (ὕλη). Jerome names Ambrose’s debts in the Hexameron as 
being Basil and Hippolytus, not Origen. See Hier. Ep. 84.7 (CSEL 55: 130). See also Hier. Vir. ill. 61 
(CCSL 114a: 35), which treats Hippolytus (“bishop of some church—the name of the city I have not been 
able to learn”), lists his works, two of which are On the Six Days of Creation and On Genesis, and indicates 
that he “is speaking in the church in the presence of Origen.” See Martin Karl Klein, Meletemata 
ambrosiana mythologica de Hippolyto doxographica de exameri fontibvs (Königsberg: R. Lankeit, 1927), 
80, who argues for Ambrose's knowledge of a lost Hippolytan Genesis commentary. The scholarly 
consensus that Ambrose relied on Hippolytus seems to stem from Jerome’s statement. See Oscar von 
Gebhardt und Adolf Harnack, Die Gnostischen Quellen Hippolyts in seiner Hauptschrift gegen die 
Häretiker (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1890), 115–20; Adolf von Harnack, Geschichte der altchristlichen 
litteratur bis Eusebius: Die Überlieferung und der bestand. Bearb. unter mitwirkung von Erwin Preuschen 
(Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1893), 627n.22;  K. Schenkl, “Praefatio,” in CSEL 32/1: xiv–xv; Courcelle, 
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translation of Isaiah 49:16 (LXX). Here is the key passage under consideration, first in 
Latin, then in the common English translation: 
Adtende inquit tibi soli (Cf. Dt. 4:9, 15:9). aliud enim sumus nos, aliud sunt 
nostra, alia quae circa nos sunt. nos sumus, hoc est anima et mens, nostra sunt 
corporis membra et sensus eius, circa nos autem pecunia est, serui sunt et uitae 
istius adparatus. tibi igitur adtende, te ipsum scito, hoc est non quales lacertos 
habeas, non quantam corporis fortudinem, non quantas possessiones, quantam 
potentiam, sed qualem animam ac mentem, unde omnia consilia proficiscuntur, 
ad quam operum tuorum fructus refertur. illa est enim plena sapientiae, plena 
pietatis atque iustitiae, quoniam omnis uirtus a deo. cui dicit deus: “ecce, 
Hierusalem, pinxi muros tuos” (Is. 49:16). illa anima a deo pingitur, quae habet 
in se uirtutum gratiam renitentem splendoremque pietatis. illa anima bene picta 
est, in qua elucet diuinae operationis effigies, illa anima bene picta est, in qua est 
splendor gloriae et paternae imago substantiae. secundum hanc imaginem, quae 
refulget, pictura pretiosa est. secundum hanc imaginem Adam ante peccatum, sed 
ubi lapsus est, deposuit imaginem caelestis, sumpsit terrestris effigiem.52  
 
“Attend to thyself alone,” says Scripture. In fact, we must distinguish between 
“ourselves,” “ours,” and “what surrounds us.” “Ourselves” refers to body and 
soul. “Ours” are the members of our bodies and our senses. “What surrounds us” 
consists of our money, our slaves, and all that belongs to this life. “Attend to 
thyself,” therefore, “know thyself,” that is to say not what muscular arms you 
have, not how strong you are physically, or how many possessions or power you 
have. Attend, rather, to your soul and mind, whence all our deliberations emanate 
and to which the profit of your works is referred. Here only is the fullness of 
wisdom, the plenitude of piety and justice of which God speaks—for all virtue 
comes from God: “Behold, Jerusalem, I have painted thy walls” (Is. 49:16). That 
soul of yours is painted by God, who holds in Himself the flashing beauty of 
virtue and the splendor of piety. That soul is well painted in which shines the 
imprint of divine operation. That soul is well painted in which resides the 
splendor of grace and the reflection of its paternal nature. Precious is that picture 
which in its brilliance is in accord with that divine reflection. Adam before he 
sinned conformed to this image. But after his fall he lost that celestial image and 
took on one that is terrestial [sic].53 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Recherches sur les “Confessions” de saint Augustin, 341n.1, 358n.3; Dudden, The Life and Times of St. 
Ambrose of Milan, 1:16 n.2, 1:113 n.7, 2:680.  
52 Ambr. Hex. 6.7.42 (CSEL 32/1: 233–34). See Smith, Christian Grace and Pagan Virtue, 236–
37 n.54. 
53 Hex. 6.7.42 (CSEL 32/1: 233–34; trans. FOTC 42: 255). 
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For Ambrose, God is the artist who crafts the interior human and who is the source of 
moral excellence.54 At the Fall, Adam “lost” (deposuit) the image and took up an earthly 
one—a clear reference to 1 Cor. 15:49.55 This much is plain. 
However, the common English translation is misleading at two key junctures. The 
primary challenge in translation lies with the first illa (illa est enim plena sapientiae 
[…]). In this context, the word can be taken an adverb, as the English translation above 
has it, and rendered “here,” “in that way,” or “there.” If illa is rendered adverbially 
(“Here only is the fullness of wisdom, the plenitude of piety and justice of which God 
speaks”), then the results are strained: the “profit of your works” (operum tuorum fructus) 
or the process of attending to oneself is presumably the source of the soul’s fullness. On 
this reading, the soul would merit virtues based on the fruit of its works. Such a reading, 
however, fails to take into account the predicate adjectives “plena sapientiae . . . pietatis . 
. . iustitiae.” The more plausible translation, I would argue, is to take illa as a 
demonstrative feminine pronoun, rendered “that one (feminine thing).” In this case, illa 
would refer to either “animam” (anima), “mentem” (mens), or to them both collectively, 
since both are singular, feminine antecedents. Given Ambrose’s multiple references to 
illa anima after the Isaiah 49:16 reference, I take this first illa to refer to anima, “the 
soul.” 
                                                
54 Cf. Orig. Hom. Gen. 13.4 (SC 7: 328). Filius Dei est pictor hius imaginis. Et quia talis et tantus 
est pictor, imago eius obscurari per incuriam potest, deleri per malitiam non potest. Manet enim semper in 
te imago Dei, licet tu tibi ipse superducas ‘imaginem terreni.’ 
 
55 Cf. Ambr. Sacr. 5.4.27 (CSEL 73: 70–71). Diues eras ad imaginem et similitudinem dei factus. 
Perdidisti, quod habebas, hoc est humilitatem, dum adrogantiam desideras uindicare, perdidisti pecuniam; 
sicut Adam nudus es factus. Accepisti a diabolo debitum, quod non erat necessarium. Et ideo qui eras luber 
in Christo, debitor factus es diabolic. Cautionem tuam tenebat inimicus, sed eam dominus crucifixit et suo 
cruore deleuit. Abstulit debitum tuum reddidit libertatem. 
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If we translate illa as “that (soul),” then it follows that plena sapientiae . . . 
pietatis atque iustitiae constitute a string of predicate adjectives, which describe the 
condition or state of that soul. Furthermore, translating plena sapientiae as “fullness of 
wisdom,” as the English translation above, can easily lead to the misunderstanding the 
anima as “the fullness (plena) of wisdom, the fullness (plena) of piety and justice.”56 But 
plena is an adjective, commonly rendered “full” or “filled;” it often takes a genitive—
some person, place or thing is “full of” or “filled with” some other thing. In this case, illa 
(anima) is said to be “full of” [or “filled with”] wisdom, full of piety and justice.  
A more faithful rendering would translate plena as “full of” or “filled with,” 
allowing for a smoother connection with the next clause—“for all virtue is from God.” 
Instead of emphasizing the atomism of the individual, this slight translational move 
would heighten the necessity for the individual to be filled by God for the pursuit of 
moral excellence. Reference to Isaiah 49:16 follows and offers scriptural proof that God 
“paints” the “walls” of the soul (pinxi muros tuos). And reflecting on the fact that God 
has painted us with divine works, Ambrose indicates, affords the recognition that the 
anima is “full of wisdom, full of piety and justice.”57  
A second translational challenge follows from the first and is revealed with the 
following phrase: “that soul of yours is painted by God, who holds in Himself the 
flashing beauty of virtue and the splendor of piety” (from: illa anima a deo pingitur, quae 
habet in se virtutum gratiam renitentem splendoremque pietatis). Warren Smith has 
helpfully pointed out that quae in the dependent clause refers not to God, but is feminine 
                                                
56 Cf. Smith, Christian Grace and Pagan Virtue, 18–19. Smith follows the FOTC translation: 
“Here only is the fullness of wisdom, the plentitude of piety and justice of which God speaks.”  
57 Ambr. Hex. 6.7.42 (CSEL 32/1: 233).  
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in gender and refers to the soul, leaving us with the rendering of “that soul, which holds 
in itself the shining grace and splendor of piety.”58 Therefore, I take “virtue” (uirtutum) as 
appositional; in short, “shining grace” and “splendor of piety” is virtue. A retranslation of 
the passage will manifest this shift and the contours of Ambrose’s logic: 
It says, “Attend to yourself alone” (Dt. 4:9, 15:9). One thing is what we are, 
another is what things are ours, and another is that which surrounds us. What we 
are, that is a soul and mind; what things are ours, that is the members of our body 
and its senses; that which surrounds us, that is our money, servants, and provision 
of this life. Therefore, attend to yourself, and know yourself, that is, not what sort 
of muscular arms you have, nor how much bodily strength or how many 
possessions or however much power you have, but attend to what kind of soul and 
mind you have, whence all your plans originate and to which the fruit of your 
work is referred. That soul is full of wisdom, full of piety and justice, since all 
virtue is from God. And to that soul God says: “Behold, Jerusalem, I have painted 
your walls” (Is. 49:16). The soul that holds in itself the shining grace of virtue and 
splendor of piety is painted by God. That soul is well painted, in which the 
semblance of divine operation shines; that soul is well painted in which resides 
the splendor of glory and the image of paternal substance. The picture which 
shine according to this image is precious. Adam lived according to this image 
before he sinned, but when he fell, he deposited the image of the heavenly one 
and assumed the semblance of the earthly one.59 
 
Attending to oneself means reflecting on the soul, which God, the source of moral 
goodness and beauty, has adorned with the semblances of divine operation. In being so 
painted, that soul holds in itself the beauty of virtue. Ambrose’s statement represents a 
clear affirmation of God as the source of virtue and artfully describes the demands that 
come packaged with such an affirmation. 
Ambrose’s use and gloss of Isaiah 49:16 is unique to the Latin tradition;60 his 
reference the soul’s walls being painted by God pertains to a Latin translation more akin 
                                                
58 See Smith, Christian Grace and Pagan Virtue, 236–37, n.54. 
59 Hex. 6.7.42 (CSEL 32/1: 233–34). 
60 For Ambrose’s other references to Isaiah 49:16, see Hex. 6.8.47 (CSEL 32/1: 238), 6.8.49 
(CSEL 32/1: 240); Ex. uirg. 10.68 (PL 16: 356); Iob 3.8.24 (CSEL 32/2: 261–62); Psal. 118 14.43 (CSEL 
62: 328); Psal. 47.22 (CSEL 64: 359). All of these references occur after at least 383 CE. I say “at least” 
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to the LXX text: “ἰδοὺ ἐπὶ τῶν χειρῶν μου ἐζωγράφησά σου τὰ τείχη.” Key for 
Ambrose here is the verb ἐζωγράφησά from ζωγραφέω (“to paint”), a verb used by 
Plato and Plutarch before him.61 Didymus the Blind, a figure with whom Ambrose was 
familiar by at least 381 CE, refers to the Isaiah 49:16 twice in his Commentary on the 
Psalms 29–34 when exegeting Psalm 30:6 (“Into your hands I will entrust my soul”).62 
Didymus argues the imagery of God’s painting of Jerusalem’s walls refers to the 
perceptible things of an incorporeal God, and in no way should the painting upon the 
hands of God be considered material. Didymus wonders after the nature of these walls, 
citing Proverbs 1:21, a verse which describes Lady Wisdom as “proclaimed on top of the 
walls.” “Of this statement,” Didymus writes, “let us say that a herald appears on top of 
the perceptible walls proclaiming things concerning the virtues. The walls are the 
watchmen of the mind, and the virtues and the divine works will make this known inside 
man.”63  
                                                                                                                                            
since Iob is sometimes dated to 383 CE and other times to 387–89 CE. That these references all show up in 
or after the mid-380s is mildly interesting, but I think this lies more due to an increase in his literary output 
than to some development in doctrine: Ambrose produces an incredible amount of material between 386–
90 CE. Cf. Hier. Is. 13.668–69 (PL 24: 469–70). In this commentary, typically dated around 410 CE, 
Jerome uses depinxi and defixi. See also Iren. Haer. 5.35.2. Irenaeus’ Latin translator uses depinxi.  
61 Greek-English Lexicon, Liddel and Scott (Oxford: Clarendon, 2003), s.v. “ζωγραφέω.” For 
early uses in Greek literature, see Pl. Resp. 598a (LCL 276: 402–3); Cra. 434a–b (LCL 167: 168–69); Phlb. 
39d (LCL 164: 302–3). For reference to Plato on divine artistry or craft, see Pl. Soph. 265e (LCL 123: 448–
49) and Prm. 132d–e (LCL 167: 218–21). See also Jean Pépin, Théologie cosmique et théologie chrétienne 
(Ambroise, Exam. 1, 1-4) (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964), 20–21, 34–37. For a discussion of 
divine creation as a work of art, see Sen. Ep. 65.7–10 (LCL 75: 448–51).  
62 Didy. Com. Psal. 29–34 139,21–140,12, in Michael Gronewald, Didymos der Blinde: 
Psalmenkommentar (Tura-Papyrus), Papyrologische Texte und Abhandlungen, Bd. 3 (Bonn: R. Habelt, 
1968), 52–55. 
63 Didy. Com. Psal. 29–34 140, 2–4.  
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While Irenaeus mentions Isaiah 49:16 in Against Heresies 5.32.2, citation of the 
LXX of Isaiah 49:16 outside of Didymus is scant.64 Whether Ambrose is privvy to 
Didymus’ Commentary on the Psalms is debateable. Similarities are plain, specifically, as 
we will see, in the linking of divine painting and virtue. Ambrose translates 
ἐζωγράφησά into Latin as pinxi (from pingo, pingere) and its other forms (pingitur and 
picta, pictus est). Ambrose’s Latin translation is representative of what Gryson has 
termed “le texte européen” of the Vetus Latina.65 The contrast between Ambrose’s “le 
texte européen”—clearly inflected by the LXX—and the more typical Latin translation, 
“Behold, I have inscribed your walls on my hands and your walls are ever before my 
eyes” (ecce in manibus meis descripsi te muri tui coram oculis mei semper), is striking. 
There is no mention of the “hands” of God (i.e., “… on my hands”) or that God 
“remembers us” in any of Ambrose’s references to Isaiah 49:16—the verse instead 
designates the importance of being created in such a masterful way by God, and with that 
in mind, how the human agent should act.  
If the scholarly assumption holds that Ambrose is indebted to Basil’s hexameral 
homilies, then naming God as painter serves to distinguish his position from his Greek 
contemporary. When he discusses what it looks like for human beings, made according to 
the image of God, to pursue the likeness of God, Basil writes that God  
                                                
64 Iren. Haer. 5.35.2. Irenaeus references the verse alongside Galatians 4:26, a verse which cites 
Jerusalem as free and the mother of us all. De qua ait propheta Esaias: ecce in manibus meis depinxi muros 
tuos, et in conspectu meo es semper. Cyril of Alexandria mentions Isaiah 49:16 in his Commentarius in 
Isaiam prophetam 4.4.676 (PG 70: 1068). John Chrysostom references Isaiah 49:16 in his Homiliae in 
Ioannem 61 (PG 59: 338), typically dated to 391 CE (about five years after Ambrose’s Hexaemeron). For a 
later (late-fifth, early-sixth century) mention of the verse, see Procopius of Gaza, Commentarii in Isaiam 
561–62 (PG 87/2: 2476). 
65 Gryson cites Ambrose as evidence of “le texte européen” that offered “une révision plus 
profonde . . . qui a été plusieurs fois retouchée d’après diverses formes du texte grec” (Vetus Latina: Die 
Reste der altalateinischen Bibel, ed. Gryson, Band 12/1: 17). 
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let us be artisans (ἐργάτας) of the likeness to God, so that the pay for the work 
would be ours. Thus we would not be like images made by a painter 
(ζωγράφου), lying without purpose, lest our likeness should bring praise to 
another. For when you see an image (τὴν εἰκόνα) exactly shaped like the 
prototype (πρωτότυπον), you do not praise the image, but you marvel at the 
painter.66  
 
A painted image, to Basil’s mind, is static and lifeless, lacking the rational “power” 
(δύναμις) that in fact distinguishes human beings. The worry is that if God is the painter, 
then praise is due to God alone, not to the individual who knowingly assents to the good 
and avoids evil. But since, Basil opines, human beings who seek after godlikeness 
deserve reward and recognition for their pursuit, the works, while aided by grace, must be 
distinctly theirs.  
By Basil’s lights, conceiving of God as painter both undermines the agency of the 
individual and bypasses recognition of human excellence; for him, the very possibility of 
the virtues necessitates such a recognition. Basil’s distinction between image and likeness 
underlies his aversion to labeling God as painter and human beings as paintings. “For this 
[the pursuit of godlikeness] God gave power (δύναμιν),” Basil maintains. “If he created 
you also according to the likeness, what would be yours to give? . . . But now the one is 
given [i.e., image], the other is left incomplete (ἀτελὲς) [i.e., likeness]; that you may 
                                                
66 Basil, Ton anthropon geneseōs 1.16 (SC 160: 208). Emphasis added. For further reflection on 
Basil’s relationship to the text of Genesis and the formation of his sermons with his audience in mind, see 
Raymond Van Dam, Becoming Christian: The Conversion of Roman Cappadocia (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 2003), 105–31. Van Dam notes that the sermons were likely given over the course 
of a week, morning and evening, and possibly during Lent. As such, they evince a dialogical character: the 
homilies’ “delivery on consecutive days in rapid succession offers a unique opportunity to examine aspects 
of the dialogue between a preacher and his audience. . . . Basil learned from and reacted to the responses of 
his listeners. . . . Even as he listened to the audience, he was listening to himself” (at 109). A prime 
example of such listening can be seen in the difference between homily one’s philosophical invective and 
homily five’s immense practicality, driven by agricultural imagery. Van Dam, however, does not discuss 
the two homilies on humanity’s creation, and mentions in passing that they are “sometimes attributed to 
Basil” (210, n.1). For a survey of scholarly arguments over the authenticity of these two homilies, see the 
introduction by Smets and van Esbroeck in SC 160: 13–126; and Harrison’s introduction to Basil the Great, 
On The Human Condition, 14–18. The question of whether these homilies are from Basil himself arises 
from the rhetorical differences between Ton anthropon geneseōs and Basil’s first nine hexameral homilies. 
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perfect (τελειώσας) yourself, become worthy of the recompense by God.”67 Basil 
reiterates the nature of the image—the capacity to reason and rule over our passions—and 
emphasizes the educative role creation and scripture play in our attention to the soul and 
pursuit of godlikeness. 
 Though Ambrose maintains Basil’s distinguishing mark of the image by insisting 
on the soul’s capacity for reason and action—what he calls “liveliness for attention” (ab 
intuendi uiuacitate)68—Ambrose has no qualms about labeling God as painter and human 
beings as divine product.69 In fact, he explicitly glosses a version of Isaiah 49:16 that 
presents God as painter (and Jerusalem or the soul as masterpiece), rather than other, 
more common Latin translations which depict God as inscribing Jerusalem upon his 
hands.70 With this choice of version, the soul (and its “walls”), and not God’s own hands, 
becomes the canvas for divine agency: God decorates the soul with the works of God. 
Here, in rather artful terms, Ambrose describes what it means to be made in and maintain 
the image of God: it means having the soul “well painted” (bene picta) by God. A “well 
                                                
67 Basil, Ton anthropon geneseōs 1.17 (SC 160: 210). 
68 Ambr. Hex. 6.7.46 (CSEL 32/1: 237). 
69 Cf. McCool, “The Ambrosian Origin of St. Augustine’s Theology of the Image of God in Man,” 
66–68. McCool mentions Ambrose’s description of the painted image from Hex. 6.7.42, straightforwardly 
arguing that “the sermons of Ambrose did in fact propose a theology of the image and likeness of God in 
which Plotinus’ metaphysics had been adapted to the exigencies of the Christian Platonism of Alexandria. 
Augustine could have discovered it if he listened carefully to the instructions of Ambrose. . . . Its [Hex. 
6.7.42] dependence on Origen’s Homilies on Genesis is unconcealed. The divine image in the human soul 
is described in words taken from Origen’s thirteenth homily on Genesis (at 66–67).” In sum, Ambrose’s 
ultimate antecedent, for McCool, is Plotinus, Christianized in the Alexandrian tradition, of which Origen is 
preeminent.  
70 Cf. Aug. Ep. ad cath. 7.16 (CSEL 52/2: 249). Ecce super manus meas descripsi muros tuos, in 
conspectu etiam meo es in perpetuum et  breui aedificaberis ab his a quibus euersa es.  
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painted” soul allows the “semblance of divine operation” to shine through (elucet) and 
the glory of the “image of paternal substance” to take up residence.71  
 
“Drinking from Thy Own Oisterns”: Ambrose and the Dispossession of Virtue 
This understanding of God as the “painter” of the soul and the source of virtue is 
both argued and assumed throughout Ambrose’s corpus; it also undergirds his view on 
the Christian’s dispossession of virtue. By dispossession of virtue I mean that virtue is 
something given in grace and not simply a result of acquisition, gumption, or something 
in between. And since it is a grace, virtue is to be referred to its source: God. In On the 
Good of Death, Ambrose exhorts his listeners to “flee evil things and exalt the soul,” 
naming the “flight” (fuga) from evil as that which attains the virtues particular to the 
image and likeness of God. To take flight and eventually attain virtue aids in the 
restoration of the image that was lost by our first parents in the garden. And just before 
Ambrose again cites Isaiah 49:16, he notes that God has painted us “with the colors of the 
virtues” (quasi auctor pinxit uirtutum coloribus); we are thus to maintain, not neglect, the 
image by attending to our souls.72 There is more to say about this passage, but here, it 
suffices to say that God is the one who paints, even decorates, us with the colors of the 
virtues. 
                                                
71 Ambr. Hex. 6.7.42 (CSEL 32/1: 234). 
72 Ambr. Bon. mort. 5.17 (CSEL 32/1: 719). Fugiamus ergo haec mala et exaltemus animam 
nostram ad illam imaginem dei et similitudinem. Fuga malorum similitudo dei est et uirtutibus imago dei 
adquiritur. Ideo qui nos pinxit quasi auctor pinxit uirtutum coloribus: ‘ecce ego,’ inquit, ‘Hirerusalem, 
pinxi muros tuos’ (Is. 49:16). Non detergeamus pinicillo neglegentiae depicta animae nostrae firmamenta 
muralia. 
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On the Good of Death 5.17 depicts the medium of God’s painting differently than 
Hexaemeron 6.7.42. While in Hexaemeron 6.7.42 Ambrose describes the soul as painted 
with “a semblance of divine operation,” in On the Good of Death 5.17 the soul is painted 
with “the colors of the virtues.” This subtle difference forces us to wrestle with the 
distinction between “divine operation” and the “virtues.” On the surface, the difference is 
plain. Divine operation, as we explored in the last chapter, is the fruit of God’s (not our) 
creative power. But further, the Son’s works (opera) serve as pedagogical scripts, 
snapshots of divine intervention, that point beyond the works themselves. Seeing the 
works of the Son, for instance, grants the viewer insight into the nature of the Father and 
Son’s shared invisible power.  
The virtues, for Ambrose, are participatory and performative. This is the case for 
(at least) two reasons. First, human beings are created and are a step removed from the 
perfect and causal source of each virtue. Hence, every human expression of moral 
excellence is a participation in the proper form of that virtue. Second, east of Eden, the 
aligning of our mind, action, and affect is a complicated affair. We must learn to become 
virtuous by means of consistent imitation of laudable exemplars. Ambrose reiterates this 
challenge by reflecting early and often on the deception the flesh introduces into our 
moral pursuits. To remedy such challenges, Ambrose argues that virtue is better seen and 
imitated than theorized, foregrounding the importance of exemplars for his moral vision. 
We will say much more about how exemplars drive Ambrose’s moral vision, but here I 
simply want to flag the importance of seeing exemplars and recognizing their virtue for 
its acquisition and practice. 
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Ambrose’s understanding of the virtues follows a typically Stoic track with 
Platonic and Aristotelian elements built in, as well. The virtues are perfections of human 
dispositions embodied by those who exemplify steadiness of spirit. Ambrose will say that 
the virtuous have no need of external legal requirement; they simply know and do what is 
virtuous. This is not unlike the description of the Stoic sage, who, as Michael Frede puts 
it, “unshakably knows what the good is.”73 Many of the virtuous forebears of the faith 
that Ambrose names—Noah, Jacob, and Joseph74—come prior to the dissemination of the 
Mosaic Law, and this, he thinks, is no coincidence. For Ambrose, the saint 
is a law unto himself and has no need for summoning the law from afar, for he 
carries it enclosed in his heart, having the law written on the tablets of his heart, 
and it is said to him, “Drink water out of thy own vessels and from the stream of 
thy own well” (Prov. 5:15). What is so close to us as the word of God? This is the 
word on our heart and on our lips which we do not see and hold.75  
 
The truly wise are those who rely not on external demand for following the law, but 
simply are themselves their own laws, knowing and pursuing the good always and 
everywhere. These laws are not arbitrary, but are inscribed on creation and human nature. 
In willing that which is in accord with nature, the saint does “all things rightly . . . 
without offense, without blame, without loss and disturbance within himself.”76 To make 
                                                
73 Frede, A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought, 121. See Charlotte Stough, “Stoic 
Determinism and Moral Responsibility,” in The Stoics, ed. John Rist (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1978), 203–33, at 211. Stough writes that the early Stoics affirm “that virtue and vice are stable and 
relatively permanent dispositions to act morally or immorally. . . . For the Stoics identified moral 
dispositions with physical states of the soul, which they believed to be relatively constant.” 
74 Ambr. Ep. 7.7 (CSEL 82/1: 46). 
75 Ambr. Ep. 7.18 (CSEL 82/1: 51–52). iustus enim ‘ipse sib ilex est,’ non habens necesse longius 
sibi accersire formam uirtutis, quam corde inclusam gerat, ‘scriptum habens opus legis in tabulis cordis 
sui’ (cf. Rom. 2:15),  cui dictum sit: ‘Bibe aquam de tius uasis et de puteorum tuorum fontibus’ (Prov. 
5:15). Quid enim nobis tam proximum quam dei uerbum? Hoc est ‘uerbum in corde nostro et in ore nostro’ 
(Rom. 10:8), quod non uidemus et tenemus. 
76 Ambr. Ep. 7.19 (CSEL 82/1: 52–53). Qui autem bene facit omnia, recte facit omnia. Qui uero 
recte facit omnia, utique inoffense et inrepraehensibiliter et sine damno et commotione sui favit omnia. Cui 
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his case, Ambrose references two verses. The first is unsurprising: “the law is not made 
for the just but for the unjust” (1 Tim. 1:9).77 Those apart from the law, notably in the 
patriarchal history, can have true justice by following after divine laws given in nature.  
Tracking down Ambrose’s usage of the second verse, Proverbs 5:15—“Drink 
water out of thy own vessels and from the stream of thy own well”—might appear 
tangential, but examining his several uses grants insight into how he conceives of the 
nature of virtue, what that virtue might mean for the action of the saint, and how the 
description of such an action differs from its philosophical shades.78 While Ambrose’s 
adaption of this gloss likely comes from Origen’s Homilies on Genesis, it is, like Isaiah 
49:16, unique to the Latin Christian tradition until Ambrose.79 He refers to the verse eight 
times throughout his corpus to refer to some form of inner contemplation; three of those 
uses show forth a doctrine of the sufficiency of virtue.  
On the surface, Ambrose’s citation of Proverbs 5:15 appears to promote 
something of self-reliance. In fact, Augustine notes Pelagius’s affection for and use of 
                                                                                                                                            
igitur hoc subsit, ut inoffense faciat, faciat inrepraehensibiliter, faciat sine commotion sui, sine damno, 
nihil insipienter facit, sed sapienter omnia. Cf. Philo, Prob. 9.59–60 (LCL 363: 42–45).  
77 Most of Ambrose’s references to 1 Timothy 1:9 support his reasoning in Ep. 7. See e.g., Ambr. 
Off. 3.5.31 (CCSL 15: 173) and Psal. 36.69 (CSEL 64: 128); Psal. 118 16.18 (CSEL 62: 362). Cf. Luc. 
3.30 (CSEL 32/4: 120), where Ambrose interprets the verse as shedding light on the inclusion of non-Jews 
into the people of God (i.e., outsiders are those who need the law). See Maes, La Loi naturelle selon 
Ambroise de Milan, 151–83, where he discusses Ambrose's view of relationship of the law to the religious 
outsider. 
78 For Ambrose’s references to Prov. 5:15, see Iac. 1.7.29 (CSEL 32/2: 22–23), 2.4.17 (CSEL 
32/2: 42); Is. 4.22 (CSEL 32/1: 656), 4.24 (CSEL 32/1: 658), 5.39 (CSEL 32/1: 666); Psal. 37.11 (CSEL 
64: 144), 45.3 (CSEL 64: 331); Spir. 1.16.162 (CSEL 79: 83); Bon. mort. 5.20 (CSEL 32/1: 722); Ep. 7.18 
(CSEL 82/1: 52), Ep. 11.24 (CSEL 82/1: 92); hex. 3.12.49 (CSEL 32/1: 91–92); Off. 3.1.1 (SBL 95/2: 80); 
Parad. 3.13 (CSEL 32/1: 272); Tob. 5.21 (CSEL 32/2: 528). 
79 See Orig. Hom. Num. 12.1 (GCS 20: 95), where Origen associates Proverbs 5:15 with John 7:38, 
as Ambrose does in Hex. 3.12.49 below. See also Orig. Gen. Hom. 7.5 (SC 7: 206–7), 12.5 (SC 7: 306–7), 
13.4 (SC 7: 330–3).  
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Ambrose’s writings in his doctrine of free will and its relationship to divine grace.80 At 
first glance, it is not too much of a stretch to see an easy alliance between Pelagius and 
Ambrose on human perfection. Simply look within yourself and your own resources, 
Ambrose seems to say, and act accordingly. In one of his homilies on creation, for 
example, Ambrose’s call to self-sufficiency seems even more egregious: 
In yourself (in te ipso) lies the sweetness of your grace, from you (ex te) does it 
blossom, in you (in te) it remains, within you (intus tibi) it rests, you must search 
in yourself (in te ipso) for the pleasantness of your conscience (iocunditas tuae 
conscientiae). For that reason, it says: “Drink water out of your own (de tuis) 
cisterns and the streams of your own (de tuorum) wells” (Prov. 5:15).81  
 
It is impossible not to take note of the repeated and overt use of reflexive prepositional 
phrases—in te ipso, ex te, in te, intus tibi, de tuis, de tuorum. If we attend solely to these 
reflexives, it certainly appears plain that Ambrose is exhorting his audiences to look 
inside themselves for the strength to live and act well.82 Initially, this might well seem to 
                                                
80 Augustine’s references to Pelagius’s use of Ambrose are frequent and peppered throughout his 
writings. These, it can be deduced, represent something of a battle over authority, attempting to answer the 
question of who has a legitimate claim on Ambrose’s teachings, Pelagius or Augustine. See Aug. Nupt. 
1.35.40 (CSEL 42: 251–52), 2.5.15 (CSEL 42: 268), 2.29.51 (CSEL 42: 307–8); Pelag. 4.11.29–4.12.34 
(CSEL 60: 559–70); Iul. 1.30 (CSEL 85/1: 24); Grat. Chr. 43.47–50.55 (CSEL 42: 159–66). For secondary 
scholarship on Augustine’s use of tradition (Ambrose, in paricular) in distinction from his rivals, see 
Mathijs Lamberigts, “Augustine’s Use of Tradition in His Reaction to Julian of Aeclanum’s Ad 
Turbantium: Contra Iulianum I–II,” Augustinian Studies 41.1 (2010): 183–200, at 187–88; Gerald Bostock, 
“The Influence of Origen on Pelagius and Western Monasticism, ” in Origeniana Septima: Origenes in den 
Auseinandersetzungen des 4. Jahrhunderts, ed. W. A. Bienert and U. Kühneweg (Leuven: Peeters, 1999), 
381–96. For Augustine’s multiple references to, and favorable monikers for, Ambrose, see Barbara 
Beyenka, O.P., “The Names of St. Ambrose in the Works of St. Augustine,” Augustinian Studies 5 (1974): 
19–28. The association of Pelagius with other disputed figures was commonplace and typical of authors 
other than Augustine, as well. Jerome, for instance, associates Pelagius with Origen. Given Ambrose’s 
widely known borrowing from Origen, Jerome’s statement might also represent a skirmish over proper 
authority. See Hier. Ep. 133.3 (CSEL 56/1: 246–47); Adu. Pelag. 1.19 (CCSL 80: 24–25), 3.19 (CCSL 80: 
123–24). 
81 Ambr. Hex. 3.12.49 (CSEL 32/1: 91–92). 
82 Cf. Burns, “A Surprise for Simplician,” 7–27, at 12–16. Burns identifies an “ambivalence” 
which “betrays a hesitation between the demands of a confessional theology which attributes to God all 
glory for human success and the requirements of a theodicy, a defense of divine justice, which must assign 
a foundation in human free choices for every deviation of God’s part from disinterested liberality or even 
overwhelming generosity. Ambrose attempted to establish a middle ground by affirming that God’s 
graciousness precedes and exceeds the creature’s merits but that particular gifts are wisely and 
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be the case, but there is nuance if we examine still another instance of Ambrose’s 
exegesis of the verse. 
Ambrose’s On Paradise, dated early on in his career (ca. 375–78 CE), shows us 
this nuance in light of Proverbs 5:15: 
There was a fount which irrigated the land of Paradise. Is not this stream our Lord 
Jesus Christ, the Fount as well as the Father of eternal life? It is written: “For with 
you is the fountain of life” (Ps. 35:10). Hence, “From within him there shall flow 
living waters” (Jn. 7:3883). We read of a fountain and a river which irrigates the 
fruit-bearing tree of Paradise, the tree that bears fruit for life eternal. You have 
read, then, that a fount was there and that “a river rose in Eden” (cf. Gen. 2:10) 
that is, in your soul there exists a fount. This is the meaning of Solomon’s words: 
“Drink water out of thy own cisterns and the streams of thy own well” (Prov. 
5:15). This refers to the fount which rose out of that well-tilled soul, full of 
pleasant things, this fount which irrigates Paradise, that is to say, the soul’s virtues 
that sprout because of their eminent merit.84 
 
The passage is bookended by reference to the divine fount that irrigates paradise (fons qui 
inrigaret paradisum . . . fons qui inrigat paradisum); “Is not this stream our Lord Jesus 
Christ, the Fount as well as the Father of eternal life?,” Ambrose asks. Ambrose equates 
the soul with paradise, while Christ, the fount, waters that paradise and causes the virtues 
to spring up within it. “Thy own vessels/cisterns” or “thy own wells” to which Proverbs 
5:15 refers are not simply the individual’s faculties devoid of outside intervention, but the 
                                                                                                                                            
appropriately distributed” (14). This, of course, is another way of saying that Ambrose affirms the critical 
importance of divine authorship in the case of moral excellence and demands that individuals take 
responsibility for their action. 
83 For Ambrose’s other uses of John 7:38, see Hex. 3.1.6 (CSEL 32/1: 62); Psal. 39.22 (CSEL 64: 
228), 45.12 (CSEL 64: 337–38), 48.4 (CSEL 64: 363), 61.14 (CSEL 64: 386); Spir. 1.16.156 (CSEL 79: 
83). 
84 Ambr. Parad. 3.13 (CSEL 32/1: 272). Erat fons qui inrigaret paradisum. Qui fons nisi dominus 
Iesus Christus, fons uitae aeternae sicut pater? Quia scriptum est: ‘quoniam apud te fons uitae’ (Gen. 
2:10), denique: ‘flumina de uentre eius fluent aquae uiuae’ (Ps. 35:10a). Et fons legitur et fluuius legitur, 
qui inrigat paradisi lignum fructuosum, quo ferat fructum in uitam aeternam (Jn. 7:38). Hic ergo fons, 
sicut legisti—fons enim procedit inquit ex Edem, id est: in anima tua fons est, unde et Solomon ait: ‘bibe 
aquam de tuis uasis et de puteorum tuorum fontibus’ (Prov. 5:15)—hic est fons, qui procedit ex illa 
exercitata et plena uoluptatis anima, hic fons, qui inrigat paradisum, hoc est uirtutes animae eminentissimo 
merito pullulantas.  
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divine action in the soul, an action which causes virtue to flow in the soul. “This,” 
Ambrose says, “refers to that fount which rose out of that well-tilled soul, full of pleasant 
things.” 
This allegorical interpretation of Eden is derived from Philo, to whom Ambrose is 
indebted for large swaths of his exegesis.85 Philo understands the Garden as the soul, 
divinely attended; by God’s planting, the Garden brings forth “earthly excellence” 
(ἐπίγειον ἀρετήν).86 These earthly excellences are “copies” (μίμημα ἀπεικόνισμα) of 
their heavenly archetypes. That God plants the virtues within the soul, Philo thinks, 
obviates the possibility of the soul boasting of its excellence: “the mind that says ‘I plant’ 
is guilty of impiety,” he writes.87 Instead, the reference in Genesis 2 to both the general 
source of water and the four named rivers flowing out from it warrants discussing the 
implanted virtues in general (“generic virtue” (ἡ γενική ἀρετή) or “goodness” (ἡ 
ἀγαθότης)) and specific excellences in particular (prudence, self-mastery, courage, and 
justice).88  
                                                
85 Five of Ambrose’s works are typically labeled his “Philonic Treatises,” most dating to the first 
half of his episcopacy: Parad., Noe, Cain, Abr., and Fug. For Ambrose’s adoption of Philo on this passage, 
see Savon, Saint Ambroise devant l’exégése de Philon le Juif, 215–41. Savon notes Ambrose’s reference to 
Psalm 35:10 at 220–23. On Ambrose and Philo more generally, see also Enzo Lucchesi, L’usage de Philon 
dans l’oeuvre exegetique de Saint Ambroise: Une “Quellenforschung” relative aux commentaires 
d’Ambroise sur la Genèse (Leiden: Brill, 1977); David T. Runia, Philo in Early Christian Literature: A 
Survey (Assen: Uitgeverij Van Gorcum, 1993), 291–311. Runia notes an ongoing “debate” as to the nature 
of Ambrose’s adoption of Philonic material, with Savon and Lucchesi on either side. In broadest strokes, 
Savon argues that Ambrose reshapes and reworks Philo; Lucchesi contends Ambrose is more of a textual 
historian, cutting-and-pasting portions of Philo’s texts. See Joseph Paramelle and Enzo Lucchesi, Philon 
d’Alexandrie Questions sur la Genèse II, 1-7: Texte grec, version arménienne, parallèles latins, Cahiers 
d’orientalisme 3 (Genève: P. Cramer, 1984), 75ff. 
86 Philo, Leg. 1.14 (LCL 226: 174–75). See Thomas H. Tobin, S.J., The Creation of Man: Philo 
and the History of Interpretation (Washington D.C.: Catholic Biblical Association of America, 1983), 135–
76; Runia, Philo in Early Christian Literature, 292. 
87 Philo, Leg. 1.15 (LCL 226: 176–77). 
88 Cf. Philo, Leg. 1.14–24 (LCL 226: 174–97). Philo glosses all of those particular things planted 
in the Garden of Eden as pertaining to the variety of the virtues planted in the soul. “By these rivers 
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In On Paradise 3.13, Ambrose connects Philo’s interpretation with Proverbs 5:15 
to show that attending to the soul implicates divine action and distinguishes God as 
creator and human beings as created. So, Ambrose’s exhortation to “look within” or 
“drink from thy own cisterns” is not straightforward counsel for earthly gumption. 
Rather, it is an exhortation to recall one’s created nature—to recall that God has graced 
us with every good and perfect gift, including the seeds (or “colors”) of moral excellence. 
Taking time and space to explicate Proverbs 5:15 and the role the saint plays in 
determining virtue helps explain God as the granter of such virtue. The conclusion is 
indeed similar to that of understanding God as painter of the soul: those who best embody 
and bear the image of God owe to God the relative success of their moral status. The 
virtues, while manifested in saintly lives and actions, point ultimately to one who has 
painted the soul with the manifold colors of moral excellence. While such a conclusion 
might frustrate Basil, Ambrose has no issue with it—God is the source and giver of all 
virtue. What makes the saint so saintly, in fact, is her humble devotion to God and the 
dispossession of the very virtues that her fellows laud and opponents chastise. She is the 
one who allows divine grace to shine through.89 
                                                                                                                                            
[Moses’] purpose is to indicate the particular virtues. These are four in number, prudence, self-mastery, 
courage, justice. The largest river, of which the four are effluxes, is generic virtue, which we have called 
‘goodness.’ The four effluxes are the virtues of the same number. Generic virtue takes its start from Eden, 
the wisdom of God, which is full of joy, and brightness, and exultation, glorying and priding itself only 
upon God its Father; but the specific virtues, four in number, are derived from generic virtue, which like a 
river waters the perfect achievements of each of them with an abundant flow of noble doings. Let us look 
too at the particular words used. ‘A river,’ it says ‘issues forth from Eden to water the garden.’ ‘River’ is 
generic virtue, goodness. This issues forth out of Eden, the wisdom of God, and this is the Reason of God; 
for after that has generic virtue been made. And generic virtue waters the garden, that is, it waters the 
particular virtues.” 
89 See Rowan Williams, “The Holy Body in Hagiography,” in Portraits of Spiritual Authority: 
Religious Power in Early Christianity, Byzantium and the Christian Orient, ed. Jan Willem Drijvers and 
John W. Watt (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 63–78, at 75–76. While dealing with different authors—particularly 
Greek and Syriac—Williams points to a similar dynamic in fourth-and-fifth-century authors. “The holy 
body becomes significant because it is empty, passive, and subject to alien will” (at 76). 
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Images, Divine or Otherwise  
For Ambrose, as for Origen, the description of God as painter and of human 
beings as paintings, is not only a matter of fact, but also necessitates moral action. We 
have begun to explore how Ambrose discerns these moral implications of being painted: 
“attending” to the soul is a therapeutic process of recognizing God’s gifting of moral 
excellence. For this picture of the examined life, Ambrose quotes Isaiah 49:16, the use 
and explication of which, as we indicated, is novel to the Latin tradition. There is yet 
another aspect of Origen’s image theology that informs what I will call, Ambrose’s 
“doctrine of rival images.” The broad strokes of the doctrine go like this. Human beings 
are created according to the image of God, which necessarily entails bearing a divine or 
heavenly image.90 East of Eden, the lure and pull of vice is so strong, we are tempted 
instead to bear an earthly image. Origen explicates the doctrine by linking Genesis 1:26–
27 and 1 Corinthians 15:49; the link connects the “putting on” of image the heavenly 
Adam rather than its dusty, earthbound counterpart with living in accord with humanity’s 
initial createdness in the image of God.  
                                                
90 See Patricia Cox Miller, “Visceral Seeing: The Holy Body in Late Ancient Christianity,” JECS 
12.4 (2004): 391–411. My discussion of the doctrine of rival images is arguably paralleled by what Cox 
Miller has coined, “visceral seeing,” which she defines as “not only the viewer’s response to images of the 
body but also the particular kind of image that is capable of provoking such a response” (at 396). She 
continues: “[V]isceral seeing refers to corporeal responses to word-pictures of the body, responses that 
implicate the reader in such a way that the boundary between text and reader begins to weaken” (at 396). 
Miller owes the phrase “visceral seeing” and the conceptuality behind it to James Elkins, Pictures of the 
Body: Pain and Metamorphosis (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999). While not addressing the texts 
or doctrine of rival images directly, Gerald Boersma’s notes on Ambrose’s use of participation language is 
conceptually related to this doctrine. See his “Participation in Christ,” 175–76: “Participatio is employed 
by Ambrose to express various ways of ‘sharing in’ something or someone: do not participate in 
wickedness, Ambrose urges his flock; rather participate in Christ in whom God is well pleased” (175). 
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Ambrose grafts Origen’s doctrine of rival images into his image theology and 
commends it to his audiences for the moral struggle sure to ensue. Before he sinned, 
Ambrose maintains, Adam conformed to the heavenly image, refracting the glory initially 
given him. When he sinned, however, Adam “deposited” the image of the heavenly one 
(deposuit imaginem caelestis) and “assumed” that of the earthly one (sumpsit terrestris 
effigiem).91 This theme of rival images, just as in Origen, is buttressed by exegesis of 1 
Corinthians 15:49, and recurs throughout Ambrose’s works.92 
In his Exposition of the Gospel of Luke Ambrose interprets the passage “render 
unto Caesar” in light of the doctrine of rival images.93 By focusing on Luke 20:24, where 
Jesus asks, “Whose image and inscription [is on the coin]?,” Ambrose maintains:  
Questioned concerning the drachma, Jesus asks concerning the image, for there is 
one Image of God, another image of the world. Therefore, he [the apostle Paul], 
also admonishes us, “As we have borne the image of the earthly one, let us bear 
also the image of the heavenly one (1 Cor. 15:49). Christ does not have the image 
of Caesar, because “he is the Image of God” (Col. 1:15). Peter does not have the 
image of Caesar, because he said, “We have left all things, and followed you” 
(Mt. 19:27; Mk. 10:28). The image of Caesar is not found in James and John, 
because they are “the Sons of Thunder” (Mk. 3:17).94 
 
                                                
91 Ambr. Hex. 6.7.42. For other references to 1 Corinthians 15:49 in Ambrose’s works, see Fid. 
5.14.175 (CSEL 78: 280); Psal. 38.26 (CSEL 64: 204); Iob 3.8.24 (CSEL 32/2: 261–62); Ep. 29.7 (CSEL 
82/1: 198–99); and De patriarchis 8.35 (CSEL 32/2: 145), where Ambrose references the image of Caesar 
on the coin from Mt. 22:17–21. 
92 Cf. Viktor Hahn, Das wahre Gesetz: Eine Untersuchung der Auffassung des Ambrosius von 
Mailand vom Verhältnis der beiden Testamente (Mu ̈nster: Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 
1969). Hahn argues that Ambrose is so absorbed in the Pauline thought world that he adapts Pauline tropes, 
often without acknowledging their presence or rootedness in the New Testament. 
93 Recall too that Ambrose glosses this passage to support his image theology in the context of his 
trinitarian polemic. See Ambr. Ep. 75a.31 (CSEL 82/3: 103). 
94 Ambr. Luc. 9.34–5 (CSEL 32/4: 451–52). Postulatus didragma quaerit de imagine; alia enim 
imago dei, alia imago mundi. Unde et ille nos admonet: “sicut portauimus imaginem terreni illius, 
portemus et imaginem huius caelestis.” Imaginem Caesaris non habet Christus, quia imago est dei. 
imaginem Caesaris non habet Petrus. Quia dicit: “reliquimus omnia et secuti sumus te.” imago  Caesaris 
non repperitur in Iacobo uel Iohanne, quia filii tonitrui.  
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Ambrose’s interpretation here plainly follows Origen’s, attaching the image to the 
imprint on the coin, explaining it by 1 Corinthians 15:49.95 It is also clear that when 
Ambrose begins to explain Jesus’ exhortation to his questioners to attend to the image on 
the coin, he has Pauline texts generally and 1 Corinthians 15:49 and Colossians 1:15 
particularly in mind. Just after Ambrose writes that “Jesus asks concerning the image, for 
there is one Image of God, and another image of the world,” a generic third-person verb 
is used “therefore, he admonishes us” (admonet). There is no titular indication that Paul 
or “the Apostle” is the one referenced, simply, “therefore, he admonishes also us.” Here 
too we see that the archetypal images are different from Hexaemeron 6.7.42: the Image of 
God is Christ, while the image of the world or earthly image is Caesar. The force of the 
doctrine and its hortatory purposes nevertheless remains the same. The goal is to throw 
off earthly images and to seek after and attain that of the heavenly one, who is the true 
Image of God, Christ. 
Ambrose’s On Duties offers an even fuller and more developed example of the 
doctrine at work. Ambrose counsels his listeners to  
                                                
95 See Orig. Hom. Luc. 39.5–6 (SC 87: 454–56). “There are two images in man. [One he received 
from God when he was made, in the beginning, as Scripture says in the book of Genesis, ‘according (iuxta) 
to the image and likeness of God.’ The other image is earthly.] Man received this second image later. He 
was expelled from paradise on account of disobedience and sin, after the ‘prince of this world’ (principis 
saeculi huius) had tempted him with his enticements. [For, just as the coin, or denarius, has an image of the 
emperor of this world, so he who does the works of ‘the ruler of the darkness’ bears the image of him 
whose works he does. Jesus commanded that image to be handed over and cast away from his face. He 
wills us to take on that image according to which we were made from the beginning, according to God’s 
likeness.] And thus it happens that we give ‘to Caesar what belongs to Caesar, and to God what is God’s.’ 
Jesus said, ‘show me a coin.’ For ‘coin,’ Matthew wrote denarius.’ When Jesus had taken it, he said,’ 
Whose inscription does it have?’ they answered and said, ‘Caesar’s.’ And he said to them in turn, ‘Give to 
Caesar what is Caesar’s, and to God what is God’s.’ [Paul also uttered this conclusion and said, ‘As we 
bear the image of the earthly man, we should also bear the image of the heavenly man.’ When Christ says, 
‘Give to Caesar what is Caesar’s,’] he means this: ‘Put off the person of the earthly man, cast off the 
earthly image, so that you can put on yourselves the person of the heavenly and give ‘to God what is 
God’s.’”  
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preserve the image, so that we attain to the truth that awaits us there. Let the 
image of justice be in us, and let the image of wisdom be in us, for that day will 
come, and we shall be assessed according to that image. Do not allow the enemy 
to find his image in you, or his rage or his fury, for these are the image of 
wickedness. Your enemy the devil goes about like a roaring lion, looking for 
someone to destroy, someone to devour.96 
 
Here we see that, distinct from his explication in Hexaemeron 6.7.42, Ambrose portrays a 
wider range of heavenly and earthly images. The heavenly Image is explained in terms of 
the virtues, justice and wisdom in particular, whereas the earthly image is associated with 
the devil and the vicious habits of rage and fury, affective signposts on the way to 
wickedness. For Ambrose, bearing and maintaining an image has direct relevance to the 
attainment of greater truth or falsehood, and that greater truth or falsehood is what 
determines the given image. Hence, images of wisdom or justice are both determined by, 
and give provisional insight into, paradigmatic wisdom or justice.97  
                                                
96 Ambr. Off. 1.49.240–1.49.241 (CCSL 15: 88–89; trans. adapted from Davidson, 255–57): Ergo 
dum hic sumus, seruemus imaginem, ut ibi perueniamus ad ueritatem. Sit in nobis imago iustitiae, sit imago 
sapientiae, quia uenietur ad illum diem et secundum imaginem aestimabimur. Non inueniat in te 
aduersarius imaginem suam, non rabiem, non furorem: in his enim imago nequitiae est. Aduersarius enim 
diabolus sicut leo rugiens quaerit quem occidat, quem deuoret. The similarity among Origen’s doctrine of 
rival images (e.g., Hom. Psal. 38.2.2 (SC 411: 374)) cited above, this passage, and Psal. 118 20.34 (CSEL 
62: 505) is striking: Fulget in te imago iustitiae, imago sapientiae, imago uirtutis. Et quia imago dei in 
corde est tuo, sit et in operibus tuis, sit effigies euangelii in tuis factis, ut in tuis moribus mea praecepta 
custodias. (“Let the image of justice, wisdom and power shine in you. And because the image of God is in 
your heart, may it also be in your works; let the portrait of the Gospel be in your deeds, so that you keep my 
precepts in all your ways.”)  
97 Origen’s imprint is plain: the image of something is momentary, a purgative prop prior to 
encountering the thing itself. Here too we come to a crossroads and must pose a question: how compatible 
is Ambrose’s injunction to “attend to” creation and its norms with his charge to attain an image of 
something? The former option, as we indicated, smacks of Stoic consideration of nature and the norms that 
dictate it: considering a thing’s nature points to norms, especially moral norms, by which that thing should 
act. To attain an image of something admits a (Platonic) provisional component operative in our existence: 
our days are shaded by sin and circumstance, and so the best we can hope for is a temporal sort of 
perfection. Ambrose is content to hold both of these together; he has no issue adhering to fixed norms in 
nature and confessing to the eventual inability of the human agent prior to seeing God face-to-face. This 
apparent blind spot might be a simple contradiction, a by-product of Ambrose’s muddling of sources like 
Basil, Origen, Philo, and Cicero. 
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There will come a day, Ambrose writes, when each will be assessed according to 
how his or her image(s) of virtue or of God were maintained. Divine judgment will be 
meted out based on the extent to which an image is “displayed,” according to Davidson’s 
translation. Such a translation emphasizes the importance of an image’s visibility to the 
pursuit of moral excellence. While this might lead us to conclude that the image can 
roughly be identified with its physical appearance and activity, this is not the case 
entirely the case here. There is no verb “display” in the Latin; Ambrose’s economic prose 
is striking: “we will be assessed according to the image” (secundum imaginem 
aestimabimur).98 It is clear Ambrose has some sort of physical manifestation of an image 
in mind; his repeated claims to bodily comportment in On Duties give this away. 
But to see Ambrose’s subtlety in On Duties 1.49.240–41, let us reconsider the 
first part of our original quotation from Hexaemeron 6.7.42, where Ambrose locates the 
essence of the individual in her being divinely gifted with a soul and mind:  
One thing is what we are, another is what things are ours, and another is that 
which surrounds us. What we are, that is a soul and mind; what things are ours, 
that is the members of our bodies and our senses; that which surrounds us, that is 
our money, servants, and provision of this life. Therefore, attend to yourself, and 
know yourself, that is, not what sort of muscular arms you have, nor how much 
bodily strength or how many possessions or however much power you have, but 
attend to what kind of soul and mind you have, whence all your plans originate 
and to which the fruit of your work is referred.99 
 
Ambrose is careful to distinguish between what human beings are, what they possess, and 
what surrounds them. What humans truly “are” (sumus) is something invisible: a soul and 
                                                
98 Ambr. Off. 1.49.240 (CCSL 15: 88). 
99 Ambr. Hex. 6.7.42 (CSEL 32/1: 233–34). Aliud enim sumus nos, aliud sunt nostra, alia quae 
circa nos sunt. nos sumus, hos est anima et mens, nostra sunt corporis membra et sensus eius, circa nos 
autem pecunia est, serui sunt et uitae istius adparatus. Tibi igitur adtende, te ipsum scito, hoc est non 
quales lacertos habeas, non quantam corporis fortudinem, non quantas possessiones, quantam potentiam, 
sed qualem animam ac mentem, unde omnia consilia proficiscuntur, ad quam operum tuorum fructus 
refertur. 
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mind (anima ac mens), not the things they happen to have. The image resides in the soul 
and is the signal distinction of the human being. To know and attend to oneself and that 
image is not to consider “what sort of muscular arms you have, . . . how much bodily 
strength or how many possessions or however much power you have,” but to ruminate on 
the state and quality of the soul.  
A few sections later at Hexaemeron 6.8.45 Ambrose explicitly refuses to equate 
the body with the image, because, unlike the soul, it cannot speculate on all things.100 The 
body is stationary, unable to imagine other possibilities, whereas the soul (anima) (and 
Ambrose uses mens, as well101) “sees absent things and surveys in its vision faraway 
lands.” “In a moment” (illuc uno momento), Ambrose contends, “the seemingly remotest 
places are imagined and understood.”102 It is rather the power of the mind that “adheres to 
Christ” (Christo adhaeret) and by which “God is attained” (deo iungitur).103 The body 
cannot encapsulate the intricate nature of the human person; an invisible motivating 
capacity or principle, the soul, always informs the body. At its best, and under grace’s 
                                                
100 Ambr. Hex. 6.8.45 (CSEL 32/1: 235–36). non ergo caro potest esse ad imaginem dei, sed 
anima nostra, quae libera est et diffusis cogitationibus atque consiliis huc atque illud uagatur, quae 
considerando spectat omnia. 
101 While presumably there is a distinction between anima and mens, Ambrose does not here 
distinguish. A similar haziness is obvious in his Ex. uirg. 10.68 (PL 16: 356), where Ambrose asks, “In 
what therefore do we consist? In substance of soul and vigor of mind (in animae substantia et mentis 
uigore). . . . Therefore we are not flesh (caro), but spirit (spiritus).” Here again, Ambrose blurs the lines 
between soul and mind and spirit, and the three words appear to function as synonyms for “something 
invisible that we are.” Ambrose once again goes on to reference Deuteronomy’s injunction to attende tibi 
and, yet again, Isaiah 49:16 with respect to being formed in the image and likeness of God: “Accept how 
great an image from Christ, that you were made according to his likeness. Preserve that image, how Christ 
painted in you his works, therefore he says to Jerusalem, that is, to the peaceful soul, ‘Behold Jerusalem, I 
have painted thy walls.’” 
102 Ambr. Hex. 6.8.45 (CSEL 32/1: 235–36). 
103 Ambr. Hex. 6.8.45 (CSEL 32/1: 235–36). 
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auspices, the body and soul are in harmonious union.104 The dynamic of the invisible 
nature of the image and its accompanying motivations and the necessity for its visibility 
expressed in virtuous action will occupy much of what follows.  
The dynamic between body and soul can be presented similarly—although not 
identically—to the relationship between the visible Son and the invisible Father. Just as 
Ambrose repeatedly emphasizes the role visible works play in understanding the Son 
(and by extension, the Father), Ambrose refuses to describe the union of the persons as 
somehow physical; their unity is always invisible. Similarly, while Ambrose impresses 
the importance of displaying virtuous images, the soul is the invisible defining mark of 
the individual, impressed with the “holy seal of imitation” (in hac pium diuinae 
imitationis insigne). The body, on the other hand, subject to sin and decay, bears 
similarity to the animals (corpus autem ad speciem bestiarum).105 Without the rational 
soul—Ambrose calls it “our whole” (in hac totus es)—human beings are bestial.106  
The soul, not the body, Ambrose argues, is therefore made according to the image 
of God, which is to conform to the true Image that is the second person (conformis 
                                                
104 Ambrose will describe this union in several ways, the most compelling and evocative I think is 
that of the soul playing the body as an instrument. See Bon. mort. 7.27 (CSEL 32/1: 727–28). “The soul, 
playing in moderation on the body as if on a musical stringed instrument, strikes the passions of the flesh as 
if they were notes on the strings, but with its fingertips, so to speak. Thus it produces music in euphonious 
accord with a virtuous way of life, and in all its thoughts and works sees to it that its counsels harmonize 
with its deeds.” For further description of this union in Ambrose’s theology, see Smith, Christian Grace 
and Pagan Virtue, 29–33. 
105 Ambr. Hex. 6.7.43 (CSEL 32/1: 234). 
106 Hex. 6.7.43 (CSEL 32/1: 234). For an extended reflection on Ambrose’s understanding of the 
soul as the “essence” of the human being, see Smith, Christian Grace and Pagan Virtue, 19–20; Boersma, 
“Participation in Christ,” 177–81. See also Holte, Béatitude et sagesse, 168, which argues that the 
conception of the individual as incorporeal is supported both by the Hebrew Scriptures and Platonic 
thought.  
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domini Iesu) by bearing images proper to that person.107 Ambrose presses the point 
further in Hexaemeron 6.7.47 by connecting humanity’s pursuit of holiness to the mind 
or soul rather than the body. Ambrose then again alludes to Isaiah 49:16: “Therefore, 
man, you have been painted by the Lord God, your painter. You are fortunate to have a 
painter of extravagance. Do not erase that painting, one that is bright not with rouge but 
with truth (non fuco sed ueritatem fulgentem), not expressed in wax but in grace (non 
cera expressam sed gratia).”108 Without mentioning rival images, the content of 
Ambrose’s distinction hinges on physical appearance and how that appearance implies a 
true or false disposition. Continuing this line, he adamantly rejects women’s use of 
makeup. 
You erase that picture, woman, if you smear your face with that material 
whiteness or if you apply an artificial rouge. That is a picture of vice, not of 
beauty; that is a picture of fraud, not of simplicity. It is a temporal picture—
cleaned off by sweat or by rain. That picture deceives and cheats: so that neither 
do you please the one you desire to please, who realizes it is not you, but an alien 
thing that is pleasing. You also displease your Author, who sees His own work 
erased.109  
 
Chapter Five will unpack Ambrose’s textured understanding of simplicity, noted here as 
fraud’s foil. Suffice it here to say that, for Ambrose, the use of makeup illustrates the 
physical habit of covering oneself with artificiality and is symptomatic of the human 
                                                
107 Hex. 6.8.46 (CSEL 32/1: 237). 
108 Hex. 6.8.47 (CSEL 32/1: 238). See also Ambr. Is. 4.24 (CSEL 32/1: 658), where he speaks of 
not allowing the image to be smeared with the rouge. 
 
109 Ambr. Hex. 6.8.47 (CSEL 32/1: 238). Deles picturam, mulier, si uultum tuum materiali 
candore oblinas, si adquisito rubore perfundas. Illa pictura vitii, non decoris est, illa pictura fraudis, non 
simplicitatis est, illa pictura temporalis est— aut pluuia aut sudore tergetur—illa pictura fallit et decipit, ut 
neque illi placeas cui placere desideras, qui intellegit non tuum, sed alienum esse quod placeat, et tuo 
displiceas auctori, qui uidet opus suum esse deletum. 
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propensity to craft inferior self-images as an amateur painter (nouis) would.110 Following 
this propensity, Ambrose maintains, is a serious offence, one he warns vehemently 
against: “Don’t remove the picture of God and assume a picture of a whore!”111 
The challenge, of course, is not simply to present oneself as moderate, but for that 
moderation to be deeply rooted in the soul—a moral ideal easier stated than 
accomplished. This side of heaven, the human heart is too easily beguiled. Ambrose’s 
remedy, in part, is to “look around” (omnia ergo circum inspice), to be aware of the 
world’s “noxious and fraudulent plots” (noxia et fraudulenta consilia),112 and fend off 
those plots by means of recalling our inner “greatness” (quantus).113 This greatness, 
Ambrose reiterates, is due to the fact that God has painted the soul’s walls. By attending 
to the “walls,” individuals become increasingly aware of the ways in which the 
allurements and snares of the world entice and ensnare.114 Ambrose offers scriptural 
warrant for such reflection: “I am a city fortified, a city besieged” (Isaiah 27:3, LXX); 
                                                
110 Cf. R. Howard Bloch, Medieval Misogyny and the Invention of Western Romantic Love 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 43–45. Bloch cites Ambrose’s homily in general and the 
passage against makeup in particular, noting that Ambrose’s driving motivation is different than 
Tertullian’s, which he goes on to describe. For Bloch, Ambrose is mostly concerned with deception and its 
moral effects, whereas Tertullian, in his treatise Cult. fem., is primarily concerned with sexual ethics. 
Ambrose’s and Tertullian’s differing anxieties aside, Bloch fails to reference Ambrose’s discussion on the 
image of God (or the fact that God paints the soul with the diverse colors of virtue). The argument here—
that artificiality is to be shunned—parallels Ambrose’s argument against unnatural speech and 
philosophical dialectic, explored in detailed in Chapter Four. Tertullian will figure in this discussion in 
other ways in later chapters. 
111 Hex. 6.8.47 (CSEL 32/1: 238). 
112 Hex. 6.8.48 (CSEL 32/1: 239). 
113 Hex. 6.8.50 (CSEL 32/1: 241). See Goulven Madec, “L’homme intérieur selon saint 
Ambroise,” in Yves-Marie Duval, ed. Ambroise de Milan: XVIe centenaire de son élection épiscopale  
(Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1974), 283–308. Madec cites the passage from Hex. 6.8.49ff.  
114 Ambr. Hex 6.8.49 (CSEL 32/1: 240–41). See also Ambr. Ep. 36.11 (CSEL 82/1: 8–9). “Woe to 
him who has a fortune amassed by deceit, and builds in blood a city, in other words, his soul. For it is this 
[the soul] which is built like a city. Greed does not build it, but sets it on fire and burns it. Do you wish to 
build your city well?” 
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and “I am a wall and my breasts are towers” (Song of Songs 8:10). For Ambrose, these 
verses manifest God’s sure defense of, and provision for, the church. The second of these 
(Song of Songs 8:10) represents the steadfastness of the Church (“walls”) and the 
oversight of its priests (“towers”) in teaching truths both sacred and secular.115  
Ambrose’s two working distinctions—“rouge” (fucus) versus “truth” (ueritas) and 
“wax” (cera) versus “grace” (gratia)— serve him to distinguish marred images from their 
pristine counterparts. Fucus was a relatively inexpensive red or purple dye created from 
rock lichen and frequently used as cover up.116 Its metaphorical sense, owing primarily in 
Cicero, implies deceit or pretense.117 Quintilian too warns against decadent style 
precipitated purely by popularity and renown using fucus: “all this [flourish] fades into 
nothingness by comparison with better things, just as ‘wool with orchella dyed’ (lana 
tinta fuco) seems fine if there is no purple in sight, but ‘if you put it near Laconian dyes,’ 
                                                
115 Ambr. Hex 6.8.49 (CSEL 32/1: 240–41). For other references to Isaiah 27:3, see Bon. mort. 
5.17 (CSEL 32/1: 719); Is. 5.39 (CSEL 32/1: 665); Psal. 118 22.37 (CSEL 62: 506). For other references to 
Song of Songs 8:10, see Bon. mort. 5.18 (CSEL 32/1: 719); Psal. 118 22.39 (CSEL 62: 507); Virgin. 1.8.49 
(PL 16: 102). Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Commentarius in Canticum canticorum 9. Gregory’s homily deals 
with Song of Songs 4:10–15. In glossing “my bride is an enclosed garden,” he writes: “So, then, the person 
who has become a garden with trees like these, flourishing and fully planted and protected on every side by 
the fence of the commandments, so that there is no entry afforded to the thief or to wild beasts . . . if then I 
say someone is both a garden and a garden that is protected, that person becomes sister and bride of the 
One who says to such a soul: ‘My sister bride is an enclosed garden.’”  
116 Arist. Hist. an. 6.13, 17 (LCL 438: 272–7, 290–91); Plin. HN 13.48 (LCL 370: 178–79), 26.66 
(LCL 393: 323–24); Xen. Oec. 10 (LCL 478: 474–81). 
117 See especially Cic. De or. 3.25 (LCL 349: 80–81), 3.52 (LCL 349: 158–59); Brut. 44.162 (LCL 
342: 138–40). See also Quint. Inst. 2.15 (LCL 124: 362–63), 8.3 (LCL 126: 342–43), 12.10 (LCL 494: 
120–21); Sen. Consl. hel. 5.56–57 (LCL 254: 426–29); Gell. NA 6.14 (LCL 200: 62–63); Ov. Tr. 1.5 (LCL 
151: 2–3). There is ample secondary literature on the “gendering” of women with reference to the 
prohibition of cosmetics. Representative examples include Kelly Olson, “Cosmetics in Roman Antiquity: 
Substance, Remedy, Poison,” Classical World 102.3 (2009): 291–310; Maria Wyke, The Roman Mistress: 
Ancient and Modern Representations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 115–54; Amy Richlin, 
“Making up a Woman: The Face of Roman Gender,” in Howard Eilberg-Schwartz and Wendy Doniger, 
eds., Off with Her Head!: The Denial of Women’s Identity in Myth, Religion, and Culture (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1995), 185–213; Marguerite Johnson, Ovid on Cosmetics: ‘Medicamina 
Faciei Femineae’ and Related Texts (London; New York: Bloomsbury, 2016). 
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as Ovid says, ‘the sight of better things eclipses it.’”118 The earliest Christian resonances, 
as we will see in the next chapter, are found in Tertullian.119 “Truth” (ueritas) contrasts 
with fucus. Elsewhere, and as we will note in the next chapter, Ambrose will use ueritas 
as that which is contrary to a fleeting image.120 Veritas indicates a certain unadorned 
stability, differing from the convoluted presentations of the world.  
It is unclear exactly what Ambrose intends with the second distinction, an image 
“not expressed in wax but in grace (non cera expressam sed gratia).”121 Based on his role 
as exegete in a Roman context, there are at least three possibilities. First, Ambrose could 
be making passing reference to biblical passages which depict creation’s fragility before 
God.122 Given Ambrose’s wide-ranging use of scripture in general and the Psalms in 
particular, this is certainly a possibility. Secondly, given the context of a gloss on the 
Painter and the painting, we could easily understand Ambrose as simply using an 
                                                
118 Quint. Inst. 12.10.73–76 (LCL 494: 320–23). See A. E. Housman, “Fragmenta Poetarum,” The 
Classical Review 49.5 (1935): 166–68, at 167. 
119 Johannes Quasten, ed., Patrology, Vol. 2: The Ante-Nicene Literature After Irenaeus 
(Westminster, Md.: Christian Classics, 1983), 246–47. “When Christ founded the new religion He did it in 
order to lead mankind in agnitionem ueritatis (Apology 21,30). The Christian God is the Deus uerus; those 
who find Him find the fullness of truth. Veritas is what the demons hate, what the pagans reject, and what 
the Christians suffers and dies for. Veritas separates the Christian from the pagan. In all these statements 
there is deep religious feeling, and an ardent longing for honesty.” For the only instance of fucus in 
Tertullian’s corpus, see his De cultu feminarum 1.2.1. See Tert. Herm. 1, 2, 33, 36, 45 (CSEL 47: 126–28, 
162–66, 174–76). Tertullian refers to Hermogenes as a painter who paints his own portrait. Most have 
taken this to simply mean that Hermogenes was a painter by trade, possibly even of icons in Carthage. 
Tertullian could well have a figural use or an ulterior motive in mind. For more on Tertullian’s depiction of 
his opponents, see Jean-Claude Fredouille, Tertullien et la conversion de la culture antique (Paris: Études 
augustiniennes, 1972), 38–49. See also Lact. Inst. 2.18, 5.1, 6.21. Lactantius carries through the distinction 
between pretense and truth, occasionally using fucus and its cognates. Other Christian usages are relatively 
rare. Exceptions include: Prud. Ham. Prologue 274 (LCL 387: 222–23); Aug. Ep. 56.1–2 (LCL 239: 480–
81). 
120 See, e.g., Ambr. Fug. 4.22 (CSEL 32/2: 182). Non enim erat apud eum imago, sed ueritas, non 
effigies ignauiae, sed solida forma iustitiae et uiuae uirtutis expressio intellegibilis. 
121 Ambr. Hex. 6.8.47 (CSEL 32/1: 238). See also Ambr. Is. (CSEL 32/1: 658), where he speaks of 
not allowing the image to be “smeared with the world’s rouge.” 
 
122 E.g., Psalms 22:14; 68:2; 97:5.  
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artisanal example to expand his driving metaphor. Earlier, in a homily on the second day 
of creation, Ambrose contrasts human artists with their divine paradigm:  
Artisans are accustomed to crafting individual parts and afterwards connecting 
them with skillful blending, so that those who hammer out of marble or handle 
with bronze or press into wax human faces or bodies do not know in what manner 
the various parts come together, nor do they know the grace the future connection 
might bring. . . . God, however, as appraiser of the work’s entirety, foreseeing 
what is going to happen as something completed, praises that part of His work 
which is still in its initial stages, being already cognizant of its termination. This is 
not to be wondered at, since in God’s case the completion of a thing does not 
depend on the consummation of the actual work, but on the predestination of His 
will. God praises each individual part as fitting with what is to come. God praises 
the total work, which is compounded of the loveliness of each part. For that true 
beauty consists of a fitting adjustment in each part and in the whole, so that the 
grace in each part and the fullness of the fitting form all the parts should be 
praised.123 
 
Wax implied the passing nature of a thing and its uncertain future, perhaps a passing 
reference to Vergil’s Aeneid 6.847.124 God, foreseeing the completed creation, is able to 
praise each portion of the creation, knowing full well how each part will fit together. The 
human artisan, gifted as she may be in working with stone, precious metal, or wax, 
cannot be certain as to the connection of individual parts of the masterpiece; that artisan 
is ignorant of the “grace the future connection brings.”  
                                                
123 Hex. 2.5.21 (CSEL 32/1: 58). solent artifices singula prius favere et postea habili commissione 
conectere, ut qui uultus hominum uel corpora excudunt de marmore uel aere fingunt uel ceris exprimunt, 
non tamen sciunt quemadmodum sibi possint membra singula conuenire et quid gratiae adferat futura 
conexio. . . . deus uero tamquam aestimator uniuersitatis praeuidens quae futura sunt quasi perfecta iam 
laudat quae adhuc in primi operis exordio sunt, finem operis cognitione praeueniens. nec mirum apud 
quem rerum perfectio non in consummatione operis, sed in suae paedestinatione est uoluntatis. laudat 
singula quasi conuenientia futuris, laudat plenitudinem singulorum uenustate conpostiam. illa est enim 
uera pulchritudo et in singulis membris esse quod deceat et in toto, ut in singulis gratia, in omnibus formae 
conuenientis plenitudo laudetur. 
124 See Verg. Aen. 6.847–53 (LCL 63: 592–93): Excudent alii spirantia mollius aera (credo 
equidem), uiuos ducent de marmore uultus, orabunt causas melius, caelique meatus describent radio et 
surgentia sidera dicent: tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento (hae tibi erunt artes), pacique 
imponere morem, parcere subiectis et debellare superbos.”  
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  A third plausible valence could be an oblique critique of the Roman funerary 
practice of making masks to wear in mourning. Often made of wax, these imagines were 
quite expensive and symbolized nobility and wealth. A well-known passage in Polybius’ 
Histories depicts the importance of this Roman practice: 
Whenever any illustrious man dies, he is carried at his funeral into the forum to 
the so-called “rostra”, sometimes conspicuous in an upright posture and more 
rarely reclined. Here with all the people standing round, a grown-up son, if he has 
left one who happens to be present, or if not some other relative mounts the rostra 
and discourses on the virtues and successful achievements of the dead during his 
lifetime. As a consequence the multitude and not only those who had a part in 
these achievements, but those also who had none, when the facts are recalled to 
their minds and brought before their eyes, are moved to such sympathy that the 
loss seems to be not confined to the mourners, but a public one affecting the 
whole people. Next after the internment and the performance of the usual 
ceremonies, they place the image of the departed in the most conspicuous position 
in the house, enclosed in a wooden shrine. This image is a mask reproducing him 
with remarkable fidelity both in its modeling and complexion of the deceased. On 
the occasion of public sacrifices they display these images, and decorate them 
with much care, and when any distinguished member of the family dies they take 
them to the funeral, putting them on men who seem to them to bear the closest 
resemblance to the original in stature and carriage.125 
 
Here we see the notable’s funerary encomium, recalling virtues and achievements, was 
accompanied by a lifelike masks which serves as an icon of the deceased. Sallust 
indicates the moral importance of these imagines, writing of how they inflamed the hearts 
of their onlookers (quom maiorum imagines intuerentur, uehementissume sibi animum ad 
                                                
125 Polybius is typically the primary source for the description and rationale of this practice. See 
Polyb. 6.7.53 (LCL 138: 428–31). For secondary treatments of funerary practices in general and imagines 
in particular, see Clive Skidmore, Practical Ethics for Roman Gentlemen: The Work of Valerius Maximus, 
Classical Studies and Ancient History (Exeter, UK: University of Exeter Press, 1996), 16–21, 25, 115; Jane 
D. Chaplin, Livy’s Exemplary History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 14–15; John Pollini, 
“Ritualizing Death in Republican Rome: Religion, Class Struggle, and the Wax Ancestral Mask Tradition’s 
Origin and Influence on Veristic Portraiture,” in Nicola Laneri, ed., Performing Death: Social Analyses of 
Funerary Traditions in the Ancient Near East and Mediterranean, Oriental Institute Seminars 3 (Chicago: 
The Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago, 2007), 237–85; Harriet I. Flower, Ancestor Masks and 
Aristocratic Power in Roman Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 1–59, 220–69; James 
Petitfils, Mos Christianorum: The Roman Discourse of Exemplarity and the Jewish and Christian 
Language of Leadership (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2016), 46–51, 67–68.  
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uirtutem adcendi).126 These ancestral depictions in other words functioned as tactile 
examples of the virtues; wax quite literally imaged the notable, capturing him staid and 
steady and presenting him before those remembering. By the time of Valerius Maximus 
(1st cent. CE), Clive Skidmore maintains, imagines “had become a virtual synonym for 
historical examples.”127 The imagines maiorum were not simply funerary remembrances, 
but functioned positively as pedagogical tools for the pursuit of moral excellence. 
 Ambrose might have intended any or all of the above in his distinction between 
wax and grace. If taken together, these possibilities reveal the textured nature of his 
juxtaposition. Wax was visible, fragile, fleeting, easily contorted, and represented the 
crafting of human hands, while grace was invisible, lasting, stable, and represented the 
handiwork of the Creator. Whatever his intent, the distinction throws into relief the stark 
difference between the temporal and eternal, between images divine and human, invisible 
and visible. 
 
Conclusion 
Our concern in this chapter was to show how Ambrose describes God as the 
source of the virtues, a claim, I argued, that he makes from his novel use of Isaiah 49:16. 
According to Ambrose, God has adorned the “walls” of the soul with the myriad colors of 
divine operation and the virtues. While others, like Basil of Caesarea, might wince at the 
depiction of God as a painter, Ambrose relishes in it, repeatedly using the metaphor and 
its supporting verse throughout his career. By no means does Ambrose think—again, 
                                                
126 Sall. Iug. 4.5 (LCL 116: 172–73). 
127 Skidmore, Practical Ethics for Roman Gentlemen, 25. 
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unlike Basil—that such a description shortchanges human agency; indeed, for him, it 
helps connect the givenness of human nature to the pursuit of virtue.  
Arguing for God as the source of virtue pressured us to tackle Ambrose’s 
seemingly contradictory statements over the sufficiency of internal stability and virtue. 
To that end, I tracked his curious use of Proverbs 5:15, likely owing again to Origen, to 
show that claims to the sufficiency of virtue come bundled with an understanding of God 
who gifts that virtue. That God is the source and bestower of moral excellence, in other 
words, necessarily means that any manifestation of such excellence must be referred to 
God. This is what I called the saint’s “dispossession” of virtue.  
Finally, I showed that Ambrose’s image theology garners further moral purchase 
with his repeated use of a doctrine of rival images, expressed with recourse to 1 
Corinthians 15:49. As for Origen who preceded him, the verse crystallizes for Ambrose 
the difficulties of bearing or acquiring moral excellence this side of heaven. While divine 
or virtuous images point to their ultimate author and source, worldly and devilish images 
weigh down upon us, begging to be put on and imitated. Ambrose depicts the challenge 
in physical terms, but the battle is ever among things unseen. Still, for all his talk of the 
invisibility of the image, the location of that image in the soul (or mind), and his 
disparaging of a body that holds us fast, Ambrose constantly exhorts his audiences to 
public virtues. I will argue that this stress on—even infatuation with—virtuous 
presentation is where Ambrose’s debt to the Roman virtue tradition, which Tertullian and 
Cyprian inherit and further, rears its head. The next chapter analyzes how Ambrose 
thinks physical action is indicative of one’s inner condition. Transformation, on this 
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account, is from the outside in: paring down physical embellishment and extravagance 
encourages and instills modesty of soul.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: GOD’S VIRTUE AND OURS: IMAGING THE CHARACTER 
OF DIVINE OPERATION 
 
“What concerned classical men was the capacity of the inner to permeate the 
outer. They expected their soul to display its quality in their body, and, along with 
the body, in those concrete and visible particulars of poise and lifestyle that 
counted so much for them.”1 
 
The last chapter argued that Ambrose’s metaphor of God as the painter of the soul 
pointed to God as the source of moral excellence. To make my case, I analyzed 
Ambrose’s unique reference to Isaiah 49:16 in his homily on the sixth day of creation. 
God’s beautiful adornment of the soul for Ambrose is a reality that comes packaged with 
moral demands of attending to and maintaining such beauty. Drawing on Origen’s 
distinction between types of images gives Ambrose occasion for tangibly describing what 
should or should not constitute the publicizing of those images. 
The present chapter analyzes Ambrose’s claim that the well-painted soul is one 
“in which a semblance of divine operation shines” (in qua elucet diuinae operationis 
effigies) with attention to his Latin debts.2 I first plumb the depth of Ambrose’s use of 
eluceo (“shine”) and effigies (“semblance[s]”) throughout his corpus to get to the bottom 
of the rhetorical significance of the phrase from Hexaemeron 6.7.42. This analysis leads 
neatly into a brief depiction of the general lines Ambrose adapts from Roman tradition, 
showing in particular how the emphasis on virtuous physical presentation and the 
ornamentation of the body highlight chaste emotions and their corresponding virtuous 
actions. These emotions and actions serve as scripts for reading interior disposition and 
                                                
1 Peter Brown, “The Saint as Exemplar in Late Antiquity,” Representations 2 (1983): 1–25, at 5. 
2 Ambr. Hex. 6.7.42 (CSEL 32/1: 233–34). 
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moral standing. The third section gives examples of how Ambrose trades in this Roman 
tradition of publicizing virtue. And the fourth section ties the multiple threads of the 
analysis together, arguing that reading Ambrose with these rhetorical and theological 
sources in mind proves that human action images the character of its divine counterpart.  
 “No matter how deeply Ambrose read in Greek,” Peter Brown quips, “he thought 
and felt in Latin. This was his moral ‘mother tongue.’”3 Brown, I think, is right: 
Ambrose’s relative facility with Greek sources (especially his Alexandrian ones) should 
not obstruct our view of his deep-seated romanitas4—what Harnack has called “the spirit 
of the West.”5 What follows argues that Ambrose’s Latin debts complement, if not 
dictate, his Greek ones. As a young man on the cutting edge of a new nobility, Ambrose 
aspired to be, as the quote at the outset of the chapter suggests, “a classical man.” He 
studied Roman classics with the grammarians at a young age; his corpus is peppered with 
examples and turns of phrase from Virgil, Sallust, Seneca, Terence, Ovid, and Valerius 
Maximus, among others. Common to each of these authors is the foregrounded 
importance of public virtue for the acquisition of social power. Trained as a proconsul 
prior to his bishopric, Ambrose was keenly familiar with both the importance of public 
performance in matters of civic dispute and the specific educational formation this 
performance entailed.6 After only three years in civic service, Ambrose traded the din of 
political tribunals for the clamor of ecclesial councils. And though Ambrose’s old officia 
                                                
3 Brown, The Body and Society, 348. 
4 See Tert. Pall. 4.1 (CSEL 76: 114). For more on romanitas, see J. N. Adams, “‘Romanitas’ and 
the Latin Language,” The Classical Quarterly 53.1 (2003): 184–205 and sources cited therein. 
5 Harnack, History of Dogma, 5: 48. 
6 See Satterlee, Ambrose of Milan’s Method of Mystagogical Preaching, 36–38. 
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dissipated, the residue of valorized Roman excellence remained, revealed by his nagging 
concern with the ways in which his students and parishioners acted in public.7 
Because of their ubiquity, Latin influences on Ambrose have proved difficult to 
trace, going largely unanalyzed thanks to their relative obviousness.8 The Roman sources 
familiar to Ambrose assert with consistency that maintaining a virtuous image of oneself 
pertains to recalling norms given by nature and tested traditions and acquitting oneself 
according to such norms and traditions. The bones of this reflection can be located in 
late-republican and early-imperial Roman virtue discourse. Early Christians, like 
Tertullian and Cyprian, adapted many of these calls to bodily comportment with nature, 
attaching divine authorship and heavenly virtues to the maintenance of the image of God.  
These early Christian writings initially take the form of counsel given to virgins, 
which explains what bearing the image should look like, what Marcia Colish has called 
                                                
7 For brief but helpful analysis of bodily comportment in Ambrose, see Jean-Claude Schmitt, “The 
Ethics of Gesture,” in Zone 4: Fragments for a History of the Human Body, Part Two, ed. by Michael 
Feher with Ramona Naddaff and Nadia Tazi (New York: Urzone, 1989), 128–47, at 129–33. Schmitt’s 
work builds upon the work of Marcel Mauss, “Techniques of the Body,” Economy and Society 2.1 (1973): 
70–88. Peter Brown picks up on these themes in Late Antiquity generally in his article “The Saint as 
Exemplar in Late Antiquity,” esp. 4–5. For attention to comportment proper to clergy, see Rudolf Haensch, 
“Christlicher Euergetismus ob honorem? Die Einsetzung von Klerikern in ihre Ämter und die von diesen 
vorangetriebenen Bauprojekte,” in Episcopal Elections in Late Antiquity, ed. Johan Leemans, Peter Van 
Nuffelen, et al (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011), 167–81. 
8 Two exceptions are Yves-Marie Duval, “Sur une page de saint Cyprien chez saint Ambroise: 
Hexameron 6,8,47 et De habitu uirginum 15–17,” Revue des études augustiniennes 16.1–2 (1970): 25–34; 
idem, “L’originalite ́ du De uirginibus dans le mouvement asce ́tique occidental: Ambroise, Cyprien, 
Athanase,” in Ambroise de Milan: XVIe centenaire de son e ́lection e ́piscopale, ed. Y.-M. Duval (Paris: 
Études augustiniennes, 1974), 9–66, esp. 21–28. Duval’s interest is more in connecting third- and fourth-
century texts on virginity (Cyprian, Ambrose, Athanasius, Zeno of Verona), but at several points, he makes 
reference to the texts central to our analysis (Cyprian’s De habitu uirginum 14–17 and Ambrose’s 
Hexaemeron 6.8.47). Duval also notes Cyprian’s worry over the adulteration of the “natural image of God” 
(“L’originalite ́ du De uirginibus, 26–27). Cf. Harnack, History of Dogma, 3: 313, n.2, where Harnack notes 
parallels between Cyprian and Ambrose; and Dogma, 5: 48, n.2, where Harnack concludes that Ambrose 
does not appear to have read Cyprian’s works.  
  
 
169 
“cosmetic theology.”9 While the use of “cosmetic” might imply something superficial or 
contrived, Colish simply states that cosmetic theology communicated the immorality 
latent in altering one’s natural appearance.10 When it comes to Ambrose, however, Colish 
also offers seemingly contradictory claims regarding his appropriation and furtherance of 
cosmetic theology. She writes that Ambrose “made a contribution of his own to the 
theme of cosmetic theology,” yet that “cosmetic theology comes up only once in his 
oeuvre, and briefly, in his Hexameron.”11 What follows here shows the insufficiency of 
Colish’s confusing statements on Ambrose’s familiarity with cosmetic theology. 
Ambrose, I argue, repeatedly impresses upon his listeners the critical importance of self-
presentation.12  
 
What Might “Shines Forth” and “Semblance” Mean for Ambrose? 
Up to this point, I have intimated that Ambrose’s doctrine of the image of God 
Ambrose manifests his concern for both the visible and invisible components of the 
moral life. We flagged the curious phrase that the well-painted soul is one in which “the 
                                                
9 See Marcia L. Colish, “Cosmetic Theology: The Transformation of a Stoic Theme,” Assays: 
Critical Approaches to Medieval and Renaissance Texts 1 (1981): 3–14. In her essay, Colish traces the 
origins of “cosmetic theology” to fourth-century BCE and the Cynics, then shows its incorporation into 
Stoic sources, and finally, early Christian literature. Her main concern is not cosmetic theology’s origins, 
but its transformative heritage for Roman Stoics and early Christians.  
10 Colish, “Cosmetic Theology,” 3. 
11 Colish, “Cosmetic Theology,” 10. Cf. Colish, The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early 
Middle Ages II. Stoicism in Christian Latin Thought through the Sixth Century, 48–70. 
12 While I have not come across anyone to speak of Ambrose’s simultaneous warnings against the 
body and embodied action and endorsements of their importance, Layton identifies such a balancing act in 
Didymus the Blind (an early source for Ambrose in elucidating pro-Nicene theology). Layton shows 
Didymus between Origen and Clement, on the one hand, and Methodius, on the other. See Richard A. 
Layton, Didymus the Blind and His Circle in Late-Antique Alexandria: Virtue and Narrative in Biblical 
Scholarship (Urbana, Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2004), 85–113. 
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semblance of divine operation shines” (elucet diuinae operationis effigies), a phrase 
which the remainder of the chapter considers. To that end, this section first scrutinizes 
Ambrose’s other uses of “shines forth” (eluceo) and “semblance(s)” (effigies) to clarify 
what he means when he writes that a semblance of divine operation shines in the soul. 
While the use of eluceo is not uncommon in the Latin theological tradition 
preceding Ambrose,13 it is imbued with distinct meaning throughout his works. Of these, 
several of his uses of this verb refer to the hand of God at work in creation. For instance, 
when exegeting Genesis 1:2 at Hexaemeron 1.8.29, Ambrose writes that “the operation of 
the Holy Trinity clearly shines forth in the constitution of the world” (in constitutione 
mundi operatio trinitatis eluceat).14 Examining created things, in short, serves to make 
plain the distinctive role of the Trinity in creation. However, Ambrose rarely attaches 
eluceo to the person of Jesus, shining out from God, presumably for fear of the baggage 
such a doctrine could introduce. In fact, only once does Ambrose use the verb to describe 
Jesus as “shining forth as the figure of God” (figura dei christus eluceat).15  
By far, Ambrose’s most common use of the verb comes when he is speaking 
about internal realities made manifest in human acting. In On Isaac Ambrose notes the 
protected inviolability of wisdom that, if truly acquired, is unable to be seized or 
lessened. This permanence characterizes virtues that reside deep in the soul or mind and 
are not attached to particular property. Although the enemy attempts to threaten and 
                                                
13 For relevant examples, see Tert. Iud. 3 (CSEL 70: 262); Ieiun. 3 (CSEL 20: 277); Greg. Illib. Tr. 
in Cant. 2.29 (CCSL 69: 188); Hilar. Trin. 7.4 (CCSL 62: 263), 10.8 (CSSL 62a: 465); Lact. Inst. 7.3.25. 
14 Ambr. Hex. 1.8.29 (CSEL 32/1: 28–29). See also Hex. 5.13.40, (CSEL 32/1: 172), where 
Ambrose follows Virgil’s Ecologues and indicates that the “grace of the halcyon should shine forth.” See 
also Psal. 118 5.7 (CSEL 62: 86). 
15 Ambr. Virg. 1.8.48 (PL 16: 202). 
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confuse wisdom’s application, the virtue’s integrity “shines forth.”16 A similar statement 
appears in The Prayer of Job and David 3.2.3, indicating that Israel’s moral goodness 
“shines forth” in their works, according to a reading of Psalm 72:1 (LXX): “How good is 
God to Israel, to those who are upright in heart!”17 Here, too, the verb appears in the 
context of the inviolability of virtue: “For true and perfect wisdom is not taken away by 
the torments, nor does it lose what it is, because it casts out fear by its zealous and loving 
purpose.”18  
 Ambrose uses eluceo repeatedly in Exposition of Psalm 118, most often to 
describe the inner beauty of some thing beaming forth. He first uses the verb in the 
work’s prologue to describe the process of exegeting the abecedarian psalm, insisting that 
David, the putative psalmist, has “diffused moral teachings like radiant stars, which shine 
forth and stand out.”19 In the fifth book, drawing on Song of Songs 2:1–220, Ambrose 
identifies the church as a “lily” that “shines in the sight of all people.”21 And in a later 
homily, Ambrose reflects similarly on Christ’s doctrine “shining forth” from chaste 
young women (eluceat pulchritude doctrinae).22  
                                                
16 Ambr. Is. 6.56 (CSEL 32/1: 680). 
17 Ambr. Iob 3.2.3 (CSEL 32/2: 249). 
18 Ambr. Iob 3.2.3 (CSEL 32/2: 250). 
19 Ambr. Psal. 118 prol.1 (CSEL 62: 3). meritoque plerisque locis moralium psalmorum sententias 
tamquam stellarum diffudit lumina, quae elucent atque eminent… 
20 Ego flos campi et lilium conuallium, sicut lilium in medio spinarum. For Ambrose’s other 
references to these verses, see Inst. 14.92–15.93 (PL 16: 327–28); Virgin. 9.51 (PL 16: 279); Virg. 1.8.43 
(PL 16: 200); Is. 4.30 (CSEL 32/1: 660); Luc. 7.128 (CSEL 32/4: 338); Psal. 118 5.12 (CSEL 62: 88); Spir. 
2.5.39 (CSEL 79: 101). 
21 Ambr. Psal. 118 5.7 (CSEL 62: 86). 
22 Ambr. Psal. 118 15.14 (CSEL 62: 337). 
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While “shining forth” could imply a relative darkness of a given context into 
which a thing shines, only once does Ambrose use the verb to refer to the challenge of 
some thing overshadowing whatever is shining. At Exposition of Psalm 118 17.14–18, 
Ambrose reflects on Psalm 118:133 in which the psalmist petitions God to “Direct my 
steps according to your word.” The reference to “steps,” perhaps unsurprisingly, sends 
Ambrose down an exegetical rabbit hole, tracking down verses that reference feet and 
shoes. He notes Isaiah 52:723, Exodus 3:524, Joshua 5:1625, and Matthew 3:1126 on the 
scriptural importance of going barefoot. Walking barefoot evinces a rusticity in the 
barefoot’s news, a frankness that is often lost on the clergy and bishop, who, occasionally 
like the scribes and Pharisees, are embroiled in controversy. “It is perhaps for this 
reason,” Ambrose concludes, “that the apostles are sent out with bare feet (Cf. Mt. 
10:10), so that their disputation might not be overshadowed but would shine out.”27 Here, 
Ambrose maintains that misused power and sin cloud the Church and its offices: “Often 
the clergy have done wrong, the bishop has changed his mind, the rich have sided with 
                                                
23 Psal. 118 17.15 (CSEL 62: 385): Quam speciosi sunt pedes euangelizantium pacem, 
euangelizantium bona! For other references to this verse in Ambrose’s works, see Ep. 11.6–8 (CSEL 82/1:  
81–83); Inst. 14.88 (PL 16: 326).  
24 Psal. 118 17.16 (CSEL 62: 385): Solue calciamentum pedum tuorum. For other references to 
this verse in Ambrose’s works, see Ep. 6.1 (CSEL 82/1: 39); Fid. 3.10.71 (CSEL 78: 134–35); Fug. 5.25 
(CSEL 32/2: 184), 7.43 (CSEL 32/2: 197–98); Is. 4.16 (CSEL 32/1: 653); Luc. 2.81 (CSEL 32/4: 85), 3.34 
(CSEL 32/4: 124), 7.57 (CSEL 32/4: 305), 9.31 (CSEL 32/4: 449–50); Valent. 67 (CSEL 73: 361); Paen. 
2.11.107 (CSEL 73: 206); Patr. 4.22 (CSEL 32/2: 136–37), 11.54 (CSEL 32/2: 155); Psal. 118 8.20 (CSEL 
62: 162). 
25 Psal. 118 17.17 (CSEL 62: 386): Ideo ad Moysen dictum est: solue calcianmentum dictum est et 
ad Iesum Naue […]. For other references to this verse in Ambrose’s works, see Ep. 6.1 (CSEL 82/1: 39); 
Fid. 3.10.71 (CSEL 78: 134–35); Luc. 9.31 (CSEL 32/4: 449–50). 
26 Psal. 118 17.18 (CSEL 62: 386): Post me uenit uir cuius non sum dignus calciamenta portare. 
For other references to this verse in Ambrose’s works, see Fid. 3.10.69 (CSEL 78: 134); Hel. 22.83–84 
(CSEL 32/2: 463–64); Is. 8.77 (CSEL 32/1: 696); Paen. 1.8.34 (CSEL 73: 136); Psal. 118 3.15 (CSEL 62: 
48–49); Spir. 1.3.41 (CSEL 79: 31), 1.3.43 (CSEL 79: 32), 1.14.145 (CSEL 79: 77). 
27 Ambr. Psal. 118 17.18 (CSEL 62: 387). Et apostoli ideo fortasse nudis mittuntur pedibus, ne 
obdumbraretur eorum disputatio sed eluceret. 
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those who hold power in the world, but the people have preserved their own faith.”28 The 
“bare feet” of the apostles are hence representative of a purity and frankness of the good 
news; the gospel has the power to “shine forth,” piercing such darkness, and shows how 
the Church can be “beautiful in her shoes.”29 
 Ambrose’s On Abraham offers us one of his more technical uses of eluceo 
attached to human action. The work’s second book begins by stating that Abraham’s 
historical narrative should be understood “to explain the progression of the appearance of 
virtue” (uirtutis formae quondam processum explicare).30 Abraham’s exemplum, 
Ambrose argues, is “set before us” so that we might attain the “form and likeness of 
virtue” (in formam uirtutis speciemque).31 With this in mind, Ambrose presents his 
readers with a moral exegesis, owing much to Philo, which follows the contours of 
Abraham’s life. The call that begins Abraham’s journey, “And go forth out of thy house,” 
pertains allegorically to the words that proceed from our mind, Ambrose contends.  
The house of the mind is the spoken word. For just as the father of the family 
lives in his own house and has the authority to rule his household, so also the 
mind lives in our utterances and governs our words, and its strength and discipline 
shine forth in what we say. As a good father of a family is appraised from the very 
entrance of this house, so also our mind is weighed from our words. Moreover, it 
strikes and answers with the rhythms of the voice.32   
 
                                                
28 Psal. 118 17.18 (CSEL 62: 386–87; Trans. from Tomkinson, 247). Plerumque clerus errauit, 
sacerdos mutauit sententiam, diuites cum saeculi istius terreno rege senserunt, populus fidem propriam 
reseruauit. 
29 Ambr. Psal. 118 17.18 (CSEL 62: 386). 
30 Ambr. Abr. 2.1.1 (CSEL 32/1: 564). 
31 Ambr. Abr. 2.1.1 (CSEL 32/1: 565). 
32 Ambr. Abr. 2.1.2 (CSEL 32/1: 566). Domus mentis prolatiuum uerbum est. sicut enim pater 
familias habitat in domo sua et in potestate habet quemadmodum regat domum suam ita etiam mens in 
sermonibus nostris habitat et gubernat uerba nostra et uis eius ac disciplina in sermone elucet. Ut bonus 
pater familias a primo uestibulo domus aestimatur ita etiam de sermonibus nostris mens nostra 
perpenditur. Denique etiam modulis uocis pulsat et reuocat. Cf. Philo, Migr. 2–5 (LCL 261: 132–35), 
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Drawing on Philo’s exegesis from On the Migration of Abraham, Ambrose maintains that 
the father (pater familias) here represents the mind, the governor of the body. 
“Utterances” (sermonibus) and “words” (uerba) are occasions for determining the mind’s 
“strength” (uis) and “discipline” (disciplina), since, Ambrose says, the mind’s power 
“shines forth” (elucet) in things said. Through the external manifestation of the voice, in 
other words, the character of the mind can be “weighed from our words” (de sermonibus 
nostris mens nostra perpenditur).33  
Ambrose’s adaptation of this line of Philonic exegesis persists throughout his 
writings and is supported by similar claims in his moral counsel. On Duties 1.46.223–
1.46.225 explains how an individual’s words and deeds reflect the beauty of God, which 
“shone forth in every part of the world” (quod in singulis mundi partibus elucebat).34 
Nature, Ambrose argues, arranges both “character and appearance” (personam igitur et 
speciem nobis natura ipsa dispensat) and thus gives us a paradigm by which to act.35 
Such a paradigm is set forth in the splendor of creation.  
You have that general seemliness; for God made the beauty of this world. You 
have it also in its parts; for God made the light and marked off the day from the 
night, when he made heaven, and separated land and when he set the sun and 
moon and starts to shine on the earth, he approved of them all one by one. 
                                                                                                                                            
where Philo lays out that the “mind has speech for its house . . . secluded from the rest of the homestead. It 
is the mind’s living place . . . It is there that mind displays in orderly form itself and all the conceptions to 
which it gives birth, treating it as a man treats a house.” 
33 Ambr. Abr. 2.1.2. Ambrose argues similarly in his Psal. 118 7.13 (CSEL 62: 135). In glossing 
Psalm 118:51– (though mocked) “I did not swerve from your law”—Ambrose writes “in these words shine 
out not only the grace of good work but also the purity of inmost conscience” (in quo non solum boni 
operis elucet gratia, sed etiam intimae puritas conscientiae). 
34 Ambr. Off. 1.46.225 (CCSL 15: 83). 
35 Ambr. Off. 1.46.223 (CCSL 83). Cf. Cic. Off. 1.97–100 (Winterbottom, 40; trans. Walsh, 35). 
“The obligation which stems from this advances first on the path which leads to harmony with nature and 
to the preservation of its laws. If we take nature as our guide, we shall never go astray…” Officium autem 
quod ab eo ducitur hanc primum habet uiam, quae deducit ad conuenientiam conseruationemque naturae; 
quam si sequemur ducem, numquam aberrabimus. 
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Therefore this comeliness, which shone forth in each single part of the world has 
been resplendent in the whole . . . If any one preserves an even tenor in the whole 
of life, and measure in all that he does, and order and keeps consistency and 
moderation in his words and moderation in his deeds, then what is seemly stands 
forth conspicuous in his life and shines forth as in some mirror.36 
 
Here we see a combination of two interpretive lines Ambrose utilizes throughout his 
writings: the goodness and work of God shine forth in creation, and the things of the 
“mind” (mens) shine forth in a virtuous life. In fact, not only are the two lines combined, 
they are functionally used to describe the same dynamic. The “order and consistency” in 
one’s words—and here in On Duties Ambrose includes “moderation in deeds,” as well—
discloses an evenness of soul “as in some mirror” (quasi in quodam speculo elucet). 
Ambrose’s counsel here to clergy-in-training precedes further considerations on how 
acting with great care, pleasant speech and tempered disposition reveals a relative 
stability of impulse or inclination. Actions thus can be said to “shine forth” from their 
actors, serving as signs for discerning inclination.”37  
 Ambrose’s frequent use of eluceo supports, as I have been arguing, a visual logic 
in his descriptions of human action. An agent’s true, unseen motivations can be said to 
“shine forth” in his or her words and works. Audiences are thus able to discern these 
motivations when observing the act and agent in question. Such language of shining forth 
often finds itself alongside consideration of something imaging something else. An image 
can thus be said to shine forth and reveal something of its paradigm in the process. In 
                                                
36 Ambr. Off. 1.46.224–1.46.225 (CCSL 15: 83). Habes hunc decorem generalem, quia fecit Deus 
mundi istius pulchritudinem. Habes et per partes, quia cum faceret Deus lucem, et diem noctemque 
distingueret, cum conderet caelum, cum terras et maria separaret, cum solem et lunam et stellas 
constitueret lucere super terram, probauit singula. Ergo decorum hoc quod in singulis mundi partibus 
elucebat, in universitate resplenduit. . . . Si quis igitur aequabilitatem universae uitae et singularum 
actionum modos seruet, ordinem quoque et constantiam dictorum atque operum moderationemque 
custodiat, in eius uita decorum illud excellit et quasi in quodam speculo elucet. 
37 Ambr. Off. 1.47.237 (CCSL 15: 86–87). 
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considering Ambrose’s frequent and varied reflection on the nature of an image, an 
analysis of his use of effigies (“image(s),” “semblance(s),” “depiction(s),” etc.) and its 
cognates is also beneficial. Ambrose employs effigies in a variety of contexts, negative, 
positive, or generally neutral. Effigies, similar to its cousins, imago, similtudo, and even 
figura, is likewise dependent upon the thing that it is presenting or imaging, and 
indicative of the nature of the thing imaged.38  
In Ambrose’s writing, effigies occasionally takes on negative connotations. 
Ambrose describes Laban’s household gods (Gen. 31) as effigies, “likenesses” or 
“semblances,” of the “solid form of justice.”39 The implication is straightforwardly 
negative: Laban’s effigies are fractured figurines, graven images which attempt to depict 
something divine and unseen, and which ultimately pale in comparison to the solid forma 
of justice present in the Hebrew patriarchal narratives. This use of effigies is unsurprising 
given some of Ambrose’s other statements, particularly in On Duties. There, Ambrose 
uses effigies in two discrete ways within the same discussion of proper physical behavior 
(tone, volume of speech, gait, etc.). He first uses effigies as the rough equivalent to a 
                                                
38 In general, this statement is in agreement with the Roman traditions preceding him. See, e.g., 
Lucr. 4.98–109 (LCL 181: 284–85); Cic. Nat. D. 1.37.103 (LCL 268: 100–1); Ov. Met. 1.83 (LCL 42: 8–
9). In Against Marcion, Tertullian uses effigies and imago and similtudo with reference to the Carmen 
Christi of Philippians 2:6–7, rebutting the Marcionite claim that this image language describes a phantom 
reality. See Tert. Marc. 5.20 (CSEL 47: 647–48). 
39 Ambr. Fug. 4.22 (CSEL 32/2: 182). …ut Laban scrutans domum eius nihil apud eum inane, 
nihil uacuum repperiret, nulla simulacra, nullam effigiem uanitatis. Non enim erat apud eum imago, sed 
ueritas, non effigies ignauiae, sed solida forma iustitiae et uiuae uirtutis expressio intellegibilis. Itaque 
Laban perscrutatus est domum eius spiritalem et non inuenit effigies; plena enim erat non figurarum, sed 
negotiorum. See also Psal. 118 8.58 (CSEL 62: 188), where effigies functions similarly. “For in heaven you 
do not have such crimes as driving a next door neighbor out of his farm, of defrauding a widow of profits 
accruing to her from her inheritance, of thrusting out minors from property bordering on one’s own, and 
then, to crown it all, of enclosing an image of some heavenly power in wood, silver, gold or bronze (in 
lignum denique et quodcumque argenti atque auri uel aeris metallum uelut effigiem quondam caelestis 
includere potestatis). These things are redolent of the most appalling sacrilege and have no place in the 
heavens, but are all too frequent on earth.” 
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“statue” to describe the opposite extreme of walking hurriedly; i.e., there is a problem 
with acting like a lifeless statue.40 
Ambrose uses effigies with a different valence later in book one of On Duties, 
exhorting his audience to “imitate nature: for her effigies, the rule of discipline, is the 
form of the honorable.”41 Here, effigies is something akin to a straightforward 
representation, given by nature. By no means, then, is effigies negative (for example, the 
equivalent to a lifeless statute or graven figurines); it is a matter of fact and moral 
standard given by nature’s underlying plan. In his two-part elegy for his brother, Death of 
Satyrus, Ambrose’s use of effigies is more or less neutral, as well. At 2.127, Ambrose 
mentions the folly of philosophers who, following certain poets, argue that men can be 
changed to the forms of beasts. To which Ambrose responds by asking rhetorically,  
How much greater a marvel, however, would it be that the soul which rules man 
should take on itself the nature of a beast so opposed to that of man, and being 
capable of reason should be able to pass over to an irrational animal, than that the 
form of the body should have been changed?42  
 
The context of the reflection is plainly negative, but the use of effigies is not; it simply is 
part of stating a matter of fact. Later in the treatise, Ambrose writes similarly: “those who 
are made in the image and likeness of God cannot be transformed into the forms of 
beasts; since it is not the image of the body but reason which is [made] after the likeness 
                                                
40 Ambr. Off. 1.18.74 (CCSL 15: 28). Nec in illis ergo tamquam simulacrorum effigies probo nec 
in istis tamquam excussorum ruinas. 
41 Ambr. Off. 1.20.84 (CCSL 15: 31–32). Naturam imitemur: eius effigies, formula disciplinae, 
forma honestatis est. 
42 Exc. 2.127 (CSEL 73: 321). Quanto maioris est prodigii gubernatricem hominis animam 
adversam humano generi bestiarum suscipere naturam capacem que rationis ad inrationabile animal posse 
transire quam corporis effigies esse mutata? See Courcelle, Recherches sur les Confessions de saint 
Augustin, 380. 
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of God.”43 Here, the two clauses reflect the same dynamic: reason is created “according 
to the image and likeness of God” and is contrasted with the “form of beasts” (effigies 
beastiarum) and the “image of the body.” Still, despite the evaluative freight, effigies 
functions as a straightforward description of the physical manifestation of animals.  
Throughout his corpus, Ambrose predominantly uses effigies in positive senses. In 
On the Faith 2.2.32, Ambrose uses effigies with respect to Christ: the “image of eternal 
goodness” (effigiem aeternae bonitatis), mentioning Wisdom 7:26 (Splendor est enim 
lucis aeternae et speculum sine macula dei maiestatis et imago bonitatis illius) in 
passing.44 While the mention of Wisdom 7:26 is noteworthy in its own regard, 
paraphrasing the verse places effigies and imago as synonyms. On the Holy Spirit 1.6.79 
depicts the Holy Spirit as “expressing the effigiem of the heavenly image in us” (ut 
spiritus sanctus exprimat in nobis imaginis caelestis effigiem).45 Ambrose’s reflection in 
Death of Satyrus, as we will see in the next and final chapter, describes his brother as 
setting forth simplicity in word and deed, manifesting the “semblance of perfect virtue” 
(perfectae uirtutis effigie).46 Here, too, like the other instances above, effigies is positive, 
even laudable, and attached to divine agency. We should want, in other words, to be an 
effigy of the heavenly image. These markedly positive uses stand in stark opposition to 
Laban’s effigies noted above. 
                                                
43 Exc. 2.130 (CSEL 73: 322). Et secundum imaginem et similitudinem dei factos transferri non 
posse in effigies bestiarum, cum utique ad similitudinem dei non corporis sit imago, sed ratio?  
44 Ambr. Fid. 2.2.32 (CSEL 78: 67). cum sit imago bonitatis exprimens aeternae in sese bonitatis 
effigiem, sicut et supra ostendimus scriptum, quia ipse est speculum sine macula et imago bonitatis illius. 
45 Spir. 1.6.79 (CSEL 79: 48). 
46 Exc. 1.51 (CSEL 73: 237). 
  
 
179 
 Particular contexts notwithstanding, common to all Ambrose’s uses of effigies is 
the force both of an image and what that image communicates by its manifestation. It is 
not too much of a stretch to see how Ambrose’s uses of effigies coincide with his doctrine 
of rival images, explored in the previous chapter. Both images and effigies can be 
manifestations of things both heavenly and virtuous or worldly and base. Like “image,” 
effigies does not function on its own, but is always tied to the moral status of the thing it 
happens to be disclosing. 
In the Exposition of Psalm 118, effigies typically pertain to heavenly or virtuous 
depictions of the saints or of God. In light of Psalm 118:38 (“Establish your word for 
your servant in your fear”), Ambrose asserts that godly fear is akin to a throne for 
Christ’s teaching, the foundation of which is solidified by the saints’ golden wisdom. He 
continues, “as a good statue presents a likeness of truth, so too, the words of the saints” 
(simulacrum autem bonum tamquam effigies ueritatis sermo sanctorum).47 While 
“semblances of truth” (effigies ueritatis) might tempt a negative gloss, here semblances 
are positive; effigies offer glimpses into the real, pointing to the founts of wisdom and 
truth.  
Elsewhere in Exposition of Psalm 118, Ambrose applies effigies to discussions of 
the image of God. “For what is so precious as an image of God?,” Ambrose asks 
rhetorically. “This [being created according to the image] should fill you with faith, such 
that a sort of representation of your Maker (auctoris effigies) should shine out from your 
                                                
47 Psal. 118 5.39 (CSEL 62: 104; trans. Tomkinson, 68). 
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heart, so that if any were to question your soul, they would not fail to find the Maker.”48 
The visual logic we have been exploring throughout underlies Ambrose’s statement here. 
Given the remarkable reality of being so created (so painted) in God’s image, a 
“representation” (effigies) will be noticeable. Notice, too, that Ambrose flips the equation 
in the second clause. While the first indicated that one’s created (we could even say 
“internal”) reality will shine forth exteriorly, the second formulation is the opposite: 
given one’s action or representation, the internal reality will become apparent. So, it is 
noteworthy that Ambrose’s notion of imago and effigies work both inside out and outside 
in.  
The similarity here to our key phrase under consideration—that the well-painted 
soul is one “in which a semblance of divine operation shines”—is unmistakable. It is not 
simply that being created according to the image and likeness of God is a statement of 
great human dignity, though it is that, as well. It is that a “representation” (effigies) will 
“shine forth” (refulgeat), such that God’s creational fingerprints will be plain. The precise 
distinction, if any, behind “image” (imago) and “representation” (effigies) here is unclear. 
It does appear that, in this context, imago occupies the singular reality of being created by 
God, while effigies has more to do with the moral implications of reflecting that created 
reality and therefore is explicated in different contexts.  
Near the end of his Exposition of the Gospel of Luke, Ambrose again distinguishes 
imago and effigies. 
Let the images of justice, wisdom and virtue shine in you. And because the Image 
of God is in your heart, may it also be in your works; let the representation of the 
                                                
48 Psal. 118 10.10 (CSEL 62: 209). An quicquam tam pretiosum quam imago est dei, quae tibi 
primo fidem debet infundere, ut in corde tuo refulgeat quaedam auctoris effigies, ne, qui mentem tuam 
interrogat, non agnoscat auctorem? 
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gospel be in your deeds, so that you keep my precepts in your habits. If you offer 
the other cheek to one who strikes you, if you have your enemy, if you take up 
your cross and follow me, then the representation of the gospel will be in you. It 
was for this reason that I carried my cross for you; that you would not hesitate to 
carry it on account of me.49 
 
Here image language—imago and effigies—pertains both to the image of God and also to 
representative snapshots of respective virtues (justice and wisdom, in particular). These 
images, Ambrose indicates, are to “shine in you” (in te) because the imago dei is in 
corde. Somehow—and he does not tell us exactly how—Ambrose conceives of this 
image in corde as present in one’s works. Ambrose calls this enacted image an effigies. 
There is, as he sees it, a connection between interior and exterior: “because (quia) the 
Image of God is in your heart, may it be in your works.”50 Ambrose continues by giving 
explanatory content to this effigies: “If you offer the other cheek to one who strikes you,” 
Ambrose writes, “if you have your enemy, if you take up your cross and follow me, then 
the representation of the gospel (effigies euangelii) will be in you.”  
Ambrose’s two-pronged image vocabulary here affords us an intriguing 
conclusion: the effigies euangelii is the rough equivalent of the imago dei in operibus. 
The moral content of this enacted effigies is from Matthew 5:39 (“turn the other cheek”) 
and Matthew 16:24 (“take up your cross and follow me”). Attending to and upholding 
gospel “precepts” (praecepta)—offering the other cheek, taking up one’s cross, following 
after Jesus—are the contents of this effigies of the Gospel. Ambrose, as we will see in 
Chapter Five, will add to these gospel precepts and the content of Jesus’ ethic, but suffice 
                                                
49 Psal. 118 22.34 (CSEL 62: 505). Fulget in te imago iustitiae, imago sapientiae, imago uirtutis. 
Et quia imago dei in corde est tuo, sit et in operibus tuis, sit effigies euangelii in tuis factis, ut in tuis 
moribus mea praecepta custodias. Effigies euangelii erit in te, si percutienti maxillam alteram praebas, si 
diligas inimicum tuum, si crucem tuam tollas et me sequaris. Ideo crucem ego pro uobis portaui, ne tu 
propter me portare dubitares.  
50 Psal. 118 22.34 (CSEL 62: 505). Emphasis added.  
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it here to say that effigies is indicative of their paradigms. Hence, in the passage from 
Exposition of Psalm 118 above, I translate effigies as “representation” because the force 
of the passage bespeaks Ambrose’s clear emphasis on displaying in operibus, in factis, in 
moribus these inner realities (in te, in corde). In a word, as images of the virtues and of 
God shine within, they demand to be embodied by the Gospel ethic of non-retaliation and 
co-suffering with Christ. This ethic will be explored in greater detail in Chapter Five.  
 
Seeing Ourselves Being Seen: Displays of Virtue in the Roman Tradition 
Ambrose’s discrete emphasis on the moral function and force of image recalls our 
analysis of his doctrine of rival images adapted from Origen in the last chapter. 
Ambrose’s debts to Origen and Platonic tradition run so deep, most scholars will say, that 
he rejects any positive assessment of the body whatsoever. There is such an emphasis on 
the flight of the soul from the prison of the body, such residual Platonic dualism,51 that no 
reader of Ambrose “could accuse [him] of having been well disposed to the human 
body.”52 Throughout Ambrose’s corpus we do indeed find the ideal of the unmoored soul, 
bursting forth from its fleshly prison to ascend to heavenly, incorporeal heights. Part of 
                                                
51 See Brown, The Body and Society, 341–65, at 348–49. 
52 Moorhead, Ambrose, 56–59, at 56. Cf. Boersma, Augustine’s Early Theology of Image, 102–
131. Boersma discusses the “embodied” descriptions Ambrose offers throughout his career concerning the 
imago dei. His analysis is more nuanced than Moorhead’s, to be sure, but when he comes to analyzing 
Ambrose’s exhortation against cosmetics in Hexaemeron 6.8.47, Boersma claims “Ambrose is never 
concerned with the body per se. Rather his concern is that the soul perfect its spirit of apatheia with respect 
to the body and conform, secundum naturam, to that of which it is an image” (at 120–21). The body, 
Boersma argues, is to be used “like an instrument” for salvific purposes; its nature is “penultimate” (at 
123). Boersma is correct that Ambrose views the body as subject to death and decay, but in what follows I 
argue that Ambrose’s concern is with the body precisely because the ways in which we move and 
physically present ourselves disclose the nature of the soul. Cf. Chad Tyler Gerber, The Spirit of 
Augustine’s Early Theology: Contextualizing Augustine’s Pneumatology (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012), 82–83. 
In the midst of his reassessment of Augustine’s early pneumatology, Gerber mentions Ambrose’s clear 
calls to the flight of the soul. However, Gerber distinguishes those calls from Plotinus’s similar calls.  
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what makes scriptural exemplars so attractive and convincing for Ambrose is their 
attention to otherworldly matters, treating their time on earth as a mere passing, 
preparatory pilgrimage.53 Themes of the immaterial soul’s imprisonment and its desired 
freedom are so prevalent in Ambrose’s On the Good of Death, for instance, that John 
Cavadini argues Ambrose’s concern with the reappropriation of Platonism outstrips any 
distinctly Christian anthropology.54 “The body,” Cavadini contends, “is therefore more an 
impediment to the soul’s function than a help.”55 Hence, when Ambrose calls his listeners 
to “imitate the practice of death” (usum mortis imitantes) for therapy from grief, Cavadini 
concludes that his supposed Christian formulation becomes hazy at best and 
compromised at worst. Cavadini’s position represents only one side of the coin, however. 
While it is evident that Ambrose retains certain aspects of Origen’s (undeniably Platonic) 
emphasis on the incorporeal nature of the image and requisite flight of the soul,56 he 
explicates the content of bearing such an image with physical descriptions and concrete 
                                                
53 Ambr. Off. 2.5.18 (CCSL 15: 103). See Ivor J. Davidson, “The ‘Vita Beata’,” 200. For the claim 
and supporting evidence that for Ambrose the virtues are preparatory, see Smith, Christian Grace and 
Pagan Virtue, 218–21. 
54 See Cavadini, “Ambrose and Augustine De Bono Mortis,” 232–49. The criticism is as 
unsurprising as it is unfounded and misplaced, in part because Ambrose’s use of sources is not as neat as it 
would need to be for Cavadini’s suspicions to be warranted. Underlying Cavadini’s critique of De bono 
mortis is a worry of the purity of Christian anthropology over and against its secular counterfeits.  
55 Cavadini, “Ambrose and Augustine De Bono Mortis,” 235. See also Brown, The Body and 
Society, 345–53. “From Philo, Origen, and Plotinus,” Brown writes, “Ambrose had picked up a dualism of 
soul and body of exceptional sharpness. He instinctively tended to identify Paul’s somber and all-engulfing 
sense of the war between the spirit and the flesh with the more familiar, classical opposition of mind and 
body. . . . We are dealing with a man whose imaginative world was a tensile system. It was built up through 
a series of potent antitheses—Christian and pagan, Catholic and heretic, Bible truth and ‘worldly’ 
guesswork, Church and saeculum, soul and body. . . . To be a Catholic Christian was to keep these 
antitheses absolute: to admit ‘admixture’ was to ‘pollute’ one’s own body and that of the Church. To 
surrender any boundary line was to court the ancient shame of the Roman male—it was to ‘become soft,’ to 
be ‘effeminated’” (346–47). 
56 See Jed W. Atkins, “The Officia of St. Ambrose’s De Officiis,” JECS 19.1 (2011): 49–77, at 68–
69. 
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examples. Such descriptions and examples exhort listeners to bodily comportment, 
pointing to what Davidson has called, an “obsession with what people see.”57  
For Roman elites, temperance, modesty, and their accompanying emotions 
comprised moral indexes for being seen by others.58 These virtues (pudor, pudicitia, and 
uerecundia) pertained to differing elements of public exposure and perception.59 Robert 
Kaster asserts that an examination of these traits provides “scripts” for analyzing moral 
action.60 Pudor (commonly rendered as “a sense of shame”), for instance, might arise 
                                                
57 Davidson, De Officiis, 2: 655. See also Davidson, “Social Construction and the Rhetoric of 
Ecclesial Presence: Ambrose’s Milan,” SP 38 (Leuven: Peeters, 2001), 385–93, at 386, 392–93, where 
Davidson writes of Ambrose’s concern with “image-making.” By this Davidson intends to draw out 
elements of Ambrose’s attempt at the “triumph of orthodoxy;” “it was about determining the way people 
perceived and thought of his church, and striving to ensure that their images were of a socially triumphant 
Catholicism, which combined the respectability of continuity in some areas with a bold renovation of moral 
standards in others” (387). Rita Lizzi’s historical reconstruction of Northern Italy’s churches around this 
time is also helpful for understanding Ambrose’s moral vision. See her article “Ambrose’s Contemporaries 
and the Christianization of Northern Italy,” The Journal of Roman Studies  80 (1990): 156–73, at 166.  
Lizzi writes, “Born and educated into the senatorial class, Ambrose had acquired considerable bureaucratic 
and administrative experience in the years preceding his election. In his letters, in the De Officiis and in 
numerous other works published during his episcopate, he was committed to having the other bishops in 
Northern Italy adopt the conduct and language typical of the senatorial nobility. This contributed to setting 
on an equal footing the relationship between Church and State hierarchies and, in turn, to advancing the 
penetration of Christianity within the upper class. In this perspective, Ambrose urged his colleagues to 
improve their intellectual training.” 
58 In the few pages that follow, similar ground is covered, albeit in briefer fashion, in my “Aspects 
of Moral Perfection in Ambrose’s De officiis,” SP (Forthcoming). 
59 See Matthew Roller, “Precept(or) and Example in Seneca,” in Roman Reflections: Studies in 
Latin Philosophy, ed. Gareth D. Williams and Katharina Volk (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 
129–56. Roller notes the “first stage” of exemplarity’s moral importance is that an action is done “in the 
public eye . . . under the gaze of an audience representing a community of which performer and spectators 
are a part” (at 130). 
60 Robert Kaster, Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), esp. 28–65. While Kaster labels these traits emotions rather than virtues, the difference he has 
in mind between the two is never explored. If there is an operative distinction, its explication is at most 
secondary for my purposes. The concern is rather with how public displays or abuses of moral excellence 
offer scripts for analyzing action and intention. See also Teresa Morgan, Popular Morality in the Early 
Roman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 300–23, at 309–11. Morgan remarks on 
Kaster’s work and notes that uerecundia and similar virtues were of little import to non-elites because 
implicit in those elite virtues was a heightened sense of public scrutiny and hierarchical expectation. Cf. 
Courcelle, Recherches sur les Confessions de Saint Augustine, 328 – 29, where Courcelle notes the 
presence of uerecundia in Apuleius’s Metamorphoses 1.23 (LCL 44: 40–41). There are other places, 
specifically in Ambrose’s Exc., where Courcelle cites Apuleius’s influence.  
  
 
185 
when one’s chastity is violated or when a person pursues self-interested ends at the 
expense of the community or when impulse is given free rein. Each of these could 
easily—and more, noticeably—blush one’s cheeks. This alteration of one’s natural 
countenance offers entrance into describing a given action and its consequences.61 In 
general, however, these emotions and virtues are, as Kaster puts it, instances of “seeing 
yourself being seen.”62  
Two likely strands of thought that inform such heightened anxiety over 
publicizing virtue in the Roman tradition. The first the commonplace reliance on 
physiognomy in antiquity, the “science” of judging moral disposition on the basis of 
human countenance and, occasionally, action. Physical presentation, for the 
physiognomist, was a telltale sign of a subject’s character.63 While most who 
practicedphysiognomic reflection were committed to the “reading” of a person’s face, 
some, like Aristotle, pointed to comportment of the body more generally. In an oft-cited 
passage from the Prior Analytics, Aristotle concludes: 
It is possible to judge men’s character from their physical appearance (τὸ δὲ 
φυσιογνωμονεῖν), if one grants that body and soul change together in all natural 
affections. (No doubt after a man has learned music his soul has undergone a 
                                                
61 Kaster, Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome, 44–45. 
62 Kaster, Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome, 56. Kaster notes that the most 
obvious similarity between pudor and uerecundia is that “both emotions are experienced when attention is 
directed to an assessment of the self in a social setting” (61). 
63 There are many examples of such thinking throughout classical texts. See, e.g., Arist. [Phgn.] 
(LCL 307: 81–138); Gell. NA 1.9.2 (LCL 195: 45–47). Recent secondary treatments include: George Boys-
Stones, “Physiognomy and Ancient Psychological Theory,” in Simon Swain, ed., Seeing the Face, Seeing 
the Soul: Polemon’s Physiognomy from Classical Antiquity to Medieval Islam (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 19–124; Mladen Popović, Reading the Human Body: Physiognomics and Astrology in the 
Dead Sea Scrolls and Hellenistic-Early Roman Period Judaism (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 68–118; Kevin 
Berland, “Inborn Character and Free Will in the History of Physiognomy,” in Physiognomy in Profile: 
Lavater's Impact on European Culture, ed. Melissa Percival and Graeme Tytler (Newark, DE: University 
of Delaware Press, 2005), 25–38; Maud W. Gleason, Making Men: Sophists and Self-Presentation in 
Ancient Rome (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), at 55–81.  
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certain change, but this affection is not one which comes to us naturally; I mean 
such affections as fits of anger or desires among natural excitements.) Supposing, 
then, this is granted, and also that there is one sign of one affection, and that we 
can recognize the affection and sign proper to each class of creatures, we shall be 
able to judge character from physical appearance. For if a peculiar affection 
applies to any individual class, e.g., courage to lions, there must be some 
corresponding sign of it; for it has been assumed that body and soul are affected 
together.64 
 
Underlying Aristotle’s comments is the assumed unity of body and soul; the two work 
together and “change together in all natural affections.”65 When the soul is moved, the 
body follows suit. There is much more to say about physiognomy and the scholarly 
debates over which thinkers were sympathetic to such views. Here, though, I simply want 
to flag Aristotle’s claim that the body can serve as a “sign” (τὸ σημεῖον) by which 
character is read (φυσιογνωμονεῖν).  
While scholars dispute the force, influence, and effectiveness of physiognomic 
reflection, another strand informed Roman anxieties over the public presentation and 
subsequent violation of moral excellence: Stoic admonitions to “live according to 
nature.”66 Though the maxim to “live according to nature” was ubiquitous, spanning 
generations and contexts—Seneca calls it “our [the Stoics’] motto” (propositum 
nostrum)—application was far from uniform.67 Some, like Musonius Rufus, were 
                                                
64 Arist. An. pr. 2.27 (LCL 325: 526–29). 
65 See Smith, Christian Grace and Pagan Virtue, 29–42. Smith writes of Ambrose’s concept of 
body-soul unity (“hylomorphic unity,” “moral unity”) and the effects of the Fall on that unity. I discuss 
Smith’s claims below with reference to several representative passages from Ambrose. 
66 Diogenes Laertius notes that Zeno of Citium was the first to expound this maxim as the basis of 
Stoic ethics. On Zeno, see Dio. Laert. 7.1.88 (LCL 185: 194–95). On other Stoics, see Dio. Laert. 7.5.169–
70 (LCL 185: 272–73). See also Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, 105–26; Gould, 
Philosophy of Chrysippus, 161–80; John M. Cooper, “Eudaimonism, the Appeal to Nature, and ‘Moral 
Duty’ in Stoicism,” in Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics: Rethinking Happiness and Duty, ed. Stephen 
Engstrom and Jennifer Whiting (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 261–84, at 267–75. 
67 Sen. Ep. 5.4 (LCL 75: 22–23). 
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rigorists and agreed that nature had ordained, for instance, that men not cut their hair or 
shave. Sages, by Musonius’ lights, could be picked out as the hairiest among us.68 Others, 
like Seneca, took a more moderate position, allowing trimmed beards in the hopes of 
attracting new students. For Seneca, being well-groomed bespoke moderation, offering 
onlookers an object lesson through which they could discern intent behind physical 
appearance.69  
Within the Roman tradition, anxieties both physiognomic and Stoic fuel late-
Republican and early-imperial writings on the publicizing of virtue. A good wife, 
Valerius Maximus writes in his work Memorable Doings and Sayings, is one 
                                                
68 Muson. Lecture 21, in Cora E. Lutz, trans., “Musonius Rufus: ‘The Roman Socrates,’” Yale 
Classical Studies 10, ed. A. R. Bellinger (New Haven, 1947), 128–29. See Orig. Cels. 3.66 (SC 136: 150–
53), where Origen mentions Musonius and Socrates as noteworthy pagans. See also John Dillon, “The 
Social Role of the Philosopher in the Second Century C.E.: Some Remarks,” in Philip A. Stadter and L. 
Van der Stockt, ed., Sage and Emperor: Plutarch, Greek Intellectuals, and Roman Power in the Time of 
Trajan (98–117 A.D.) (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2002), 28–40. The classic introductions to 
Musonius Rufus are Cora E. Lutz, “Musonius Rufus: ‘The Roman Socrates,’” 3–31; A. J. Festiguière, Deux 
Predicateurs de l’Antiquité: Télès et Musonius (Paris: Librairie Philosophique, 1978).  For more recent 
treatments of Musonius Rufus and the relationship of his teaching to that of other Stoics, see J. T. Dillon, 
Musonius Rufus and Education in the Good Life: A Model of Teaching and Living Virtue (Dallas: 
University Press of America, 2004), esp. 9–19; James A. Francis, Subversive Virtue: Asceticism and 
Authority in the Second-Century Pagan World (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1995), 1–21, at 11–14;  Raymond A. Belliotti, Roman Philosophy and the Good Life (Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books, 2009), 181–223, at 196–203; Runar M. Thorsteinsson, Roman Christianity and Roman 
Stoicism: A Comparative Study of Ancient Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 40–54, at 44–
46; Richard Valantasis, The Making of the Self: Ancient and Modern Asceticism (Cambridge: James Clarke 
& Co, 2008), 278–91. Valantasis notes that Musonius set up his ascetical system to deal with hardship of 
both body and soul: “There is no suggestion here of denigration or rejection of the body. Nor is there any 
sense that bodily practices are secondary to spiritual practices. The focus on the performance of specific 
acts of endurance allows Musonius to integrate body and soul in one common ascetical formation that 
benefits the whole person” (at 290).  
69 Sen. Ep. 5.3 (LCL 75: 20–21). Id agamus, ut meliorem vitam sequamur quam vulgus, non ut 
contrariam; alioquin quos emendari volumus, fugamus a nobis et avertimus. [“Let us try to maintain a 
higher standard of life than that of the multitude, but not a contrary standard; otherwise, we shall frighten 
away and repel the very persons whom we are trying to improve.”] Seneca is adamant that “live according 
to nature” (secundum naturam uiuere) (5.4) implies a “mean” (modus) (5.5) that seeks to communicate the 
prime motivation for philosophy: a communal sense that accompanies “humanity and sociability” (hoc 
primum philosophia promittit, sensum communem, humanitatem et congregationem) (5.4).  
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conspicuous both in her fertility and chastity, her pudicitia.70 Valerius catalogues multiple 
examples enamored with public scrutiny and the payoff of chastity. Verginius murdered 
his daughter in the Forum, “preferring to be the slayer of a chaste daughter than the father 
of a defiled one.”71 After the daughter of a noble Roman knight, Pontius Aufidianus, was 
raped, Pontius killed both the guilty and the innocent to avoid a “disgraceful marriage” 
between the two.72  
Other authors describe similar anxieties over attaining and maintaining chastity. 
In his Annals, Tacitus provides a soaring description of Agrippina the Elder, noted for her 
“shining chastity”;73 Petronius’ Satyricon tells of a woman from Ephesus whose spectacle 
of chastity drew visitors far and wide.74 Pudicitia made “public” also served to ward off 
predatory behavior, according to Seneca the Elder’s Controversies; a matron’s dress, gait, 
eye contact, and taciturnity worked together to dull rapacious advances and disclose 
virtue.75 And while the exact combination of these factors for certain acquisition of virtue 
                                                
70 Val. Max. Fact. ac dict. 7.1.1 (LCL 493: 102–5). See Livy. Ab urb. con. 1.1.57–59 (LCL 114: 
196–99). Sextus Tarquinius is taken over not only by lust (libido) for Lucretia’s beauty, but also by her 
spectata castitas. See also Dennis Trout, “Re-Textualizing Lucretia: Cultural Subversion in the City of 
God,” JECS 2.1 (1994): 53–70.  
71 Val. Max. Fact. ac dict. 6.1.1–2 (LCL 493: 2–5). Verginius, plebeii generis, sed patricii uir 
spiritus, ne probro contaminaretur domus sua, proprio sanguini non pepercit: nam cum Ap. Claudius 
decemuir filiae eius uirginis stuprum, potestatis uiribus fretus, pertinacius expeteret, deductam in forum 
puellam occidit, pudicaeque interemptor quam corruptae pater esse maluit. See Livy. Ab urb. con. 3.44–49 
(LCL 133: 142–61). Livy’s description is much more detailed, chronicling the intensely public nature of the 
case. 
72 Val. Max. Fact. ac dict. 6.1.3 ((LCL 493: 2–5). 
73 Tac. Ann. 1.41 (LCL 249: 314–15). 
74 Petron. Sat. 111–13 (LCL 15: 268–77). 
75 Sen. Controv. 2.7.3 (LCL 463: 366–67). Si tantum in formonsa sperari posset quantum placere 
potest, omnes formonsae in se uniuersos oculos conuerterent. Matrona, quae <tuta> esse aduersus 
sollicitatoris lasciuiam uolet, prodeat in tantum ornata quantum ne inmunda sit; habeat comites eius 
aetatis quae inpudicum, si nihil aliud, in uerecundiam annorum mouere possit; ferat iacentis in terram 
oculos; aduersus qfficiosum salutatorem inhumana potius quam inuerecunda sit; etiam in necessaria 
resalutandi uice multo rubore confusa <sit>. Sic se in uerecundiam pigneret <ut> longe ante inpudicitiam 
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is not explicated, two things are assumed: when chastity is violated, its onlookers will 
know, and external or physical violation spoils inner sanctity.76  
This obsession over visible representation expressing one’s moral standing is 
determinative for early Latin Christian virginity discourses, which trade in many of the 
same technical terms as its late-Republican and early-imperial forebears. Tertullian and 
Cyprian cite the same virtues—pudor, pudicitia, uerecundia—as well as their cousins—
clementia, castitas, temperantia, modestia, simplicitas—for both similar and dissimilar 
ends. Ultimate standards were different, to be sure; the anxiety, however, was similar. 
How Christian women presented themselves in public betrayed their true thoughts, 
feelings, moral, even theological, dispositions. For Tertullian and Cyprian, image 
language funded the description of such a presentation.77  
Tertullian’s two-book On the Apparel of Women, dated somewhere between 198 
and 204 CE, considers the importance of modesty and simplicity in dress and 
presentation and connects that simplicity and presentation to salvation. Cosmetics are 
specifically denounced because they blur natural beauty; those who stain their cheeks 
                                                                                                                                            
suam ore quam uerbo neget. [“If a beautiful woman offered as much hope as pleasure to the beholder, all 
beauties would turn the eyes of the world upon them. A married woman who wants to be safe from the lust 
of the seducer must go out dressed up only so far as to avoid unkemptness. Let her have companions old 
enough, at the very least, to make the shameless respect their years. Let her go about with her eyes on the 
ground. In the face of the over-attentive greeting, let her be impolite rather than immodest.”] 
76 Rebecca Langlands, Sexual Morality in Ancient Rome (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), 71. Rebecca Langlands sums up the logic this way: “the way that married women dress and behave 
in public is grounds for making valid decisions about their moral standing” (71). Marcia Colish has called 
this Roman reflection on the connection of physical appearance and moral standing “cosmetic theology.” 
Our late-modern preconceptions of “cosmetic” notwithstanding, Colish’s clever category and phrase 
identifies those authors infatuated with moral attentiveness to the norms of nature and the physical 
decoration of that nature. See n. 8 above. Cf. Marcia L. Colish, “Cosmetic Theology,” 3–14; Colish, The 
Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages II, 48–70. 
77 See Tert. An. 20 (CSEL 20: 332–33), 42 (CSEL 20: 369); Res. 12 (CSEL 47: 40–41). See also 
Daniélou, The Origins of Latin Christianity, 209–31; Fredouille, Tertullien et la conversion de la culture 
antique; Braun, Deus Christianorum; Allen Brent, Cyprian and Roman Carthage (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 91–116; Brown, The Body and Society, 76–82, 153–54. 
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with rouge make themselves enemies of God.78 For Tertullian, “apparel” (cultus) and 
“adornment” (ornatus) are necessarily opposed. Cultus is that which is fitting for a 
womanly grace (mundus); ornatus leads to womanly disgrace (immundus) and 
deception.79 
For Tertullian, the vicious roots of physical adornment are twofold. He first traces 
the advent of cosmetics back to fallen angels, a theme in the apocryphal Book of the 
Watchers (1 Enoch 8:1).80 Tertullian then links these unnatural arts to the devil, the “rival 
creator.”81 By Tertullian’s lights, the devil, who “by wickedness transformed humanity’s 
spirit” (spiritum hominis malitia transfigurauit), also introduced to our first parents the 
way in which “to change the body” (corpus mutare monstraret).82 “Whatever, then, is 
                                                
78 Tert. Cult. fem. 2.5 (CSEL 70: 78–79). See Fredouille, Tertullien et la conversion de la culture 
antique, 49–65. A dated but still helpful treatment of the treatise is Lillian B. Lawler, “Two Portraits from 
Tertullian,” The Classical Journal 25.1 (1929): 19–23. Lawler’s concern is largely to reconstruct the actual 
fashion and ornamentation against which Tertullian is writing; she concludes that Tertullian’s descriptions 
are “free from exaggeration and distortion and altogether reliable” (23). 
79 Tert. Cult. fem. 1.4 (CSEL 70: 64). See also Carly Daniel-Hughes, The Salvation of the Flesh in 
Tertullian of Carthage: Dressing for the Resurrection (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 75–78. Cf. 
Ov. Amor 3.160–210 (LCL 232: 128–33). On Tertullian’s potential familiarity with Ovid and other Latin 
poets, see René Braun, “Tertullien et les poètes latins,” in R. Braun, Approches de Tertullien: Vingt-six 
études sur l’auteur et sur l’oeuvre (1955-1990) (Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1992), 21–33. 
80 See Annette Yoshiko Reed, Fallen Angels and the History of Judaism and Christianity: The 
Reception of Enochic Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 177–80, 190–200. For 
the status of 1 Enoch as scripture in the early church, see James C. VanderKam, The Jewish Apocalyptic 
Heritage in Early Christianity (Brill: Uitgeverij Van Gorcum, 1996), 33–101, at 47–54, 67–70; Loren 
Stuckenbruck, "The Book of Enoch: Its Reception in Second Temple Jewish and in Christian Tradition," 
Early Christianity 4.1 (2013): 7–40, at 15–21. The tradition is referenced in Tert. Cult. fem. 1.2 (CSEL 70: 
60–61); 2.10 (CSEL 70: 87–88). For discussion on the exegetical significance of 1 Enoch in early Christian 
literature and 1 Enoch 8:1–3 in particular, see Daniélou, The Origins of Latin Christianity, 163–167. See 
also George W. E. Nickelsburg, “Apocalyptic and Myth in 1 Enoch 6–11,” Journal of Biblical Literature 
96.3 (1977): 383–405, at 397–404. Nickelsburg insists that the fallen angels interject illicit instruction into 
the world; he also further connects the Azazel narrative to the Prometheus myth. See Paul D. Hanson, 
“Rebellion in Heaven, Azazel, and Euhemeristic Heroes in 1 Enoch 6–11,” Journal of Biblical Literature 
96.2 (1977): 195–233. Hanson’s case resembles Nickelburg’s, focusing on the errant instruction introduced 
by Azazel (and other angels). But instead of connecting the section of the Book of Watchers to the 
Prometheus myth, Hanson finds deep resonances of 1 Enoch with Leviticus 16.  
81 Tert. Cult. fem. 2.5 (CSEL 70: 78–79). 
82 Tert. Cult. fem. 2.5 (CSEL 70: 79). 
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plastered on,” Tertullian contends, “is the devil's occupation” (ergo quod infingitur 
diaboli negotium est).83 Since God is on the side of the modest,84 “salvation, of both 
women and men, is determined chiefly in an exhibition of sexual modesty” (ea salus nec 
feminarum modo sed etiam uirorum in exhibitione praecipue pudicitiae statuta est).85 
True adornment should come not from fineries of jewelry and makeup, but from the 
beauties of the virtues. Tertullian concludes his treatise by allegorizing the effects of 
cosmetics:  
Go forth therefore made-up in the ointments and ornaments of prophets and 
apostles; drawing your whiteness from simplicity, your ruddy hue from modesty; 
painting your eyes with bashfulness, and your mouth with silence; plant in your 
ears the word of God; tie on your necks the yoke of Christ. Submit your head to 
your husbands, and you will be enough adorned. Occupy your hands with 
spinning; keep your feet at home; and you will be more pleasing than if were 
decked gold. Clothe yourselves with the silk of uprightness, the fine linen of 
sanctity, the purple of modesty. So painted, you will have God for a lover.86 
 
Leaving aside Tertullian’s complicated understanding that this virtuous sort of female 
adornment should be proximately for her husband at home and finally for her God, 
suffice it to say that the ornamentation (or lack thereof) of the body reveals either devilish 
or divine allegiance. To be well dressed and well made up was to be present to one’s 
                                                
83 Tert. Cult. fem. 2.5 (CSEL 70: 79).  
84 Tert. Cult. fem. 2.8 (CSEL 70: 84). 
85 Tert. Cult. fem. 2.1 (CSEL 70: 71). See Langlands, Sexual Morality in Ancient Rome, passim, 
esp. 1–77.  
86 Tert. Cult. fem. 2.13 (CSEL 70: 95). Prodite uos iam medicamentis et ornamentis extructae 
prophetarum et apostolorum, sumentes de simplicitate candorem, de pudicitia ruborem, depictae oculos 
uerecundia et os taciturnitate, inserentes in aures sermonem Dei, adnectentes ceruicibus iugum Christi. 
Caput maritis subicite et satis ornatae eritis; manus lanis occupate, pedes domi figite et plus quam in auro 
placebitis. Vestite uos serico probitatis, byssino sanctitatis, purpura pudicitiae. Taliter pigmentatae Deum 
habebitis amatorem. Daniel-Hughes notes the “ekphrastic” nature of this passage, “a trick of technical 
oratory . . . [that] involves painting a detailed picture for one’s audience with words" (Daniel-Hughes, The 
Salvation of the Flesh in Tertullian of Carthage, 80). 
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created nature: a bare face disclosed a natural soul adorned with the virtues, the 
perfections of the created order. 
Cyprian, like his Carthaginian progenitor Tertullian, utilizes the Book of the 
Watchers to recount the advent of makeup. Those fallen angels “taught them also to paint 
(fucare) the eyes with blackness drawn round them in a circle, and to stain the cheeks 
with a deceitful red (genas mendacio ruboris inficere), and to change the hair with 
adulterous colors (adulterinis coloribus), and to expunge all truth both of face and head 
(expugnare omnem oris et capitis ueritatem), by the assault of their own corruption.”87  
Unlike Tertullian, however, Cyprian is less interested in crafting an invective against 
female behavior than with educating a small group of women committed to celibacy in 
the home.88 He connects this interpretive tradition with Genesis 1:26: human beings are 
crafted according to the divine image, and as such, they are to charged with preserving 
that image rather than a rival demonic cover-up.89 Since, as Cyprian puts it, “everything 
that is changed is the devil’s,” seeking to alter one’s appearance is functionally an affront 
to God as artist.90 Cyprian illustrates this point by considering an artist whose painting is 
amended by an unskilled imposter. Even with slight edits, the work is ruined, the artist is 
                                                
87 Cypr. Hab. uirg. 14 (CSEL 3: 197–98). See Duval, “Sur une page de saint Cyprien chez saint 
Ambroise,” at 27–28, n.7. Yves-Marie Duval has explicitly connected Cyprian’s treatise to Ambrose’s, 
offering a fine-grained study of the two texts. Similarities notwithstanding, Duval cannot account for 
Ambrose’s reference to Isaiah 49:16, noting only that it is not present in Tertullian or Cyprian’s logic. See 
E. W. Watson, “The ‘De Habitu Virginum’ of St. Cyprian,” JTS 22.88 (1921): 361–67, at 363. While 
Watson comments on Cyprian’s rhetorical excess, he nevertheless places Cyprian within a strand of Roman 
thinking, exemplified by Seneca, that treated various moral questions in an “artificial way.” I take Watson’s 
adjective “artificial” here as roughly synonymous with “hyberbolic” or “embellished.”  
88 See Colish, “Cosmetic Theology,” 8–9. 
89 Cypr. Hab. uirg 15 (CSEL 3: 198). 
90 Cypr. Hab. uirg 15 (CSEL 3:198). 
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insulted, and the truth that once obtained in the original image is not preserved.91 In 
conceiving of the female body as a masterpiece, Cyprian wonders if God will cease to 
recognize the individual because of her unnatural adornment, and, at the last, say  
this is not my work and our image. You have polluted your skin with false 
medicine, and you have mutated your hair with an adulterous color. Your face is 
violently taken over by a lie, your figure is corrupted, your countenance is alien. 
You cannot see God, since your eyes are not those which God made, but those 
which the devil has infected. You have followed him, you have imitated the 
blazing red and painted eyes of the serpent. As you are dressed by your enemy, 
with him also you shall burn.92 
 
As much as Cyprian’s hypothetical statement might be an indictment on the extravagance 
of makeup, it serves to establish and reiterate created nature as a moral standard and 
designate the consequences for corrupting the image of God: the inability to “see” God. 
Cyprian is explicit: God will judge these virgins based on how well they physically 
maintain their original divine image.  
Each of the authors highlighted above is preoccupied by an “obsession with what 
people see.” Ambrose’s preoccupation, he admits, is similar and aimed at securing 
favorable public opinion (decet enim actuum operumque nostrorum testem esse publicam 
existimationem).93 But he does not stop there: his purpose is also evangelical, not simply 
for the sake of saving public face. As Ambrose puts it: “the person who sees a minister of 
                                                
91 Cypr. Hab. uirg (CSEL 3:198–99). See also Daniélou, The Origins of Latin Christianity, 63–66. 
92 Cypr. Hab. uirg 17 (CSEL 3:199). Opus hoc meum non est nec imago haec nostra est. cutem 
falso medicamine polluisti, crinem adultero colore mutati, expugnata est medacio facies, figura corrupta 
est, uultus alienus. Deum uidere non poteris, quando oculi tibi non sunt quos Deus fecit sed quos diabolus 
infecit. Illum tu sectata es, rutilos adque depictos oculos serpentis imitata es, de inimico tuo compta, cum 
illo partier arsura. See also Brown, The Body and Society, 192–95. Brown spells out the importance that 
the body plays in Cyprian’s works. The body of the Christian for him served as a “microcosm of the 
threatened state of the Church” (195). Brown continues: “Church and body alike were both presented in 
terms of ever-vigilant control, from which the relentless pressure of the saeculum gave no respite” (195). 
93 Ambr. Off. 1.50.247 (CCSL 15: 91). See also Ambr. Off. 1.47.226 (CCSL 15: 84); 2.7.29 
(CCSL 15: 108); 2.8.40–45 (CCSL 15: 111–13); 2.15.68–69 (CCSL 15: 121). 
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the altar adorned with the virtues appropriate to his calling will bring praise to the Author 
of these virtues, and will worship the Lord who has such lowly servants.”94 The virtues 
for Ambrose are not simply acquired techniques for gaining social or political renown, 
although they often function like that, too. Virtuous images in us reveal their divine 
source and foretell a fuller reality yet to come, further raising the stakes for decorum and 
decency.  
 
Gauging the Spirit Through the Body: Ambrose’s Roman Virtue 
Understanding background traditions that likely motivated Ambrose’s milieu and 
training cannot help but inform our analysis. As a card-carrying member of the Roman 
virtue tradition, Ambrose evinces physiognomic and Stoic psychological influence. His 
writing is driven by an obsession with what people see—by what Davidson has called his 
“image-making.”95 Ambrose consciously and consistently constructs a reputable Nicene 
identity intended to wield power and to tamp down discontents. While I do not disagree 
with Davidson’s charge—Ambrose was indeed concerned with facilitating and fostering 
religious politics, looking the part of ecclesial victor and mediator in the process—I think 
Ambrose’s motivating concern is also moral and spiritual. If this is the case, his doctrine 
is not merely social and political, but critical to understanding both his broader 
theological vision and his adaptation of rhetoric. 
                                                
94 Ambr. Off. 1.50.247 (CCSL 15: 91). 
95 Davidson, “Social Construction and the Rhetoric of Ecclesial Presence: Ambrose’s Milan,” 
392–93. 
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Ambrose’s familiarity with Roman rhetorical and early Latin theological 
traditions has either been assumed or ignored by secondary treatments. This lacuna is 
due, in large part, to the picture of Ambrose as a traditionally educated proconsul prior to 
his episcopacy.96 On the other hand, Carole Hill’s unpublished dissertation on Ambrose 
as a reader and transformer of classical texts is worth mentioning here. Hill argues that 
Ambrose’s theology presents his readers with a “fusion” of Roman and Christian 
elements,97 supported by debts to apologetic literature that sought to portray Christianity 
as a viable way of life.98 While I am nervous about language of “fusion”—as if Roman 
and Christian traditions were discrete until Ambrose melded or intertwined them—Hill’s 
hunch, I think, is the right one: Ambrose’s anxiety over the presentation or publicizing of 
virtue has a distinctly Roman pedigree. Or, as Jean-Claude Schmitt has put it, Ambrose 
“defined the Christian virtue of gesture, under the headings of modestia, temperantia, and 
most importantly, uerecundia.”99 Multiple texts in On Duties bear this out.  
To be modest, for instance, is to hold one’s tongue in order to cloak (and 
eventually remedy) the existence of passion, so that anger or indignation does not disturb 
the proprieties of speech.100 Young priests are not to visit the home of a woman or virgin 
alone; this is not only for temptation’s sake, but as Ambrose asks rhetorically: “Why 
                                                
96 See Paulin. Vit. Ambr. 5. Sed postquam edoctus liberalibus disciplinis ex urbe egressus est 
professusque in auditorio praefecturae praetorii, ita splendide causas perorabat ut eligeretur a uiro illustri 
Probo, tunc praefecto praetorii, ad consilium tribuendum. 
97 Carole Hill, “Classical and Christian Traditions in Some Writings of Saint Ambrose of Milan” 
(DPhil Dissertation, Oxford University, 1985), 36. 
98 Hill, “Classical and Christian Tradition in Some Writings of Ambrose of Milan,” 54. 
99 Schmitt, “The Ethics of Gesture,” 132. 
100 Ambr. Off. 1.4.14 (CCSL 15: 6). 
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should we give worldly people the occasion to criticize us?”101 Therapy for such behavior 
works outside in, beginning with “keeping close watch over clemency and modesty 
(clementiam ac uerecundiam).”102 The beauty of modesty (uerecundia) is manifested in 
both word and deed, evidenced by certain mannerisms, tones of voice, and styles of 
walking.103 Ambrose’s underlying assumption is that whatever stability (or lack thereof) 
is present within is made plain through one’s actions.104  
Similar to actions, emotions can be “read” to determine moral standing, as well.105 
Shame (pudor) serves as a bellwether foretelling potential violations of modesty, chastity, 
                                                
101 Ambr. Off. 1.21.87 (CCSL 15: 32–33). 
102 Ambr. Off. 1.17.65 (CCSL 15: 24; Trans. from Davidson, 155).  
103 Ambr. Off. 1.18.67 (CCSL 15: 25; Trans. from Davidson, 157).. Ne <ultra> modum 
progrediaris loquendi, ne quid indecorum sermo resonet tuus. speculum enim mentis plerumque in uerbis 
refulget. ipsum uocis sonum librat modestia ne cuiusquam offendat aurem vox fortior. denique in ipso 
canendi genere prima disciplina uerecundiae est; immo etiam in omni usu loquendi, ut sensim quis aut 
psallere aut canere aut postremo loqui incipiat, ut uerecunda principia commendent processum. “It 
guarantees that you never go beyond the measure that is appropriate when you speak and that your 
language never drops an unseemly note. The image of our spirit is so often reflected in the words that we 
use. Moderation balances even the sound of the voice, so that if a person has a voice that is a little on the 
strong side it will not offend anyone's ear. In the art of singing, the very first rule people have to learn is the 
importance of modesty. Indeed, this applies not just in singing, but in any vocal process: a person always 
has to start off in the same gradual manner, whether he is going to intone a psalm, or sing, or indeed speak. 
The idea is that if you begin modestly, you will commend what is to follow.” On the Stoic importance of 
φωνή or uox, see Wolfram Ax, Laut, Stimme und Sprache: Studien zu drei Grundbegriffen der antiken 
Sprachtheorie (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986). 
104 Ambrose uses stabilitas throughout his career, usually with reference to a firmness of faith or 
soul and the steadiness that perfect virtue brings. See Iac. 2.6.28 (CSEL 32/2: 48); Iob 3.3.5 (CSEL 32/2: 
252); Psal. 118 11.18 (CSEL 62: 244), 12.29 (CSEL 62: 269), 17.15 (CSEL 62: 385). Stability’s rough 
synonyms include constantia and firmitudo. Though each term carries discrete emphases and valences, as 
far as I can tell, they are used more or less interchangeably. For representative examples of each, see Abr. 
2.9.51 (CSEL 32/1: 604) for constantia and Bon. mort. 3.12 (CSEL 32/1: 714) for firmitudo (in conjunction 
with constantia). At Spir. 3.3.14 (CSEL 79: 156) Ambrose maintains that the firmitudo of the soul will be 
lessened if the unity of the Godhead is not confessed. These terms (stabilitas, constantia, and firmidtudo) 
also have distinct connection to simplicitas and purus, since the individual who is stable and unmoved by 
the senses and the body can be said to be simple, plain, and uncomplicated in the coordination of inner and 
outer realities. For more on this connection, see Off. 1.18.75 (CCSL 15: 28), where Ambrose in discusses 
manners of walking and the standards of nature. 
105 For precisely what I mean by “emotion” here, see Kaster, Emotion, Restraint, and Community 
in Ancient Rome, 8–9, 32–33. “[A]ny emotion-term is just the lexicalized residue of what happens when the 
data of life are processed in a particular way . . . to produce a particular kind of emotionalized 
consciousness, a particular set of thoughts and feelings. . . . I mean that if you are a Roman monitoring your 
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and their accompanying excellences. Ambrose cites Susanna’s willing silence before 
vicious elders (Dan. 13106): she considered her “great act of modesty” (maximus actus 
uerecundiae est) more precious than her life (tacebat in periculis Susanna et grauius 
uerecundiae quam uitae damnum putabat).107 In so doing, Susanna allowed shame to be 
her companion and guide, knowing full well that shame “is always on the lookout and on 
its guard against the first signs of danger.”108 Shame also pervades the story of the 
Annunciation, Ambrose maintains, and he commends the Virgin Mary’s virtue in the 
process. 
Here she is, in her chamber, and on her own; she keeps silent when the angel 
greets her and is moved when he comes into the room; and, the gaze of the virgin 
travels toward the sight of the masculine sex. She was humble, yes, but such was 
her modesty that she did not return his greeting or make any response to him—
unless when she learned her role in the Lord’s generation; and even then she 
spoke only to ask how this amazing thing could be so, not to talk for the sake of 
talking.109 
                                                                                                                                            
emotions, you will register the playing out of this process by saying (for example) “hui! fastidium!” . . . The 
emotion properly understood, however, is the whole process and all its constituent elements, the little 
narrative or dramatic script that is acted out from the evaluative perception at its beginning to the various 
possible responses at the end. Subtract any element of the script, and the experience is fundamentally 
altered: without a response (even one instantly rejected or suppressed), there is only dispassionate 
evaluation of the phenomena; without an evaluation (even one that does not register consciously), there is a 
mere seizure of mind and body that is about nothing at all” (8). 
106 Chapters 13–14 of Daniel are often considered addenda or appendices to the larger biblical 
book. Protestants largely reject these chapters/stories as deuterocanonical or apocryphal. This rejection is 
due in large part because of the text’s survival in Greek, but not Hebrew. Daniel 13, which includes the 
narrative of Susanna and Joakim, is present in the LXX. For more on the “additions” to Daniel, see Carey 
A. Moore, Daniel, Esther and Jeremiah: The Additions, Anchor Bible Commentary 44 (Garden City, NJ: 
Doubleday, 1977), 23–149; Alexander. A. DiLella, “The Textual History of Septuagint-Daniel and 
Theodotion-Daniel,” in John J. Collins and Peter W. Flint, eds., The Book of Daniel, Vol. 2: Composition 
and Reception (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 586–607. 
107 Ambr. Off. 1.18.68 (CCSL 15: 25). See A. M. Piredda, “Susanna e il silenzio: L'interpretazione 
di Ambrogio,” Sandalion 14 (1991): 169–92. Davidson notes strong classical precedents for “eloquent 
silence” (I. Davidson, De Officiis: Edited with an Introduction, Translation, and Commentary [2002], 2, 
454). Cf. Orig. Com. Rom. 7.16 (SC 543: 404–15).  
108 Ambr. Off. 1.18.69 (CCSL 15: 26; Trans. Davidson, 159). 
109 Ambr. Off. 1.18.69 (CCSL 15: 26). quod in cubiculo, quod sola, quod salutata ab angelo tacet 
et mota est in introitu eius, quod ad uirilis sexus speciem peregrinatur aspectus uirginis. Itaque quamuis 
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Here, we read Ambrose’s description of Mary being “moved” (mota est) when Gabriel, 
considered by Ambrose as a male angel, “greets” (salutata) her and announces that she 
will bear the Christ. Ambrose explains Mary as feeling shame; she “is moved.” Still, 
rather than return the Gabriel’s greeting (resalutauit), Mary’s modesty, coupled with her 
humility, demands she remain quiet until she heard of her divine mission.  
Ambrose also glosses the parable of the Pharisee and tax collector from Luke 18 
to show shame as a companion to modesty. The former prays that God be merciful to him 
because of his great deeds, while the latter, knowing that the sinner’s prayer should “veil 
itself with a blush of shame,” beats his breast in humble repentance—a display of 
“modesty” (uerecundia) that wins God’s favor.110 The examples of Susanna, Mary, and 
the tax collector from Luke 18 point to the complex relationship of emotion to virtue in 
general, and to shame, chastity, and modesty, in particular. Ambrose’s immediate 
audience (new or nearly ordained priests) was tasked with discerning how these emotions 
and virtues implicate one another for concrete action. In the cases of Susanna, Mary, and 
the taxt collector, Ambrose stresses the moral value of silence or measured and modest 
speech, refusing to allow inner perturbations to dictate reactionary behavior or excessive 
talking.  
These exempla occasion Ambrose’s generalized counsel: “It is from the attitude 
of the body that the habit of the spirit is gauged” (habitus enim mentis in corporis statu 
                                                                                                                                            
esset humilis, prae uerecundia tamen non resalutauit nec ullum responsum retulit nisi ubi de suscipienda 
Domini generatione cognouit, ut qualitatem effectus disceret, non ut sermonem proferret. 
110 Ambr. Off. 1.18.70 (CCSL 15: 26–27). Ambrose intimates that modesty, shame, etc. can be 
perfected or honed with better training, grace, and more accurate doctrine. Others in the Roman tradition do 
not share this position. Seneca, for instance, longs for personified Wisdom to take away tendencies for 
embarrassment, but concludes that this is simply not possible because of the inevitability of nature. See 
Sen. Ep. 11 (LCL 75: 60–5). 
  
 
199 
cernitur).111 How an individual holds and presents him- or herself, in short, discloses the 
habitus mentis. Ambrose’s interest in the comportment of the body owes much to ancient 
rhetoric.112 Here, in particular, Ambrose’s exempla and counsel follow very nearly 
Cicero’s description of the successful orator.  
For delivery is wholly the concern of the feelings, and these are mirrored by the 
face and expressed by the eyes; for this is the only part of the body capable of 
producing as many indications and variations as there are emotions, and there is 
nobody who can produce the same effect with the eyes shut. . . . For it is by action 
the body talks so it is all the more necessary to make it agree with the thought; 
and nature has given us eyes, as she has given the horse and the lion their mane 
and tail and ears, to indicate the feelings of the mind, so that in the matter of 
delivery which we are now considering the face is next in importance to the voice; 
and the eyes are the dominant feature in the face.113 
 
                                                
111 Ambr. Off. 1.18.71 (CCSL 15: 27).  
112 During the Second Sophistic, it was commonplace to accuse philosophers of inconsistency 
between belief and physical behavior. See Luc. Icar. 29 (LCL 54: 316–17): “There is a class of men which 
made its appearance in the world not long ago, lazy, disputatious, vainglorious, quick-tempered, gluttonous, 
doltish, addle-pated, full of effrontery and to use the language of Homer, “a useless load to the soil.” Well, 
these people, dividing themselves into schools and inventing various word-mazes, have called themselves 
Stoics, Academics, Epicureans, Peripatetics and other things much more laughable than these. Then, 
cloaking themselves in the high-sounding name of Virtue, elevating their eyebrows, wrinkling up their 
foreheads and letting their beards grow long, they go about hiding loathsome habits under a false garb, very 
like actors in tragedy; for if you take away from the latter their masks and their gold-embroidered robes, 
nothing is left but a comical little creature hired for the show at seven drachmas.” Lucan’s Icaromenippus 
depicts Menippus, who, in imitating the infamous Icarus, crafts wings to fly up to Zeus, only to find Zeus 
hell-bent on destroying all philosophers. Here, we get a glimpse of Zeus’s divine judgment, critiquing 
philosophical presentation and its absence of actual content. Philosophers are lambasted for being akin to 
comic, hired actors, “cloaking themselves in the high-sounding name of Virtue” but offering little content 
in return. To Lucan’s mind, there is a disconnect, in other words, between the behavior and actual content. 
See also See Luc. Demon. 1–2 (LCL 14: 142–43); Dio Chrys. Or. 4.83–96 (LCL 257: 206–13). See also 
Roller, “Precept(or) and Example in Seneca,” 152–53, which notes a similar dynamic with reference to 
“philosophers who do not live according to their own praecepta” (at 152), citing Seneca’s Ep. 108.36–
108.37 (LCL 77: 252–53). In not living according to the precepts he teaches, a philosopher is useless: “a 
teacher like that can help me no more than a sea-sick pilot can be efficient in a storm. . . . What good is a 
frightened and vomiting steersman to me” (at 108.37). 
113 Cic. De or. 3.59.222–24 (LCL 349: 176–79). Animi est enim omnis actio, et imago animi 
vultus, indices oculi; nam haec est una pars corporis quae quot animi motus sunt tot significationes et 
commutationes possit efficere, neque vero est quisquam qui eadem conivens efficiat. . . .  Est enim actio 
quasi sermo corporis, quo magis menti congruens esse debet; oculos autem natura nobis, ut equo et leoni 
iubas, caudam, aures, ad motus animorum declarandos dedit, quare in hac nostra actione secundum vocem 
vultus valet; is autem oculis gubernator.  
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We can note the importance of the face for Cicero in listening to and translating body 
language that reveals what is happening in the mind. The body’s movement (actio) in 
particular is of great interest to Cicero here. “For is it by action the body talks so it is all 
the more necessary to make it agree with the thought,” he writes. The above passage also 
uses examples from the natural world to reiterate the ends requisite for human action: just 
as nature has “given us eyes . . . she has given the horse and lion their mane and tail and 
ears.” The assumed connection is plain: things proper to nature are discernable by reading 
a given creature’s physical appearance and activities. 
Of course, in this passage, Cicero concerns himself with oratorical delivery and 
demeanor, but Ambrose’s hortatory counsel to priests is not altogether different. Words 
and deeds indicate a priest’s virtuous modesty. As Ambrose puts it, “the mirror of the 
mind shines forth for the most part in our words” (Speculum enim mentis plerumque in 
uerbis refulget).114 Jarring or awkward movements and incendiary speech are, for 
Ambrose, telling of a lack of self-consistency and inner stability. Anger literally contorts 
the face, and pride noticeably alters the way one walks.115 In one of his more memorable 
examples, Ambrose recalls his own refusal to admit an ordinand to the priesthood and a 
dismissal of a practicing clergy member because of the their respective gaits.  
You will recall, my sons, a certain friend of ours. He appeared to commend 
himself by carrying out his duties with due care; yet I still refused to admit him 
into the body of the clergy. I had one reason only, and it was this: he carried 
himself physically in a way that was totally unseemly. You will recall another 
man, too. He was already a member of the clergy when I first encountered him, 
but I issued instructions that he was never to walk in front of me, for the cocky 
way in which he walked was—to be frank—painful for me to behold. And I said 
                                                
114 Ambr. Off. 1.18.67 (CCSL 15: 25). 
115 Ambr. Off. 1.45.229 (CCSL 15: 84–85). See Cic. Off. 1.130–32 (Winterbottom, 53–55; Trans. 
amended from Walsh, 44–45.  
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just that when he was restored to his office after committing his offence. I had no 
other reason but this to reject these men; but I did not prove mistaken in my 
judgment, for both of them went on to leave the church: they showed themselves 
to be every bit as faithless in spirit as their style of walking had suggested. One 
deserted the faith at the time of the Arian onslaught; the other was so keen on 
money that he was prepared to say he was not one of us, so as to escape being 
judged by his bishop. The image of the fickleness inside these men beamed forth 
in the way they walked—they had all the appearance of wandering jesters.116  
 
“Gait”—a functional actio—is the singular reason Ambrose cites for dismissing the two 
priests; he confirms that he was correct in his judgment when the two leave the Church—
“they showed themselves to be every bit as faithless in spirit as their style of walking had 
suggested.” The two had an illorum incessu imago leuitatis—literally, “an image of 
levity”—that was manifested in their particular species of walking.117  
The dismissal of these newly and nearly ordained priests shows Ambrose doing 
something akin to physiognomy—reading moral standing off of physical representation. 
This practice was common in the works of his Latin pre-Nicene predecessors, like 
Tertullian and Cyprian, as well as in other non-Christian philosophical and rhetorical 
texts, pointed out above, reading moral standing off of physical representation is also 
                                                
116 Ambr. Off. 1.17.72 (CCSL 15: 27; Trans. amended from Davidson, 161). Meministis, filii, 
quemdam amicum, cum sedulis se uideretur commendare officiis, hoc solo tamen in clerum a me non 
receptum, quod gestus eius plurimum dedeceret; alterum quoque, cum in clero repperissem, iubere me ne 
umquam praeiret mihi, quia uelut quodam insolentis incessus uerbere oculos feriret meos. Idque dixi cum 
redderetur post offensam muneri. Hoc solum excepi, nec fefellit sententia: uterque enim ab ecclesia 
recessit, ut qualis incessu prodebatur, talis perfidia animi demonstraretur. Namque alter Arianae 
infestationis tempore fidem deseruit, alter pecuniae studio, ne iudicium subiret sacerdotale, se nostrum 
negavit. Lucebat in illorum incessu imago leuitatis, species quaedam scurrarum percursantium.  
117 Ambrose, I would argue, is playing upon species’s multiple meanings here. That these two 
dismissed clergy exhibited a particular species of walking implies at least two things. First, the species of 
the imago leuitatis occupies a different category than a heavenly image. Secondly, species also carries the 
connotation of a visible representation. Hence, the species (read: the appearance) of these priests’ walking 
style indicates something vicious. 
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operative in Cicero’s On Duties, Ambrose’s most proximate source and foil for his own 
On Duties.118  
Ambrose’s remarkable similarities to pre-Nicene theologians and Cicero (among 
others) have not cooled debate over the motivations behind his counsel about bodily 
comportment generally and behind the description of walking in this passage in 
particular. Neil McLynn, for one, is hesitant to take Ambrose at his word, maintaining 
that he had more than one reason to dismiss these men.119 McLynn’s Ambrose trades not 
in issues of moral theology, of explicit and concerned ethical counsel and warning, but in 
the currency of social capital. Ambrose would not have dismissed these priests because of 
their pompous walking styles, McLynn contends, but because of a desire to weed out 
those who posed a non-Nicene threat to his authority, likely holdovers from Auxentius’s 
bishopric.120 McLynn’s Ambrose is less concerned with the actual ethical formation of his 
flock than with using his ecclesial authority for political gain.121  
                                                
118 Cic. Off. 1.130–31: “So any adornment unworthy of a man should be isolated from his person, 
and he should be careful not to betray a similar effeminacy in his gestures and movements. The movements 
rehearsed on the exercise-ground, for example, are often rather offensive, and some gestures of actors are 
rather foppish. In both these cases what wins praise is the straightforward and wholesome. A dignified 
appearance is to be maintained by the healthy complexion which is tidy enough to avoid boorish and 
uncivilized slovenliness. We must devote similar care to our dress; as in most things, the ideal here is the 
golden mean. We must be careful also not to saunter along too mincingly, looking like the tray-bearers in 
public processions, nor again to hurry along at breakneck speed so that we puff and blow, go red in the 
face, wear agonized expressions—all indicating clearly that we lack fixed purpose. But we must work even 
harder than this to make sure that our mental processes do not forsake nature’s path” (Trans. Walsh, 44). 
119 See McLynn, Ambrose of Milan, xiii–xviii, 34–35. McLynn admits the difficulty of locating the 
“real Ambrose” because of the “façade” these strategies project, concealing an “inner man” behind the 
mask. Instead of embarking on such a search, by steering clear of theological analysis, McLynn ably 
renarrates the social and historical context of Ambrose’s tenure as bishop. McLynn indicates that the 
dismissal of the two priests is akin to others of Ambrose’s public actions, meant to show the importance of 
publicizing his actions for garnering social clout. 
120 Ivor Davidson’s tack is different from McLynn’s. See Davidson, “A Tale of Two Approaches,” 
61–83, at 74–76. “The modesty of 1.1–22 has nothing to do with a diplomatic attempt to forestall criticism 
of the bishop's credentials. Rather, in an environment where personality clashes, petty squabbles, and 
selfish ambitions are an inevitable on-going reality, Ambrose aims implicitly to equate such attitudes with 
the arrogance and self-aggrandizement displayed by the ungodly, and to contrast this spirit with the image 
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While McLynn is more than capable of discerning Ambrose’s embroilment in late 
antique religious politics, his inherent suspicion regarding Ambrose’s writing and counsel 
here is, I think, overstated. Elsewhere, as I have pointed out, discussion of bodily 
comportment reiterates Ambrose’s obsession with public perception. And again and 
again, Ambrose reinforces this obsession with theological claims, calling into question 
McLynn’s assessment that Ambrose crafts a doctrinal artifice to cloak his attempts at 
influencing emperors, winning over the public, and securing political power. The body 
and its movements are moral scripts for Ambrose, the reading of which aids in discerning 
the soul and its inward movements, even its deepest longings and allegiances. In this, he 
is clearly at-home in the Roman traditions of public virtue, which emphasize both a moral 
attentiveness to living according to one’s nature and physical moderation as an indicator 
of such attentiveness or lack thereof.  
                                                                                                                                            
of the humble Christian minister. He introduces himself as a modest student-teacher, conscious of his own 
limitations, precisely in order to show that his style epitomizes the Christian approach; pride and self-
seeking are synonymous with a pagan ethic which has been rendered obsolete by the gospel’ (ibid., 76). 
See also, Davidson, De Officiis, 2: 510–511, where Davidson comments: “A[mbrose] evidently had no 
shortage of applicants, if he could refuse a man simply because of his gait. The second individual was 
among the clergy inherited by A[mbrose] from Auxentius’ time. . . . A[mbrose] had initially endeavoured 
not to create alienation by directly replacing those of homoian sympathies with his own pro-Nicene 
candidates, but perhaps he found some subtler ways of altering his retinue. We have no indication that the 
kind of rejection described here was typical, but even an isolated case or two would have contributed 
indirectly to the end-result of ensuring that the bishop's ranks were filled with the ‘right’ men.” See also 
Doerfler, “Law and Order,” 221–30, at 227. Doerfler mentions the example in passing, maintaining that the 
relationship of clergy to their bishops paralleled children to their father. For similar appraisals, see Meslin, 
Les Ariens d'Occident, 335–430, 45; Simonetti, La crisi ariana nel IV secolo, 438.  
121 The concern that drives much of this investigation is whether Ambrose can be trusted in light of 
his crafted self-presentation rooted in his classical training. The tendency has been to think either that 
Ambrose was theologically rigorous and fought off bands of heretics, or that he was concerned with 
presenting an image of Christianity and his office tending toward the heroic. Even if the latter is the case—
and I do not doubt that it is, in part—much can still be gleaned from Ambrose’s examples, rhetorical 
construction and all. I take Davidson’s tack here as a middling position between Ambrose the dramatist, 
concerned only with crafting an episcopal persona and drama for imperial on-lookers, and Ambrose the 
anti-Arian bully, constantly fighting back heretical surges based on his principled faith. For Ambrose, 
theology and rhetoric are not opposed, but go hand-in-glove. See Ivor J. Davidson, “Staging the Church?: 
Theology as Theater,” JECS 8.3 (2000): 413–51, at 421–23. 
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Finally, one should point out that Ambrose is at home in the thought-world of an 
early Stoic psychology of action. The driving question of such action theory is, as Brad 
Inwood has put it, “how the things we do, actions, can be related to thoughts, sentences, 
and other more or less mental entities used to describe and talk about the things we 
do.”122 The Stoics thought that action was caused by the agent’s rational assent to a given 
impulse. The goal, as often described, was one of ἀπάθεια. Our modern presuppositions 
notwithstanding, Stoic “apathy” was not a carefree, emotionless state, but the ordered and 
proper alignment of reason and internal impulse.123 Key to this alignment was attending 
to the demands inherent in one’s given nature. Assent fostered motivation for a given 
action, such that the agent would be able to render an account of her doings, the imagined 
end for which she acted, and such that she might be held responsible for a given action.124  
Walking was one of the Stoics’ most famous object lessons for the role of 
judgment and human action. Seneca’s Epistle 113 recounts a debate between Cleanthes 
and Chrysippus in describing the motivations and mechanics of walking.125 Cleathes held 
the more moderate position of the two: bits of movements within an individual’s spirit 
were transmitted to one’s limbs, causing their movement.126 “The action, properly 
speaking, is not the movement of the limbs,” Inwood writes of Cleanthes’ position, “but 
                                                
122 Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, 95. 
123 Dio. Laer. 7.110 (LCL 185: 216–17). ἔστι δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος κατὰ Ζήνωνα ἡ ἄλογος καὶ 
παρὰ φύσιν ψυχῆς κίνησις ἢ ὁρμὴ πλεονάζουσα. See also J. M. Rist, Stoic Philosophy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1969), 22–36, at 29. See Stough, “Stoic Determinism and Moral 
Responsibility,” 205–6. 
124 Stough, “Stoic Determinism and Moral Responsibility,” 207–09. 
125 Sen. Ep. 113.23–25 (LCL 77: 294–95).  See also Sen. Ep. 66.5–6 (LCL 76: 4–5), where Seneca 
describes the “modest gait, a calm and honest countenance, and a bearing that suits the man of wisdom.” 
126 Cf. Arist. De Motu an. 702a (LCL 323: 466–69). 
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the pneuma which made them move.”127 Chrysippus’ claim was stronger (and likely less 
orthodox): the primal essence itself was the movement of the limbs; the act of walking 
was an instance of the principale ipsum, or, as John Rist has put it, “an act of the 
personality itself.”128 Rist continues: “Walking is in fact a showing forth or state of our 
continuing decision; or, we might say conversely, our continuing decision is the 
conceptual image of our action.”129  
The two Stoics’ debate is thus over whether the internal principle first moved and 
next operated upon the legs for the purpose of walking or whether internal and external 
movement happened simultaneously. Cleanthes took the former position, which appears 
to have been Stoic convention, Chrysippus the latter. Chrysippus’ corrigendum took up 
the issue of temporal sequencing. It was not that we first think about moving our limbs 
and then begin to move them, but rather that judgment and movement come packaged 
together. While the debate was proximately over walking, it ultimately pertained to the 
existence and function of emotions in relation to rational assent. “The problem about 
πάθη is similar to the problem of any bodily activity,” Rist writes. “In [Chrysippus’] 
view, it seems, we do not make judgments and then feel emotional effects. The emotional 
effects are a part—and indeed an inseparable part—of the judgment itself.”130 Still, 
                                                
127 Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, 50 
128 Rist, Stoic Philosophy, 34. 
129 Rist, Stoic Philosophy, 34. 
130 Rist, Stoic Philosophy, 33–35. 
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despite their differences, both Cleanthes and Chrysippus maintained a core claim: that 
pneuma caused the exterior movement of walking.131  
This brief excursus into Stoic psychology of action gives greater texture and depth 
to Ambrose’s critiques of voice inflection and gait. Behind his critiques in sum is a 
Roman world that largely assumes the connection between internal states and external 
action. To put it even more starkly: it would be strange in Ambrose’s time not to connect 
impulse or intention to a given action. The connection to our organizing passage from 
Exposition of the Gospel of Luke 1.7–1.9 is striking. There, we recall, Ambrose’s 
statement regarding first “reading” Jesus’ acts as insight into his invisible divinity and 
shared power with the Father; this was followed by a parallel reading of scriptural 
exemplars’ actions as insight into the intention.132  The character of each act indicates its 
interior motive source and the relative balance of virtue’s twins: action and intention.  
 
Imaging Divine Operation, or, Smith on the “Unity of the Faculties” in Ambrose  
Given ourword studies above of eluceo and effigies and our investigation of 
Ambrose’s debts to the Roman virtue tradition, we can now return to the curious phrase 
that the well-painted soul is one in which “a semblance of divine operation shines” and 
offer a perhaps more provocative reinterpretation. In one respect, the statement is a 
common outworking of image theologies: a created thing will inevitably resemble its 
                                                
131 See Rist, Stoic Philosophy, 33–35. The close connection between inner and outer states further 
illumines the fact that Stoics are often labeled “materialists” and that in Stoic reflection on human action, 
“impulse” (horme) rather than “action” (praxis) is used more often. See Inwood, Ethics and Human Action 
in Early Stoicism, 52–53. 
132 Ambr. Luc. 1.8–9 (CSEL 32/4: 16). 
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creator in one way or another. Most will find this and similar lines familiar and attach 
that familiarity to the influence of “Hellenistic” traditions on theologians like Ambrose. 
But we might be surprised to find a very similar statement in the Latin tradition, of an 
ideal shining forth in its copy in Cicero’s description of the perfect orator.  
Consequently in delineating the perfect orator I shall be portraying such a one as 
perhaps has never existed. Indeed I am not inquiring who was the perfect orator, 
but what is that unsurpassable idea which seldom if ever appears throughout a 
whole speech but does shine forth at some times and in some places, more 
frequently in some speakers, more rarely perhaps in others. But I am firmly of the 
opinion that nothing of any kind is so beautiful as not to be excelled in beauty by 
that of which it is a copy, as a mask is an image of a face. This ideal cannot be 
perceived by the eye or ear, nor by any of the senses, but we can nevertheless 
grasp it by the mind and the imagination. For example, in the case of the statues 
of Phidias, the most perfect of their kind that we have ever seen, and in the case of 
the paintings I have mentioned, we can, in spite of their beauty, imagine 
something more beautiful. . . . Accordingly, as there is something perfect and 
surpassing in the case of sculpture and painting—an intellectual ideal by reference 
to which the artist represents those objects which do not themselves appear to the 
eye, so with our minds we see the ideal of perfect eloquence, but with our ears we 
catch only the copy.133 
 
                                                
133 Cic. Orat. 2.7–3.11 (LCL 342: 310–14). Atque ego in summo oratore fingendo talem informabo 
qualis fortasse nemo fuit. Non enim quaero quis fuerit, sed quid sit illud quo nihil esse possit praestantius, 
quod in perpetuitate dicendi non saepe atque haud scio an nunquam in aliqua autem parte eluceat 
aliquando, idem apud alios densius, apud alios fortasse rarius. Sed ego sic statuo, nihil esse in ullo genere 
tam pulchrum, quo non pulchrius id sit unde illud ut ex ore aliquo quasi imago exprimatur. Quod neque 
oculis neque auribus neque ullo sensu percipi potest, cogitatione tamen et mente complectimur. Itaque et 
Phidiae simulacris, quibus nihil in illo genere perfectius uidemus, et eis picturis quas nominaui cogitare 
tamen possumus pulchriora. . . . Ut igitur in formis et figuris est aliquid perfectum et excellens, cuius ad 
cogitatam speciem imitando referuntur ea quae sub oculos ipsa non cadunt, sic perfectae eloquentiae 
speciem animo uidemus, effigiem auribus quaerimus. See also Dillon, The Middle Platonists, 52–113, at 
93–95. In his discussion of Antiochus of Ascalon, Dillon points to Cic. Orat. 2.7–3.11 (LCL 342: 310–14). 
This passage and others from Cicero is representative of Antiochus’s emendations of Plato. Cicero’s 
passage can thus be seen as a reinterpretation of Plato’s notion that “ideas . . . derive their eternity and 
immutability not from their existence in a transcendent realm, but rather from the essential uniformity of 
the human intellect” (94).  For more on Phidias’s statues as “the most perfect of their kind”, see Verity 
Platt, Facing the Gods: Epiphany and Representation in Graeco-Roman Art, Literature and Religion 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 224–35. “In viewing Phidias’ creation, one beheld not 
simply a statue, but a visual embodiment of Hellenic religious tradition itself. The sense of epiphanic 
encounter generated by the image thus demonstrated the Greek world’s privileged relationship with the 
divine, symbolising not only the piety and virtue of worshippers at Olympia, but also the vibrancy and 
vitality of Hellenic culture” (at 226–27). 
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For Cicero, there appears to be little distinction among his various words for copy 
(similacrum, pictura, forma, figura, effigies); each has similar interpretive force as the 
others. There is an ideal of the “perfect orator” (summo oratore), of which only a copy or 
image “shines forth” (eluceat). Semblances are not negative, they are simply how we 
come to know something of the true and beautiful. Cicero references Phidias’ statues, 
said to be “the most perfect of their kind,” and still, they point to something yet more 
beautiful. The crafted beauty representative in these works of art, in other words, points 
to something further. Or, as Cicero concludes, “with our minds we conceive the ideal of 
perfect eloquence, but with our ears we catch only the copy.” It is not simply that beauty 
resides in the copy or statue. It is that, when these works of art are experienced, we are 
able, in sum, “to see” (uidemus) perfect eloquence distinct from its images, and to which 
the very images point. 
Most early Christian reflection on the image of God entailed a related claim. The 
human being, even in her beautifully created complexity—“the most perfect of its 
kind”—will point to something still greater, namely, her Creator. Treatments of 
Ambrose, by and large, follow this tack and argue that he attaches rational and invisible 
value to the divine image within the soul and that the image’s stated beauty reveals the 
increate dignity present therein. The soul, adorned with divine works, necessarily bears 
the marks, an image or effigies, of those works. In this instance, we can conclude that 
effigies is straightforwardly a matter of fact that further emphasizes the difference 
between Painter and masterpiece.  
The most recent secondary treatment is that from Warren Smith. In reference to 
Hexaemeron 6.7.41, Warren Smith argues that Ambrose’s intent in using the metaphor of 
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God as Painter and the individual as painting is for the purpose of highlighting the beauty 
of the soul.  
Like the interior walls of Jerusalem, [the soul] has been adorned by God with 
God’s own virtues. Where one sees the beauty of virtue, one sees the artistry of 
God’s creative operation. Such likeness to the divine is not hidden but shines out 
on the world through the soul. Such a soul that simultaneously sets its thoughts 
upon God and gives life to the body does not participate in worldly vanity, but 
bears the divine image to the world.134 
 
I think Smith is right to foreground Ambrose’s artistic metaphor in order to understand 
the import of the image of God has for anthropology. Ambrose surely wants to draw 
attention to the beauty of the image depicted in—or, more properly, on— the soul. As we 
have seen repeatedly, he reiterates to his audiences that eacb of them needs to “attend to 
thyself alone,” to consider what he or she is at bottom, following the words from Exodus 
and Deuteronomy and the Delphic injunction. Such self-contemplation serves as moral 
motivation to throw off images of vice and put on images of virtues.135  
Smith is also correct to highlight Ambrose’s use of “shine” (elucet) to 
communicate that godlikeness beams through the world. I am most interested in Smith’s 
attention to how the soul, as he puts it, “gives life to the body . . . [and] bears the divine 
image to the world.”136 What this chapter has suggested is that this conclusion can be 
taken a step further with consideration of Ambrose’s Roman debts. These debts, 
contracted through his education and training as public official, temper and occasionally 
                                                
134 Smith, Christian Grace and Pagan Virtue, 19. 
135 Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy, 326–28. This is in line proper to what Lewis Ayres has called a 
“dual-focus” anthropology. Ayres writes: “Any anthropology is ‘dual-focus’ where problems with 
unsanctified human thinking and action—and the cure for those problems—are described by exploring how 
human beings should possess a trained soul that animates the body and attends to their joint τέλος in the 
divine presence through contemplation of God” (at 326). 
136 Smith, Christian Grace and Pagan Virtue, 19. 
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direct Ambrose’s Greek debts. Since the human being can be said to bear the marks of 
divine operation within, she continuously reflects a dynamic similar to divine opera in 
her activity. It is not simply that God adorns the soul—although it is surely that—it is that 
the character of human action resembles its divine painter’s by virtue of being so painted. 
This connection of human and divine action, sharing similar logics, is critical I think to 
Ambrose’s moral vision, and can help us, as readers, understand why Ambrose seems to 
harp on the tangible enactment of moral virtues and the exemplars who perform them.  
So, the more technical, and perhaps more provocative, implication, based on our 
reflection above on the nature of divine and human action, goes like this. If God painted 
the soul such that divine operation shines within it, then we can expect the soul’s 
operation to reflect the same (or at least a similar) character as divine operation. By 
saying human action reflects the character of divine operation, I mean that the logistics of 
human action mirror divine action, that, whether in divine action or in human action, the 
invisible, divine or human, is in some respect made known by the visible. Latin 
theologians’ understanding of divine operation, as argued in Chapter One, explained 
divine action by highlighting biblical passages presenting the Son’s visibility as 
indicative of his divinity and indicative of a shared, single divine power. By means of the 
Son’s visible works and words, we are able to identify both his divine status and the unity 
of power between the visible works and the invisible divine life.  
When Ambrose thus maintains that a “semblance of divine operation shines” in 
the rational soul, I am arguing that he has this visual logic of Trinitarian unity and 
operation in mind. If this is the case, then two things follow. First, just as the invisible 
Father and visible Son are united in power, will, and operation, so are the soul and body 
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to be united in power, will, and operation. At the beginning of Hexaemeron 6.7.42, 
Ambrose lays out a threefold distinction between “what we are” (nos sumus), “the things 
that are ours” (sunt nostra), and “that which surrounds us” (quae circa nos sunt).137 
“What we are” refers to the unity of body and soul, in their initial marriage and 
presumably prior to our first parents’ sin; “the things that are ours” refers to the 
“members of our bodies and senses;” and “that which what surrounds us” refers to the 
things proper to this life. The distinction affords Ambrose discrete ways of talking about 
the body and the material world that are more complex than simply equating the body 
with death and imprisonment. So, Ambrose’s repeated injunction, “Attend to thyself,” 
charges his listeners to consider the prelapsarian unity of body and soul rather than one’s 
physical members or the desiderata of one’s present state. 
Through the lens of Hexaemeron 6.7.40ff., Smith picks up on this unity and seeks 
in part to reappraise the ways in which the body and soul can be said to cohere. Smith 
argues that there are two principle philosophical sources behind Ambrose’s claims to this 
unity; Smith calls this claim Ambrose’s “hylomorphic theory.”138 The first line is the 
Aristotelian. In Ambrose’s “clear” adaptation of Aristotle, Smith argues that the soul is 
both the formal cause of the body and its animating principle that “determines the end to 
                                                
137 Hex. 6.7.42 (CSEL 32/1: 233). Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Homilies on the Song of Songs 9 (GNO 6: 
275–76; translation from Gregory of Nyssa, Homilies on the Song of Songs, Writings from the Greco-
Roman World 13 [Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2012], 291). Gregory’s homily deals with Song 
of Songs 4:10–15.“But the motion of the reasoning faculty becomes properly ours only when it is going in 
the direction of what is beneficial for us and when it assists us in every way to possess what is good. . . . Of 
the things that are within us, there are some, whatever is proper to the soul, that are truly ours; and there are 
some, things associated with the body, I mean, and things outside of us, that we appropriate as though they 
were ours because, by reason of some erroneous notion, we deem what is alien to be our own.”  
138 Smith, Christian Grace and Pagan Virtue, 29–42. 
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which our bodily actions are directed.”139 The relationship of the soul to the body is here 
an “instrumental” one.  
That the soul can be said to instrumentalize the body for the attainment of virtue 
Smith thinks points to a second philosophical source: Plotinus and the Platonic tradition. 
In this stream of thought, the soul is the more important of the two and “attends” to the 
body’s needs for its governance.140 While both Aristotle and Plotinus lie in the 
background, Smith contends that Ambrose is more Plotinian than Aristotelian. Smith 
understands, à la John Cavadini,141 that this Plotinian predominance is seen in the 
importance that Ambrose places on the flight of the immaterial soul from the body. Like 
Cavadini, Smith cites On the Good of Death and the soul’s temptation amongst bodily or 
worldly snares.142 By soul and body, Smith maintains, Ambrose has in mind, like other 
authors of his day, something like the “competing faculties or impulses of the soul that 
have different orientations” and Ambrose is thinking about the subsequent longing for 
“harmonic unity” or “moral unity” of these faculties.143 
While Smith’s reconstruction has greatly facilitated discerning Ambrose’s 
potential classical debts and their Christian transformations, he fails to attend to the 
significance of embodied, particularly Roman, public virtue in Ambrose’s moral counsel. 
I do not mean that Smith fails to discuss virtue. He does, and, in some places, at length. I 
                                                
139 Smith, Christian Grace and Pagan Virtue, 29. 
140 Smith, Christian Grace and Pagan Virtue, 30. 
141 See Cavadini, “Ambrose and Augustine De Bono Mortis,” in The Limits of Ancient 
Christianity, 232–49.  
142 See Smith, Christian Grace and Pagan Virtue, 31. Smith cites Ambr. Bon. mort. 6.25 (CSEL 
32/1: 725–26) in reference to worldly snares. 
143 Smith, Christian Grace and Pagan Virtue, 33. 
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mean rather that Smith sees the struggle between soul and body to be remedied with 
reference to a decidedly Greek ascent to incorporeal realities or contemplation. By doing 
so, Smith attends well to the Greek’s heritage in Ambrose’s background.  
I do not deny that Ambrose plainly has Greek thinkers at his disposal and that his 
work occasionally evinces themes of interior, incorporeal ascent and contemplation. Take 
this statement as an example. “I have often preached,” Ambrose admits, “on flight from 
this world.”144 Later in the same work, Ambrose tells his readers to gaze upon Christ with 
“inner eyes” (interioribus oculis),145 and, like David, to take up “an ascent of the mind 
(mentis ascensione) . . . to become a type of Christ” (typus Christi).146 Lines like these are 
peppered throughout, and, some might even say, dictate Ambrose’s moral counsel.  
Smith’s underlying presupposition is Ambrose’s focus on ascent, contemplation, 
and hence, virtue owes to his Greek sources. He says as much at the outset of his 
treatment: “This book extends the argument of Hadot, Madec, and Lenox-Conyngham 
that Ambrose’s theology is primarily an expression of his reading of Scripture—albeit in 
conversation with philosopher-exegetes like Philo and Origen—rather than Plato or 
Plotinus.”147 But Ambrose also maintains, as we have explored above, the undeniable 
importance of virtue publicized, of priests and catechumens holding their bodies in 
certain ways and those ways being indicative of an interior stability and moderation. And 
these sorts of statements are difficult to square with Ambrose’s supposedly consistent 
doctrine of the imprisoned soul, needing to ignore bodily realities that weigh it down. 
                                                
144 Ambr. Fug. 1.1 (CSEL 32/2: 163). 
145 Ambr. Fug. 1.4 (CSEL 32/2: 165). 
146 Ambr. Fug. 4.19 (CSEL 32/2: 179–80). 
147 Smith, Christian Grace and Pagan Virtue, xviii. 
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Here, the body is not altogether damnable, but a key means of communication—the 
physical comportment of the body tells of theological allegiance and moral disposition. 
And while Smith admits such a nuance when he cites Ambrose’s trifold treatment of the 
body from Hexaemeron 6.7.42—nos sumus; sunt nostra; quae circa nos sunt148—he 
concludes that the body, at best, functions as a sort of moral placeholder for our 
appetitive or passionate failings east of Eden. Making such a move leads Smith to believe 
that Ambrose prescribes the quick remedy of such failings as the flight of the soul from 
the body. This, Smith concludes, is Ambrose’s virtuous ideal. Ultimately, Smith’s 
recourse to flight of the soul from the body obviates the possibility for the body to be a 
locus for moral transformation; for Smith’s Ambrose, the body should instead be treated 
with suspicion and ultimately left behind. 
Ambrose certainly desires a unity of body and soul, and a similar unity can even 
be seen in Aristotle. But Ambrose’s commitment to an Aristotelian “harmonic unity” 
between body and soul is at least supplemented, if not outshined, by Stoic reflection on 
reason as distinctive of the human condition and the governor of the individual. Because 
the soul is the informing principle of the body, the soul is tasked with subjecting the 
body, its impulses and appetites, under the governing principle of reason. It is the case 
that this governing is in part the work of faculties, competing appetites and the like, but 
Ambrose is also adamant that the physical body’s activity will disclose the inner nature of 
the soul.  
While Smith capably explicates the moral unity present in Ambrose’s theology, 
my primary concern here is perhaps more basic: to show how physical action discloses 
                                                
148 Ambr. Hex. 6.7.42 (CSEL 32/1: 233). 
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the inner nature of the agent. Maria Doerfler has called this disclosure the way in which 
the body serves as a moral “synecdoche” for late antique authors.149 For Ambrose, the 
physical body serves as a script by which the successes and challenges of the inner soul 
are made plain. The unity of body and soul, therefore, is ultimately concerned with the 
publicizing of interior action, with how bodies live and express the dispositions of the 
souls that quicken and govern them. The point is not to disregard Ambrose’s reflection on 
competing faculties, but to draw attention to the fact that the way in which one knows 
about the imbalance (or balance) of those faculties is by seeing such an imbalance (or 
balance) disclosed in concrete action. Smith hints at an admission along these lines when 
he notes that occasionally Ambrose intends a unity of body and soul that might be termed 
“physical.”150 Rather than explaining what such a claim might mean, Smith instead 
attends to the soul’s longing for “moral unity” in Ambrose, a move I argue attends not to 
the claims of public virtue, but to mystical and incorporeal ascent.  
 The question is not whether Ambrose is more Roman or Greek, but how these 
differing strands (Cicero, Philo, etc.) come together, even occasionally contradict each 
other, in the same mind.  The tendency to read Ambrose, following Jerome’s charges of 
plagiarism, as a warmed over, out-of-touch Greek lookalike does a disservice to the 
texture and nuance of romanitas in late antiquity generally and Ambrose’s discrete 
theological contribution to virtue particularly. The old view that Romanness, as a state of 
                                                
149 See Maria E. Doerfler, “Coming Apart at the Seams: Cross-Dressing, Masculinity, and the 
Social Body in Late Antiquity,” in Dressing Judeans and Christians in Antiquity (Ashgate: Burlington, VT, 
2014), 37–51, at 48. Doerfler admits the now-pervasive view of Ambrose as political powerbroker (as seen, 
for instance, in the work of Neil McLynn), but contends that “the true battle . . . would not be fought 
merely over pagan altars and the trappings of imperial office, but over the hearts, minds, and bodies of 
Roman citizens. The latter’s importance was further enhanced by virtue of the body’s privileged powers of 
signification in late ancient thought.”   
150 Smith, Christian Grace and Pagan Virtue, 33. 
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mind, is the rough equivalent to being power-hungry dies a slow death. Still, this is the 
essence of Roman culture McLynn, Brown, and, by negation, Smith assume. McLynn’s 
Ambrose is Roman in the sense that he is cagey; Brown’s in the sense that he is too 
political to be contemplative; and Smith’s in the sense that Ambrose’s Hellenism is the 
(transformed) pagan source for best understanding Ambrose’s virtue theology. What I 
have sought to do throughout, and in Chapter Four in particular, is to balance the Greek 
and Roman threads in Ambrose so as not to resort to this antinomy. The promise in 
reading Ambrose as a thoroughgoing Roman who adapts Greek exegesis takes his pre-
episcopal training and career seriously and affords us, as his late modern interpreters, a 
more fulsome portrait of him as cosmopolitan bishop. Taking seriously the ubiquity of 
Ambrose’s Roman debts also paints for us a more complex and distinct picture of his 
public, pro-Nicene virtue, and it helps us to see the Latin and Roman traditions behind his 
theology.  
 
Conclusion 
If it is the case that Ambrose is “obsessed with what people see,” as Davidson 
claims, then the struggle for the unity of soul and body is not only a competition of 
faculties, but the challenge of measured self-presentation. To see a given action granted 
insight into the motivating principle, emotions, and general affect of the agent. This 
chapter has argued that Ambrose’s familiarity with Roman rhetorical and Latin 
theological traditions, forged in the crucible of controversy, supports the visual logic we 
identified in his Trinitarian theology. We can also say the obverse: the visual logic 
present in Ambrose’s rhetorical training is reiterated by his Trinitarian theology. 
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Ambrose’s rhetorical training as a public official, while presumably traditional, 
was not the unavoidable conclusion or supplement to a pro-Nicene theology. Parallel 
visual logics between Trinitarian and moral theologies were not inevitable. Public virtue 
did not have to be Christian virtue; plenty of other ascetic programs could be squared 
with pious, Nicene theology. Fourth-century thinkers other than Ambrose exemplify 
alternate forms.  
Still, for Ambrose, public virtue became the telltale signifier of the soul. Such a 
program of public virtue aided in winnowing discontents from the Church, to be sure; it 
also, as I have argued above, bore the logical marks of pro-Nicene Christology.151 Lewis 
Ayres gestures to something like this conclusion in Nicaea and Its Legacy, indicating that 
the reach of pro-Nicene thought extended into “accounts of the spiritual progress that 
constitute Christian life. . . . Emphasis on the coequal statue of the Word and on the 
simplicity of the divine existence resulted in a deferring of our cognitive rest and in the 
construction of a new attention to the paradoxes and tensions of speaking, seeing, tasting, 
and touching in Christian existence.”152 For Ambrose, attention to the visual logic in his 
reflection on God was coequal with his attention to human action. This twinning of 
divine and human action, I have maintained, was the result of a particular blend of public, 
educational training and the result of intellectual influence in the context of theological 
polemic. A question still lingers, however: if the character of human action follows a 
similar logic as its divine author and counterpart, and if human action reveals the 
                                                
151 See Brown, The Body and Society, 345–47. 
152 See Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy, 340–43, at 341. 
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character of the human soul, what should watermark the content of human action? What 
is the distinctive characteristic Ambrose specifies for pro-Nicene virtue?  
  
  
 
219 
CHAPTER FIVE: “FOR EVEY SIMPLE SOUL IS BLESSED”: PRO-NICENE 
VIRTUE, CHRISTIAN AND SIMPLE 
 
 The concern throughout the previous four chapters has been analyzing Ambrose’s 
considerations on divine and human action. Ambrose connects these doctrines with a 
visual logic: visible works disclose invisible nature. In his Christology, the visible works 
of the Son indicate his deity and shared power with the Father. This reflection comes to 
expression in Ambrose’s debates with the homoians—debates that shaped most of his 
corpus.  
A similar visual logic drives Ambrose’s moral anthropology and subsequent 
doctrine of human action. Chapter Three examined God as Painter and hence, as the 
source of moral excellence, while the last chapter analyzed the force of Ambrose’s 
curious statement that the well-painted soul is the one “in which a semblance of divine 
operation shines.”1 I argued that this phrase helps us understand not only that the rational 
soul is dignified, but that the character of divine operation will be imaged or mirrored by 
its human counterpart. So, just as Ambrose describes divine operation as visible works 
disclosing the invisible nature of God, the human subject’s visible works disclose her 
unseen human motivations and impulses. Or, as I put it in the last chapter, virtuous 
human action mirrors the character of its divine author and counterpart. If virtues are 
intrinsically public, for Ambrose, questions linger, namely: What is the uniquely 
Christian content of Christian (public) virtue according to Ambrose? What distinguishes 
Christian action from its multiple laudable rivals or even from apparent non-Christian 
virtues? This chapter poses an answer: for Ambrose, true Christian virtue is simple in 
                                                
1 Ambr. Hex. 6.7.42 (CSEL 32/1: 233–34). 
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intent, word, and deed. By “simple” Ambrose intends a specific content, which I will 
explore in this chapter. 
This chapter’s organization in part seeks to rebuff the claim that several secondary 
treatments have implicitly put forward: that Ambrose’s use of rhetoric is necessarily 
opposed to his theology. I flagged this claim in Brown’s treatment of Ambrose in his 
Augustine: A Biography, as well as in McLynn’s inherent suspicion of all things 
theological in Ambrose’s writings, a suspicion that unearths ulterior motives and power 
plays at work. In order to revisit the scholarly antinomy between Ambrose’s rhetoric and 
theology, I first explore proceedings from the Council of Aquileia (381 CE). There, as we 
will see, Ambrose lambasts homoians Palladius and Secundianus for being deceptive and 
failing to confess a simple faith. Still, polemical charges of deception were common in 
the later fourth century, and Ambrose’s resort to them in the conciliar context does not 
prove simplicity’s theological content. Ambrose, as several have suggested, could have 
disguised his theological shortcomings under the guise of rhetorical tactics. 
The second section of this chapter proves the moral importance Ambrose places 
on simplicity in a context where precious few would question his motives: his first 
funeral oration at the passing of his brother, Satyrus.2 I zero in on one passage in 
                                                
2 For more on De excessu fratris and its role as a piece of early Christian consolation literature, see 
Yves-Marie Duval, “Formes profanes et formes bibliques dans les oraisons funèbres de saint Ambroise,” in 
Christianisme et formes littéraires de l’antiquité tardive en occident, ed. M. Fuhrmann (Geneva, 1968), 
235–92; Hervé Savon, “La première oraison funèbre de saint Ambroise (De excessu fratris 1) et les deux 
sources de la consolation chrétienne,” Revue des études latines 58 (1980), 370–402; Moorhead, Ambrose, 
36–39. For Ambrose’s similarities to other authors who wrote philosophical consolation, like Cicero and 
Seneca, see Marie-Pierre Labrique, “Ambroise de Milan et Sénèque: À propos du ‘De excessu fratris II’,” 
Latomus 50.2 (1991): 409–18. See also Markschies, Ambrosius von Mailand und die Trinitätstheologie, 
102–6, which uses Exc. to examine Ambrose’s early Christology. For locating funeral orations within the 
genre of epideictic rhetoric, see Laurent Pernot, Epideictic Rhetoric: Questioning the Stakes of Ancient 
Praise (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2015), 21–28. 
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particular, where Ambrose uses key and technical terms for exploring the content and 
effects of moral simplicity. 
 
Reading Heresy as Vice: Pro-Nicene Virtue and Its Homoian Deviants 
This section shows that identifying simplicity as an ideal does the double service 
of helping distinguish pro-Nicene virtue from its homoian deviants.3 The trope of 
homoian deception took root early in Ambrose’s mind. Ambrose’s use of the trope, some 
have said, shows his careful and measured use of rhetorical rather than theological 
training. This use is, to put it crassly, merely a tactic, wielded in a “rapid though rather 
superficial fashion”4 and manifested by multiple blanket condemnations of “Arianism” 
rather than specific Arians.5  
                                                
3 See Richard Paul Vaggione, O.H.C., “Of Monks and Lounge Lizards: ‘Arians’, Polemics and 
Asceticism in the Roman East,” in Arianism after Arius : Essays on the Development of the Fourth Century 
Trinitarian Conflicts, ed. M. R. Barnes and D. H. Williams (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1993), 181–214. 
Vaggione ably reconstructs the Greek association of heresy and vice. See also Daniel H. Williams, 
“Necessary Alliance or Polemical Portrayal? Tracing the Historical Alignment of Arians and Pagans in the 
Later Fourth Century,” in Historica, theologica et philosophia, critica et philologica, ed. Elizabeth A. 
Livingstone, SP 29 (Leuven: Peeters, 1997), 178–94. Williams argues that Nicene polemics against Arians 
rested on the association of heresy and paganism. See too Maria Doerfler, “Ambrose’s Jews,” 749–72. 
Doerfler further notes the connection between Ambrose’s “Jews” and heretics, both en masse and in 
particular in the Exposition of the Gospel of Luke, exploring how Ambrose uses rhetorical techniques to 
“establish guilt by association” (at 753). Rather than seek to reconstruct the historical landscape of 
competing religious traditions in Milan, Doerfler proceeds with the understanding that these tactics “reveal 
far more about the framework that the bishop sought to create for his audience than about links—perceived 
or genuine—between Jews and heretics in fourth-century northern Italy” (at 754). Further, the association 
in Luc. of Jews and heretics is “bi-directional, moving from ‘Jewishness’ to ‘heresy’ and vice versa” (764). 
Others have written about the association of non-Christian “groups” for mass dismissal. See, e.g., Averil 
Cameron, “Jews and Heretics—A Category Error?” in The Ways that Never Parted: Jews and Christians in 
Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages, ed. Adam H. Becker and Annette Yoshiko Reed (Minneapolis: 
Fortress, 2007), 345–60. 
4 For this turn of phrase, see Paredi, Saint Ambrose, 180. While I think this “rather superficial” 
manner of dismissing is typically for him, Ambrose does mention specific figures on occasion. See, for 
example, Ambr. Ep. 13.6 (CSEL 35/1: 56). In this letter, addressed to the Roman council on behalf of 
Gratian and Valentinian II, Ambrose notes the case of the homoian bishop Florentius of Puteoli, expelled 
from that see only to sneak back into his former jurisdiction several years later to instigate riots. The fifth-
century historian Sozomen identifies homoian elusiveness and persuasion in finding their way back into the 
  
 
222 
In an epistle offering counsel to newly appointed Constantius, about to assume 
jurisdiction of a homoian basilica in Illyria,6 Ambrose warns the region’s residents are 
“saturated with false teaching”; that they “spread false seeds of doctrine”; that they are 
guilty of “perfidy”; and that their “minds [are] imbued with the poisons of infidelity.”7 
                                                                                                                                            
emperor’s good graces. See his Hist. eccl. 4.19. This judgment is reiterated by Hanson, The Search for the 
Christian Doctrine of God, 562, 669. 
5 See Ambr. Fid. 1.5.34–42 (CSEL 78: 16–7). There, Ambrose gives a broad characterization of 
the “Arians”: “They say that the Son of God is unlike (dissimilem) his Father. To say this of a man would 
be an insult. They say that the Son of God had a beginning in time, whereas he himself is the source and 
ordainer of time and all that therein is. . . . They say that he was created. . . . They deny his goodness. . . . 
They deny that he is truly Son of God (negant uerum dei filium), they deny his omnipotence . . . 
Furthermore, the Arians deny that in Godhead the Son is one with the Father (negant etiam diuinitate unum 
esse cum patre). . . . Seeing, then, that the heretic says that Christ is unlike (dissimilem) his Father, and 
seeks to maintain this by subtle disputation (uersutis disputationibus), we must cite the Scripture: ‘Take 
heed that no one make spoil of you by philosophy […].” Hanson notes that in defending their theology, 
homoians “were under the constant necessity of disavowing a position which their opponents . . . constantly 
ascribed to them—that of Anhomoianism. This was the doctrine that the Son was positively unlike the 
Father without further qualification” (Hanson, The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God, 572). 
6 For background on Illyria, the area immediately east of the Adriatic, its dangers, and Ambrose’s 
distaste for it, see McLynn, Ambrose of Milan, 88–106. The Nicene mythos surrounding Illyria promoted it 
as a seedbed for heresy, and the products of its errant teaching were akin to outgrowths which sought to 
choke out orthodoxy. The heretical characterization of Illyria was at root supported by the widespread 
claim that Arius himself had been exiled there. In his brief stint before being recalled to Egypt, Arius 
supposedly nurtured the heresy in the region by means of deception. According to Athanasius, Ursacius of 
Singidunum and Valens of Mursa were two of Arius’ top students; both were condemned at the Council of 
Rimini in 359, some twenty years after their supposed teacher’s death. Recent English-language treatments 
of Arius after Nicaea include: Timothy Barnes, “The Exile and Recalls of Arius,” The Journal of 
Theological Studies 60.1 (2009): 109–29, at 125–26; R. Williams, Arius; Maurice Wiles, Archetypal 
Heresy: Arianism Through the Centuries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 36; Hanson, The Search 
for the Christian Doctrine of God, 173, n.71, 591–97. Hanson notes that Valens of Mursa and Ursacius of 
Singidunum are almost always mentioned together. See Mar.-Vict. Ar. 1.42 (CSEL 83/1: 132), where the 
Illyrians are mentioned in the same terms as the Arians, Lucianists, and Eusebians who promote “diverse 
and heretical opinions” (diuersae opinionis et haeretici). See also Michel Barnes, “The Fourth Century as 
Trinitarian Canon,” in Christian Origins: Theology, Rhetoric and Community, ed. L. Ayres and G. Jones 
(London: Routledge, 1998), 47–67, at 58, which argues that “the use of Valens and Ursacius as types of 
Arius is a feature of the Western pro-Nicene, anti-Arian polemic of the [three-]fifties and early sixties, and 
no later: even polemicists from the seventies as indebted to Athanasius as the Latin-speaking Ambrose and 
the Greek-speaking Epiphanius no longer refer to Valens and Ursacius in this way.” For the use and 
examples of literary constructs for invectives against Arians, see Maurice Wiles, “Attitudes to Arius in the 
Arian Controversy,” in Arianism after Arius : Essays on the Development of the Fourth Century Trinitarian 
Conflicts, ed. Michel R. Barnes and Daniel H. Williams (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1993), 31–43. 
7 Ambr. Ep. 36.28 (CSEL 82/2: 18). For a later explication of this sentiment, see Ambr. Incarn. 
2.7 (CSEL 79: 227). There, Ambrose writes of a Eunomian “coming from the fount of Arian impiety [who] 
slips in the copious mire of his perfidy as he asserts that the generation of Christ . . . is to be sown from the 
traditions of philosophy […].”See Gérard Nauroy, “L’Écriture dans la pastorale d’Ambroise de Milan,” in 
Le monde latin antique et la Bible, ed. J. Fontaine and E. Pietri, vol. 2, Bible de tous les temps (Paris: 
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Mixing metaphors, Ambrose further maintains that these “poisons of infidelity” function 
like a stream, hell-bent on overwhelming the Church.8 And so understandably, Ambrose 
likens Constantius’ position to taking the helm of a ship during the perilous storm of 
deception.9 To rise above the tumult, Ambrose advises speech that is “pure and plain 
(puri et dilucidi) so that by moral disputation [Constantius] may pour sweetness into the 
ears of the people, and the grace of [his] words (gratia uerborum) may allure (demulceas) 
the crowd to follow willingly where you lead.”10 The answer, in sum, to the tide of 
                                                                                                                                            
Beauchesne, 1985), 371–408, at 391. Nauroy mentions Ambrose’s letter to Constantius in only one section 
of his essay and notes in passing that it could easily be considered Ambrose’s De doctrina christiana. 
8 See McLynn, Ambrose of Milan, 240. Mixing metaphors, McLynn notes, is typical of Ambrose’s 
exegetical practices. Rarely does he explicate themes systematically. Instead, Ambrose “range[s] across the 
Old Testament, unraveling one mystery after another through application of a figurative interpretation, an 
exhilarating fizzing of paradoxes which conjure up the possibility that sense could be made of the whole.” 
This ranging across the Old Testament consists of Ambrose assembling direct and passing references to 
texts mentioning water, rivers, and the sea, and to the difficulty and pitfalls of the world. All these he 
associates with one another, and each plays a particular role in constructing his response. 
9 Ambr. Ep. 36.1–3 (CSEL 82/3: 3–5). Cf. Ambr. Ep. ex. 9. See also Lizzi, “Ambrose’s 
Contemporaries and the Christianization of Northern Italy,” 156–73, at 160. Lizzi highlights the fact that 
the likely area of Constantius’ jurisdiction had been ravaged by severe agricultural problems, giving further 
reason for mentioning competing (non-Nicene versus pro-Nicene) “streams.” 
10 Ambr. Ep. 36.5 (CSEL 82/2: 5). See also Ambr. Ep. 36.7 (CSEL 82/2: 6): “Such speech brings 
solid truth as well as sweetness and delight. “Let your exhortations be full of discernment” (alloquia tua 
plena intellectus sint), Ambrose advises, “let the manifestation (manifestatio) of your words shine forth 
(fulgeat), let your discernment gleam (intellectus coruscet), and let no treatment require strange things by 
assertion, and not any word of yours go out in vain (in uanum) and go forth without meaning (sine sensu), 
but let your discourse defend itself with its own weapons (armis suis sese ipse tueatur). It is a bandage (est 
enim alligatura) which binds up the wounds of souls, and if anyone rejects this, he exhibits his despair of 
his own health. Likewise, with those who are vexed by a serious sore, use the oil of speech (oleo sermonis) 
that you may soften their hardness of mind (foueas mentis duritiam); apply a poultice (appone malagma); 
put on a bandage of healthful precept (adiunge alligaturam salutaris praecepti), so that you may never 
allow those who are roaming or who are wavering regarding the faith or the observance of discipline to 
perish through loss of courage (soluto animo) and a breakdown of strength (remisso uigore).” Here, 
Ambrose connects exhortation (alloquia) and bandaging the sick and sore (alligatura), exemplifying how 
speech can be both its own defense and the balm for the wounded soul. The connection also shows how 
Ambrose sees persuasion as beneficial for salvation, for convincing souls of their errant ways and setting 
them right. In other contexts, Ambrose uses alligans and its cognates in reference to Jesus, the one who 
places upon our sin-sickened souls the words of heaven as a bandage. The words of heaven are a “good 
bandage” (bona alligatura), Ambrose writes, which “connect[s] the bones of [our] fractured souls.” For 
other instances of this connection, see Ambr. Psal. 118 21.5 (CSEL 62: 476). See also Ambr. Patr. 4.23 
(CSEL 32/1: 137). Cf. Dio Chrys. Or. 32.10–12 (LCL 358: 180–83), which speaks of the difficulty of 
finding one who will speak plainly and frankly. On the Second Sophistic and its effects in Christianity until 
the Fall of Rome, see Peter Brown, Power and Persuasion in Late Antiquity: Towards a Christian Empire 
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duplicity is “pure and plain” speech, which helps woo audiences and pierce through 
uncertainty. 
Proceedings from the Council of Aquileia (381 CE)11 reveal that the trope of 
homoian deception had become something of a pro-Nicene commonplace by the second 
half of the fourth century.12 In his debate with two of the council’s homoian 
representatives, Palladius and Secundianus, Ambrose charges his opponents with deceit, 
with tactics that attempted to postpone their inevitable condemnation.13 The council’s 
proceedings also attest to the homoian bishops’ claim to a straightforward exegesis of 
scripture: only biblical language should be predicated of the Father and the Son. “I speak 
to you according to the Scriptures. I call the Son the very Son of God,” Palladius 
maintains.14 While employing scriptural language might seem a laudable goal, the extant 
                                                                                                                                            
(Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1992), 35–70; George Alexander Kennedy, Classical 
Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times (Chapel Hill, NC: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 47–50, 187–82; Graham Anderson, The Second Sophistic: A 
Cultural Phenomenon in the Roman Empire (London; New York: Routledge, 2005), passim, esp. 197–212. 
Janice M. Lauer and Kelly Pender, Invention in Rhetoric and Composition (West Lafayette, IN: Parlor 
Press, 2004), 51–57. 
11 For discussion of the historical, religious-political context surrounding the Council of Aquileia, 
see Williams, Ambrose of Milan and the End of the Arian-Nicene Conflicts, 154–84 and multiple texts cited 
therein. Williams notes the provenance of the Gest. conc. Aquil. manuscript at 169–72. The current critical 
editions (both CSEL edited by Zelzer and SC edited by Gryson) we have depend on a fifth-century 
compilation of anti-Arian texts that were amended by pro-homoian sources. The amendments, Williams 
indicates, were “directed at Ambrose and the proceedings of the council” (at 170).  
12 See “Fragments of Palladius” 106.340v (SC 267: 290–91). See Vaggione, Eunomius of Cyzicus 
and the Nicene Revolution, 91–92, who mentions Ambrose and Augustine as those who lambasted non-
Nicenes and the influence of philosophy and who “demanded a return to biblical simplicity” (at 91). D. H. 
Williams sees similar charges of deception in the Council of Ariminum, some two decades prior to 
Aquileia, lending credence to the trope as common. See Williams, Ambrose of Milan and the End of the 
Arian-Nicene Debates, 26–32. See also Meslin, Les Ariens d’Occident 335–430, 90, 127. See also Doerfler, 
“Ambrose’s Jews,” 764. Doerfler in particular points to homoian deception as a commonplace, particularly 
in the East. 
13 Hanson, The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God, 109–10, 596. Hanson notes from the 
Scholia how Palladius “trapped” Ambrose, who appears driven to the verge of patripassianism. 
14 Ambr. Gest. conc. Aquil. 18 (CSEL 82/3: 336). See Gryson, ed., Scolia ariennes, 178, n.2. 
Gryson notes that Nicenes might have been hesitant to enter into scriptural debates because the authors of 
the scriptures “ignoraient la notion philosophique de consubstantialité, et leurs expressions favorisaient 
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records of the council’s proceedings depict this move as a diversionary tactic, portraying 
Palladius as disingenuous when questioned and as forcing Ambrose and his pro-Nicene 
colleagues to coax tendentious positions out of him.15  
Upon invitation to the council, Palladius likely expected a collegial dialogue, 
Christian to Christian,16 but Ambrose instead assumed the magisterial mantle, playing 
“the double part of public prosecutor and principal judge.”17 At the Council’s 
commencement, Ambrose orders Arius’ infamous letter to Alexander of Alexandria to be 
read before the entire council. When interrogated about his possible allegiance with 
Arius’s teaching—that the Father alone is eternal and that the Son is not everlasting, but 
created—Palladius’ first response is not to reply to Arius’s teaching, but to accuse 
Ambrose of a mistrial: “You have crafted, as appears by the sacred document which you 
                                                                                                                                            
plutôt la théologie archaïsante des ariens.” See also Williams, Ambrose of Milan and the End of the Nicene-
Arian Conflicts 18–22; Wiles, Archetypal Heresy, 10–17, 35. Homoian claims to the scriptures led Maurice 
Wiles to label homoian doctrine “scriptural and unphilosophical in character” (35). Wiles’s characterization 
would help to explain in part Palladius’ initial refusal to enter into debate at Aquileia and to begin utilizing 
“being” (οὐσία) or “substance” (substantia) with reference to the Son. Since these terms did not occur in 
scripture, they should not have been predicated of the Son. See Williams, Arius, 234–35, which remarks on 
the earnestness of anti-Nicenes regarding the “the catholic and scriptural nature of their language,” on the 
fact that they “see themselves as guardians of centrally important formulae.” See D. H. Williams, “The 
Anti-Arian Campaigns of Hilary of Poitiers and the ‘Liber contra Auxentium,’” Church History 61.1 
(1992): 7–27, at 9, n.10. Williams notes that Palladius vehemently denied using terms like of dissimilis.  
15 See Hanson, The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God, 124. Hanson notes that Ambrose’s 
questions are “leading” and that his invoking of anathemas is “outrageously unfair” since Palladius had not 
read the document in question. For a brief description of Palladius’ theology, see Hanson, The Search for 
the Christian Doctrine of God, 563–64. 
16 Ambr. Gest. conc. Aquil. 12 (CSEL 82/3: 333). 
17 For this turn of phrase, see Dudden, The Life and Times of St. Ambrose, 1:199–206, at 201. In 
his Apologia penned soon after the conclusion of the Council of Aquileia, Palladius records that the room 
in which he and Secundianus had been interrogated was a narrow room off the main basilica (secretarium) 
(SC 267: 274). Dudden goes on to argue that Ambrose’s anti-Arian push at Aquileia was intended “to strike 
a blow which would effectively crush the lingering remnants of the heresy in North Italy and Illyricum” (at 
1:199), and that the “Council of Aquileia marks the victory of Catholicism over Arianism, so far as the 
Western Empire was concerned” (1:205). See also, Simonetti, La crisi ariana nel IV secolo, 547, who calls 
the Council the “definitive defeat of Arianism in the West.” While the Council undoubtedly was a marked 
point of Catholic prominence, McLynn’s nuanced view is more accurate. See McLynn, Ambrose of Milan, 
1–52.  
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have brought forward, that this should not be a full and general council: in the absence of 
our colleagues we are not able to speak.”18 As recorded, Palladius’ response makes him 
seem simply to be biding time. In reality, however, there were only a couple of “Eastern 
bishops”—his “colleagues”—in attendance.19  
Palladius is portrayed as cornered, outnumbered, and insistent that the 
prosecution’s case be postponed. Throughout, Palladius commits to diverting attention 
away from theological positions. In so doing, he seeks to avoid Ambrose’s incessant 
interrogation with responses like: “It is not within your authority to ask me;”20 “Neither 
have I seen Arius nor do I know who he is;”21 and “We do not respond to you now, but 
we will respond to you in a general and full council.”22 After these attempts to dispute the 
council’s legitimacy, which are depicted as procedural stalling, Palladius answers the 
interrogation, responding succinctly and often reluctantly.23  
Ambrose and the other pro-Nicene bishops take Palladius’ taciturn disposition as 
at least deceptive, if not an outright affront to creedal allegiance. Early in the proceedings 
Ambrose indicates: “That you [Palladius] may see how simply (simpliciter) we seek the 
                                                
18 Ambr. Gest. conc. Aquil. 6 (CSEL 82/3: 329). 
19 E.g., Ambr. Gest. conc. Aquil. 6–8 (CSEL 82/3: 329–30), 10–11 (CSEL 82/2: 331–32). Three 
dozen or so bishops, most from northern Italy, were in attendance. Williams indicates that the gathering 
“resembled a north Italian synod more than a general western council” (175). It is safe to assume that 
Palladius felt the deck stacked against him and his homoian compatriots. Ambrose indicates at the council’s 
outset that stenographers were used, but Palladius accuses them of pro-Nicene allegiance and occasionally 
refuses to speak for fear that his answers would be misreprested. 
20 Ambr. Gest. conc. Aquil. 11 (CSEL 82/3: 332). 
21 Ambr. Gest. conc. Aquil. 14 (CSEL 82/3: 334). 
22 Ambr. Gest. conc. Aquil. 32 (CSEL 82/3: 345). 
23 Gest. conc. Aquil. 20 (CSEL 82/3: 337), 50 (CSEL 82/3: 356–57). For similar description of 
Secundianus at the council, see Gest. conc. Aquil 28 (CSEL 82/3: 343), and of Attalus, see Gest. conc. 
Aquil 44 (CSEL 82/3: 353). 
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truth. . . . For by speaking as you do, you appear to deny that the Son of God is the true 
God (deum uerum); if however you confess simply (simpliciter) that the Son of God is 
true God, state it in the order in which I proposed it to you.”24 Later, another bishop for 
the pro-Nicene side, the host Valerian of Aquileia, speaks up: “Do not agitate Palladius 
so much, he is not able to confess our truths simply (simpliciter); for his conscience is 
confused by a twofold blasphemy (duplici blasfemia): he was ordained by the Photinians 
and was then condemned by them, and now, he will be condemned further.”25  
What we see repeatedly is that the pro-Nicenes use their majority against their 
opponents and wield key rhetorical tactics for dismissing them;26 “strategy, not theology,” 
Williams writes, “was the need of the moment.”27 At the conclusion of the proceedings, 
Secundianus receives treatment similar to that doled out to Palladius.28 Ambrose presses 
him to confess “simply” (simpliciter) the Son to be “true God.” Secundianus refuses, and 
instead predicates “only-begotten” (unigenitus) of Christ and professes him to be the 
“true Son of God.” In response, Ambrose references Matthew 5:37 (“Let your word be 
yea, yea. . .”) and repeats, “say simply (simpliciter): the only-begotten Son of God is true 
                                                
24 Gest. conc. Aquil. 18 (CSEL 82/3: 336). See Yves-Marie Duval, “Le sens des débats d’Aquilée 
pour les nicéens: Nicée-Rimini-Aquilée,” in Atti del colloquio internazionale sul concilio di Aquileia del 
381, Antichità Altoadriatiche 21 (Udine: Arti grafiche friulane, 1981), 69–97, at 80–81. 
25 Gest. conc. Aquil 49 (CSEL 82/3: 356). The accusation of Palladius’ ordination by the 
Photinians is disregarded as rhetorical in secondary literature. See Hanson, The Search for the Christian 
Doctrine of God, 595; Meslin, Les Ariens d’Occident 335–430, 85–92. 
26 See Williams, Ambrose of Milan and the End of the Nicene-Arian Conflicts, 175–181, at 179–
80. Williams mentions Ambrose’s charge of fraus but indicates that this charge is entirely because 
Ambrose thought that the Nicene council fathers at Ariminum were deceived by a faulty interpretation of 
Arius’ letter to Alexander. While this might well be part of the case, Williams does not explicitly connect 
fraus, heresy, and vice with each other to show how Ambrose denigrates the homoian bishops’ case, a point 
that is drawn out in the remainder of the chapter. 
27 Williams, Ambrose of Milan and the End of the Nicene-Arian Conflicts, 178. 
28 Gest. conc. Aquil 67–71 (CSEL 82/3: 365–67). 
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God.” After Secundianus replies succinctly to heated questioning, Eusebius butts in, 
accusing him of Photinian and Sabellian allegiances. The exchange reaches a fever pitch 
when Ambrose repeats: “You should have brought [your profession] forward today, but 
you are attempting to evade (subterfugere). You demand a profession of me, and I 
demand a profession of you. Is the Son of God true God?”29 Secundianus refuses to 
consent to Ambrose’s questioning; he will again only confess to the Son’s status as 
“only-begotten” (unigenitus) and not “true God” (deus uerus).30  
According to Ambrose, the homoians were guilty of heresy, temporizing, 
equivocating, deceiving, and disseminating “perfidy” (perfidiam).31 Ambrose’s dual 
dismantling of heresy and vice proved an effective technique for dismissing his 
opponents, disclosing his classical training in the art of epideictic rhetoric, along the way. 
Still, Ambrose’s and his allies’ calls for simplicity of speech are more than a rhetorical 
façade. As I have been arguing, Ambrose’s critiques of the form or presentation of action 
and language—here, in the Council’s proceedings, accusations of deception or 
disingenuous speech—are critiques of the underlying motivations of that same action and 
language.  
                                                
29 Ambr. Gest. conc. Aquil. 74 (CSEL 82/3: 368). 
30 Ambr. Gest. conc. Aquil. 75 (CSEL 82/3: 368). See Williams, Ambrose of Milan and the End of 
the Nicene-Arian Conflicts, 183. Williams calls the Nicenes’ perspective “reactive, almost regressive, in the 
sense that the assembly is concerned with attacking the Christological theses exemplified at Ariminum by 
means of Arius’ letter” and that “in effect, no progress is made theologically.” 
31 Ambr. Gest. conc. Aquil. 18. There are several references to Palladius’ claim to simply 
“speaking according to the scriptures.” Ambrose’s tactics here bear uncanny resemblance to Athanasius’ 
Life of Antony (passim). Athanasius argues that Arians’ lies presaged the coming of the Antichrist (69); that 
Arian teaching was not from the apostles but from demons and their father, the devil (82); and that the 
Arians were captured by impiety and vice (69, 89). See Williams, Arius, 89–91; Michael Stuart Williams, 
Authorised Lives in Early Christian Biography: Between Eusebius and Augustine, Cambridge Classical 
Studies (New York: University of Cambridge, 2008), 101–47, 223–35.  
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That the proceedings represent more than empty rhetoric to cover up 
shortcomings in logic or training is evidenced by the fact that Ambrose upholds the 
importance of simplicity in word and deed even when the acute challenge of homoian 
religious politics lessened in Milan during the second half of his tenure as bishop. These 
calls to simplicity took the form of heightened demands of renunciation. And these 
demands functioned as protreptics to pro-Nicene Christian devotion.32 Ambrose begins 
Epistle 27 to Sabinus, dated near the end of his career in 394/5 CE, with a discussion of 
Paulinus, future bishop of Nola (354–431 CE), who, while noble in birth, social rank, and 
wealth, had taken up the practices of the faith.33 Because of his conversion, Paulinus gave 
away his all his property and said farewell to his former life, “relieving himself of the 
heavy burden of home, country, and kindred in order to serve God with greater zeal.”34 
                                                
32 During the fourth century, renunciation became a necessary virtue of the clergy. See Gryson, Le 
prêtre selon saint Ambroise, 295–317, at 301–8. See also Smith, Christian Grace and Pagan Virtue, 201–
10, at 206–9. Smith does not mention Paulinus of Nola or Ambrose’s letter recalling his exemplary 
conversion, but does write of the importance of renunciation and “forgetting” past sins, attachment, and 
means of education.  
33 Ambr. Ep. 27 (CSEL 82/1: 180–87). See Dennis E. Trout, Paulinus of Nola: Life, Letters, and 
Poems (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 63–66, 78–103. Trout indicates that Paulinus’ 
retreat into seclusion in northern Spain was quite likely because of the loss of a child, the evidence for 
which is reconstructed through several of Paulinus’ later poems. See also Peter Brown, The Rise of Western 
Christendom: Triumph and Diversity, A.D. 200-1000 (Chichester, West Sussex; Malden, MA: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2013), 86–87. For Ambrose’s relationship with Sabinus, see Lizzi, “Ambrose’s Contemporaries 
and the Christianization of Northern Italy,” 160.  
34 Ambr. Ep. 27.1 (CSEL 82/1: 180). For the general contours, timeline, and critical dating of 
Paulinus’ conversion, see Dennis Elwood Trout, “Secular Renunciation and Social Action: Paulinus of 
Nola and Late Roman Society” (PhD Dissertation, Duke University, 1989), 131–76. See also Pierre Fabre, 
Saint Paulin de Nole et l’amitié chrétienne, Bibliothèque des écoles françaises d’Athènes et de Rome, fasc. 
167 (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1949). The burden of wealth was not simply a construct of religious zealotry, but 
an intense weight that pressured its participants into social and political action. See Peter Brown, Through 
the Eye of a Needle: Wealth, the Fall of Rome, and the Making of Christianity in the West, 350-550 AD 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 185–240. Brown also connects Paulinus’ renunciation with 
Priscillian and his ascetic denial and cultish practices resembling Gnostic Manichaeism. See Supl.–Sev. 
Chron. 2.46–51 (CSEL 1: 99–105).  
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Paulinus’ wife, Therasia, is said to have followed suit, imitating her husband’s “virtue 
and zeal” (uirtuti et studio).35  
We read in his Carmina that Paulinus perceived his own struggle as being 
between the Muses and Christ.36 For him, there was to be no mixed message: 
philosophical wisdom, rhetorical extravagance, and poetic fictions paled in comparison to 
God’s power and illumination.37 Paulinus could not serve two masters; by loving the One 
he must hate the other.38 This shift in will and disposition altered everything for Paulinus. 
In decorating a Church under his new jurisdiction, Paulinus exclaims, “The black 
ugliness is hidden, and painting has restored youthful brilliance to the old architecture by 
pouring over it the splendor of varied colors.”39 These faithful new colors hid the “idle 
wealth, impure love and soiled desire at the rubble of the soul.”40  
“When our leading men hear this [remarkable renunciation], what will they say?” 
Ambrose wonders. “It is unthinkable that a man of such family, such background, such 
nature, gifted with such eloquence (tanta praeditum eloquentia), should retire from the 
                                                
35 Ambr. Ep. 27.2 (CSEL 82/1: 180). 
36 The classic example is from P.-Nol. Carm. 10.115 (CSEL 30: 29). There, Paulinus speaks of the 
Muses as being sine numine numina or “names without power.” See Michael Stuart Flower, “‘sine numine 
numina’: Ausonius and the Oulipo,” in Unclassical Traditions: Volume I, Alternatives to the Classical Past 
in Late Antiquity, ed. Christopher Kelly, Richard Flower, and Michael Stuart Williams (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Philological Society, 2010), 140–63. 
37 See P.-Nol. Carm. 10.35–38 (CSEL 30: 25). See also Trout, Paulinus of Nola, 78–103. Trout 
traces this conflict between ars and Christian devotion in Carm. 10.  
38 P. G. Walsh, “Paulinus of Nola and the Conflict of Ideologies in the Fourth Century,” in P. 
Granfield and J. A. Jungmann, eds., Kyriakon: Festschrift for Johannes Quasten, 2 vols. (Münster: 
Aschendorff, 1970), 2: 565–71. 
39 P.-Nol. Carm. 28.212–28.214 (CSEL 30: 300). 
40 P.-Nol. Carm. 28.285–86 (CSEL 30: 303). 
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Senate and that the succession of so noble a family should be broken.”41 Surely that man 
would feel shame, Ambrose imagines the notables would say. He then crafts his own 
reply by means of two biblically-inflected rhetorical questions: Was David ashamed 
when he danced before the Ark of the Covenant? Was Isaiah ashamed when he went 
“naked and barefoot (nudus et discalciatus) through the crowd, exclaiming heavenly 
oracles?”42 On the surface, such renunciation (and its scriptural analogues) appears 
unseemly if taken as an isolated incident, but within the correct context, Ambrose 
contends, it is in fact worshipful. “No one becomes committed to excess (luxui committit) 
unless he departs from the precepts of the true God (dei ueri),” he concludes.  
Whenever he begins to abound in the excesses of luxury, he begins deviating from 
the true faith. Then he commits two grievous crimes: an outrage of the body and 
sacrilege of the mind. One who does not follow the Lord his God therefore gorges 
himself or herself with luxury and pleasure, those destructive passions of the 
body. One who engorges and immerses himself or herself in these hog-pools falls 
into the snares of faithlessness.43  
 
We should note here that again mind and body are linked. Ambrose equates abounding in 
“luxury” with nobility, exemplified by excess of wealth; the perpetrator is guilty of sins 
of visible and invisible.44  
Ambrose employs visceral language for describing the profligate: he is engorged, 
bloated with luxury and “immersed in hog-pools” (uolutabrum). Ambrose will only use 
uolutabrum a couple times in his writings, the first of which is in his Concerning Virgins 
                                                
41 Ambr. Ep. 27.3 (CSEL 82/1: 181). 
42 Ambr. Ep. 27.4 (CSEL 82/1: 181). 
43 Ambr. Ep. 27.16 (CSEL 82/1: 186). Ubi autem coeperit quis luxuriari, incipit deviare a fide 
vera. Ita duo maxima committit crimina, obprobria carnis et mentis sacrilegia. Ergo qui non sequitur 
dominum deum suum, ingurgitat se luxuriae ac libidini, pestiferis corporis passionibus. Qui autem se 
ingurgitaverit adque inmerserit volutabris, perfidiae laqueos incurrit. 
44 See P.-Nol. Carm. 10.305–10 (CSEL 30: 38), where Paulinus speaks about the great weight of 
worldly things bearing down on him.  
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(ca. 377), where he describes the modest flower of virginity growing in the garden of the 
Lord. In that garden, “the water of the pure fountain shines, reflecting features of the 
image of God (inpressam signaculis imaginem dei), lest its streams be polluted, having 
been sprinkled with mud from the hog-pools (uolutabris) of the spiritual wild beasts.”45 
Here, too, the absence of lurching about in these uolutabra marks off purity: virginal 
modesty is unpolluted by such spiritual wallowing places. For Ambrose, devotion to the 
deus uerus precludes cavorting in these metaphorical “hog-pools,” be they spiritual and 
allegorical in the case of the virgins or material in the case of Paulinus. Still, Ambrose is 
not simply denouncing wealth in toto, but warning of the “destructive passions” (corporis 
passionibus) that can creep in if luxury persists.46  
 Pro-Nicene devotion to the deus uerus, as we saw above in Ambrose’s exchange 
with Secundianus, prohibits attachment to such fineries.47 Anti-homoian polemic was 
replete with similar charges of failing to worship the deus uerus. This is no coincidence. 
If the diversionary tactics of the “Arians” failed to take seriously the “simplicity” proper 
to confession of the true God, then further self-discipline was necessary.48 In view of the 
recurring visual logic of Ambrose’s Christological and moral reflections, such a 
conclusion should not be surprising. What we see repeatedly in Ambrose’s interactions 
                                                
45 Ambr. Virg. 1.8.45 (PL 16: 201). 
46 Ep. 27.16 (CSEL 82/1: 186). 
47 Smith comes to similar conclusions in reference to a different passage of Ambrose’s. See Smith, 
Christian Grace and Pagan Virtue, 202. 
48 See Vaggione, “Of Monks and Lounge Lizards,” 182, 202. Vaggione uses the language of “anti-
monks” and “false ascetics” of non-Nicenes in accordance with Nicene theological evidence charging non-
Nicenes with a lack of virtue. See also Lizzi, “Ambrose’s Contemporaries and the Christianization of 
Northern Italy,” at 162–63. While Lizzi’s concern is a historical reconstruction of ecclesial presence and 
influence in Northern Italy with respect to paganism, her conclusions aid in considering the social and 
ethical dynamics of Western sees at this time.  
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with the homoians is that, to his mind, wayward theological statements betrayed a 
misstep in inner judgment.49 Deception and evasiveness disclosed heresy and unnecessary 
attachment to worldly ways. The “Arians,” Ambrose warns in his Exposition of the 
Gospel of Luke 8.17, are “intent on worldly pursuits, . . . [they] pursue the fellowship of 
kingly power, in order that they might impugn the truth of the Church with military arms. 
Do they not seem to you to be lying in purple and on linen cushions (Cf. Lk. 16:19), 
those who defend embellishments rather than truths?”50 Notice Ambrose’s clever 
association of “lying in purple” and “embellishments” (fucata). As we explored above in 
Chapter Three, fucus was a purple dye derived from lichen in the Mediterranean Basin, 
often used for cosmetic purposes. Cicero and Quintilian in the Roman tradition and 
Cyprian in the early Latin Christian tradition began using the term fucus metaphorically, 
playing off the concealing aspect of makeup. Here, Ambrose puts forth a multivalent use 
of fucata: mentioning purple, the dye’s actual color, and the implication that the Arians 
shade the truth by way of lavish deception in word and deed. 
Perhaps ironically, fourth-century Christian denunciations of extravagance and 
corresponding calls for simplicity were often themselves exemplary in their eloquence, 
and their authors happened to find themselves in positions of great authority and 
prominence. Paulinus, for instance, became bishop of Nola, Ambrose, bishop of Milan. 
On the one hand, Ambrose’s classical education demanded the sort of persuasion driven 
                                                
49 Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy, 343. Cf. Averil Cameron, “Ascetic Closure and the End of 
Antiquity,” in Vincent L. Wimbush and Richard Valantassis, eds. Asceticism (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), 147–61, at 154. See also idem, Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire: The 
Development of Christian Discourse (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 72ff. 
50 Ambr. Luc. 8.17 (CSEL 32/4: 399): pone nunc ante conspectum saecularibus Arrianos studiis 
intentos, qui societatem potentiae regalis adfectant, ut armis militaribus inpugnent ecclesiae ueritatem, 
nonne tibi uidentur in quadam purpura et bysso exstructis iacentes toris, qui pro ueris fucata defendant. 
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by eloquence that Paulinus supposedly disowned.51 Yet, on the other, Ambrose’s abrupt 
appointment as bishop forced him into a position that was distinctly for the people and 
that made rusticity and frank speech necessary. Ambrose was self-conscious enough to 
realize the near-palpable contradiction. These competing goals showed the critical 
importance of public presentation, of showing when, where, and how Christian virtues 
outstripped their rivals.52  
Since what resulted oftentimes was an elaborate, verbose underselling of pro-
Nicene Christianity for the masses,53 Ambrose could easily be depicted as playing a 
rhetorical game with smoke and mirrors. I do not doubt that Ambrose is conjuring up his 
rhetorical education for the sake of winning arguments. But as the next sections will 
show, it is hard to get around his repeated discussions of the saint’s simple virtue. The 
same simplicity of word and deed that cuts against the grain of homoian deception at the 
Council of Aquileia in 381 is upheld as a pious ideal. And based on the context of 
Ambrose’s statement of this ideal, we would do well to hold our suspicion in abeyance. 
 
                                                
51 See A. Cameron, Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire, 47–88; Sophie Lunn-Rockliffe, 
“Prologue Topics and Translation Problems in Latin Commentaries on Paul,” in Interpreting the Bible and 
Aristotle in Late Antiquity, ed. Josef Lössl and John W. Watt (Farnham; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011), 
33–47, at 44–45. 
52 See Walsh, “Paulinus of Nola and the Conflict of Ideologies in the Fourth Century,” 2: 567–70.  
53 See Dominic Janes, God and Gold in Late Antiquity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998), 153–64; A. Edward Siecienski, “Gilding the Lily: A Patristic Defense of Liturgical Splendor,” in 
Susan R. Holman, ed., Wealth and Poverty in Early Church and Society (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker 
Academic, 2008), 211–20. Both Janes and Siecienski note that the seeming contradiction between 
promoting the virtue of simplicity and the extravagance expended in the liturgy and on the Church itself 
represents a distinctly modern worry. Siencienski argues that “it is clear that the fathers never believed that 
gold and wealth were absolute evils to be avoided at all costs” (at 212). For a similar conclusion, see also 
Auksi, Christian Plain Style, 164–67. 
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Simplicity in Elegy: Satyrus as an Exemplum of Faith  
 
Simplicity as a moral ideal is not relegated to Ambrose’s conciliar interactions, 
often deemed to be object lessons in rhetorical flourish and dismissal. Quite to the 
contrary, simplicity emerges early and often in Ambrose’s career and pointedly in his 
Death of Satyrus, the two-part elegy for his departed brother. Throughout the work, dated 
to the first few years of his episcopacy (378 CE), Ambrose lionizes his late brother as an 
exemplum of faith, steady in virtue and devoted to holy living. Here, though the context is 
notably different—at the somber occasion of a loved one’s death rather than in conciliar 
proceedings—the moral ideal is similar to what we saw in the proceedings of the Council 
of Aquileia: just as Ambrose exhorted homoians to the ideal of simple word and deed, he 
said that Satyrus had attained the saintly goal of simplicity. The following passage, taken 
from the work’s first part, will serve to organize the remainder of our chapter.  
But in what words can I set forth [Satyrus’] simplicity? By this I mean a certain 
moderation of habits and soberness of mind. Forgive me, I beg, and attribute it to 
my grief, if I allow myself to speak somewhat fully about him with whom I am no 
longer permitted to converse. And certainly it profits you to see that you have 
borne this kindly office not led by weak feelings, but by sound judgment; neither 
impelled by pity for his death, but provoked by desire to do honor to his virtues. 
For every simple soul is blessed. And so great was his simplicity that converted 
into a child, he shines with the innocent simplicity of that age, an effigy of perfect 
virtue, and like a mirror of innocent habits. Therefore he entered into the kingdom 
of heaven, because he believed in the word of God, because he, like a child, 
rejected the artistry of flattery. He quietly absorbed the grief of insult that he had 
sharply sought to avenge; he was more inclined to complaint than to guile, ready 
for conciliation, intractable toward ambition, holy in modesty, so that in him one 
would rather speak of such an excess of bashfulness than look for a necessary 
amount of it.54 
                                                
54 Ambr. Exc. 1.51 (CSEL 73: 236–37): Qua vero prosecutione simplicitatem eius edisseram? Ea 
est enim quaedam morum temperantia mentis que sobrietas. Date, quaeso, ueniam et permittite dolori 
meo, ut de eo mihi paulo uberius liceat loqui, cum quo iam non conceditur conloqui. Certe et uobis proficit, 
ut aduertatis non fragilitate quadam uos hoc officium, sed iudicio detulisse, nec misericordia mortis 
inpulsos, sed uirtutum honorificentia prouocatos. Anima enim benedicta omnis simplex. tanta autem 
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Ambrose here describes both the content and effects of simplicity. The content of 
simplicity, as he puts it, is “temperance of habits and sobriety of mind” (Ea est enim 
quaedam morum temperantia mentis que sobrietas). The prominence of temperantia in 
Ambrose’s catalogue of virtues is unsurprising given our explorations of his admonitions 
on bodily comportment; its importance for his moral psychology and theology cannot be 
overstated. Here, as elsewhere, temperance regards that which is fit and seemly with a 
calmness of mind and spirit. Though on occasion Ambrose will write of temperance as a 
virtue proper to the body (and not the mind or soul), he predominantly applies 
temperance to both corporeal and incorporeal realities.55 In the case of Satyrus, 
temperance is applied to “habits” (morum).  
Ambrose’s use of “habit” (mos, moris) here is striking and intends a depth of 
meaning lost on late-moderns. Mos was but one term used for “habit” throughout the 
Latin tradition.56 Hilary and Augustine trade in language of consuetudo;57 Thomas 
                                                                                                                                            
simplicitas, ut conuersus in puerum simplicitate illius aetatis innoxiae, perfectae uirtutis effigie et 
quodam innocentium morum speculo reluceret. Intrauit igitur in regnum caelorum, quoniam credidit dei 
uerbo, quoniam sicut puer artem reppulit adulandi, iniuriae dolorem clementer absorbuit quam 
inclementius uindicavit, querelae quam dolo promptior, satisfactioni facilis, difficilis ambitioni, sanctus 
pudori, ut frequenter in eo superfluam magisu uerecundiam praedicares quam necessariam quaereres. 
Emphasis added. See Courcelle, Recherches sur les Confessions de saint Augustin, 319–36, where 
Courcelle notes parallels between some of Ambrose’s technical terminology in Exc. and Apuleius’s De 
Platone and Apologia. See also Madec, Saint Ambroise et la philosophie, 27–36. Madec explores the dating 
and background for the treatise and its stylization but nowhere references this passage, even in his section 
on the simplicity of faith at 214–36. See also Smith, Christian Grace and Pagan Virtue, 129–45, which 
mentions Exc. multiple times, but in the context of Ambrose’s understanding of resurrection in the second 
oration. Smith does not comment on this passage.  
55 Abr. 2.10.68 (CSEL 32/1: 624). In On Abraham, the pair of temperantia and sobrietas paired are 
proper to the body and must be connected to virtues particular to the soul, like prudentia and iustititia. 
56 Quintilian talks about orators communicating mores as being received through imitation by a 
student, in part through the comportment of the body. See Quint. Or. 1.11.2–3 (LCL 124: 236–39). [N]am 
frequens imitatio transit in mores. Ne gestus quidem omnis ac motus a comoedis petendus est. Quamquam 
enim utrumque eorum ad quendam modum praestare debet orator, plurimum tamen aberit a scaenico, nec 
uultu nec manu nec excursionibus nimius. Nam si qua in his ars est dicentium, ea prima est ne ars esse 
uideatur. 
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Aquinas is well known for baptizing Aristotle’s conception of habitus for Christian 
purposes.58 Ambrose will also use consuetudo and habitus elsewhere. Here, however, he 
makes a conscious decision to use mos, a term engraved upon the Roman consciousness 
as an accepted way of living laid by one’s ancestors and undergirded by social and 
political norms.59 Cicero is replete with reference to the “way of our ancestors” (mos 
maiorum). Here, for Ambrose to evoke Satyrus’s temperantia morum implies his 
brother’s calm and steady following of the established ways of those who preceded him.60  
“Sobriety of mind” (sobrietas mentis) recalls others of Ambrose’s metaphorical 
statements on sobriety and drunkenness in general,61 chief of which is his statement, 
borrowed from Philo, on the Spirit’s bestowal of “sober drunkenness” to the soul.62 More 
particularly, Ambrose’s turn of phrase in Death of Satyrus 1.51 presages his several uses 
                                                                                                                                            
57 Hilar. Trin. 1.1 (CCSL 62: 1–2); Aug. Conf. 8.11.26 (CSEL 33: 192). See John G. Prendiville, 
S.J.,“The Development of the Idea of Habit in the Thought of Saint Augustine,” in Traditio: Studies in 
Ancient and Medieval History, Thought, and Religion, ed. Edwin A. Quain, Bernard M. Peebles, et al (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 1972), 29–99. It is worth noting that Prendiville mentions nothing of 
Ambrose’s use of mos and its distinction from Augustine’s typical use of consuetudo. 
58 The best-known instance is Thomas’s so-called “treatise on habit” at ST I–II.49–54. 
59 For an excellent overview of the crafting, force, and function of mos in the Latin traditions, see 
Henriette van der Blom, Cicero’s Role Models: The Political Strategy of a Newcomer (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 1–25, at 12–17, and sources cited therein. 
60 Off. 1.27.129 (CCSL 15: 47). Van der Blom also attaches the construction of mos to the shaping 
of “cultural memory,” a term coined and popularize by Jan Assmann. 
61 Examples include: Hex. 3.7.28 (CSEL 32/1: 77), 3.13.55 (CSEL 32/1: 98), 3.17.72 (CSEL 32/1: 
109); Noe 8.24 (CSEL 32/1: 429). 11.38 (CSEL 32/1: 437), 12.41 (CSEL 32/1: 439), 14.49 (CSEL 32/1: 
447); Abr. 2.4.17 (CSEL 32/1: 576); Bon. mort. 6.25 (CSEL 32/1: 726); Fid. 1.20.135 (CSEL 78: 56); Ios. 
6.34 (CSEL 32/2: 96). Augustine also uses the metaphor when recalling his time in Milan. See Aug. Conf. 
5.13.23 (CSEL 33: 110): Et ueni mediolanium ad ambrosium episcopum, in optimis notum orbi terrae, 
pium cultorem tuum, cuius tunc eloquia strenue ministrabant adipem frumenti tui et laetitiam olei et 
sobriam uini ebrietatem populo tuo. 
62 See Ambrose’s hymn “Splendor paternae.” For secondary statements on the phrase, see Runia, 
Philo in Early Christian Literature, 308; Dunkle, Enchantment and Creed in the Hymns of Ambrose, 103–
5.  
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of the precise phrase sobrietas mentis.63 Sobrietas (and related terms) function similarly 
as temperantia and modestia in Ambrose’s moral vocabulary.64 Soberness implied a 
moderate and measured disposition in acting and in counteracting and preempting the 
seductive threats of passions that drive the individual to extreme behaviors. Applying the 
metaphor of soberness to the reasoning faculty (mens) would thus demand an even, 
rational approach in deliberation, and a refusal to be thrown about by the roiling tides of 
contingency.  
From this description of Satyrus, we are further able to discern two qualities of 
simplicity particular to Ambrose’s moral vision and distinctive of a faithful life. First, 
simplicity is considered childlike in its innocence. I will show that childlikeness, for 
Ambrose, is imitative of and stems from “the Child,” by which he means the promised 
Son and second person of the Trinity. Second, simplicity shuns pretense, making its 
practitioners semblances of perfect virtue and mirrors of habitual innocence. The third 
section analyzes this portrayal of shunning pretense and putting on simplicity, qualities 
that emerge in Ambrose’s depiction of homoians and their theology. The third section 
thus shows that the exhortation to simple virtue does the double service of being a moral 
standard and an anti-homoian trope. I thus conclude by showing how, for Ambrose, 
simplicity as a moral ideal is uniquely pro-Nicene, exemplifying what Ayres has called 
the “‘portability’ of ascetic practice and literature.”65 
                                                
63 Hex. 1.4.14 (CSEL 32/1: 12), 1.8.31 (CSEL 32/1: 32); Abr. 2.11.85 (CSEL 32/1: 636); Patr. 
3.13 (CSEL 32/2: 313); Hel. 8.23 (CSEL 32/2: 424); Off. 1.3.12 (CCSL 15: 5); Ep. 1.19 (CSEL 82/1: 13). 
64 Examples include: Psal. 118 10.43 (CSEL 62:229), 22.15 (CSEL 62: 495–95); Ep. 1.19 (CSEL 
82/1: 13); Iac. 1.2.5 (CSEL 32/2: 7), 1.8.37 (CSEL 32/2: 29); Off. 1.3.12 (CCSL 15: 5), 2.16.76 (CCSL 15: 
124). 
65 Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy, 343. 
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Simplicity as Childlikeness: Imitating the “Beginning” of Virtue  
Ambrose’s statement that Satyrus was “converted into a child shining with the 
simplicity of that guiltless age” (ut conuersus in puerum simplicitate illius aetatis 
innoxiae reluceret) deserves our attention. The expression includes a paraphrase of 
Matthew 18:3 (nisi conuersi fueritis et efficiamni sicut puer iste, non intrabitis in regnum 
caelorum)66, where Jesus exhorts his disciples to become like little children in order to 
enter the kingdom of heaven. At a handful of places, Ambrose mentions either Matthew 
18:3 explicitly or the importance of becoming a child in simplicity characteristic of the 
virtuous Christian.  
In his most extensive ethical counsel to young priests, On Duties, Ambrose refers 
to Matthew 18:3 when exhorting his audience to “avoid or temper anger” (uitemus aut 
temperemus iracundiam) so that it does not “limit our praises or exaggerate our vices” 
(aut in laudibus exceptio aut in uitiis exaggeratio).67 Children’s tantrums are then 
exemplified to express the ease with which the fires of anger can be quenched. “True, 
children are easily provoked into quarrelling with one another,” Ambrose admits, “but 
they are calmed down readily enough and revert to their normal selves, more agreeable 
than they were before; they do not know how to behave deceitfully and artfully.”68 A 
                                                
66 This translation is typical of Ambrose’s citation of Matthew 18:3. For Ambrose’s other uses of 
Matthew 18:3, see Abr. 1.5.39 (CSEL 32/1: 532); Luc. 8.57 (CSEL 32/4: 420); Off. 1.21.93 (CCSL 15: 34–
35); Parad. 12.59 (CSEL 32/1: 320); Psal. 36.52 (CSEL 64: 111). 
67 Ambr. Off. 1.21.93 (CCSL 15: 34–35). 
68 Ambr. Off. 1.21.93 (CSEL 15: 34; trans. Davidson, 173): Et si cito pueri inter se mouentur, 
facile sedantur et maiore suauitate in se recurrunt; nesciunt se subdole artifioseque tractare. 
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reference to Matthew 18:3 follows, which Ambrose interprets Christologically: “the Lord 
himself, that is, ‘the Power of God’ (1 Cor. 1:24), became just as a child, ‘though reviled, 
he reviled not; though struck, he did not strike back’ (1 Pt. 2:23).”69 Likewise and perhaps 
somewhat idealistically, Ambrose states that children have a short memory when it 
comes to wrongs received, displaying no malice or hints at retaliation, only innocence, 
recognizing even at their young age that “one fault quickly forges another.”70 Ambrose 
counsels his priests to act likewise: “Guard your place and keep custody of your heart’s 
simplicity and purity” (locum tuum serua, simplicitatem et puritatem tui pectoris 
custodi).71  
Ambrose’s most detailed descriptions of childlikeness as characteristic of 
simplicity are in his Exposition of the Gospel of Luke, books seven and eight, written 
several years after his comments in On Duties. At Exposition 7.22–23, Ambrose exegetes 
Luke 9:48 (“whosoever shall receive this child in my name…”) to introduce the claim 
that “simplicity ought to be without arrogance, charity without envy, and devotion 
without anger.”72 Luke 9:48 gives Ambrose occasion to reflect on the importance of 
Jesus’s words and what children and “receiving” them might mean for one’s moral life. 
The “mind of a child” (mens pueri), Ambrose maintains, fulfills the tripartite claim that 
simplicity should be without arrogance, charity without envy, and devotion without 
                                                
69 Ambr. Off. 1.21.93 (CSEL 15: 35): itaque ipse Dominus, hoc est Dei virtus, sicut puer, cum 
malediceretur, non remaledixit; cum percuteretur, non repercussit. 
70 Ambr. Off. 1.21.93 (CSEL 15: 35; trans. Davidson, 173). Cf. Sen. Ira 2.19.4 (LCL 214: 206–7). 
Seneca argues that “the anger of children and women is more vehement than serious, and it is lighter at the 
start.”  
71 Ambr. Off. 1.21.93 (CCSL 15: 35). 
72 Ambr. Luc. 7.23 (CSEL 32/4: 292).  
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anger. By behaving without strings attached or ulterior motives, children are said to act 
with “purity of affect,”73 and to pursue the “form of virtue” (formam uirtutis).74  
The “purity of affect” and “form of the virtues” are distinguished from the 
counterfeit “appearance of obedience” (species obsequiorum).75 The distinction between 
forma and species here is an interesting one, given that Ambrose will use the two terms 
as rough synonyms elsewhere. In On the Mysteries 4.25, for instance, Ambrose uses 
species in a paraphrase of both Philippians 2:8 (Et specie inuentus ut homo) and John 
5:37b (Neque speciem eius uidistis), respectively.76 This usage of species, as we will see 
later in this chapter, is preceded by a consideration of the difference between the “true 
dove” (uera columba) in Genesis’s flood narrative and the “semblance” (species) of a 
dove which descends on Jesus at his baptism (Mt. 3). Differences in usage 
notwithstanding, Ambrose utilizes the visual qualities in both forma and species. By 
juxtaposing “form” (forma) and “appearance” (species) in Exposition 7.22–23, Ambrose 
                                                
73Luc. 7.22 (CSEL 32/4: 292).  
74 Ambr. Luc. 7.22–23 (CSEL 32/4: 292). […] sed dominus non obsequiorum speciem, puritatem 
quaerit adfectus. Denique supra ait: quicumque receperit puerum istum in nomine meo. Quo loco dominus 
simplicitatem sine adrogantia docet, caritatem sine inuidia, deuotionem sine iracundia esse debere; nam et 
pueri mens prouectioris adfectu recipienda suadetur, quia, dum puer nihil sibi uindicat, formam uirtutis 
exsequitur et, si rationem nescit, culpam ignorant. Tamen quia plerisque non uirtus, sed infirmitas uidetur 
sine ratione simplicitas, ut tu ueram recipias admoneris, id est ut exsequaris industria munus naturae. 
Ambrose uses forma and species together to explain virtue a couple times throughout his corpus. See 
Abr.1.1.1 (CSEL 32/1: 501): Nam si altiore disputatione processus quidam et forma uirtutis et quaedam 
species exprimatur, tamen forensia quoque actuum eius uestigia spectare uirtutis profectus est; and Abr. 
2.1.1 (CSEL 32/1: 565): Ergo ut mens, quae in Adam totam se delectationi et inlecebris corporalibus 
dederat, in formam uirtutis speciem que transiret, uir sapiens nobis ad imitandum propositus est. In 
addition to these, Ambrose uses the phrase forma uirtutis in Fug. 4.17 (CSEL 32/2: 178).  
75 Ambr. Luc. 7.22 (CSEL 32/4: 292). 
76 Ambr. Myst. 4.25 (CSEL 73: 99). Cf. Abr. 2.11.84 (CSEL 32/1: 635), where Ambrose uses 
species for a “type of thing”; Hex. 1.1.1 (CSEL 32/1: 3), which distinguishes “matter” (materia) and 
“form” (species); 1.2.5 (CSEL 32/1: 4), where Ambrose uses the phrase “proposed model” (speciem 
propositam) to describe an errant (Timaean?) view of creation. 
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aims at aligning inner states and outward appearance. Pursuing and seeing the “form of 
the virtues” is lauded, while cultivating only an “appearance” is denigrated and shunned.  
A fuller exposition of childlike simplicity and its connection to virtue comes in 
the eighth book of the Exposition in light of Luke 18:16: “Let the little children come to 
me and do not prohibit them; of such as these is the kingdom of heaven.”77 Given their 
feebleness in mind and body, Ambrose wonders why Jesus would name children as 
worthy of the kingdom of heaven. And, moreover, if children are the promised heirs of 
the heavenly kingdom, why did Jesus choose grown men as his apostles? What is it about 
children that indicates their divinely favored status? “Perhaps, because [children] do not 
know malice,” Ambrose writes,  
they have not learned to deceive, they dare not strike back, they neglect to search 
for wealth, they do not strive after honor and ambition. But virtue is not to be 
ignorant of those things, but to despise them, nor is there praise of abstinence 
where there is integrity of weakness. It is not therefore childhood that is 
designated, but goodness emulating childhood’s simplicity.78   
 
Children operate with a certain innocence, Ambrose contends. This is admittedly due in 
large part to their ignorance. Still, it is their sincere simplicity that Ambrose lauds. Virtue 
knows not ignorance, but, as children do, it does choose to neglect wealth, honor, and 
highhandedness. So, true virtue is both embodied by children in its innocence and 
simplicity and not embodied by children because puerile ignorance is not typical of 
virtue. It is therefore not childlike immaturity or ignorance that Ambrose lionizes—what 
                                                
77 Ambr. Luc. 8.57 (CSEL 32/4: 419–20): sinite pueros uenire ad me et nolite eos uetare; talium 
est enim regnum dei. See also Luc. 8.61 (CSEL 32/4: 422), where Ambrose reiterates the teaching 
highlighted here. 
78 Luc. 8.57 (CSEL 32/4: 419–20; Trans adapted from Tomkinson, 358): Fortasse quia malitiam 
nescient, fraudare non nouerint, referire non audeant, scrutari ignorent opes, honorem, ambitionem non 
appetent. Sed non ignorare ista uirtus est, sed contemnere nec continentiae laus, ubi infirmitatis integritas. 
Non igitur pueritia, sed aemula puerilis simplicitatis bonitas designatur. 
  
 
243 
Ambrose labels “childhood” (pueritia)—but “childlike” (puerilis) integritas and 
simplicitas.79 
Ambrose continues by again referring to Matthew 18:3 (“Unless you turn and 
become like this little child, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven”) to reiterate 
his point. This citation prompts a line of questions and responses pertaining to the precise 
identity of “this little child” and what it might look like to “turn and become like” him. 
He writes:  
Who is this boy to be imitated by Christ’s apostles? Not one of the children? So, 
this is the virtue of the apostles? But, then, who is the boy? He of whom Isaiah 
says, “For child is born to us, a son is given to us” (Is. 9:6)? For the Child Himself 
said to you, “Take up thy cross and follow me” (Mt. 16:24). And that you may 
recognize the Child, when “he was cursed, he did not curse in return; though he 
was struck, he did not strike back” (1 Pt. 2:23). For this is perfect virtue. Thus, 
there is in childhood the venerable old age of customs and in old age, an innocent 
childhood. “For venerable old age is not that of a long time, nor counted by the 
number of years. But the understanding of men is grey hairs and a spotless life is 
old age” (Wis. 4:8–9).80  
 
Ambrose asks, and subsequently answers, about the exemplary child by citing three 
verses: Isaiah 9:6 (“Unto us a child is born, unto us a son is given”),81 Matthew 16:24 
                                                
79 Cf. Psal. 36.52 (CSEL 64: 111), where Ambrose does not make this distinction. There, he 
maintains that Jesus teaches us pueritia and its uirtus (ipse nos docuit pueritiam esse uirtutem). A similar 
figurative logic can be found in Ambrose’s statements on eunuchs: the demands of the faith are demands of 
chastity, not castration. See Ambr. Off. 2.6.27 (CCSL 15: 107); Vid. 13.75 (PL 16: 257–58); Virgin. 6.28–
30 (PL 16: 273). For more on this sort of figurative exegesis, see Elizabeth A. Clark, Reading 
Renunciation: Asceticism and Scripture in Early Christianity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 
70–103, at 89–92 
80 Ambr. Luc. 8.58 (CSEL 32/4: 420; trans. amended from Tomkinson, 358): Quis est ergo puer 
imitandus apostolis christi? Num unus ex paruulis? Haec igitur uirtus apostolorum? Quis ergo puer? Ne 
forte ille de quo Esaias dicit: Puer natus est nobis, filius datus est nobis? Ipse enim tibi puer dixit: Tolle 
crucem tuam et sequere me. Et ut agnoscas puerum: Cum malediceretur, non remaledixit; cum 
percuteretur, non repercussit; haec est enim perfecta uirtus. Itaque et in pueritia est quaedam uenerabilis 
morum senectus et in senectute innocens pueritia; senectus enim uenerabilis est, non diuturna, nec numero 
annorum conputata; cani sunt autem sensus hominum et aetas senectutis uita inmaculata. 
81 Puer natus est nobis. Filius datus est nobis. For other references to this verse in Ambrose’s 
corpus, see Abr. 1.8.77 (CSEL 32/1: 552); Ep. 17.11 (CSEL 82/1: 126); Exc. 1.12 (CSEL 73: 215); Fid. 
3.7.53–3.8.57, 3.9.60 (CSEL 78: 127–30), 4.1.6 (CSEL 78: 160), 4.6.63 (CSEL 78: 179); Iob 4.4.17; Luc. 
1.40 (CSEL 32/4: 35), 2.55 (CSEL 32/4: 71), 3.8 (CSEL 32/4: 104), 6.4 (CSEL 32/4: 233), 8.58 (CSEL 
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(“Take up your cross and follow me”),82 and 1 Peter 2:23 (“Though he was cursed, he did 
not curse in return; though he was struck, he did not strike back”).83 The third of these, 1 
Peter 2:23, we identified in the last chapter as critical to understanding how the imago 
Dei was to be a “representation of the gospel” (effigies euangelii).84 This ethic of non-
retaliation pervades Jesus’ “precepts” (praecepta) and, as Ambrose notes repeatedly, is 
characteristic of children.85  
Still, being “converted” to a child might lead us to Nicodemus’s question, a 
puzzle over how one advanced in years might reverse the course of time. Ambrose argues 
that there is a wisdom that comes from childhood’s innocence and a similar innocence 
brought about by wisdom’s age. For support of this claim, he quotes Wisdom of Solomon 
4:8–9: “For venerable old age is not that of long time, nor counted by the number of 
years. But the understanding of men is grey hairs, and a spotless life is old age” (senectus 
enim uenerabilis est, non diuturna, nec numero annorum conputata; cani sunt autem 
                                                                                                                                            
32/4: 420), 10.112 (CSEL 32/4: 497); Paen. 2.4.24 (CSEL 73: 174); Patr. 6.31 (CSEL 32/2: 142); Psal. 
118 10.14 (CSEL 62: 211), 13.7 (CSEL 62: 286), 22.3 (CSEL 62: 490); Psal. 1.33 (CSEL 64: 30), 36.52 
(CSEL 64: 111); Sacr. 2.2.4 (CSEL 73: 26–27); Spir. 1.5.66 (CSEL 79), 2.2.20 (CSEL 79), 3.2.9 (CSEL 
79). 
82 Tolle crucem tuam et sequere me. For other references to this verse in Ambrose’s corpus, see 
Abr. 1.4.29–30 (CSEL 32/1: 524–25); Apol. Dau. 9.47 (CSEL 32/2: 331); Ep. 1.15 (CSEL 82/1: 10), 4.16 
(CSEL 82/1: 34); Fug. 2.6 (CSEL 32/2: 167); Iob 3.11.28 (CSEL 32/1: 265); Off. 1.29.142 (CCSL 15: 51), 
2.3.9 (CCSL 15: 101); Paen. 2.10.97 (CSEL 73: 201–2); Psal. 118 6.25 (CSEL 62: 121), 13.10 (CSEL 62: 
288), 22.34 (CSEL 62: 505). 
83 Cum malediceretur, non remaledicit; cum percuteretur, non repercussit. For other references to 
this verse in Ambrose’s corpus, see Fid. 3.7.52 (CSEL 78: 127); Virg. 13.86 (PL 16: 526); Luc. 5.21 (CSEL 
32/4: 188), 5.77 (CSEL 32/4: 213), 7.59 (CSEL 32/4: 306), 8.58 (CSEL 32/4: 420); Off. 1.21.93 (CCSL 
15:); Parad. 12.59 (CSEL 32/1: 320); Psal. 118 13.27 (CSEL 62: 297), 14.28 (CSEL 62: 317); Psal. 37.45 
(CSEL 64: 173). 
84 See Psal. 118 22.34 (CSEL 62: 505). 
85 Off. 1.10.33 (CCSL 15: 12), 1.21.93 (CCSL 15: 34–35). See also Exc 1.51 (CSEL 73: 237). The 
demands of non-retaliation are highlighted in Ambrose’s praise of Satyrus, as is evidenced by the 
organizing passage quoted above. “He quietly absorbed the grief of insult which more sharply he sought to 
avenge” (iniuriae dolorem clementer absorbuit quam inclementius uindicavit).  
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sensus hominum et aetas senectutis uita inmaculata).86 There are only a few patristic 
references to Wisdom 4:8–9 in early Christian literature, save Origen’s Commentary on 
John which mentions only a portion of Wisdom 4:9,87 a citation in Epiphanius’s 
Panarion,88 and Gregory Nazianzus’s passing reference to qualities of “old age.”89 The 
amount of Ambrose use of this scripture, here and elsewhere, is unprecedented in the 
Latin tradition.90 The text offers a middle way between the prized character of antiquity 
and the novelty Christian commitment brings, calling followers to be born anew.  
For many Hellenistic Jewish writers, early Christian apologists, and some of 
Ambrose’s contemporaries, both Greek and Latin, to claim Christianity’s remote 
antiquity pointed to its superiority over its rivals. In the main, this too is what we see in 
Ambrose’s writing: saints antedate sages, philosophers, and heroes, and therefore the 
faithful’s embodiment and expressions of the good life win out.91 Still, what to do with 
verses like Matthew 18:3 and Luke 18:16 that laud not the tested wisdom of history, but 
                                                
86 Ambr. Luc. 8.58 (CSEL 32/4: 420).  
87 Orig. Com. Ion. 20.10.79.  
88 See also Epiphanius, Panarion 67.4.7, in Williams, trans., The Panarion of Epiphanius of 
Salamis, 312.  
89 Gregory Nazianzus, Oration 43.23. 
90 For other references to Wisdom 4:8–9 in Ambrose’s corpus, see Abr. 2.9.64 (CSEL 32/1: 619); 
Cain 1.3.11 (CSEL 32/1: 346), 2.1.2 (CSEL 32/1: 378); Noe 31.119 (CSEL 32/1: 419), Psal. 118 2.17 
(CSLE 62: 30), 6.20 (CSEL 62: 118), 6.30 (CSEL 62: 123), 13.13 (CSEL 62: 289), 16.6 (CSEL 62: 354); 
Psal. 36.59 (CSEL 64: 117), 43.5 (CSEL 64: 363); Ep. 20.9 (CSEL 82/1: 150), 52.5 (CSEL 82/2: 70); Iac. 
2.8.35 (CSEL 32/2: 52); Ios. 8.43 (CSEL 32/2: 103); Off. 2.20.101 (CCSL 15: 134). See Gryson (ed.), 
Vetus 11/1, 306–9. For other uses in the Latin tradition, see P.-Nol. Ep. 13.6 (CSEL 29: 89); Aug. Ep. 218.1 
(CSEL 57: 425); Eucher. Form. 5 (CSEL 31: 32). 
91 See my forthcoming article, “History and Virtue: Contextualizing Exemplarity in Ambrose,” 
JECS 25.2 (2017). For the production of an exemplary canon in another author, Thodoret of Cyrrhus—
during roughly the same time—see Krueger, “Typological Figuration in Theodoret of Cyrrhus’s Religious 
History and the Art of Postbiblical Narrative,” 393–419. Krueger maintains that Theodoret’s use of biblical 
typology, informed by his rhetorical and philosophical education, creates a literary device for ascetical 
purposes. By appealing to virtuous biblical models and connecting those models to Christ, Krueger argues, 
Theodoret reshapes (even fabricates) certain events (at 398). 
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the moral and salvific standing of children, their simplicity and fresh innocence? Wisdom 
4:8–9 helps Ambrose solve the apparent quandary; it serves as a bridge verse, wedding 
the innocence that Christianity demands—the “new creation” at baptism—and the 
veteran respect of antiquity. 
Ambrose’s use of the first verse in Exposition 8.58, Isaiah 9:6, is unique in this 
moral context.92 For Ambrose, Isaiah’s well-known prophetic sentence serves to name the 
Child worthy to be imitated and followed: Jesus is “the Child Himself” (ipse puer), 
Ambrose tells us, who sets out the moral ideal for individuals to look to for guidance. 
Distinctive of this childlike way is a life of self-denial and non-retaliation, described in 
the bible verses cited in Exposition 8.58. This way of life Ambrose labels perfecta 
uirtus.93 And yet Ambrose’s assertion of the Child as virtuous ideal emerges from a 
career of engagement with Isaiah 9:6 and its possible moral implications.  
On the Faith 3.7.46ff. likely represents Ambrose’s first attempt at using Isaiah 9:6 
in connection with the acquisition of virtue. Written around 380 CE, On the Faith 3 is 
remarkably more precise than the work’s first two books, as it tackles the scriptural logic 
of the homoians rather than engaging broad-brushed comments on the “Arian” heresy. 
Leading up to his use of Isaiah 9:6 in On the Faith 3.7.46, Ambrose disputes the meaning 
of Proverbs 8:22, a popular anti-Arian reference: “The Lord created me the beginning of 
                                                
92 While he was definitely not the first to refer to Isaiah 9:6, Ambrose was the first, as far as I can 
determine, to gloss this verse with reference to securing virtue rather than in discussing how the prophet 
foretold the Son’s birth. For use of Isaiah 9:6 in the generation after Ambrose, and not in the same hortatory 
ways, see Crawford, Cyril of Alexandria’s Trinitarian Theology of Scripture, 18–30, 60–62. 
93 At other points, Ambrose criticizes children for their silly behavior, telling his audience to “stop 
judging like a child, speaking like a child, thinking like a child, and behaving like a child” (Off. 1.16.62 
[CCSL 15: 23]). See also Off. 1.18.67 (CCSL 15: 25), where the childish silence deserves to be criticized; 
and Off. 3.22.128 (CCSL 15: 201), where Ambrose critiques children for changing friends haphazardly, 
like Cicero’s arguments in Amic. 33–34 (LCL 154: 144–47). For a textual comparison of Off. 3.22.128 and 
Cicero’s, see Davidson, Ambrose: De officiis, 2: 899–900. 
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his ways for his works” (Dominus creauit me principium uiarum suarum in opera sua).94 
Ambrose understands Proverbs 8:22 as a description of the incarnation—the redemption 
of the Father’s creation is accomplished in the incarnation and works of the Son.95 The 
Son, Ambrose contends, is without a doubt “the beginning” of all things, quoting John 
8:25: “[Jesus] was asked, ‘Who are you?’ He answered, ‘The beginning, as I have told 
you’” (Cum interrogatus in carne ‘tu qui es?,’ responderit: ‘Principium quod et loquor 
uobis’).96 Ambrose argues that John 8:25 refers not only to the Son’s eternal nature, but to 
                                                
94 Fid. 3.7.46 (CSEL 78: 124–25). 
95 Proverbs 8:22 was a controverted scriptural battleground in homoian-Nicene debates. See 
“Fragments de Palladius,” 110, 340r–v (SC 260: 294–97) and 134, 346v–347r (SC 260: 315–17). For 
secondary analysis on the use of Proverbs 8:22 in Trinitarian debates, see Manlio Simonetti, “Sull’ 
interpretazione patristica di Proverbi 8,22,” in Studi sull’ Arianesimo (Rome: Editrice Studium, 1965), 9–
87; Michel van Parys, “Exégèse et théologie trinitaire: Prov. 8,22 chez les Pères cappadociens,” Irénikon 43 
(1970): 363–79; Frances Young, “Proverbs 8 in Interpretation: Wisdom Personified; Fourth-Century 
Readings: Assumptions and Debates,” in Reading Texts, Seeking Wisdom: Scripture and Theology, ed. 
David F. Ford and Graham Stanton (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003), 102–15; Sara Parvis, Marcellus 
of Ancyra and the Lost Years of the Arian Controversy 325-345 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 
38–95, at 57–58, 66, 94; Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy, 106–15, 370; idem, “Exegesis in the Trinitarian 
Controversies, ” in The Oxford Handbook of Early Christian Biblical Interpretation, ed. Paul Blowers and 
Peter Martens (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, Forthcoming); Barnes, The Power of God, 
112, 196–97; Hanson, The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God, passim, esp. 30, 50, 102–25, 824–49. 
96 Fid. 3.7.49 (CSEL 78: 125). See also, Fid. 5.10.121 (CSEL 78: 262); Luc. 10.112 (CSEL 32/4: 
497), both of which reference Christ as principium. Augustine cites John 8:25 twice, using principium both 
times. See Aug. Ep. 149.25 (CSEL 44: 371); Gen. imp. 2.3 (CSEL 28/1: 461–62). Principium rather than 
intium (or related words) ends up in the Vulgate (Principium quod et loquor uobis). In both Ambrose’s 
references to John 8:25, “beginning” (either principium or initium) is taken as a nominative (“[I am] the 
beginning, who speaks to you.”) rather than an adverbial accusative, sometimes labeled an internal 
accusative, (“Just as I have been telling you from the beginning”). This latter rendering is most typical of 
English translations. The adverbial accusative is an accusative object which functionally renames the action 
of the verb. In this case, the literal translation, taking an accusative rendering of principium, would be 
woodenly: “What I speak the beginning to you”, but is rendered “What I have been telling you from (or 
since) the beginning”). For more on the this construction in John 8:25 and related literature, see Chyrs C. 
Caragounis, “What Did Jesus Mean by τὴν ἀρχήν in John 8:25?,” Novum Testamentum 49.2 (2007): 129–
47; Gualtiero Calboli, “Latin Syntax and Greek,” in New Perspectives on Historical Latin Syntax: Syntax of 
the Sentence, ed. Philip Baldi and Pierluigi Cuzzolin, (Berlin; New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2009), 65–
195, at 111–14. Origen mentions John 8:25 in his Com. Ion. 19.159–60, but the remainder of the book is 
lost and he does not mention Jesus as the “beginning.” In the extant text, Origen does not reference Isaiah 
9:6. For others of Ambrose’s use of this verse, see Hex. 1.2.5 (CSEL 32/1: 4), 1.4.15–16 (CSEL 32/1: 13–
14); Tob. 19.66 (CSEL 32/2: 559). Each of these texts refers to John 8:25 and uses initium rather than 
principium for Jesus’s response. In Hex. 1.2.5 Ambrose uses both intium and principium interchangeably 
throughout the passage for “beginning,” with little explanation why. With no explicit reason, he refers to 
two uses of “beginning” in scripture: Genesis 1:1 (in principio fecit deus caelum et terrram) and John 8:25 
(Initium quod et loquor uobis). Hex. 1.4.15–16 is similar to Hex. 1.2.5 in that it uses several different 
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the fact that he is the “author of each virtue” (uniuscuiusque uirtutis auctorem).97 In so 
authoring each virtue, Christ “paves the road to heaven for us” (ad caelum nobis sterneret 
iter),98 revealing the ways of the good life driven by holy excellence.99 Ambrose writes 
that Christ is thus both the perfect exemplar of virtue and, as “author” (auctor), the very 
“beginning” (principium) of all virtue.  
Christ then is the beginning of our virtue, the beginning of our integrity, who 
taught virgins not to pine for lying with men, but integrity of the mind and of the 
body more to the Holy Spirit than to a husband. Christ is the beginning of 
frugality, who “became poor though he was rich” (2 Cor. 8:9). Christ is the 
beginning of patience, who, “though cursed, did not curse, though struck, did not 
strike back” (1 Pt. 2:23). Christ is the beginning of humility, who “accepted the 
form of a slave” (Phil. 2:7), though equal to the Father in his majesty of virtue. 
From him, each virtue receives its beginning. For this cause then, that we might 
learn these various virtues, “a Son was given us, whose beginning was upon his 
shoulder” (Is. 9:6). That “beginning” is the Lord’s cross—the beginning of 
                                                                                                                                            
words for “beginning” (initium, principium, and caput). When John 8:25 is cited, Ambrose uses initium, 
but later he uses principium to describe Christ (in hoc ergo principio, id est in Christo…). Ambrose also 
uses caput as synonymous with principium and initium, indicating that some have translated Genesis 1:1 
(in principio) from the Greek ἐν κεφαλαίῳ, which they render in capite. As far as I can tell, there are three 
possible reasons for Ambrose’s variations of “beginning” in general and his use of John 8:25 in particular. 
First, it is possible that Ambrose is using two different sources for John 8:25 in De fide and Hexaemeron. 
Second, it is possible that Ambrose came across a variant in the Vetus, which led him to introduce unique 
terms for “beginning.” Third, it is possible that Ambrose is using these words interchangeably for variety’s 
sake, for artistic purposes rather than technical ones. Complicating the first two of these possibilities is the 
fact that Ambrose uses principium as “beginning” and in his citation of John 8:25 in Luc. 10.112 (CSEL 
32/4: 397)—a work the date of which remains uncertain. There is similar uncertainty surrounding the 
dating of Tob. 19.66 (CSEL 32/2: 559), a text that includes initium in Ambrose’s citation of John 8:25. 
Hence, we are unable to say that Ambrose had one textual variant up to, say, the early 380s, and then 
another after, when he was composing his hexameral homilies. Speculating on precisely why, then, 
Ambrose uses principium at some places and initium at others is beyond the scope of this dissertation.  
97 Fid. 3.7.49 (CSEL 78: 126). See also Hex. 1.2.5 (CSEL 32/1: 4), where Ambrose’s description 
of God as creator bears remarkable resemblance to his statements about Jesus in Fid. 3.7.49, where 
Ambrose writes as follows: Vnde diuino spiritu praeuidens sanctus Moyses hos hominum errores fore et 
iam forte coepisse in exordio sermonis sui sic ait: In principio fecit deus caelum et terram, initium rerum, 
auctorem mundi, creationem materiae conprehendens, ut deum cognosceres ante initium mundi esse uel 
ipsum esse initium uniuersorum, sicut in euangelio dei filius dicentibus: tu quis es? respondit: Initium 
quod et loquor uobis, et ipsum dedisse gignendi rebus initium et ipsum esse creatorem mundi, non idea 
quadam duce imitatorem materiae, ex qua non ad arbitrium suum, sed ad speciem propositam sua opera 
conformaret. Pulchre quoque ait: In principio fecit, ut inconprehensibilem celeritatem operis exprimeret, 
cum effectum prius operationis inpletae quam indicium coeptae explicauisset.  
98 Fid. 3.7.50 (CSEL 78: 126). 
99 Fid. 3.7.51 (CSEL 78: 126). 
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fortitude, whereby a way has been opened to the holy martyrs to enter the 
sufferings of the holy war.100  
 
Notice here Ambrose’s naming of the virtue is followed by Christ’s perfect virtue—self-
denial, humiliation, non-retaliation—most fully exemplified at the crucifixion. By 
associating the Son with “the beginning” to which Proverbs 8:22 refers, Ambrose can 
point to other “beginnings” embodied by Jesus’ life and crucifixion. The reference to 
Isaiah 9:6, noted above, is remarkable in this respect, as well. The “beginning” from 
which Ambrose gets his argument comes not simply from the young age of the child 
promised from Isaiah 9:6, but from the second half of the verse’s textual variant: “whose 
beginning was upon his shoulders” (cuius principium super umeros eius).101 Principium 
here is polyvalent, connoting “origin” as well as “precedence,” indicating both the Son’s 
eternality and his preeminence over all others.102 It is, perhaps, because of the distinctly 
pro-Nicene context that Ambrose feels obliged to argue for the Son’s eternality.  
The second half of Isaiah 9:6, as Ambrose cites it (cuius principium super umeros 
eius), sounds odd, since most contemporary translations trade in language of 
“government” or “power” rather than “beginning.” Ambrose’s citation of principium for 
                                                
100 Ambr. Fid. 3.7.52–53 (CSEL 78: 127): Principium itaque nostrae uirtutis est Christus, 
principium integritatis, qui docuit uirgines non uiriles expectare concubitus, sed integritatem mentis et 
corporis sancto magis dicare spiritui quam marito; principium parsimoniae Christus, qui pauper factus est, 
cum diues esset, principium patientiae Christus, qui, cum malediceretur, non remaledixit, cum 
percuteretur, non repercussit, principium humilitatis Christus, qui "formam serui accepit", cum patrem 
deum maiestate uirtutis aequaret. Ex illo enim accepit uirtus unaquaeque principium. Et ideo ut haec 
uirtutum genera disceremus, filius datus est nobis, cuius principium super umeros eius. Principium illud 
crux domini est, principium fortitudinis, quo uia sanctis est reserata martyribus ad sacri certaminis 
passionem. 
101 Ambr. Fid. 3.7.53 (CSEL 78: 127).  
102 Ambrose could be adapting this polyvalence of principium from Tertullian, who indicates that 
principium has to do both with “order” and with “power”. See Tert. Herm. 19 (CSEL 47: 147–48): Possum 
et aliter principium interpretari, non ab re tamen, nam et in Graeco principii uocabulum, quod est ἀρχή, 
non tantum ordinatiuum sed et potestatiuum capit principatum, unde et archontes dicunt principes et 
magistratus. Ergo secundum hanc quoque significationem principium pro principatu et potestate sumetur. 
In principatu enim et in potestate deus fecit caelum et terram. 
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the verse is atypical in the Latin tradition preceding him. Other Latins used texts that 
utilized imperium not principium, for example.103 But Ambrose’s translation most closely 
follows the LXX, which notes the “beginning” (ἀρχή) being upon the Son’s shoulders.104  
Ambrose indicates that the prophet Isaiah saw this principium, which is why he 
quotes Isaiah 9:6.105 For all Ambrose’s language of Christ as the principium of virtue and 
his reference to Isaiah’s prophecy of the child, he does not reference Matthew 18:3 
(“Unless you turn and become like this little child, you shall not enter into the kingdom 
of heaven”) or similar verses at On the Faith 3.7.53. Christ is the one Isaiah foretold in 
Isaiah 9:6—the “Child” and the “Son”—the verse does not directly reference a moral 
ideal, only that Christ is a beginning and that that beginning pertains to virtue. 
Ambrose treats each descriptor from Isaiah 9:6 separately, “Child (who is born)” 
and “Son (who is given).” The Child, he writes, is “a gift from earth,” while the latter, the 
Son, is “a gift from heaven.”106 And though each pertains to a discrete type of gift, both 
point to “one thing, perfect in respect to each, without any mutability of divinity and 
without any diminishment of human nature.”107 The magis’ singular adoration shows that 
“the one who was seen in the stalls is the very Lord of heaven” (ut ostenderent ipsum 
                                                
103 See, e.g., Tert. Marc. 3.19 (CSEL 47: 408); Adu. Iud. 10.11 (CCSL 2: 1378 ); Lac. Inst. 4.12.10 
(CSEL 19: 312); Chromat. Mat. 5.1 (CCSL 9A: 216), 6.1 (CCSL 9A: 220), 55.2 (CCSL 9A: 473–74). 
104 See Gryson (ed.), Vetus Latina 12/1, 288. Principium is one of five Vetus variants and is 
representative of a sub-variant of what Gryson calls “le texte européen.” Other variants include: imperium, 
initium, potestas, and principatus. For the LXX use of ἀρχή in reference to the verse, see Eusebius, 
Demonstratio Euangelica 9.8; Basil [Dub.], Commentarius in Isaiam prophetam 9.226 (PG 30: 512); 
Marcellus, De incarnatione et contra Arianos 22.91 (PG 26: 1025); Hippolytus, De benedictionibus Isaaci 
et Iacobi 21.222 (PO 27: 88). 
105 Ambr. Fid. 3.8.54 (CSEL 78: 127–28). 
106 Ambr. Fid. 3.8.54 (CSEL 78: 128). 
107 Ambr. Fid. 3.8.54 (CSEL 78: 128): utrumque unus in utroque perfectus et sine mutabilitate 
diunitatis et sine humanae inminutione naturae. 
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esse caeli dominum, qui in praesepibus uideretur).108 Here again, we cannot help but flag 
the visual logic at work: seeing Christ—this time, at his birth as “Child”—grants insight 
into his nature as “the very Lord of heaven.”  
In the paragraphs immediately following Ambrose’s citation of Isaiah 9:6, he 
indicates that there are “other places” (alii), presumably other textual variants of which 
he is aware, which include an additional nobis (“to us”).109 With this slight addition, the 
verse thus reads: “A Child is born to us, and a Son is given to us” (Puer natus est nobis, 
filius et datus est nobis). Ambrose uses the additional nobis to his rhetorical advantage, 
indicating that the “to us” is directed not toward the world in general, but to Nicenes in 
particular. He lists Jews, Manicheans, Marcionites, Photinians, Sabellians, and Arians as 
those for whom neither a child nor a son was given;110 hence, Ambrose can say that this 
particular variant of Isaiah 9:6 “extinguishes multiple heresies” (hic locus multas hereses 
extinguat).111 
The pairing of John 8:25 (Jesus’ statement: “I am the principium”) and Isaiah 9:6 
recurs in Ambrose’s Exposition of the Gospel of Luke 10.112. There, in exegeting the 
reasoning for the placement of the sign above Jesus’ head at the crucifixion (“Behold, the 
King of the Jews”), Ambrose references the two verses—Isaiah 9:6 first, followed by 
John 8:25.  
So the title is written and placed above, not below, the cross, because “the 
beginning is upon his shoulders” (Is. 9:6). So what is “the beginning” if not his 
eternal power and divinity? Hence, when Jesus was asked, “Who are you?” he 
                                                
108 Ambr. Fid. 3.8.54 (CSEL 78: 128). 
109 Fid. 3.8.56 (CSEL 78: 128). 
110 Fid. 3.8.57–58 (CSEL 78: 128–29). 
111 Fid. 3.8.57 (CSEL 78: 128–29). 
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replied “the beginning, who also spoke to you” (Jn. 8:25). Let us read this title, 
“Jesus of Nazareth,” it says, “The King of the Jews” (Jn. 19:19).112 
 
Here, we see that the positioning of the title—super not infra—leads Ambrose to attach 
the event with the two scriptures in question. That the sign is near his shoulders conjures 
up reference to Isaiah 9:6, and Isaiah’s reference to the principium recalls John 8:25.  
While others prior to Ambrose discussed the nature of principium as well as 
Christ’s relationship to the Father in terms of eternality and virtue, Ambrose is the first 
Latin to label Christ as principium uirtutis.113 Claiming Christ as the principium uirtutis 
interjects Ambrose into a longstanding and ongoing dialogue with classical philosophers, 
over the principia, the “beginnings” or “principles”, of virtue.114 Cicero names the sides 
                                                
112 Luc. 10.112 (CSEL 32/4: 497). Scribitur autem titulus et super crucem ponitur, non infra 
crucem. quia ‘principium super umeros eius.’ principium autem quod est nisi sempiterna uirtus eius atque 
diuinitas? Unde et ipse interrogatus: ‘tu quis es?’ respondit: ‘principium, quod et loquor uobis.’ Legamus 
hunc titulum. ‘Iesus inquit Nazarenus rex Iudaeorum.’ 
113 See, e.g., Tert. Herm. 19 (CSEL 47: 146–48), which discusses the “true meaning” of the term 
principium with reference to John 10:30, Genesis 1:1, and Proverbs 8:22; Ps.-Tert. Marc. 5.200 (CCSL 2: 
1453), which refers to Christ as the uirtus of the Father sub imagine; Lact. Inst. 1.7 (CSEL 19: 28), who 
indicates that God’s virtue cannot be estimated, even as his beginning is not comprehended; Mar.-Vict. Ar. 
1.58 (CSEL 83/1: 158), where the Holy Spirit is labeled the principium of movement and the Son is the 
uirtus of God. Augustine is known for predicating principium of Jesus, as well, in distinguishing Christian 
and Platonic teaching. See, e.g., Aug. Ciu. 10.23–24 (CSEL 40/1: 484–86): Nose itaque ita non dicimus 
deo uel tria principia, cum de Deo loquimur, sicut nec duos deos uel tres nobis licitum est dicere quamuis 
de unoquoque loquentes, uel a Patre uel de Filio uel de Spiritu sancto, etiam singulum quemque Deum esse 
fateamur, nec dicamus tamen quod haeretici Sabelliani. . . . Sed subditus Porphyrius inuidis potestatibus, 
de quibus et erubescebat, et eas libere redarguere formidabat, noluit intellegere Dominum Christum esse 
principium, cuius incarnatione purgamur.  For secondary literature on Augustine, Christ, and principium, 
see B. Dalsgaard Larsen, “Saint Augustine on Christ as principium in De ciuitate Dei, 10,23–24,” SP 22 
(Leuven: Peeters, 1989), 283–89. Larsen mentions Ambrose’s use in passing at 285–86, arguing that 
Ambrose “interprets principium as reign (principatus) and finds in John 8,25 Christ’s own testimony that 
he has won sovereignty by his victory over death” (at 285). 
114 By at least the time he pens his hexameral homilies (386 CE), Ambrose appears cognizant of 
the philosophical freight principium can bear. See, e.g., Hex. 1.1.1 (CSEL 32/1: 3): Tantum ne opinionis 
adsumpsisse homines, ut aliqui eorum tria principia constituerent omnium, deum et exemplar et materiam, 
sicut Plato discipuli que eius, et ea incorrupta et increata ac sine initio esse adseuerarent deum que non 
tamquam creatorem materiae, sed tamquam artificem ad exemplar, hoc est ideam intendentem fecisse 
mundum de materia, quam uocant ὕλην, quae gignendi causas rebus omnibus dedisse adseratur, ipsum 
quoque mundum incorruptum nec creatum aut factum aestimarent, alii quoque, ut Aristoteles cum suis 
disputandum putauit, duo principia ponerent, materiam et speciem, et tertium cum his, quod operatorium 
dicitur, cui subpeteret competenter efficere quod adoriendum putasset. 
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of the debate in his On Ends, citing several principia for virtue and discussing Stoic 
claims at length. At On Ends 4.15.40–4.17.46, Cicero praises the Stoics who label nature 
the principium officii,115 and he argues they are better than most at finding the proper 
“principle” (principium) for action.116 The principia serve as both the ideals and the 
starting points; nature functions as the means by which Stoics know that and how to 
act.117 If we are right that such considerations are part of the backdrop for Ambrose’s 
reflections on principium of virtue, then saying Christ is the “beginning” of virtue signals 
his preeminence over nature in matters of moral decision making. It is Christ, and not 
nature, who instructs us in virtue, which is to be driven by his example of childlike 
simplicity.  
It would be a challenge not to draw similarities between Ambrose’s exegetically 
motivated statements on Christ as principium from On the Faith 3 and those on 
childlikeness from On Duties 1.21.93 and Exposition of the Gospel of Luke 8.58 and 
10.112. Though used in differing exegetical contexts, and not all utilizing Isaiah 9:6, they 
all have a similar argument: Jesus calls us to be like children in the putting on of 
simplicity, and the ideal of childlikeness is found in the Son, whose poverty, persecution, 
and crucifixion constitute both the origins and ideals of virtue.  
 
                                                
115 Cic. Fin. 4.15.40 (LCL 40: 344-45). 
116 Cic. Fin. 4.16.43 (LCL 40: 346-49). 
117 Cic. Fin. 4.17.46 (LCL 40: 350–53). 
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Semblances of Virtue and Mirrors of Innocence: Embodied Simplicity as Normative 
 The second aspect of simplicity prompted by Ambrose’s description of Satyrus is 
that Satyrus “shines with a semblance of perfect virtue” (perfectae uirtutis effigie) and 
“with a mirror of innocence of habits” (quodam innocentium morum speculo reluceret).118 
Possible philosophical debts aside, this phrase’s similarity to Ambrose’s claim that the 
well-painted soul is the one in which “a semblance of divine operation shines” (elucet 
diuinae operationis effigies) is plain.119 From it we concluded in Chapter Four that 
effigies functions as an image’s enacted representation and display of invisible realities. 
Applying this finding to Ambrose’s depiction of Satyrus from Death of Satyrus 1.51, we 
can similarly make the case that Satyrus’ simplicity is necessarily a concrete 
manifestation, an effigies, of perfect virtue and a mirror of innocence. Let us take each 
predication—Satyrus having a semblance and Satyrus having a mirror—in turn. 
 The first effect of Satyrus’ simplicity is that he “shine[s] with a semblance of 
perfect virtue.” Recall our prior analysis of effigies, which interpreted the predication this 
way: Satyrus’ simplicity is a lived representation of virtue. This should not be a 
surprising conclusion if we recall Ambrose’s consistent reference to exempla of the 
Christian faith throughout his writings. He begins his best-known ethical work, On 
Duties, by enumerating exempla from the scriptures; each exemplum personifies the very 
virtues its audience seeks.120 Rather than first explicate definitions of the virtues and then 
                                                
118 Ambr. Exc. 1.51 (CSEL 73: 236–37). See Courcelle, Recherches sur les Confessions de saint 
Augustin, 320–25, where he argues that language of “perfect virtue” and “mirror” is likely adapted from 
Apuleius’s Platonism. 
119 Ambr. Hex. 6.7.42 (CSEL 32/1: 233–34). 
120 For Ambrose’s use of exemplars with the end of trumping secular counterfeits, see Wolf 
Steidle, “Beobachtung zu des Ambrosius Schrift De officiis,” VC 38.1 (1984): 18–66, at 20–35; Steidle, 
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point to those same virtues’ manifestation or application, Ambrose does just the opposite, 
allowing virtuous exempla to precipitate further technical analysis. “It is artificial,” 
Ambrose contends, “to start by defining duty and then divide it into fixed categories.”121 
He continues,  
We want to shun artificiality: we would rather present the examples of our 
ancestors, which are neither difficult to understand nor tricky to handle. The life 
of our ancestors ought to be a mirror of moral instruction for us rather than a 
record of our own ingenuity, and we should show respect by imitating them 
instead of looking clever in the way we structure arguments.122 
 
On Duties 1.25.116 is significant for our purposes on several levels. As we saw earlier in 
the chapter, the excess of ars—translated here as “artificiality”—is a trope often attached 
to Ambrose’s most bitter doctrinal rivals, the homoians. For Ambrose, Christians 
sympathetic to Nicaea offer straightforward teaching, unconcerned with technicality or 
florid explanation. But here, I want to explore Ambrose’s main reason for placing 
exemplars prior to the definitions of the virtues they embody: exempla maiorum are easy 
to understand.123 
                                                                                                                                            
“Beobachtung zum Gedankengang im 2. Buch von Ambrosius, De officiis,” VC 39.3 (1985): 280–98; 
Klaus Zelzer, “Zur Beurteilung der Cicero-Imitatio bei Ambrosius,” Wiener Studien 11 (1977): 168–91. 
Ambrose’s impetus for using exemplars for training in virtue is mirrored by his zeal for recovering relics of 
martyrs, specifically the physical bodies of Gervasius and Protasius. See Filippo Carlà, “Milan, Ravenna, 
Rome: Some Reflections on the Cult of the Saints and on Civic Politics in Late Antique Italy,” Rivista di 
storia e letteratura religiosa, 46.2 (2010): 197–272, at 198–211, 238–41. “The relationship between the 
patron and his believers is based on the physical presence of the relics, and is then strongly connected to the 
geographical place (or places) where such relics are held” (204). 
121 Ambr. Off. 1.25.116 (CCSL 15: 42; trans. amended from Davidson, 185): Sed hoc artis est ut 
primo officium definiatur, postea certa in genera dividatur. 
122 Ambr. Off. 1.25.116 (CCSL 15: 42; trans. Davidson, 185): Nos autem artem fugimus, exempla 
maiorum proponimus quae neque obscuritatem adferunt ad intellegendum neque ad tractandum uersutias. 
Sit igitur nobis uita maiorum disciplinae speculum, non calliditatis commentarium, imitandi reuerentia, 
non disputandi astutia. 
123 See Seneca’s similar statement in Ep. 6.5 (LCL 75: 26–27), “the way is long if one follows 
precepts, but short and helpful, if one follows examples” (longum iter est per praecepta, breue et efficax 
per exempla). Cf. Plin. Pan. 45.6 (LCL 59: 422–23). 
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  We should first note that the signal importance Ambrose places on exemplars in 
his moral theology is typically Roman. The theme is prevalent throughout Roman 
educational works with which Ambrose would have been familiar.124 Quintilian, for one, 
praises the effectiveness of foregrounding exemplars and the retelling of national 
histories for moral training. “Even more important are the records of the notable sayings 
and actions of the past,” he writes. “Nowhere is there a larger or more striking supply of 
these than in the history of our own country. Could there be any better teachers of 
courage, justice, loyalty, self-control, frugality, or contempt for pain and death?”125 For 
Quintilian, examples are easy to follow and readily available; history offers the fullest 
catalogue of excellent human action and functions as the best and most straightforward 
pedagogue of virtue.  
The significance of easy-to-follow examples was also used to distinguish Roman 
education from its Greek counterpart. Anthony Corbeill explains these efforts of Roman 
                                                
124 For more on Ambrose’s educational background, see Saterlee, Ambrose of Milan’s Method of 
Mystagogical Preaching, 36–44. For more on grammatical and rhetorical Roman education, see Stanley 
Frederick Bonner, Education in Ancient Rome: From the Elder Cato to the Younger Pliny (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1977), 189–276. 
125 Quint. Inst. 12.2.29–31 (LCL 494: 236–37). See also Quint. Inst. 10.1.15 (LCL 127: 258–59); 
Val. Max. Fact. ac dict. 1.praef (LCL 492: 12–15); Rhet. Her. 4.49.62 (LCL 403: 382–87), where a 
pertinent example is said able to “render a thought more brilliant” and shed ”light upon what was somewhat 
obscure.” See Morgan, Popular Morality in the Early Roman Empire, 122–59. For a dated, but still helpful 
treatment of exempla in the Roman rhetorical tradition, see Bennet J. Price, “‘Παράεδιγμα’ and 
‘Exemplum’ in Ancient Rhetorical Theory” (PhD dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1975). 
Price is keen to highlight both the general continuity in rhetorical writing on exempla and its multiple 
strands of discontinuity, concluding that it is in general unhelpful to offer an Ur-definition for exemplum 
over the entirety of Greco-Roman literature. Instead, Price contends that we must look to each specific 
author to see what function examples have. For a recent treatment of the mos maiorum in the Roman 
tradition and with reference to Judaism and Christianity, see Petitfils, Mos Christianorum. The formative 
role of exemplars in the Christian life is continued and expanded in Augustine’s works. See Wetzel, 
Augustine and the Limits of Virtue, 112–60; Ayres, “Into the Poem of the Universe: Exempla, Conversion, 
and the Church in Augustine’s Confessions,” ZAC 13 (2009): 263–81. Ayres’s article shows how 
Augustine’s use of exempla aids in the reconstruction of Christian memory (conversion) and in stimulating 
ordered desire. Ayres’s conclusions bear resemblance to work in cultural studies. See, e.g., Jan Assmann, 
Religion and Cultural Memory: Ten Studies, trans. Rodney Livingstone. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2006).  
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Republican authors to adapt Greek rhetorical elements while simultaneously seeking to 
distance themselves from those same Greeks. This process, Corbeill contends, sought to 
“naturalize” Hellenistic models into the Roman social landscape.126 This naturalization 
exacerbated a seemingly understandable, though likely exaggerated, tension between 
Greeks and Romans, the broad strokes of which are discernable in Cicero and Quintilian, 
among others. The tension is fueled by a distinction between theory and practice: Greeks 
prefer theory, Romans, practice.127 One implication of Roman exhortation to practice 
rather than theory was that public display and spectacle became significant educational 
nexuses, which placed a high price on the budding rhetorical training of established and 
aspiring Roman elites. What resulted was a growing contingent of Latin rhetors, who 
themselves adapted the forms and impetuses of Greek rhetoric, while ignoring or 
lambasting their Greek forebears.  
In On Duties 1.25.116, Ambrose adapts the Roman argument for exemplarity for 
argument against all things non-Nicene, using his educational formation against itself. 
The relative ubiquity of exemplarity’s preeminence in Roman rhetorical manuals should 
not obscure Ambrose’s uniqueness here. While he continues this traditional reflection on 
exemplars—say, instead of Greek “precepts”128—Ambrose’s stable of exemplars aims to 
outstrip classical canons by embodying the “simple faith of truth” (simplex ueritatis 
                                                
126 Anthony Corbeill, “Education in the Roman Republic: Creating Traditions,” in Yun Lee Too, 
ed., Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2001), 261–87, at 261–62. 
127 See Cic. Rep. 4.3 (LCL 213: 232–3).  
128 See Matthew Roller, “Exemplarity in Roman Culture: The Cases of Horatius Cocles and 
Cloelia,” Classical Philology 99 (2004): 1–56. 
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fides).129 Throughout On Duties he repeatedly admits the “remarkable” (praclaerus) 
nature of Roman heroes and sages (generals, philosophers, etc.), while nevertheless 
maintaining that Christian analogues out-simplify, and often antedate, them.130  
For instance, at On Duties 3.12.80–3.13.84, Ambrose contrasts Jephthah’s 
daughter (Judg. 11–12) and Judith with two Pythagorean sages, Damon and Phintias.131 
After being condemned to death by a tyrannical ruler, the first sage requested to postpone 
the execution. If he failed to return, the second sage’s life would be taken. The ruler 
grants the postponement, and is surprised to find the first sage return to be executed on 
the day promised. In the face of such anxiety, the second sage waited calmly and 
patiently for his comrade’s return. Once reunited, the sages’ calmness and display of 
friendship was so disarming and remarkable that the tyrant’s hand was stayed, and he 
even befriended them.  
While Ambrose acknowledges the strong camaraderie between the two sages and 
lauds their even disposition, he argues that scriptural examples surpass these Pythagorean 
ideals. Similar to the first sage, Jephthah’s daughter (Judg. 11:30–39) hears of her 
impending sacrifice and thereupon requests time (two months) to communally mourn not 
the loss of her life, but her virginity, which was “now to be consecrated by death.”132 
                                                
129 Ambr. Abr. 1.2.3 (CSEL 32/1: 503). See Smith, Christian Grace and Pagan Virtue, 88–94; 
Elizabeth Bisbee Goldfarb, “‘Transformation Through Imitation’: Biblical Figures as Moral Exempla in the 
Post-Classical World” (PhD dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 2005), 165–90. 
130 Ambr. Off. 3.15.92 (CCSL 15: 188). I explore Ambrose’s argument for antedating—or laying 
claim to Christianity’s remotest antiquity—in my forthcoming article “History and Virtue: Contextualizing 
Exemplarity in Ambrose.” See also Peter Auksi, Christian Plain Style: The Evolution of a Spiritual Ideal 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1995) 144–73, at 150. 
131 See Cic. Off. 3.45 (Winterbottom, 126–27). An earlier telling of the story can be found in Cic. 
Tusc. 5.32 (LCL 141: 488–91). Ambrose also names the two sages at Virg. 2.5.34 (PL 16: 216).  
132 Ambr. Off. 3.13.81 (CCSL 15: 184). For other references to this story in Ambrose’s writings, 
see Off. 1.50.255 (CCSL 15: 94–95); Valent. 49 (CSEL 73: 353). See also John L. Thompson, Writing the 
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Neither friends’ tears nor grief nor laments “move” (mouit) her133: she freely returned and 
submitted herself to death. Ambrose offers the example of Judith too, who acted like the 
Pythagorean sages, but whose courage surpassed the philosophers:  
Like them, she showed not a trace of fear at the danger of death. But with her 
there was more: she showed no fear at the danger to her honor, and that is a matter 
of graver concern to women of good character. Like them, she did not quake at 
the prospect of the executioner's knife. But she went further: she did not quake at 
the prospect of a whole army and all its weaponry.134 
 
The courage of both Jephthah’s daughter and Judith bears striking similarity to the 
equanimity of the Pythagorean sages. Ambrose admits as much. However, he makes the 
case that these scriptural exempla are “more remarkable” (praecellentius), “more ancient” 
(antiquius),135 “much more magnificent” (magnificentius multo), “more illustrious” 
(illustrius),136 and “amazing” (mirabilis).”137 Both women display courage on a grander 
scale than do the sages: exhibiting their virtue before armies and entire groups instead of 
a single ruler. In the case of Jephthah’s daughter, Ambrose is keen to point out the 
                                                                                                                                            
Wrongs: Women of the Old Testament among Biblical Commentators from Philo through the Reformation 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 100–78, at 118–21. Thompson admits no real development in 
Ambrose’s usage of the story of Jepthah’s daughter throughout his career, but claims that “his comments 
are best understood as driven . . . by his desired applications” (at 121). 
133 Similar language of being “moved,” as noted in Chapter Four, is operative in Ambrose’s 
description of the Annunciation. See Ambr. Off. 1.18.69 (CCSL 15: 26). 
134 Ambr. Off. 3.13.83 (CCSL 15: 185; trans. amended from Davidson, 405): Utique quod in illis 
Pythagoreis duobus mirantur, non expavit mortis periculum, sed nec pudoris, quod est gravius bonis 
feminis; non ictum carnificis sed nec totius exercitus tela trepidavit. For more on Ambrose’s use of Judith 
in his corpus, see Virginia Burrus, “‘Equipped for Victory’: Ambrose and the Gendering of Orthodoxy,” 
JECS 4.4 (1996): 461–75, at 472–74; Marcia Colish, “Ambrose of Milan on Chastity,” in  Chastity: A 
Study in Perception, Ideals, Opposition, ed. Nancy Van Deusen (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 37–60, at 50, 58; 
Jean Doignon, “La première exposition ambrosienne de l’“exemplum” de Judith (“De virginibus”, 2, 4, 
24),” in Ambroise de Milan. XVIe centenaire de son élection épiscopale, ed. Y.-M. Duval (Paris, 1974), 
219–28; Fernando Vera, “Los exemplos femeninos en san Ambrosio" (Doctoral thesis, La Universidad de 
Navarra, 2003), 154.   
135 Ambr. Off. 3.12.80 (CCSL 15: 184). 
136 Ambr. Off. 3.12.81 (CCSL 15: 184). 
137 Ambr. Off. 3.13.82 (CCSL 15: 185). 
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contrast between a seemingly meek virgin’s action and that of a great philosophical sage. 
In Judith’s example, Ambrose similarly distinguishes between the assumed male victor 
and the subjugated female: “Her first triumph was that she returned from the enemy’s tent 
with her honor intact; her second was that as a woman she carried off a victory over a 
man, and put nations to flight through the plan she devised.”138 
 Elsewhere, Ambrose’s comments on the effectiveness of Christian exemplars and 
the easy therapy the retelling of their lives brings. His treatise on the life of Abraham is a 
case in point. There, Ambrose notes at the work’s outset that Moses—putative author of 
Genesis—depicts Abraham’s life in such a way as to “resuscitate the hearts of men 
gliding into vice” (corda hominum in uitium labentia resuscitaret).139 Ambrose claims 
that the Abrahamic narrative offers a more lasting “expression of virtue” (expressam 
uirtutem) than its classical counterparts, Plato’s Republic and Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, in 
particular. Plato’s Republic presents its readers with “something fictive and counterfeit” 
(aliquam fictam et adumbratam), while Xenophon trades in the “ostentatious falsehood of 
eloquence” (ambitioso eloquentiae mendacio).140 Ambrose’s Abraham, instead, deals 
with the “simple faith of truth” (simplex ueritatis fides): “devotion” (deuotionem) and 
“fruitful virtue” (efficacia fructuosa).141  
                                                
138 Ambr. Off. 3.13.82 (CCSL 15: 185). 
139 Abr. 1.1.2 (CSEL 32/1: 501). 
140 Abr. 1.1.2 (CSEL 32/1: 502). A related statement can be found in Ambr. Luc. Prol.1 (CSEL 
32/4: 3): scripturi in euangelii librum, quem Lucas sanctus pleniore quodam modo rerum dominicarum 
distinctione digessit, stilum ipsum prius exponendum putamus; est enim historicus. nam licet scriptura 
diuina mundanae euacuet sapientiae disciplinam, quod maiore fucata uerborum ambitu quam rerum 
ratione subnixa sit, tamen si quis in scripturis diuinis etiam illa quae miranda illi putant quaerit, Ambrose 
makes the point that the scriptures, and the gospel of Luke in particular, evince a “historical style” (stilus 
historicus) that pierces through the “embellishments of words” (fucata uerborum). 
141 Abr. 1.2.5 (CSEL 32/1: 505). Ambrose uses efficacia a handful of times rather than uirtus in 
discussing moral excellence or the unique efficiency of something. See Exc. 1.23 (CSEL 73: 222); Luc. 
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Ambrose also lauds exempla maiorum because they afford students of virtue “a 
mirror of moral instruction” (Sit igitur nobis uita maiorum disciplinae speculum). Simply 
put, when we take note of others’ exemplary action, our own shortcomings are laid 
bare.142 Ambrose uses a similar phrase in his catechetical work on the patriarch Joseph, 
for instance, proposing that the patriarch be “set before us as a mirror of purity” 
(speculum castitatis).143 As a mirror of purity, Joseph’s character and actions “shine forth 
with modesty” (lucet pudicitia) and reflect the splendor of virtue.144 Talk of speculum 
works hand-in-glove with our previous analysis of both Ambrose’s doctrine of rival 
images, borrowed from Origen (Chapter Three), and his claim that divine operation 
“shines forth” in the soul and is discernible in the character of human action (Chapter 
Four). If the soul can be said to image its model—be it a biblical or early Christian 
exemplar or God—it is a short step to say that the agent reflects that model.145  
Talk of a “mirror” of laudable action also helps individuals identify a plumb line 
of virtue, an ideal to which the agent is tasked to conform. Still, the mirror is not a 
stagnant principle or set of precepts, but a life lived under the auspices of grace. Joseph’s 
signal virtue, for instance, is pudicitia, annexed to, and lived out with respect to, castitas. 
                                                                                                                                            
10.31 (CSEL 32/4: 467); Hex 6.9.61 (CSEL 32/1: 252); Valent. 79b (CSEL 73: 367). Cf. Lac. Ir. 10.37 
(CSEL 27/1: 91). 
142 Ambr. Off. 1.25.116 (CCSL 15: 42; trans. Davidson, 185). Cf. Ambr. Psal. 118 20.33 (CSEL 
62: 460–61), where the gospel is called both the morum magisterium and speculum iustae conuersationis. 
143 Ambr. Ios. 1.2 (CSEL 32/2: 74). See Colish, Ambrose’s Patriarchs, 127–48, at 128–29. For 
background on Joseph as exemplar in Ambrose, see Anna Maria Piredda, “La tipologia sacerdotale del 
patriarca Giuseppe in Ambrogio,” Sandalion 10–11 (1987–88): 153–63. 
144 Ambr. Ios. 1.2 (CSEL 32/2: 74). See Ambr. Hex. 6.8.45 (CSEL 32/1: 236), where, by means of 
a gloss on 2 Corinthians 3:18 (Nos itaque omnes reuelata facie gloriam dei speculantes ad eandem 
imaginem reformamur a gloria in gloriam sicut a domini spiritu), the soul is referred to as a mirror that 
reflects divine glory.  
145 See Smith, Christian Grace and Pagan Virtue, 46–47. 
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In his life, Joseph reflects this virtue, and by reading his life and hearing his example, we 
can envision that virtuous standard and scrutinize and improve our own actions. By 
beholding beautiful and laudable manifestations of a given virtue, we come to know the 
content of that virtue and how to enact it. This means of communicating virtue—we 
might call it “example-first”—serves to reinforce the visual dynamic we have explored in 
previous chapters on Ambrose’s Christology and moral anthropology. To know God is to 
see, to “read”, Jesus’ opera. Likewise, to know the principles, precepts, or definitions of 
virtue is to see the virtue performed.  
Simple virtue is not only first embodied; its character reveals that it is 
uncomplicated by passion and driven by holy impulse. In his treatise On Isaac, Ambrose 
interprets Rebecca’s dismounting of her camel and the removal of her veil (cf. Gen. 
24:65) as the search for the “true beauty of naked virtue” (uerum decorum nudae 
uirtutis).146 Ambrose offers two glosses on the unveiling of Rebecca. The first posits that 
the garment is representative of concupiscence and the trappings of deceit. Such a line 
would make sense of both Ambrose’s exhortations to chastity and praise of virginity, but 
also of his repeated warnings against philosophy. The philosophers—cloaked with 
pallia—are accused of interjecting deception and unnecessary confusion into people’s 
                                                
146 Ambr. Is. 6.55 (CSEL 32/1: 679). Being cloaked in virtue, charity, or God often follows 
reference to Song of Songs 5:7 (percusserunt me et uulnerauerunt me, tulerunt pallium a me custodes 
murorum). See Psal. 118 7.35–36 (CSEL 62: 148), where the Church, personified as a woman, retains her 
cloak: Quomodo ergo infra tulerunt pallium, nisi forte quia processu operosae fidei ecclesia dum nudatur, 
a domino plus amatur, expolians se ueterem hominem, ut nouum induat, quem non operiunt indumenta, sed 
mentis secreta clarificant, aut quia amictum sapientiae saecularis ad Christum uentura deposuit? Et Noe 
exutus est pallium, postea quam coepit esse perfectior. See also Psal. 118 14.34 (CSEL 62: 320): Bonus 
amictus uitae aeternae. Hoc pallium sponsae custodes uolerunt auferre murorum, quo primus homo fuerat 
exutus; sed anima Deo deuota quaesitum diu tenendo et non dimittendo dilectum pretioso caritatis diuinae 
se uestiuit inuolucro. Beati igitur qui tali pallio uestiuntur et amictum huiusmodi legis obseruatione 
meruerunt. 
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minds. And so, by taking off the philosopher’s cloak, Rebecca’s heart is stripped bare of 
wrongful desire and excessive education.147 
 Ambrose puts forth a second interpretation of Rebecca’s unveiling. The soul, 
when stripped, can be revealed to be of good intent. Ambrose cites John 14:30 for his 
support: “The prince of this world is coming and in me he will find nothing” (uenit enim 
huius mundi princeps, et in me inueniet nihil).148 “Nothing” (nihil) here indicates an 
absence of worldly wisdom and convention; hence, when the prince of the world comes, 
he will find nothing indicative of earthly pleasure, secular learning, or the like. Ambrose 
then concludes: “Blessed is the one in whom he [the prince of the world] does not find 
grave or multiple sins, but on her finds an amice of faith and the rule of wisdom.”149 So, 
again, “nothing” does not convey a physically naked subject, but pertains rather to 
noteworthy transgression. The faithful are to be “clothed” with garments of faith and the 
rule of wisdom. This amice of faith and discipline of virtue exemplify true wisdom, 
inviolable and unassailable to outside forces. Such virtue, such singlemindness of good 
intent, bespeaks “true integrity” (uera integritas), which “shines forth” (elucet) in the 
face of loss or challenge.150 
                                                
147 See Ambr. Virgin. 8.48 (PL 16: 278–79), where Ambrose contrasts the philosopher’s pallium 
with Christ’s, which he also calls the amictum prudentiae, insigne patientiae. See also Ambr. Virgin. 12.76 
(PL 16: 285), 14.85–92 (PL 16: 287–90), where “if one removes the amice of philosophy, then he will draw 
near to Christ.”  
148 For other references to this verse in Ambrose’s works, see Abr. 2.9.62 (CSEL 32/1: 616); Bon. 
mort. 5.16 (CSEL 32/1: 717); Ep. 1.17 (CSEL 82/1: 11); Fug. 4.23 (CSEL 32/2: 183); Iac. 2.6.24 (CSEL 
32/2: 46); Is. 6.55 (CSEL 32/1: 679–80); Luc. 4.39 (CSEL 32/4: 158); Off. 1.49.241 (CCSL 15: 88); Psal. 
118 14.36 (CSEL 62: 322); Psal. 38.27 (CSEL 64: 204–5); Tob. 9.33 (CSEL 32/2: 536); Virgin. 17.109 (PL 
16: 294). 
149 Ambr. Is. 6.55 (CSEL 32/1: 680): Beata et illa est in qua non grauia aut multa peccata inuenit, 
sed inuenit in ea amictum fidei et sapientiae disciplinam. 
150 Ambr. Is. 6.56 (CSEL 32/1: 680). 
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As Margaret Mohrmann has pointed out, Ambrose’s use of integritas as a broad 
moral category has its roots in his writings on virginity and chastity, writings which 
bookend his episcopacy.151 The one with integrity is chaste outside and measured inside; 
her body and soul are harmoniously aligned. Virgins, like children, exemplify true virtue 
in their innocence, by devoting their entire selves to God.152 In On Virgins (ca. 376/7 CE), 
Ambrose praises his sister Marcellina, a consecrated virgin, for her “love of integrity” 
(amor integritatis).153 Throughout the work, integritas functions as a synonym of 
“chastity” (castitas) and “modesty” (pudor, modestia),154 while signaling “virtue” 
(uirtus). 
Let virginity be first marked by the voice, let modesty close the mouth, let 
religion remove weakness, and habit instruct nature. Let her gravity first 
announce a virgin to me, by a shy approach, by a sober gait, by a modest 
countenance. Let the signs of virtue be preceded by the evidence of integrity.155  
 
                                                
151 See Margaret E. Mohrmann, “Integrity: Integritas, Innocentia, Simplicitas,” Journal of the 
Society of Christian Ethics 24.2 (2004): 25–37. See also Madec, Saint Ambroise et la philosophie, 36–45. 
Cf. Pierre-Thomas Camelot, “Les traités ‘De virginitate’ au IVe siècle,” Études carmélitaines 31 (1952): 
273–92.  
152 Cf. McLynn, Ambrose of Milan, 60–68, who identifies differences in tone and function in 
Ambrose’s multiple treatises on virginity. For McLynn, however, virginity serves, by and large, as a 
diversionary tactic because of Ambrose’s unpreparedness to assume the episcopacy. Cf. Madec, Saint 
Ambroise et la philosophie, 225–36. Though Madec mentions the role that simplicity of faith plays in 
Ambrose’s works, he omits consideration of simplicity connected to virginity or chastity. 
153 Ambr. Virg. 1.3.10 (PL 16: 191), 1.4.15 (PL 16: 193). This is likely Ambrose’s first work as 
bishop. See Ambr. Virg. 2.6.39 (PL 16: 218), where Ambrose mentions that, as a bishop for not even three 
years, “though untaught by experience,” he had “learned much” from the virgins’ way of life (Haec ego 
uobis, sanctae uirgines, nondum triennalis sacerdos munuscula paraui, licet usu indoctus, sed uestris 
edoctus moribus).  
154 Ambr. Virg. 1.5.21 (PL 16: 194–95), 1.12.62–63 (PL 16: 205–6), 2.4.22 (PL 16: 212–13). 
155 Ambr. Virg. 3.3.13 (PL 16: 223): Vocis uirginitas prima signetur, claudat ora pudor, 
debilitatem excludat religio, instituat consuetudo naturam. Virginem mihi prius grauitas sua nuntiet pudore 
obuio, gradu sobrio, uultu modesto, et praenuntia integritatis anteeant signa uirtutis. See Luc. 7.196 
(CSEL 32/4: 371), where celibacy is prized above marriage for its integritas; and Ambr. Luc. 8.9 (CSEL 
32/4: 395), where he maintains that virginity’s signal virtue is integritas. 
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The passage is striking for a number of reasons. For one, modest and praiseworthy bodily 
comportment serves as a bellwether of virginal virtue. Here too we see Ambrose 
attaching shyness, modesty, gait, and presentation as aspects of womanly grauitas. It is, 
in sum, the seriousness of activity that bespeaks an inward intention steadfast in 
faithfulness and devotion; the aligning of these makes a true virgin. 
 Integritas also has the function of negating the effects of sin and slander. In 
Ambrose’s neglected treatise On Widows, he contends that a virgin’s character, and not 
her body, has first claim on her. Integritas aids her in denying defamation, which in fact 
is characteristic of the virtue in se and not particular to its presence among virgins.156 
Christ’s integritas is described in similar ways: he “became for us a malediction so that 
benediction might absorb malediction; that integrity might absorb sin; that forgiveness 
might absorb judgment; and that life might absorb death” (Cf. Gal. 3:13).157 Here, in 
rather striking terms, Ambrose notes integrity’s ability to “absorb” sin. Later in the same 
passage, Ambrose makes his case that since we bear Christ’s death within our bodies (Cf. 
2 Cor. 4:10), Christ’s life should be manifest in our lives, expanding further the reach of 
integritas. “It is not therefore our life we live,” Ambrose writes, “but Christ’s life, a life 
of innocence, a life of chastity, a life of simplicity and of all the virtues.”158 Integritas, 
                                                
156 Ambr. Vid. 4.26 (PL 16: 242): Virgo enim, licet in ea quoque maior sit morum praerogatiua 
quam corporis, calumniam tamen integritate carnis abiurat. 
157 Ambr. Fug. 7.44 (CSEL 32/2: 198): Vt benedictio absorberet maledictionem, integritas 
peccatum, indulgentia sententiam, uita mortem.  Ambrose’s argument recalls Galatians 3:13: “Christ 
redeemed us from the curse of the law by becoming a curse for us.” See also Iac. 1.6.24 (CSEL 32/2: 19), 
where Ambrose mentions the uita beata “absorbs grief” (absorbet dolorem); Ios. 7.39 (CSEL 99–100), 
where Ambrose writes that the present age “will be absorbed by the one to come;” Iob 1.1.1 (CSEL 32/2: 
211), where a godly spirit “should absorb” the “many disturbances” (multas perturbationes) of this life; 
Psal. 118 9.3 (CSEL 62: 190–91), where the grace of love “absorbs fear;” Psal. 118 17.5 (CSEL 62: 379), 
where David is saddened but not “absorbed by grief.” 
158 Ambr. Fug. 7.44 (CSEL 32/2: 198): non ergo iam nostrum illam uitam, sed Christi uitam 
uiuimus, uitam innocentiae, uitam castimoniae, uitam simplicitatis omniumque uirtutum. 
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innocentia, castitas, and simplicitas comprise a family of terms; each denotes single-
hearted sincerity and uncomplicated purity. 
Integritas in particular points to a moral ideal uncompromising in the face of sin 
and unbothered by worldly snares. It bespeaks a chaste disposition that is simple, 
straightforward, unadorned, and disaffected with the temptations of the present age, thus 
recalling Eden’s original innocence. In On the Patriarchs, Ambrose identifies virgins as 
exempla integritatis, who “to some degree, shine with the flashing of supernal light” 
(supernae lucis fulgore resplendeant).159 Agnes of Rome (d. 304), a young chaste martyr, 
outstrips her pagan counterparts because she is said to have triumphed over more 
adversity and is even “more confident in her constancy” (constantia confidentior).160 
These virgins’ upstanding character and internal stability again point to the inviolability 
of the virtues that, once secured, steady the soul and inform human action.161 Elsewhere 
                                                
159 Ambr. Patr. 3.12 (CSEL 32/2: 131). 
160 Ambr. Virg. 1.4.19 (PL 16: 191). See Madec, Saint Ambroise et la philosophie, 39–40, which 
argues that throughout De uirginibus Ambrose presents the Christian virgin as the angel of earth, lauding 
her as a living exemplum, a category that would have been seen as paradoxical. On the Christian virgin as 
living exemplum, see Ambr. Virg. 2.5.35 (PL 16: 216–17). 
161 Virg. 2.4.22 (PL 16: 212), where Ambrose recounts the story of an unnamed Antiochene virgin 
who had no desire to be seen in public—conspicuous in her diffidence. When the virgin’s first customer, a 
soldier appears, he cloaks her in his military garb rather than taking advantage of her. The soldier confesses 
his intentions of saving the virgin from defamation, willing too to be martyred in the process. Ambrose 
records the virgin becoming a soldier, while the soldier became a virgin. There are multiple mentions of 
this episode in secondary literature. Ariel Bybee Laughton, “Virginity Discourse and Ascetic Politics in the 
Writings of Ambrose of Milan” (PhD dissertation, Duke University, 2010), 94, 114–15; Virginia Burrus, 
The Sex Lives of Saints: An Erotics of Ancient Hagiography (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2004); 134–35; Mathew Kuefler, The Manly Eunuch: Masculinity, Gender Ambiguity, and Christian 
Ideology in Late Antiquity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 242–44; Kathleen Coyne Kelly, 
Performing Virginity and Testing Chastity in the Middle Ages (London; New York: Routledge, 2002), 47; 
Maud Burnett McInerney, Eloquent Virgins: The Rhetoric of Virginity from Thecla to Joan of Arc (New 
York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), 71–73; Daniel Boyarin, Dying for God: Martyrdom and the Making of 
Christianity and Judaism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 85–88; Colish, “Ambrose of Milan 
on Chastity,” 57–59; Jean Doignon, “La première exposition ambrosienne de l'exemplum de Judith (De 
uirginibus 2.2.24),” in Ambroise de Milan, XVIe centenaire de son élection épiscopale, ed. Y.-M. Duval 
(Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1974), 220–28. 
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Mary is named the imago uirginitatis, the exemplum who allows a great number of 
virtues to shine forth.162  
Ambrose draws on several of gospel statements to support his calls to simplicity; 
foremost is Jesus’ counsel to be “as wise as serpents, yet simple as doves” (Mt. 10:16).163 
Ambrose interprets Matthew 10:16 with several different ends in view. In The Prayer of 
Job and David, he identifies Job as serpent-like and shrewd, while David is identified as 
ingratiating and innocent.164 Rather than depict the two as conflicting ideals, Ambrose 
notes how Job’s and David’s affects work together, referring to Matthew 10:16 as the 
ideal for balancing shrewdness and simplicity.  
A more extensive explanation of the text comes in his work On Mysteries, where 
Ambrose explores the relationship between baptism and simplicity with reference to the 
                                                
162 Ambr. Virg. 2.2.15 (PL 16: 210). See Ambr. Psal. 118 5.3 (CSEL 62: 84; trans. Riain, 55), 
where Ambrose indicates that Mary is light like the cloud accompanying Israel because of her “virginal 
integrity. Light too, because she sought not to please the world, but to please God. Light because she did 
not conceive in sin, but became fruitful by the overshadowing of the Spirit. She brought forth her child not 
in sin but in grace.” Leuis erat secundum uirginitatis integritatem; leuis erat quae non homini quaerebat 
placere, sed domino, leuis erat quae non in iniquitate conceperat, sed spiritu superueniente generabat nec 
in delicto, sed cum gratia parturibat. See Charles William Neumann, The Virgin Mary in the Works of 
Saint Ambrose, Paradosis 17 (Fribourg: University Press, 1962), 64–66. 
163 For references to this verse in Ambrose’s corpus, see Abr. 2.8.59 (CSEL 32/1: 613); Aux. 21 
(CSEL 82/3: 95); Hex. 5.7.17 (CSEL 32/1: 152), 5.14.49 (CSEL 32/1: 177); Fid. 3.16.130 (CSEL 78: 154); 
Fug. 7.40 (CSEL 32/2: 195), 9.58 (CSEL 32/2: 207); Inst. 1.4 (PL 16: 306), 17.112 PL 16: 332); Iob 4.1.1 
(CSEL 32/2: 267); Luc. 2.74 (CSEL 32/4: 80), 2.92 (CSEL 32/4: 94–95), 9.34 (CSEL 32/4: 451); Myst. 
4.25 (CSEL 73: 98–99); Psal. 118 6.15–17 (CSEL 62: 115–17), 14.38 (CSEL 62: 323–24); Psal. 36.10 
(CSEL 64: 76–77), 37.8 (CSEL 64: 142); Virgin. 12.70 (PL 16: 284). Ambrose also uses others of Jesus’ 
statements, regarding deception and simplicity, like Matthew 5:37 (“let your yea be yea, your nay be 
nay…”), 8:20 (“Foxes have holes and birds of the air have nests…”), and Luke 9:58 (“Foxes have holes 
and birds of the air have nests…”). 
164 Ambr. Iob 4.1.1 (CSEL 32/2: 267): Multi quidem deplorauerunt infirmitatem fragilitatis 
humanae, excellentius tamen ceteris sanctus Iob et sanctus Dauid. Ille superior directus uehemens acer et 
quasi grauibus exasperatus doloribus maiore coturno: hic blandus et placidus atque mansuetus, mitiore 
affectu, ut uere quem imitandum sibi proposuit cerui imitaretur affectum. Nec te moueat, si tantum 
prophetam ferae similitudine uidear praedicare, cum legeris ad apostolos dictum: ‘Estote astuti sicut 
serpentes, simplices sicut columbae.’ See also Luc. 2.74 (CSEL 32/4: 80), where the Jews are said to have 
had “natural prudence” (prudentiam naturalem); and Luc. 9.34 (CSEL 32/4: 451), where Matthew 10:16 is 
quoted to support dealing shrewdly with heretics. 
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Spirit’s descent in the “likeness” (species) of a dove at Jesus’ baptism.165 The mention of 
the dove recalls Noah sending out an actual, that is, a “true dove” (uera columba; Gen. 
8:8–12), which raises for Ambrose a potential objection: How can the Noahic narrative 
be a foreshadowing of what is to come if Noah sent out a “true dove” (uera columba) and 
only a “likeness” (species) of a dove descended upon Jesus? Ambrose responds that 
nothing is more real than the Godhead (diuinitas), which “remains” (manet) forever, and 
thus, the physical (“true”) creature (dove) is not the reality, but only a likeness.166 
Likewise, those baptized into the name of the Godhead are to be simple “not in likeness . 
. . but in truth.”167 
 Ambrose’s use of “remains” (manet) here recalls John 14:10—that the Father 
“remains” with the Son and the Son with the Father—a verse contested throughout anti-
monarchian and anti-homoian debates.168 The verse, as we noted earlier, prompts 
consideration of Jesus’ visible opera and invisible diuinitas. Ambrose’s seemingly 
passing reference to the verse here is intended not only to point to the eternality of the 
                                                
165 Ambr. Myst. 4.25 (CSEL 73: 99). Cf. Luc. 2.92 (CSEL 32/4: 94–95): Quare sicut columba? 
simplicitatem enim lauacri requirit gratia, ut simus simplices sicut columbae. Pacem lauacri requirit 
gratia, quam in typo ueteri columba quondam ad illam arcam, quae sola fuit diluuii inmunis, aduexit. 
Docuit me cuius typus columba illa fuerit, qui nunc descendere dignatus est in specie columbae, docuit in 
illo ramo, in illa arca typum fuisse pacis et ecclesiae, quod inter ipsa mundi diluuia spiritus sanctus ad 
ecclesiam suam pacem adferat fructuosam. Docuit etiam Dauid, qui prophetico spiritu cernens baptismatis 
sacramentum ait: quis dabit mihi pinnas sicut columbae? Ambrose could be read as requiring simplicity in 
order to be baptized, depending on how the verb requiro is taken, whether as a prerequisite or a resulting 
demand. I take requiro here as the resulting demand of baptism, read in accord with the passage in On 
Mysteries. See also Geir Hellemo, Adventus Domini: Eschatological Thought in 4th Century Apses and 
Catecheses (Leiden: Brill, 1989), 121–24; Smith, Christian Grace and Pagan Virtue, 215–16. 
166 Ambr. Myst. 4.25 (CSEL 73: 99). Ambrose later cites Philippians 2:8 (“being found in human 
form, he humbled himself…”) and John 5:37 (“you have never heard his voice nor seen his form”), which 
indicate both that Christ was found in the species of humanity and that no one has seen the Father’s species, 
respectively.  
167 Ambr. Myst. 4.25 (CSEL 73: 99). Cf. Smith, Christian Grace and Pagan Virtue, 154–55, which 
mentions the passage but nothing of the unique vocabulary. 
168 E.g., Tert. Prax. 24.7–8 (CCSL 2: 1195). See also See Heine, “Christology of Callistus,” 61–
63, 68–71, 75–78. 
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Father abiding with the Son, but, I would argue, also to foreground the visual logic that 
recurs throughout his theology. Here, Noah’s dove, while appearing “true” (uera), 
portends a “likeness” (species) of a dove that is, in fact, truer than the uera columba of 
Genesis. The logic might initially strike us as backwards: Noah’s physical dove is 
actually a likeness, and the likeness of a dove from Matthew’s gospel is actually truer 
than the physical dove. Ambrose completes the analogy with respect to true simplicity. 
True simplicity is distinguished not only by concrete expressions of virtue. True 
simplicity is to reside deep within, and, as we saw, is rooted in pro-Nicene allegiance.  
 
Conclusions  
 This final chapter has argued that, for Ambrose, the distinctiveness of Christian 
virtue lies in its simplicity. These calls to simplicity did the double service of dismissing 
non-Nicene theology and theologians and serving as moral ideal. To demonstrate this 
double point, we first examined Ambrose’s dismissal of homoian representatives at the 
Council of Aquileia. The Council’s proceedings, we noted, depict Palladius and 
Secundianus as initially diffident, only to write them off as deceptive in presenting their 
non-Nicene theology. Such perfidy betrayed inner disturbance and theological misstep 
and should be rejected by true Christian adherents. 
Against those who would write off Ambrose’s conciliar arguments as power grabs 
and dramatically non-theological, I next analyzed a portion of Ambrose’s elegy of 
Satyrus, where he lauds his late brother’s simplicity. The first quality of simplicity I 
noted was its connection to childlikeness and innocence. Such a call to childlike 
innocence and virginal purity went beyond the imitation of a child or virgin, but tapped 
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into the source of virtue—the Child—who is, as Ambrose says, the “beginning of virtue” 
(principium uirtutis).169 Language of principium, we noted, interjects Ambrose into a 
longstanding philosophical debate over the principia—the sources and measures—of 
virtue.  
Ambrose also depicts Satyrus as shining with a “semblance of perfect virtue, and 
with a mirror of innocence of habits,” a description that recalls both Ambrose’s doctrine 
of rival images and the importance of enacted virtue for disclosing holy habits.170 The 
simple’s innocent habits, Ambrose contends, contrast with her dissenters’ equivocating 
jargon and argumentative ornamentation; the Christian is to be dovelike in her simplicity, 
neither duplicitous nor deceptive. For Ambrose, then, simplicity of word and deed 
disclosed an inner stability and holy intention only Christian exemplars could instill. 
These exemplars, renown for their simple virtue, had a corner on the “beginnings” of 
moral excellence. These exemplars ultimately depend on the Son, the true principium of 
virtue.  
That Jesus is the “beginning” means two things for Ambrose. Jesus is first the 
source of virtuous human action, which makes Jesus divine since God alone paints virtue 
in the soul. Thus, when Christians act simply, their virtue points to the true roots of virtue 
itself. Secondly, principium, we also noted, functioned as standard. Since Jesus is the first 
expression of virtue, he represents the standard according to which all action is to be 
assessed. And so, as truly simple, the Son sets the standard for our earthly pursuits of 
simplicity. The inverse, however, is also true for Ambrose: if one is not truly simple, he is 
                                                
169 Ambr. Fid. 3.7.52–53 (CSEL 78: 127). 
170 Ambr. Exc. 1.51 (CSEL 73: 237). 
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not connected to the Son. Such a claim was wielded early and often by fourth-century 
Nicenes to winnow dissenters from their ranks and to demarcate normative Christian 
belief and expression. Ambrose follows suit, depicting his specific opponents, the 
homoians, as devious and vicious. In so doing, he is able to distinguish pro-Nicene virtue 
from its non-Nicene counterfeits, linking simple virtue to orthodoxy and vice to all things 
non-Nicene. 
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CONCLUSION 
The foregoing has reconsidered the ways in which Ambrose’s theology holds 
together by means of a “visual” logic. Ambrose’s Exposition of the Gospel of Luke 1.5–
1.9 has served as our organizing passage and, I have claimed, represents the heavy lifting 
this visual logic performs. There, in exegeting Luke 1:2, Ambrose comments on both the 
“eyewitnesses” and “ministers of the Word;” the former comment animates Ambrose’s 
Christological reflections, while the latter dictates analysis of human action. Both 
Christological and moral elements operate by means of this visual logic, that works 
indicate nature. This is a unique crystallization of Ambrose’s theological innovation, an 
innovation that I have traced in the chapters above. 
In Ambrose’s Christological reflection I have argued that the general contours of 
this visual logic follow the script that the concrete works of the Son disclose the invisible 
divinity (or power) that the Father and Son share. In Chapter One, I showed that Latin 
precedents to Ambrose (Tertullian, Novatian, Hilary, and Marius Victorinus) use a 
common collection of scriptures which foreground this visual logic. Though separated by 
history, location, and station, these four precedents help lay for us the distinctly Latin 
theological ground Ambrose trod. Chapter Two presents Ambrose in the same exegetical 
traditions as his Latin forebears, hard at work using similar scriptures, to make the case 
for the Son’s shared divine power with the Father. This Christological reflection is held 
up against homoianism, which staked its claim on many of the same texts.  
Against non-Nicene theologians who argued for multiple powers based on 
differing divine revelations, Ambrose maintains a pro-Nicene theology that there is a 
  
 
273 
single, invisible power that the divine persons share. If it is the case that there is a single 
divine power, then, Ambrose says, the divine persons are unified in their operation. 
Against other non-Nicenes, Ambrose can thus make the related point that the relationship 
of the Father and Son is non-bodily. Texts from John’s gospel which tell of Jesus’s works 
proving his divinity, as well as references to Jesus as the image of God, fund Ambrose’s 
pro-Nicene polemic.  
I have further argued, following Exposition 1.5–1.9, that Ambrose’s moral 
theology operates by means of a similar visual logic. Throughout Ambrose’s counsel to 
priests and catechumens, for instance, we have seen the importance of concrete virtuous 
human action for discerning unseen moral motivation. How a priest walked proved 
critical for discerning his intent and theological allegiance. While these statements could 
be seen as a rhetorical smokescreen to garner political authority, I have contended that 
Ambrose’s purpose is moral and theological: to read an individual’s action made sense of 
his moral standing.  
That this moral counsel shows evidence of a similar visual logic as his 
Christology, I have maintained, is no coincidence but the necessary conclusion drawn 
from Ambrose’s doctrine of the image of God. In Chapter Three, I showed that 
Ambrose’s doctrine of the image of God hinges on a unique gloss of Isaiah 49:16 
(“Behold, Jerusalem, I have painted thy walls”). From this verse, Ambrose argues for 
God as the Painter, and thus Source, of all good human works, and that the well-painted 
soul is the one in which a semblance of divine operation shines. This latter phrase, which 
I took up in Chapter Four, offers explanation for why human action follows the character 
of its divine source.  
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Chapter Five considered Ambrose’s call to simplicity as the distinct Christian 
content of virtuous human action. This call to simplicity, I have argued, was consistent 
throughout his career, discerned over a variety of contexts. We saw Ambrose upholding 
the moral ideal of “simple” word and deed in both his two-part elegy for his late brother 
and in his exchanges with Palladius and Secundianus at the Council of Aquileia in 381 
CE. I have pointed to Ambrose’s explanations of exemplars (virgins, Hebrew patriarchs, 
etc.) as offering insight into the functional content and the effects of simplicity. Ambrose 
reiterates that the faithful have a unique corner on this content and these effects because 
they are childlike in their simplicity, following after the Child, a claim Ambrose supports 
with reference to Isaiah 9:6. As Child, Ambrose contends, Jesus is the “beginning” 
(principium) of virtue, further drawing on a variant of Isaiah 9:6 (“…and the principium 
shall be upon his shoulders”). 
In depicting his homoian opponents as un-simple, deceptive, and duplicitous, I 
have argued, Ambrose weds his theological heritage and his traditional Roman education. 
In other words, what Ambrose offers us is a distinctly Latin pro-Nicene moral theology 
that pairs orthodoxy with virtue.1 This conclusion charts a third way between Neil 
McLynn’s Ambrose, a savvy politician masked as a theologian, and Warren Smith’s 
Ambrose, a contemplative Greek sort who owes his theological contribution to most (if 
not all) things Hellene.  
                                                
1 The aligning of orthodoxy and virtue supports Ayres’ conclusion about the so-called 
“‘portability’ of ascetic practice and literature.” See Ayres, Nicaea and Its Legacy, 343. “When non-Nicene 
theology is seen to result both from a failure to maintain appropriate attention to the mysteriousness of God 
and from an inappropriately trained soul, it is not surprising that in the homilies of many pro-Nicene 
authors there is a conscious attempt not simply to encourage people to join ascetic communities, but to 
encourage those who continue to live within non-sexual-renunciant families to adopt practices that stem 
from ascetic contexts.” 
  
 
275 
The truth of the matter is that both McLynn and Smith give us necessary portraits 
of Ambrose’s complex persona as bishop in the functional capitol of the Roman Empire. 
McLynn cleverly paints a portrait of Ambrose so carefully edited and so self-aware that 
he cannot be trusted. Ambrose’s theology, for McLynn, likewise cannot be trusted, only 
treated as rhetorical artifact to help reconstruct Ambrose’s public aplomb. In sum, 
McLynn’s Ambrose is too Roman to be theological. Smith’s Ambrose is different, pious 
and aiming for the flight of the immaterial soul. The Hellenistic writing is on the wall: 
Smith’s Ambrose baptizes Greek philosophical and theological sources for the crafting of 
his orthodox program of catechesis and askesis. In sum, Smith’s Ambrose is too much of 
a Greek to be Roman, at least Roman in the ways McLynn proposes.2 
I agree with McLynn that Ambrose was politically savvy, using his rhetorical 
tools to leverage social and political renown, but I have also argued that this savvy and 
rhetoric do not and should not trump Ambrose’s theological innovation. I agree with 
Smith that Ambrose used his facility with Greek sources, both theological and 
philosophical, for pious ends, but I have also made the case that Ambrose remained Latin 
and Roman at heart. Plato, Philo, and Origen might feature prominently, but so do 
Quintilian, Cicero, Tertullian, and Hilary, sources from the canon of Ambrose’s 
education.  
                                                
2 These competing portraits are unsurprising in view of Peter Brown’s depiction of Ambrose as a 
two-faced man. See Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo: A Biography (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2000), 69–78. Brown names Ambrose as a power-savvy “man of action” with a soft spot for the 
Song of Songs (at 73). It was this latter Ambrose—contemplative and “other-worldly,” with an abiding 
appreciation of Greek sources—who mentored a young Augustine. Such an emphasis on the immaterial, 
coming from someone with such immense political clout, was jarring for Augustine. For the most part, 
scholarship has traveled along the fault line Brown identifies to describe either Ambrose’s political 
leverage or his Hellenistic sampling.  
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This dissertation has thus cast Ambrose’s rhetorical tools and training in light of 
his theology and his theology in light of his rhetorical tools and training. What I have 
identified in both Ambrose’s education and theology is a common logic that visible 
works disclose invisible nature. In his teaching on Christian virtue, Ambrose transformed 
the ideals of the virtuous orator: outwardly a statesman and inwardly at rest. I have shown 
this dynamic to be similar to Ambrose’s trinitarian theology: that the Son’s opera 
manifest his divine status and indicate his shared invisible power with the Father. In 
short, I have argued that Ambrose judged his understanding of God the Trinity to be 
related to his understanding of virtue and the good by means of a visual logic, a logic he 
found in both his Latin Christian tradition and in his Roman rhetorical tradition.  
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